It was a cool fall morning in the heart of the nation’s capital. It had only been forty-five days since the towers at One World Trade Center fell in the deadliest attack on American soil since Pearl Harbor. The date was November 27th, 2001, and then Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, was writing a haunting note for the briefing of CENTCOM (the military’s central command organization). The note is three pages long and bulleted. The style is informal. A mix of typewritten and handwritten text covers the pages. Stars, lines, and notes denote subsequent changes and alterations.
Upon first glance the note looks just like any other note composed by a busy bureaucrat before a meeting, until one looks deeper. The note details extensive preparations for the Second Gulf War in Iraq. Judging by the tone of the memo, it is clear that the Iraq war is going to happen. In perhaps the most stunning section of the document, Rumsfeld states: “how start” in regards to the war in Iraq. “How Start” is a bullet point with three subsections, involving three possible scenarios, none of which had actually happened. The note implies that there is no imminent threat to the United States, only a degree of of risk. A year and four months before the Iraq War, Rumsfeld and the Bush administration had already decided to invade Iraq.
I argue that this memo is evidence that the war in Iraq was not declared in response to some real danger, but instead responded to the future possibility of danger. Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration viewed war as a tool to manage risk, rather than a response to imminent threat. The mainstream view of the Iraq war at its onset was that Iraq was a danger to American interests, not a risk. I argue the opposite throughout this paper, that the futurity embodied through this memo, and therefore the Iraq war, constituted a response to implied risk as opposed to imminent danger.
Risk, defined
“We are living in a world that is beyond controllability” -Ulrich Beck
I begin by defining terms. I define risk as an indefinite threat in the future, i.e. the possibility of danger/harm. I define danger as the definite threat of harm to a system. Danger is immediate, risk is not. Another important distinction must be made between “risk”, and “danger.” Risk differs from “danger” in that “risk” is created by the system that experiences it. As the Sociologist Niklas Luhmann describes, risk is self-made, or autopoetic, whereas “Danger” is altogether external (Lakoff 2).
Empirical evidence supports this view. A study using natural language processing, a technique that analyzes words in context, by Dr. Åsa Boholm at the University of Gothenburg set out to prove Luhmann’s hypothesis. Dr. Boholm found that “risk has a strong agency orientation” (Boholm 291). The term “risk” is almost always used along with words indicating human agency. Risk, therefore, is self-made. As Dr. Susanne Holmstrom puts it, “More and more dangerous situations are regarded not, as in older societal forms, as the result of nature, God, or destiny, but as the result of decisions” (Holmstrom on Luhmann).
Risk-we have it, now what do we do?
“Modern society has become a risk society in the sense that it is increasingly occupied with debating, preventing and managing risks that it itself has produced.” -Ulrich Beck in the World Risk Society
The memo in question outlines steps that were required to engage in the Iraq war. “How start” is the bullet point that stands out. In the past we responded to real threats. Nazi Germany and Japan, for instance, posed real danger to American lives and interests. Iraq, however, did not. “Without “a “clear and present danger” such as the Axis Powers in 1941, or later the Soviet Union, to coalesce public agreement on the threat, it is difficult to construct a supporting strategy that can be effective either in setting priorities or objectives” (Ullman XIX). We live in a world of statistics, and threat calculation, of managing risk (Beck). As Luhmann notes, the modern world is one where “the future can now be perceived only through the medium of probability” (Luhmann 48).
In the bullet point “How Start”, a clear picture emerges of Rumsfeld searching for an unclear cause. The war in Iraq was not a justified response to a real threat, rather, it was a response to a presumed risk. “To treat potential loss as a matter of risk means, first of all, that we weigh this future against the cost of possible actions we can take in the present to mitigate its effects” (Collier 4).
These possible actions are clearly weighed under the bullet point “how start.” Rumsfeld lists three: Saddam moves against the Kurds, US discovers a connection to the September 11th attack, or a disagreement over WMD inspections (here Rumsfeld ironically states he will “start thinking about inspection demands”). The “irony of risk” abounds. “The irony of risk here is that rationality, that is, the experience of the past, encourages anticipation of the wrong kind of risk” (Beck 330).
The Irony most pervasive in the memo is that Iraq is not currently a threat to the United States. The threat is clearly indefinite because Rumsfeld posits lists searching for a reason initiate the war as a major task. This banality implies that that Rumsfeld is planning the war in Iraq to counter an indefinite threat. As is stated in the National Security Strategy document distributed close to the time this memo was written: “America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best.” (The National Security Strategy of the United States). This is clearly a case of acting “against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”
We have to do something; that’s the feeling we get from Rumsfeld’s memo. We need the Iraq war, not to prevent a real threat, but to combat an imagined one. As Beck notes, these risks “exceed our problem solving capacities” (Beck). How can we solve something we fundamentally cannot know?
Ulrich Beck notes there are three responses to risk in modern society: “denial, apathy, or transformation” (331). I posit that for Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, the response was one of transformation. The Iraq war was an attempt to create a more definite future, an attempt to control the uncontrollable. The goal was to mitigate and destroy the future possibility of harm, in order to shift the balance of power in favor of a Pax Americana (PNAC 1). In attempting to promote and build the future desired by Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives in the Bush administration, the Iraq War was launched. In an ultimately ironic turn, this war would eventually create the modern power vacuum that led to the rise of threats such as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. “Instead of palpable dangers (such as nuclear enrichment by North Korea), a hypothetical and unproven state of affairs in Iraq was placed at the center of U.S. national security strategy.” (Harper 211). Threat calculation is endemic in the world risk society, as it is a way to “manage” risks in the future.
Risk calculation
“The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest-Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure.”
― John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism
Risk for neoconservatives in the Bush administration was deeply intertwined with the Utilitarian theory of normative ethics. In the risk society, it only matters that utility, or power, of the United States is maximized. It matters much less whether or not an action is just or unjust. Utility maximization became the primary driver behind the Iraq war. The neoconservatives in the Bush administration believed the war in Iraq would shift probabilities in their favor, maximizing America’s (or at the very least their personal) utility. It does not seem to matter whether or not Iraq was truly responsible or not, epitomizing what Beck calls the “mathematicized morality” of modernity (Beck 333).
The tone of this note suggests my primary thesis. The Bush administration decided to go to Iraq in response to an indefinite threat. The “irony” of this decision is clear. We created more destruction than (we assume) otherwise would have occurred if we had not gotten involved. As Beck notes, “Despite billions of dollars in missile defense, it only took a few individuals on a plane to turn it into a missile no defense system could stop” (Beck 330). The Iraq war exemplifies the irony of global risk. Rumsfeld tried to strike against the unknown in an attempt to protect against an indefinite threat, one that cannot be truly known because it does not exist. This war was envisioned as a way to prevent Iraq from “upsetting the balance of power” in the region, a threat that is not real. These Risks as classified by the Neoconservatives in the Bush Administration “are not ‘real’”; they exist in a world of virtuality until they become catastrophe (Beck 332).
Why Iraq? Neoconservativism and a belief in fading American power
“American foreign and defense policy is adrift” -Project For A New American Century’s founding statement
Now that we have defined risk and how it is calculated, we come to the why. Neoconservativism as a foreign policy view holds that we need to respond to indefinite threats to create and maintain American hegemony. The primary aim of the Iraq war involved establishing control and stability in the Middle East, mitigating risk caused by powers in the Middle East we could not control (Iraq, Iran, and Syria), which threatened not only Israel, but also America’s energy suppliers. The mainstream view at the onset of the Iraq war believed that Iraq was a danger to American interests, not a problem that may affect American power many years down the road. In reality, neoconservatives hoped the Iraq war would represent “what sort of role the United States intends to play in the world in the twenty-first century.” (Harper 206).
The Iraq war was viewed as a tool to combat the threat of the perceived waning of American power outlined by the Project For A New American Century. PNAC was a neoconservative think tank whose founding principles were signed by Donald Rumsfeld. The threats to America outlined by the PNAC constitute risks, rather than dangers. American power is viewed as slipping, while facing future threats from China, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea, threats that do not yet present any immediate danger (PNAC 4). Regime change in Iraq was seen as cementing American power in the future, by preventing an indefinite threat farther down the line.
“Slices (building momentum for regime change)”
Rumsfeld is creating a plan to counter threats we ultimately cannot know. What is the most effective way to lower risk, to prevent these indefinite threats from occurring? How do we create regime change in the most effective manner? The meticulous planning we in this specific section sanitizes war, making the risks seem as simple as neutralizing missile sites. Imposing order unto chaos. Creating a future in the way we want, in opposition to a world full of risks we cannot always conceptualize.
“People hate him.. may want to take him out”
Here we have the first mention of “risk” in the memo. Here, it is implied that the doctrine of “shock and awe” will mitigate risks. As Harlan Ullman, the architect of Shock and Awe notes, “In designing its defense posture, the United States has adopted the doctrine of employing “decisive or overwhelming force.” This doctrine reinforces American advantages in strategic mobility, pre-positioning, technology, training, and fielding integrated military systems to provide and retain superiority” (Ullman XIX). In an ironic turn of events, the destruction of power and communications grids would be one of the many complaints against America following the Iraq War. The very tactic used to mitigate risk caused by the Iraqi Army, would create the discontent leading to the rise of groups such as ISIS in Iraq and the Levant.
“Decapitation of Government”
This bullet point is similar to the last. Describing the removal of Saddam as a “decapitation” implies that the government will be without a brain. Rumsfeld wants to do it “early”, while simultaneously cutting off communications such as television and radio. The mitigation of these risks leaves us with holes in our logic. If we destroy the government, what enters the vacuum? It turns out, the Iraqi power vacuum proved many times more dangerous than the Iraq war to the United States in 2001. “The destruction of former government buildings demolished seventeen out of the twenty-one ministry buildings that Washington had planned to use. Millions of dollars’ worth of equipment and materials were stolen or obliterated.” The destruction greatly hampered America’s ability to stabilize and rule the country following the invasion (Harper 222).
“Consider Radical Ideas”
Here, Rumsfeld leaves a blank space to consider “radical ideas.” It is not clear whether these were redacted, or were never filled in. The notion that there would be ideas more radical than the ones already put forth in the memo(start a war against an indefinite threat) seems quite odd.
“Influence Campaign… when begin?”
The influence campaign, shown in Rumsfeld’s scrawled shorthand, proved integral to the successful launch of the Iraq war. Two of the three bullet points under “how start” would be used in the influence campaign. The argument throughout the influence campaign would be the connection between Iraq and terrorism, and Iraq’s possession of nuclear weapons. The influence campaign’s most potent weapon would be what Professor Monica Prassad calls “inferred Justification.” Inferred justification is the belief that because we are going to war, there must be a very good reason (Prassad 1). The presumption of the memo is that there is a reason, a very good one in fact, for the war in Iraq. The assumption is that the grand neoconservative strategy, although not apparent here, most definitely does exist. This logic is apparent in interviews conducted by Prassad. Most individuals she interviews in 2004 rationalized a link from Saddam to 9/11, and nuclear weapons to justify the Iraq war. The mainstream believed there was a danger to the United States, while in reality Iraq represented only an indefinite threat.
The Known unknowns, and unknown unknown of Rumsfeld
“Reports that say that something hasn’t happened are always interesting to me, because as we know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns — the ones we don’t know we don’t know. And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category that tend to be the difficult ones.” -Donald Rumsfeld on February 12th, 2002
One cannot avoid discussing the Known, Known comment when writing an analysis of Donald Rumsfeld, the Iraq War, and Risk. The statement has been called nonsense by some, and taken seriously by many others. The filmmaker Errol Morris characterizes the statement as simply misdirection and self deception (Morris).
I am not so sure. Here Rumsfeld directly acknowledges that the war in Iraq addresses an indefinite threat, an ”unknown, unknown.” Rumsfeld states “And if one looks throughout the history of our country and other free countries, it is the latter category (unknown unknowns) that tend to be the difficult ones.” Rumsfeld comes right out and tells us that he is focusing on the difficult ones, the “Unknown Unknowns”, another word for risks. This stands in opposition to a “Known Known” responding to an actual danger.
Conclusion
“We do not know what it is we don’t know but from this dangers arise, which threaten mankind!” -Ulrich Beck, The World Risk Society (Beck 1).
The Iraq war responded to an indefinite threat, a danger that was not yet fully formed. Throughout the memo one can see that Iraq has been presumed guilty without a fair trial. As Paul Krugman states in his article, “Errors and Lies”, the “Iraq war wasn’t an innocent mistake, a venture undertaken on the basis of intelligence that turned out to be wrong. America invaded Iraq because the Bush administration wanted a war. The public justifications for the invasion were nothing but pretexts, and falsified pretexts at that” (Krugman). The Bush administration decided to go to war, and then had to justify it. The reason was to respond to an indefinite threat. The risk that Iraq, with its oil money might disrupt the balance of power in the region. As I have demonstrated, the Iraq war was a bitter attempt by Rumsfeld to become God by imposing order in a world full of indefinite threats.
“Risk makes its appearance on the world stage when God leaves it (van Loon)” (Beck 333). Modernity involves the understanding that humans, not God, create their reality, meaning and purpose (Moroff). Humans used to look to God for meaning, believing in the role of God’s power in fate and future events. Now, we recognize that risk environment are primarily self created. The basic assumption of secular society is that modernity overcomes religion (Beck). Rumsfeld and the neoconservatives tried, and failed to play God. Responding to an unreal, indefinite threat was a mistake that cost countless lives, and trillions of dollars. Rumsfeld’s memo was an example of a transformation; not a denial of risk, but an attempt to transform it into a more favorable outcome. Ironically, the ultimate conclusion was worse than it otherwise would have been.
Without making any foreign policy recommendations, l propose an area for further inquiry. In a world filled with risks, the correct response is not necessarily to ignore them, but to accept that they exist, and only respond to threats that are actual dangers. Attempting to impose one’s will on indefinite threats is ultimately ironic and only leads to more risk, transforming risks into real danger and eventually catastrophe.
A few sources if ya wanna learn more
Beck, Ulrich. “Living in and Coping with World Risk Society — 42nd St. Gallen Symposium.” 28 Nov. 2015. Lecture.
Beck, Ulrich. “Living in and Coping with a World Risk Society.” Humanity at Risk : The Need for Global Governance (2013): n. pag. Web.
Boholm, Max. “The Semantic Distinction Between “Risk” and “Danger”: A Linguistic
Analysis.” Risk Analysis 32.2 (2011): 281–93. Web.
Collier, Stephen J., Andrew Lakoff, and Paul Rabinow. “Biosecurity: Towards an Anthropology of the Contemporary.” Anthropology Today 20.5 (2004): 3–7. Web.
Halper, Stefan, and Clarke, Jonathan. America Alone : The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order. West Nyack, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2004. ProQuest ebrary. Web. 3 December 2015.
Holmstrom, Susanne. “Niklas Luhmann: Contingency, Risk, Trust and Reflection.” Niklas Luhmann: Contingency, Risk, Trust and Reflection. N.p., n.d. Web. 04 Dec. 2015.
Krugman, Paul. “Errors and Lies.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 17 May 2015. Web. 29 Nov. 2015.
Luhmann, Niklas. Risk: A Sociological Theory. New York: A. De Gruyter, 1993. Print.
Moroff, Holger. “Poli 130 Lecture.” Chapel Hill, NC.
Prasad, M., Perrin, A. J., Bezila, K., Hoffman, S. G., Kindleberger, K., Manturuk, K. and Powers, A. S. (2009), “There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification. Sociological Inquiry, 79: 142–162. doi: 10.1111/j.1475–682X.2009.00280.
Rumsfeld, Donald. “Donald Rumsfeld Memo.” 02001–11–27 Rumsfeld to Franks Notes.pdf (2002): n. pag. Web.
The Unknown Known. Dir. Errol Morris. Perf. Donald Rumsfeld. N.d.
Ullman, Harlan. “Shock and Awe.” The Gold Cartel (2013): n. pag. Web.
“Shaking Hands with Saddam Hussein: The U.S. Tilts toward Iraq, 1980–1984.” Http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB82/. N.p., n.d. Web.
