Lex Luthor and the Problem of Evil: A Theodicy

In the movie, Batman V. Superman Lex Luthor put forward an explicit argument on the character of God,

“What we call God, depends upon our tribe…Because God is tribal, God takes sides. No man in the sky intervened when I was a boy to deliver me from daddy’s fist and abominations. I figured out way back, if God is all-powerful then He cannot be all-good, and if He is all-good, then He cannot be all-powerful.” Lex Luthor — Batman v. Superman

This type of argument against the existence of God is commonly referred to as the problem of evil. It is not a new problem; it actually has a rather lengthy history. Typically, Epicurus (341–270 B.C.) has been credited with formulating what has been referred to as the Epicurean Paradox, but it was Scottish Philosopher David Hume who popularized it. His version of the argument is stated in the following way,

“Is he [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then is he malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?”

The first question I would ask is, how did Lex Luthor know that his father’s actions against him were evil? Why does he come to that conclusion? Could it be that Lex Luther has an innate sense of what is right or wrong? That certain evils perpetrated are not arbitrary or subjective, but that objective morality does in fact exist? That certain acts of evil exist regardless of time, location, occasion, or circumstance?

If objective moral values exist, then God exists. If objective moral values do not exist, then God does not exist. Objective moral values do exist therefore, God does exist. If we are going to claim that objective morality does not exist, and that morality only exists subjectively then Hitler did nothing wrong, he was simply doing what he believed was right. Ergo, Luther’s father did nothing wrong in beating him as a child. But if we know that to perform an act of genocide on a group of people in an effort to obliterate them, or to beat and sexually abuse a child is abhorrently wrong, then we know that certain evils are objectively wrong and that therefore objective morality does exist.

God is perfect in existence in the absolute, as such, He can do nothing which is contrary to His own nature. God is light, and in him is no darkness at all (1 Jn. 1:5). While God is omnipotent, there are some things that He cannot do, He cannot sin, He cannot be tempted, He cannot deny (contradict) Himself, He cannot lie, for God cannot be tempted with evil, and he himself tempts no one (James 1:13b). He may test an individual, but He will not tempt anyone. Evil acts are the out workings of a sinful nature. Evil is extraneous, sin is constitutional, evil is an effect and sin is its efficient cause. This article will come in two parts, in the first part I will address the doctrine of sin, in the second part I will address the more philosophical problem of evil.

Part One: The Doctrine of Sin

The philosophical problem of evil is predicated on the theological doctrine of sin or hamartiology, derived from the Greek word, hamartia, meaning, “to miss the mark”. In theological circles it is referred to as the doctrine of “original sin”. Original sin is a term referring to the universal defect in human nature caused by the fall, entailing the loss of original righteousness and the distortion of the image of God (imago Dei) [i] in man.

1. Man in the Image of God

The world as it is, “red in tooth and claw”, is not the way God originally created it when He pronounced it “very good”. In the Genesis account of creation, the Hebrew adjective, ṭôḇ is translated as “good” six times. This Hebrew word has been translated a number of different ways, “good” is one way, but also as “appropriate” and “excellent”. He certainly would not create anything that was not excellent, or which was inappropriate, even if He could do it He would not do it as it would be contrary to His nature to do so.

In Genesis 1:31 the writer uses a double adjective to express the state of God’s completed creation, “very good”. All that God had made was not just “good” it was “very good”, me‘ôḏ meaning vehemently, exceedingly, or exceedingly great to a high degree. Everything that God had created was not only excellent (or ṭôḇ) it was exceedingly excellent (me‘ôḏ ṭôḇ) , or great, to a high degree. The creation of man would have been no less excellent.

Then God said, “Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. And let them have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the heavens and over the livestock and over all the earth and over every creeping thing that creeps on the earth.” (Gen. 1:26).

Differences of opinion respecting the likeness of man to God early appeared in Christian thought. With a common agreement that man himself was the image of God, there was still the cardinal question as to what really constituted man. Some could not dispense with the body as an essential part, and therefore assumed for it a likeness to God. This required the assumption of some form of corporeity in God; for it is not to be thought that a physical nature can bear the likeness of a purely spiritual being. [ii]

This idea that man’s “likeness” to God or having been “created in the image of God”, inferred some corporeal similitude with God never gained widespread acceptance. Rather, the predominant view was that being “created in the image of God” meant that he was like God in his spiritual nature, not in his physical make up. Contrary to some New Age thinkers who believe that we are God.

There seems to have been some rather divisive discussion over the years regarding the question of the words, “image” and “likeness” and their respective meaning. Whether their meaning is different, or if the two words serve jointly to express a singular notion. Some church fathers including Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen believed that these two words possessed distinctive meanings. Such a view is utterly discredited by the fact that this likeness of man to God was an original creation, not any subsequent attainment through either the free agency of man or the sovereignty of divine grace. A distinction of meanings in the two original terms is again discredited by the fact that in other places only one is used, sometimes one and sometimes the other, and in a manner to give to each the full meaning of both in the primary instance of their conjunct use. [iii]

The words “image” and “likeness” are derived from two Hebrew words, ṣelem; LXX εἰκών; Lat. imago) and “likeness” (Heb. d’mûth; LXX ὁμοίωσις; Lat. similitudo).[iv] Selem or image is utilized seventeen times in the Old Testament, four of those occurrences are found in Genesis. The four times the word is used in Genesis occurs as part of the phrase, “image of God”. Of the thirteen times the word is used outside the book of Genesis, six are in reference to idols, three refer to the “physical representation” of tumors and rats, two are in reference to something transitory, one is in reference to a painting, and the last is in reference to Seth being in the image of Adam. The Hebrew for image (selem) comes from a root word meaning “to cut” or “hew”, so typically the reference is in the physical sense, though selem can refer to things which are intangible which is not unreasonable as the definition implies such things as man’s ability to contemplate the meaning of life and his own mortality. The ability to conduct himself rationally, or irrationally. To conduct himself morally or to contemplate the consequences of his immorality, the ability to reason or act volitionally and so on.

The “likeness” of man to God was constituted in the fact that God is a spirit (Jn. 4:24), while physical in makeup man is also a spiritual being and is therefore relatable to God on that level. Furthermore, man is moral in nature, possessing a sense of duty and obligation, right and wrong, as previously noted, which tends toward the moral argument for God’s existence. There is within man’s being created in the image of God, the sense of implicit holiness as born out in the life of the regenerate, a recreation of fallen man back to the image of God once again, whose image though defaced by sin was not erased by it. Jonathan Edwards has stated that,

“Adam was brought into existence capable of acting immediately, as a moral agent, and therefore he was immediately under a rule of right action; he was obliged as soon as he existed to act right. And if he was obliged to act right as soon as he existed, he was obliged even then to be inclined to act right.… And as he was obliged to act right from the first moment of his existence, and did do so till he sinned in the affair of the forbidden fruit, he must have had an inclination or disposition of heart to do right the first moment of his existence; and that is the same as to be created or brought into existence, with an inclination, or, which is the same thing, a virtuous and holy disposition of heart.” [v]

Theologian John Miley appears to contest Edwards’ view that Adam was “obliged” to “act right” when no act of duty was yet pending on his person. Perhaps, but Adam was created in the image of God, implicit within that creation was a holy disposition on the part of Adam who, therefore, would at least have been “inclined to act right” though not, as yet, having the occasion to do so. Though doubtful of Edwards view Miley recognizes that, “There may be holiness of the moral nature previous to free moral action…Whatever it might become by good conduct, such it might be constituted in its original creation”. [vi] Furthermore, Miley recognized that a moral nature must have moral tendencies. [vii]

2. The Origin of Sin

Biblical history is divided by dispensations, the “dispensation of innocence” is the time frame of the creation of man which extends to the time of the fall of the same (Genesis 1–3). Biblical history may also be divided by covenants; this same time frame, under covenant theology, has been referred to as “the covenant of works”, though some have argued that there is no explicit evidence from the text that any such covenant existed as the Hebrew word for covenant, ḇerîyṯ (ber-eeth’), can be located nowhere in the text of the creation account. That being said, many will concede, at least, a probationary period is very possible, but not necessarily as a covenant per se.

There is no injustice here on the part of God in implementing a period of testing, human depravity is a consequence of man’s sin. What would constitute an injustice would be if God had instituted a probationary period for man without man’s having the ability to perform it in the way he ought to as a moral duty. As Geisler has noted, “there can be no response-ability without the ability to respond.” [viii]

If God had so desired that man should be obedient, happy, and to conduct himself after a holy manner, then He must have endowed him with such power and ability so as to perform it. Therefore, they must have possessed the power of obedience as a divine endowment. There can be no testing of fidelity under a law of duty where there is not the power of obedience. [ix]

Theologian Henry Orton Wiley held that this probation period was necessary and that as such God permitted their temptation. While I agree with the former, I would contest the latter. What God was willing to permit was a period of testing which, as a result, could lead to one’s being tempted. But being tempted is not the problem submitting to it is, which was a possibility given that they were created as free creatures. Nevertheless, they still possessed within themselves “the power of obedience”. Likewise, Miley contended that God permitted “the Adamic fall”. This, as in the former is, I believe, contestable on the same grounds as I have made regarding Wiley’s position. God was not permitting their temptation or the fall of the race, as Miley has indicated, obedience to His instruction was preferable. What God did permit was their testing; probation is a temporal, testing economy. There is a law of duty, with the sanction of rewards. The essential fact of probation under a testing law of duty is moral responsibility. [x]

God is free, being free He is able to choose whether to create or not to create. As He has chosen to create, He must therefore create that which is perfect, He must create the “best possible world”, it would be contrary to His nature to do otherwise. A perfect being, such as He is, must create that which is perfect, therefore Adam and Eve were created as perfect. How can a perfect Adam or a perfect Eve be capable of committing an act of sin? As God is free, a perfect world must include in it creatures which are themselves free. Possessing free-will and the ability to choose means, however, the ability to choose otherwise, or to choose contrary to God’s will. We are moral creatures possessing free-will and a sense of duty, as such a period of testing is necessary. A being personally constituted and endowed with free moral agency must be under law to God, and responsible for his conduct. [xi]

The nature of free-will could either be deterministic, in-deterministic, or self-deterministic. Determinism can come in two forms, soft or hard determinism. Soft determinism holds that human free-will is under God’s control. In hard determinism there is no free-will. Indeterminism takes the neutral position that human acts are not caused by anything. Self-determinism holds that free-will acts are self-caused. As for determinism, God did not cause Adam to sin, for, again, God can neither sin nor tempt anyone else to do so. Neither did Satan cause Adam to sin, for the tempter did only what his name implies, neither forcing him to do it nor doing it for him. As for indeterminism, there was not evil (or lack of wholeness) in Adam’s nature that gave rise to his sin, for he had none — God created him perfect. And there are no uncaused actions; this would violate the principle of causality. [xii] Geisler has stated that,

“Adam… must have caused it himself; Adam’s choice was self-determined. This is the heart of human freedom; namely, the ability to be the efficient cause of one’s own moral actions. Acts of which one is not the efficient cause, but rather which are forced, are not free moral acts.” [xiii]

When Adam partakes of the fruit in Genesis 3, the most severe charge brought against God is not that he caused Adam to sin, but that in making Adam significantly free God brought about the possibility that Adam might misappropriate his freedom and choose a course of action that is morally wrong. God is not responsible for Adam’s choices given that Adam was endowed in creation with self-determining free will. [xiv]

The object of their testing lay in the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and God’s express instruction not to eat of it, therefore a choice for creatures of free-will, either to obey the word of God or to follow the lie of the serpent existed. Obedience would have resulted in reward, by extension disobedience would have resulted in punishment. In terms of the punitive punishments of sin, physical, spiritual, and possible eternal death ensued. In addition, human depravity is the result of a deprivation. When man sinned, he lost the moral image of God in which he had been created. This meant that the Holy Ghost withdrew from his being, and man lost his state of primitive holiness. The result of this deprivation or loss was that the tide of sin flowed in upon man, overflowing his whole nature. The controlling, enabling, sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit being lost, man became estranged from God, enslaved to irregular impulses and evil passions. [xv]

Man’s whole nature was affected as a result of sin. Having the freedom to choose is a good thing, however, it is possible that such freedom could be misused. God is responsible for the creation of free-will creatures such as we are. Man is responsible for the misuse of that freedom. “For from within, out of the heart of man, come evil thoughts, sexual immorality, theft, murder, adultery, coveting, wickedness, deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride, foolishness”. (Mark 7:21–22).

The total depravity of our human nature has resulted from Adam’s acting as federal head of the entire race. Such depravity was imputed, though the race did not exist at the time of Adam’s transgressing, yet existing in him potentially, we all receive the curse and stand guilty. Such total depravity intimates inability to achieve by our own striving any form of absolution from such guilt. Our depravity, reprehensible as it is, does not indicate an inability to receive from God that which He graciously offers, forgiveness.

So, what does all this have to do with Alexander (Lex) Luthor? We are not sinners because we sin, we sin because we are sinners. To claim the former would indicate that all are innocent up to and until a transgression is actualized, but this runs contrary to scripture. Scripture actually purports the latter, that we sin because we are sinners by nature. The reason Luthor, his father, and we ourselves, do what we do merely shows that we are sinners already. God cannot be implicated; we act in accordance with our own free-will to do right or not. We commit acts of sin by commission, doing what we know we ought not do, and sins of omission, not doing those things we know we should do. The apostle Paul not only recognized the problem in himself, but also its solution. Romans 7:15–25.

This article has been built around two premises, (1) that God is wholly perfect in existence and existing as a perfect being with total freedom it is impossible that He should create anything imperfect. That man being created in the image and likeness of God was perfect in existence possessing a holy disposition, and was created as a free moral agent, with the ability and freedom to choose. (2) That Adam acting as federal head of the race did of his own volition enact his own will contrary to the will of God bringing sin into the world and death as its consequent. Thus, leading to the conclusion that God cannot be held to account for sin’s origin and the suffering that has resulted from it.

[i] Hay, A. (2016). Original Sin. In J. D. Barry, D. Bomar, D. R. Brown, R. Klippenstein, D. Mangum, C. Sinclair Wolcott, … W. Widder (Eds.), The Lexham Bible Dictionary. Bellingham, WA: Lexham Press.

[ii] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 406). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[iii] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (pp. 406–407). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[iv] Ryle, H. E. (1921). The Book of Genesis in the Revised Version with Introduction and Notes (p. 20). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[v] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 411). Quoting Edwards: Works, vol. ii, p. 385. New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[vi] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 412). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[vii] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 434). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[viii] Geisler, Norman. (2004). Systematic Theology: Vol. 3 (p. 86). Bloomington, MI: Bethany House Publishers.

[ix] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (pp. 433–434). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[x] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 437). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[xi] Miley, J. (1892). Systematic Theology, Volume 1 (p. 437). New York: Hunt & Eaton.

[xii] Geisler, Norman. Systematic Theology: Vol. 3 (Bloomington, MI: Bethany House Publishers, 2004), p. 86.

[xiii] (Ibid)

[xiv] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs (B&h Studies in Christian Apologetics) (p. 9). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition

[xv] Wiley, H. Orton. (1946). Introduction to Christian Theology, (p. 177). Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press.