Inherent Responsibilities of Detainee Collection Points
Military Police companies and platoons supporting a brigade combat team (BCT) in the execution of decisive action training exercises (DATE) at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) are failing to effectively conduct detention operations. Military Police Observers, Coaches, and Trainers (OCTs) observed and recorded tactical trends over a period of two years and twenty brigade training rotations. Rotational observations included 15 separate Military Police units and highlighted a common trend of limited detention operations, focused solely on the establishment of a Detainee Collection Point (DCP). Military Police leaders must execute comprehensive Detention Operations by implementing the principles of capture, detain, and screen in order to achieve effective detention support to decisive action.
Expanding Military Police detention support to a BCT’s operations within a DATE begins within the Troop Leading Procedures (TLP), by planning, resourcing, coordinating, and rehearsing operations across the three detention principles. Military Police leaders (The MP Company Command Team, The MP Platoon Leadership, and The BCT Provost Marshal) must inject subject matter expertise within the supported brigade’s operational planning and Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Detention planning must consider techniques and tactics from point of capture at the forward line of troops (FLOT), working backwards to the brigade rear area for detention, and include processes for screening detained persons with the robust assets available to a BCT. Critical to a robust detention plan is the synchronization with adjacent units at key coordination points.
The first key coordination point during execution begins, as FM 3–39 Military Police Operations states, “…with collecting detainees from combat units as far forward as possible[1].” Initial capturing and processing of detainees forward, near the FLOT, provides two critical advantages. The first, is the preservation of combat power, where the need for combat power is the greatest. When Military Police do not begin the capturing process at or near the point of capture, combat units must then allocate resources, personnel, and equipment to transport detainees to the rear — pulling combat power away from the FLOT. MP inaction reduces combat power and is in stark contrast with the regimentally directed guidance for Military Police Support to Decisive Action[2], which describes the honing of MP Disciplines to enable combat power. The second advantage created is the application of subject matter expertise at the initiation of contact with detainees. This expertise forward reduces administrative errors during processing, establishes chain of custody/accountability, and ensures the humane treatment of detainees while applying the minimum force required. These detention principles[3] and applied expertise are force multipliers serving to not only protect combat units, but also enables the legal screening and exploitation of detainees’ critical intelligence. The Military Police Leader’s Handbook emphasizes the need for MP Soldiers at the point of capture, as the manual states, “Military Police are uniquely suited to preform detainee operations because of the skills that are developed through training, education, and experiential learning during [Law Enforcement] missions…” MP Soldiers are better trained, can execute with minimal force requirements, and are doctrinally empowered to begin detention operations at or near the FLOT.
The requirement to move from a brigade rear area, commonly referred to as the “Lodgment” during DATEs at JRTC, creates second order opportunities for MP to expand operational influence within a brigade’s area of operations (AO). Movement from the lodgment to the FLOT requires MP units to achieve shared understanding of the battlefield, maintain current knowledge of routes and adjacent unit operations (i.e. engagement area development, in placed obstacles, major unit movements, etc), and the ability to move independently, without combined arms assistance, around the AO. This second order effect requires MP units to rely on the simultaneous execution of multiple MP Disciplines. This is not a foreign concept, as the Military Police Operations manual says, “Military Police disciplines are interdependent areas of expertise within the Military Police Corps Regiment[4].” MP OCTs do not observe the deliberate interdependent execution of disciplines while training at JRTC. Instead, the trend observed is a deliberate independent execution, with units switching between discipline focuses. The application of Security and Mobility Support technical capabilities and tactical tasks in support of detention operations introduces a wide set of opportunities for MP units to exercise initiative within a brigade AO and exercise mission command systems.
The second key coordination point occurs in the rear, or within the lodgment, at the designated and established Detainee Collection Point (DCP). The DCP serves as the focal point for critical detainee processing and screening tasks. The intersection of Judge Advocate General, Human Intelligence Collection Teams, Brigade and Battalion S2s, and Military Police rests at this location. MP enforce the standards of processing at this intersection, with the unique obligation to not only ensure compliance for processing detainees, but also the enforcement of compliance on adjacent friendly forces present. TC 3–39.30 arms MP leaders with the “Point of Capture Processing Standards (5 Ss and T technique)[5], which directs the searching, silencing, segregation, speeding (to the rear), safeguarding, and tagging of detainees.
Military Police observed at JRTC predominantly focus on the processing standards associated with detainees and rarely leverage the capabilities of adjacent units to collect critical intelligence and exploit captured evidence. This observed trend is a direct result of two factors. The first is a steadfast resolve to rapidly process detainees while protecting them from danger or harm. The second factor is a lack of understanding of available assets to effectively collect critical intelligence and preserve crucial evidence. Deliberate planning during the TLPs and the MDMP will enable robust shared understanding of friendly organizations available at the complex intersection of the DCP. Combining this knowledge with the theater requirements for detainee processing will enable MP units to effectively maximize adjacent unit capabilities within the allotted time and standards.
Initial detention is frequently observed at JRTC as a positive trend. The typical method for initial detention is the establishment of concertina wire based DCPs. This minimal application of class IV resources is ideal within the operational environment replicated at JRTC during DATEs. While MP OCTs report the establishment of DCPs as a positive trend, they also note that this is a reflection of the observed independent detention discipline focus. MP center on the directed task to establish a DCP, constructing the simple facility independent of adjacent units and without consideration of implied tasks. MP achieve success in limited execution of a single collective task, yet they fail to achieve the desired effects of detention operations.
The inherent responsibilities within detention operations demands that Military Police units expand their scope of operations to exceed the basic construction of a DCP. The way ahead for Military Police units conducting decisive action training requires comprehensive preparation. MP leaders begin preparations through collaborative and detailed planning with their supported unit. Leaders must then further operational expansion with action and initiate detention operations as far forward as possible; enabling combat power at the FLOT. In order to add stability to internal detention operations across the battle space, MP companies and platoons must simultaneously execute mutually supporting disciplines and enhance their Soldiers’ ability to accomplish the three principles of detention. Finally, the leveraging of available assets for screening and exploiting intelligence gathered from detainees will provide the supported brigade with an amplified understanding of the enemy threat and comprehensive detainee support. The summations of seizing opportunities presented within the identified inherent responsibilities are increased Military Police influence within decisive action and subsequent opportunities to enable combat power.
[1] FM 3–39 Military Police Operations (August 2013), Chapter 3, Para. 48.
[2] FM 3–39 Military Police Operations (August 2013), Chapter 1, Figure 1–1
[3] TC 3–39.30 Military Police Leader’s Handbook (August 2015), Chapter 5, para 2.
[4] FM 3–39 Military Police Operations (August 2013), Chapter 1, para. 3
[5] TC 3–39.30 Military Police Leader’s Handbook (August 2015), Chapter 5, Table 5–1
