Deep Dive: Carlo Ancelotti’s Real Madrid
The rich history of Real Madrid can’t be written without the legendary Carlo Ancelotti. The Italian coach, who had been at the helm of some of Europe’s biggest powerhouses, joined Los Blancos back in 2013 intending to lead the club to their famed quest of La Decima. Having achieved this historic feat spectacularly and simultaneously ending the Spanish outfit’s 12-year Champions League barren run in 2014, things began to take a turn for the worse. Performance levels dwindling in tandem with Barcelona flourishing at the top with MSN gave Florentino Perez no choice but to sack Ancelotti in favour of his then-assistant manager Zinedine Zidane.
The decision paid dividends for Madrid as Zidane led the club to the first-ever Champions League three-peat, meanwhile, Ancelotti went on to have subpar stints at Bayern Munich, Napoli, and Everton. However, he eventually found his way back to the capital of Spain in the summer of 2021 after Madrid were unable to find a successor to Zidane. With the rise of positional play and Don Carlo’s lack of success post-Madrid, it looked like Los Merengues were taking a step backwards. Yet Ancelotti’s self-proclaimed lack of philosophy transformed a team in transition into trophy-winning machines, grabbing six in two seasons including another Champions League as well as a league title to boot. So how has a manager whose time was seemingly up managed to turn the tables on the footballing world? This article will be a deep dive into Ancelotti’s team’s play on and off the ball from his latest two full seasons at Real Madrid.
Squad Profile
Before beginning to look at some of Ancelotti’s tactics, it’s important to provide a quick background on the players that were at his disposal, since they are undoubtedly the most important cog in Real Madrid’s machine. This dashboard below will showcase a list of players who played for Real Madrid in the last two years with a look at their statistical impact per season as well as some notes on their play style. (Unfortunately Tableau doesn’t embed so click the link below the picture to have a look).
In Possession
Ancelotti’s lack of philosophy, a sentiment that is only true related to his team’s play in possession, makes it difficult to analyse their work on the ball. Fortunately, there are noticeable patterns they utilised in the both build-up and final third phases.
To start with, Madrid had a clear structure from goal-kick scenarios.
The shape Madrid most often used here was akin to a 4–3–3, which is their formation on paper. This set-up produced mixed outcomes with there being a heavy reliance on players making decisions regarding movement and positioning, a clear theme in their play in possession.
In addition to that, the opposition’s press also had a significant effect. If teams used a man-to-man approach, Thibaut Courtois didn’t risk playing from the back and went long to the striker. That’s a low percentage play with regards to ball retention but the nature of the press meant that the opposition are leaving Benzema with only one centre-back marking him. Therefore, Madrid should have had a competent chance of winning the first or second ball. Yet the tandem of a strong defender and Courtois’ inconsistent accuracy, led to turnovers and hence, immediate pressure from the opposition attack. Luckily, the squad settled into their deep block quickly and were comfortable in a position like this.
In terms of moments of success in these situations, there were certainly some instances that Madrid worked their way out from the back. On occasion, they could find the free man when the opposition didn’t have man-to-man approach, whether that is by going directly to the free man or by relying on the ball retention quality in defence and midfield.
A benefit of not relying on patterns or automatisms is that movement is encouraged. One of the main ways they unlocked their build-up and caused confusion within the opposition’s structure was with natural movements across the horizontal plane and third-man runs by the likes of Luka Modrić, Marco Asensio and Rodrygo.
When Ancelotti took over from Zidane in 2021, he kept a wrinkle that the Frenchman had developed in the deep build-up phase. Casemiro acted as a ‘fake 6’ as he was pushed higher up the pitch to support Karim Benzema. Then, either a full-back like Dani Carvajal/Fede Valverde or a midfielder like Modrić/Toni Kroos would pick the ball up in the middle in a single pivot.
However, with Casemiro departing ahead of the 22–23 season, Don Carlo had to tweak the structure of the build-up. The formation didn’t change per se, more so the rotations and the players occupying the space did. Madrid had a direct replacement for the Brazil international in Aurélien Tchouaméni, but his skill set fits nicely as a single pivot at the base of the 4–3–3. With Kroos getting older, Madrid had the option of bringing Valverde into the midfield three as the development of Rodrygo meant he could consistently start on the right wing. However, the latter functioned better centrally so Ancelotti had Modrić dropping deeper to support Tchouaméni, whilst Rodrgyo stepped into the attacking midfielder position with Valverde occupying the right-wing spot. This still was a 4–3–3 but looked more like a 4–2–1–3 but once again, it suited the talents of every player, something Ancelotti does incredibly well.
Once Madrid have built out from the back into the middle third, they, once again, don’t tend to have a structure but did have a couple of normal patterns and movements that were trained. An example of this, was when they brought Ferland Mendy into the front four but in between Vinícius Jr. and Benzema, whilst Kroos dropped to the deep left space to cover the vacated space. This is done to accentuate Kroos’ strengths as he likes to play deep and pass to the right side with his body open. Mendy also has a good instinct going forward but he lacks some technical skill to combine with Vinícius and Benzema at a high level. Madrid also have David Alaba, a left-back by trade, playing at centre-back to help cover the left side.
This usually created a 3–3–4 structure, which Madrid predominantly used in their build-up phase but they could often switch between this, 2–3–5 or even a 2–4–4 at times.
They also like to do a lot of circular rotations on both wings, reminiscent of the 2014 NBA champions San Antonio Spurs. This may or may not be trained but it is a common move for Madrid players to pass and rotate into the position the pass is played into. It’s a rotation that starts with the ball-sided midfielder, full-back and winger. The beginning of the video below showcases the rotation creating confusion between the opposition and how it opens up space between the lines while the rest highlights what it leads to.
An issue with Madrid’s style of play is that their spacing was awkward at times. This is a natural trade-off in their ‘relational’ play style in comparison to the popular positional framework, which is predominantly about maximising space occupation. They had massive distances between its midfield and frontline and this was problematic against deep blocks. In theory, it is beneficial at times to have a gap there as it allows their players to come into that space at the last possible moment if it allows the attacking team to create wide overloads. Yet, there were too many players occupying the central area rather than looking to get players out wide, most likely due to most of their players having a preference to play in the centre of the pitch. A by-product of this is that the team regularly finds itself without having enough players in the box to attack potential crosses, often leaving Benzema and Vinícius as the only potential recipients.
With that being said, Madrid were fantastic at wing play so their chance creation was still excellent. As mentioned earlier, their circular movements are key, even in the final third. To make this work though, their decision-making and effectiveness at counter movements had to be superb, which it was.
There were multiple reasons for this. First, they had a good intuition for timing their switches when their side was outnumbered by the opposition defence and their far-side winger was isolated. This left players such as Vinícius and Rodrygo alone against full-backs, which was a very favourable matchup. Also, they were good at stretching the play out wide with players running in behind and a player offering short at the same time. Benzema was vital in their fantastic wing play because of his versatility. He can hold the ball up or pin the centre-backs to allow others to create. These consistent counter-movements that Madrid players make speak to their game intelligence and chemistry as well as a clear idea on behalf of Ancelotti.
The only negative for Madrid was that their full-backs lacked high-level talent anymore. Marcelo and Carvajal were way past their prime despite the latter still featuring often and Mendy hasn’t replicated the performance levels he showed at Lyon. However, Ancelotti did a good job of maximising their ability by having them make underlapping runs to create cut-back situations in the box.
An advantage that Los Blancos seem to have over every club, is the plethora of players with fantastic ball striking. Many elite teams will at best have 2–3 players who can strike the ball from range, but Madrid have a squad full of players capable of great long-distance shooting. This could be a double-edged sword though as the team often elected to take low xG shots rather than work the ball into the box. However, their proficiency in these shots can create moments of magic and should be looked at favourably as momentum-busting moments. Akin to Steph Curry’s greatness behind the arc, the mere threat of taking a shot from range petrifies opponents and Madrid had plenty of opportunities to find gaps behind the defence when teams sold out to long shots.
An important chance creation method for Madrid is their attacking transitions as shown by the radar chart in the visualisation below.
Real were quick to move the ball forward after winning the ball. This tended to be via a quick short pass forward and then dribbling with the ball whilst the attackers sprinted into space in behind the defence. With willing runners with and without the ball, Los Blancos were extremely dangerous and caused problems for the best in the world on counterattacks.
Out of Possession
Madrid are the antithesis of modern-day teams in that they are most comfortable in the mid to deep block in comparison to pressing high up the pitch. It helps that the players’ profiles were more suited to that style. The mid/deep block in 2022/23 resembled a 4–5–1 whilst in the season prior, Ancelotti started the season with a 4–4–2 that could morph into a 4–3–3. In both formations, the defensive midfielder acted as a sweeper between the lines to create a 4–1–4–1 or 4–1–3–2.
Despite the change of shape, the traits of the block remained the same. The main one was the players being aggressive when the ball came near their zone i.e., wingers attacking the full-back when the ball is out wide; central midfielders stepping up to close opposition midfielders and centre-backs stepping up to challenge attackers who receive the ball between the lines.
For the most part, the team did a great job of staying compressed but were caught out when teams found clever solutions to use their aggressiveness against them. Here, against PSG, they pressed their respective matchups forcing Casemiro to push up, which left a noticeable gap between the lines for Paris to progress the ball. Moments like this or players making poor choices were usually the downfall of Madrid’s block, a testament to their solidity in defence.
Madrid also established a concept wherein their back line had two centre-backs tightly marking a striker while their full-backs were wide, defending the wingers. This left a substantial gap in each half-space, and it is a little unclear as to the advantages it creates. In certain situations where the striker’s talent outmatched the centre-backs, like Erling Haaland, it was worth the gamble to keep the frontman quiet. Without this reason, it left the full-backs on an island against the opposition winger. Or it allowed for deep third-man runs from midfield into the half-space by the opposition if the communication and organisation in the back line was poor.
To stop access into the half-space, Madrid central midfielders must do a good job covering the half-space by following runs into the channel. This strategy was most notably seen in their loss to Manchester City in the Champions League semi-final where Kroos and Valverde tracked City’s #8’s superbly causing their attacks to crumble.
This strategy also relied on Madrid being able to press efficiently high up the pitch in a man-to-man style, given their numerical disadvantage in the last line. This is quite baffling given the team’s obvious limitations in this department; however, I believe Ancelotti used this set-up against good teams to not invite constant pressure. While the set-up can be exploited, it might be a better trade-off than constantly sitting in a deep block against teams who have phenomenal forward players who have been coached to be able to beat that style of play consistently.
The issue with pressing from the front in a man-to-man style whilst the last line stays connected to the opposition forwards is that there is space left in the middle of the pitch.
These gambles Ancelotti makes only pay dividends if the players showcase enough effort to make up for the space they concede. This is no clearer than in defensive transition scenarios. A hallmark of great teams is that they control the opposition by showing them into positions where you, as a team, don’t want the ball to be in. Pep Guardiola has done a phenomenal job in building a possession structure that allows his players to be in optimal position to track back. The Manchester City coach has often used a 2–3 structure to help his team push the opposition wide, delay the attack and prevent cutbacks. It was clear to see where Madrid drew inspiration from as they employed the same structure. Combining this with high-motor players willing to make lung-bursting runs back to defence meant Real were usually in control when defending counterattacks.
When executed right, their transition-defending strategy is textbook. First, the closest Madrid player must apply pressure on the ball immediately after Madrid turn it over, whilst the others fall back into the 2–3 shape, aware of the ball, opposition, and space. If the opposition player bypasses the first line of pressure, a player from the structure has to apply pressure on the ball carrier and make sure to be in the passing lanes. Finally, they need to either win the ball back cleanly or force a mistake/turnover.
Overall, this process has yielded some good results, especially in the first season. When Madrid conceded high-quality chances, it was often from individual mistakes like poor pass selection. However, it is important to note that mistakes such as this can come from inadequate spacing in possession. Ancelotti’s style meant there were situations where players had to play ambitious passes across the midfield as players weren’t in proximity. This not only led to turnovers but also meant that there wasn’t a Madrid player in sight to apply pressure on the ball carrier when the turnover was committed, allowing distance to be gained closer to the goal.
Where they liked to apply pressure was in goal-kick situations. For both seasons, Ancelotti opted to go with a man-to-man approach up front with their aggressiveness based on their opposition. Meanwhile, his team had to have a +1 advantage in defence meaning that the midfield and attack are going to be outnumbered, usually by two when including the goalkeeper in the equation. Their usual structure looked like this:
They switched to a man-to-man approach across the pitch when their original structure was played through too easily, isolating the goalkeeper in the hopes that he would go long allowing the centre-backs to win the duel.
One of the better ways to play through their initial structure was to be aggressive with the alignment of the forwards, which was easier to do when playing with a back three. Inter Milan did this to great effect as they had four players on the last line against Madrid, by pushing their wingbacks high. With Ancelotti’s +1 rule, it forced his team into a back five. This creates space for players to drop into space, which Martinez did in the example below.
This strategy worked even better in their first match-up when Madrid weren’t as aggressive in their press from the front.
What this example showcases is an important issue and a key reason as to why Ancelotti’s team weren’t a high-pressing one. Inter were allowed to build up easily because Benzema didn’t recognise that he had to apply pressure on the ball carrier. While the striker had moments of energetic pressing, his timing was often a detriment to the team. He led the pressure from the front, but the rest of the team were often caught out due to his occasional lack of commitment. Like Benzema and Vinícius, Rodrygo can be too eager to press in poor situations. As mentioned before, this forces their teammates to cover for them and leaves space for the opposition to manipulate.
Whilst the team’s traits don’t align perfectly to be an exception high pressing teams, they have more than enough talent to be great. Ancelotti’s attempt to have a defence capable of combining high-pressing and deep-block principles has meant they haven’t perfected either idea, with his team excelling more in the latter. As an example, Benzema leading the press from the front usually occurs when a backwards pass is played, a common pressing trigger. Yet, the squad weren’t always on the same page as the Ballon d’Or winner and tended to pick up the wrong players, highlighting a clear area for improvement coaching-wise.
Set Pieces
This analysis is based on Madrid’s play on and off the ball but set pieces are an underutilised and undervalued part of the game. Therefore, here is a mini section on Madrid’s effectiveness on corners in the form of a dashboard since I don’t deem myself qualified enough to analyse their corner routines on both ends.
What Makes Real Madrid Successful in the Champions League?
Perhaps the biggest question asked by the everyday football fan regarding Los Blancos is this. Unfortunately, the answer to this is not Ancelotti just raising an eyebrow to solve every problem. Instead, several key elements stood out that helped their chances in these competitions. The list is as such with a brief explanation below each point:
Extremely talented players, that can change momentum:
Yes, the first part of this statement is boring and basic but it’s undoubtedly the most important part of their success. There is not a team that has won the Champions League that doesn’t feature some of the world’s best in each position. To have a squad, let alone a starting XI, of elite players, is much tougher than it looks with certain clubs still spending a few hundred million at a time to not even get close to that level ahem Manchester United. Credit must go to Florentino Perez who has adopted a transfer philosophy of hoarding the most gifted youngsters that are malleable and ready to have an impact quickly, to complement their ageing superstars.
While talent goes a long way though, momentum changers take you over the top. Many players in the squad, even defenders, contain at least one but usually multiple characteristics that include characteristics such as overperforming xG, counter-attacking threat and ball-striking. That’s purely from an attacking point of view as Courtois could even shift momentum purely from his shot-stopping. To understand the importance of momentum, see Rodrygo’s two goals against Manchester City in the Champions League.
It’s better to be lucky than to be good:
To see this importance, also see Rodrygo’s two goals. Madrid were thoroughly outplayed in that tie against the Citizens yet the Brazilian was able to score twice at the death to send Real through. In a world where we’d like to have an answer for every outcome, it can be difficult to accept why something can happen without an explanation. One thing to note though is that while Madrid have been fortunate in this competition this decade, Ancelotti hasn’t been. During his time with Munich, he lost to Madrid and PSG, perhaps giving credence to José Mourinho’s football heritage idea but really, who knows.
Squad Depth
Having a deep squad with different types of profiles allows for tactical flexibility, which helps a ton in cup competitions. Moreover, high quality can come off the bench to change the game as touched on earlier and teams can continue to field strong teams despite potential injuries. An example would be City having to match up Fernandinho against Vinícius in their loss due to the absence of Kyle Walker.
Comfortability in deep blocks:
The main reason why this is important is that you can control the game state and momentum. While sitting back will inevitably invite a lot of pressure, if you execute a deep block well, the opposition won’t be able to affect the game despite having a ton of possession. It can curb momentum by stopping the opposition from building on their upward trajectory by limiting chances from being created and absorbing pressure within a prolonged period, usually 10–15 minutes.
TL;DR
For those who want a snapshot of the analysis above:
- Madrid had mixed results when playing out of goal-kick situations;
- They’re not fixated on patterns of play, rather concentrating on player-focused movements to create space and/or progression;
- Chance creation is great despite poor spacing in the final third, but the spacing did bring up issues with breaking deep blocks;
- They were pretty good in transition on both ends but were naturally better going forward;
- The team were comfortable in deep blocks, not so much in pressing, which is a big area for improvement;
- Space between the lines was exploitable due to subpar pressing and having a deep defensive line;
- Ancelotti found good solutions regarding player deployment and roles but needs to work on tactical foundations;
- Their success in the Champions League is down to a few key traits: excellent players capable of changing momentum, luck, squad depth and deep block familiarity
Conclusion
Ancelotti has proved that it is possible to be successful despite challenging the managerial status quo in terms of age, changing eras and tactical philosophy. The iconic manager does have some flaws that might hold Real Madrid back at times, but his famous man-management style still gives him a great chance to coach at an elite level.
Whilst I believe his time at Madrid is closer to coming to an end rather than being a beginning, rumours suggesting a move to the Brazilian national team would help accentuate his strengths as a manager and be a fantastic next step. Meanwhile, Los Blancos will continue their success with or without the Italian given their new strategy of stockpiling all the ‘wonderkid Galácticos’ such as Jude Bellingham and Arda Güler to add to their already supremely talented squad.
