The State of Iraq — Part 5: The Psyche For War
How to Justify Policy
Continued from The State of Iraq — Part 4: Saddam
History usually makes sense in retrospect, and whilst we know the results of the War in Iraq now, we didn’t in 2003. Looking back at the timeline of the invasion is easy, but when evaluating history, it’s helpful to analyse the public mindset leading up to the war.
How do you know you are being conditioned for war?
Would you recognise it again?
The reasons that led to the war in Iraq are complex and multifaceted, and there is still much debate and disagreement about the motivations behind the conflict, but it boils down to the four below:
- Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs): The Bush administration claimed that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction and that they posed a threat to global security. This was the main justification used to launch the war.
- Regime change: Successive US administrations expressed a desire to remove Saddam Hussein from power and promote democracy in Iraq.
- Oil: Iraq has significant oil reserves.
- Global War on Terror: The war in Iraq was part of the broader “Global War on Terror” declared by the Bush administration after the 9/11 attacks. The conflict was seen as a way to disrupt and defeat extremist groups in the region.
There was an enormous public outcry against the invasion, and not everyone was gung ho. I think many people knew that oil was a large part of the discussion and that intelligence had been sexed up, but cynicism for the reasons aside, when the invasion began, the majority of people in the US and UK got what they wanted.
We must understand that most people wanted to go, most people thought they would find WMDs. Only twenty years later is the conversation about how clearly we were proveably misled.
“If we recapitulate all the WMD evidence; add his attempt to secure nuclear capability; and, as seems possible, add an al-Qaida link, it will be hugely persuasive over here. Plus, of course, the abhorrent nature of the regime.” — Blair’s letters to Bush, 2002
So how did a number of nations and millions of people end up supporting a conflict that was unnecessary? Could you recognise if it was happening again?
Out-grouping
It’s hard to picture the mindset of the early 2000s when Jack Bauer syndrome swept the western world and there was a general willingness to sacrifice freedoms in pursuit of the bad guys.
‘You’re wrong, I’m right, and I’ll do whatever it takes to prove that’
We were taught that torture was reasonable to protect us, we were taught it worked. The association of Arabs as terrorists was dangerously normalised and the US even started a ‘special registration programme’ for many Arabs, which was just kind of… acceptable.
In 2003, Islam was viewed by many in the West with suspicion and mistrust. The 9/11 attacks and other acts of terrorism carried out by Islamic extremists led to a perception that Islam was a violent and dangerous religion. This negative view of Islam was reinforced by the rhetoric of some political leaders and media outlets, which characterized the conflict in the Middle East as a struggle between the West and Islam — the Clash of Civilizations theory was touted a lot at this time.
‘You are with us, or you are with the terrorists.’
This famous quote from George W. Bush is the pithiest foreign policy I have seen in my lifetime. In the shadow of 9/11, the subsequent outpouring of banal nationalism dampened opposition to the invasion of Iraq both internally and externally. It shifted world polarity around what was essentially an American issue, and framed it as a ‘Global War’.
Many people in many countries wanted to be on the side of the only world superpower. The UK House of Parliament voted for the war 412–149; a reasonably clear indicator that it was what the country wanted. It wasn’t just the Anglo-American entente that was pro-war either; Poland, Spain, Denmark, Japan, South Korea, Italy and Ukraine all supported action. Even ‘anti-war’ countries supplied troops to the coalition of the willing. To not support the war in your own country was ‘unpatriotic’ and to not help America was illiberal — remember Freedom Fries?
This may cause some disagreement, but you can liken this post-9/11 pro-war mindset somewhat to that of the COVID-19 pandemic. We unified behind the government because we trusted them. The people in charge told us one thing, even if they bent the truth, and we mostly went along with it — we were the ingroup. Saddam, Islam, Iraq, Arabs and the people who didn’t support the war were the outgroup — and this was an important distinction to believe that war was appropriate and necessary.
Fear
In 2003, a mushroom cloud over London, Berlin or Paris was such a vivid and plausible image that haunted the minds of the electorate. After all, less than two years earlier 3,000 people were killed in Manhattan. Saddam’s Halabja mustard gas massacre of Kurds was only in 1988 and the 1995 Tokyo subway sarin attack kept us fearful we could be next.
Decades of Tom Clancy-esque movies had us convinced that a bad guy could carry a suitcase nuke into any city in the world. Tactical nukes, dirty bombs, anthrax, sarin, VX, mustard gas, nerve gas and chemicals… a whirlwind of vivid images and an indelible fear of invisible terrorism — all linked to Saddam. Yes we were searching for WMDs and chemical weapons, and no they hadn’t been found yet, but we couldn’t trust him.
“Saddam Hussein and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction” — Colin Powell, 5 Feb 2003
We can look back now and see how the intelligence community doubted links between Saddam and Al Qaeda, but they suggested the opposite pre-war (p323). And whilst yes, there were links between the two, they were not at the level the public was led to believe.
“I don’t think we ever said — at least I know I didn’t say that there was a direct connection between September the 11th and Saddam Hussein”— President Bush, 2006
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, Saddam, Iraq… the links were made, and they didn’t have to be overly convincing or survive the invasion.
Action-centric policies
Before the war in Iraq, the national psyche of the West was characterized by a mixture of anxiety and determination. At the same time, there was a sense of optimism and confidence in the power of technology and firepower to achieve success in military operations.
“What’s the point of having this superb military you’re always talking about if we can’t use it?” — Madeleine Albright, 1992
In the mid-late-90s, there was this kind of post-Cold War arrogance that could not be stopped, an unapologetic political fervour that got 👏 shit 👏 done 👏. Saddam 91', done; Somalia, solved, Northern Ireland peace process, deal; Bosnia, fixed; East Timor and Sierra Leone, both saved. Back-to-back interventionism from the Anglo-American machine, and Iraq was next.
Iraq was very loosely tied to Al Qaeda and Bin Laden, and although Saddam was nothing to do with 9/11, actions in Iraq felt like aimed retribution at the global terror network that was responsible. The Iraqi army and later the insurgent groups became the same enemy who flew the planes. In November 2004 coalition forces faced some of the most intense fighting since Vietnam with the Second Battle of Fallujah. The Saddam regime was long defeated, in fact, the man himself was in prison, but the fighting kept going — because action leads to victory; action feels like progress.
Political commentators and war hawks may tell you that we have to act, but over 70 years of ‘acting’ in others’ affairs has yielded mixed results — but I’ll admit standing still does not feel like success either. This ‘action over reaction’ psychological phenomenon is called Hawks vs Doves in foreign policy. Hawks favour coercive action and are more willing to use military force. On the other side are the doves, sceptical about the utility of force and more inclined to contemplate political solutions. Time and time again, the hawks win. War is action. War is proactive. War unifies the population. War proves power supremacy. War allows you to exert pressure on others, and in a neorealistic sense; war is natural.
So What?
Public support of the war faded quickly, but it’s hard to know if that’s because it dragged on into counter-insurgency nation building, or because we had a long think about it after the fact. For a few short years, we had been conditioned that the war was correct and right. The modern erosion of trust in government or the increasing polarisation of politics may mean it can never happen again — but it doesn’t mean we can’t look for the signs.
- ‘XXXX is terribly dangerous.’
- ‘XXXX is illiberal and the good people there must be liberated.’
- ‘XXXX’s control of resources hurt us economically.’
- ‘XXXX promotes evil to be done against us.’
Just like Iraq, both Libya and Syria were surrounded by this rhetoric.
Removal of Saddam is … “the right thing to do. He is a potential threat. His departure would free up the region. And his regime is … brutal and inhumane.” Tony Blair — Chilcont Inquiry
Saddam was evil incarnate— I don't think this is arrogant neo-liberalist morality — he had to be removed in order to secure Iraq for the Iraqi people, but policy and politics got in the way. Oil and energy security, Ba’athism, Iran and the War on Terror are all complex jigsaw pieces that only the policymakers can understand. One thing is evident and that is that the WMD-al-Qaeda-Saddam nexus was a lie, but to the politicians, perhaps a necessary one that gave the pretext to remove a genuine vile tyrant.
And although Saddam was a villain, he was also overly villainized in a way to coerce the psyche.
History usually makes sense in retrospect, but never forget that at the time everything made sense too. The psychology of out-grouping, fear-mongering and a human bias to action is partially responsible for allowing us to go to War in Iraq, and we will see it before the next war.
Continue the journey with The State of Iraq — Part 6: Shock and Awe
