“The EEA Option would be a betrayal”

The point has been made to me on a number of occasions that if the government agreed to the EEA option after a Leave vote, it would be seen as a betrayal by all those who voted Leave. Why? Because “it does nothing about free movement, the main reason people want Brexit”.
As a consequence, so the line goes, the Leave-centric electorate would react very badly to such a move, with accusations quickly thrown around of “a stitch-up by the Westminster and EU elite” and demands for a second referendum on this deal.
Before we go much further, I should note that this narrative is generally sketched out to me by Remainers, not by fellow Leavers.
There are a number of responses to this narrative but I should note upfront that I am not at all averse to holding a second referendum on the outcome of exit negotiations. I come from a stable of Brexit thought that wants to invigorate democracy through a series of measures including the wider use of referendums. That should include a referendum on the outcome of exit negotiations.
But I’m also a realist about what is more likely to happen. I can’t implore fellow Leavers to live in the real world when it comes to adopting the EEA option and then depart from it in other circumstances.
It is certainly true that the main Leave camps, especially Vote Leave, are making my argument difficult by their constant and rather foolish statements about the single market, a visa system, a new border in Ireland, £350m a week, saving the NHS, and so on. Having said that, scratch the surface of Vote Leave’s position on immigration and it becomes very nuanced very quickly (as discussed here) and one quickly discovers that they are not necessarily talking about a change in migrant volumes.
So why do I believe there will not be a second referendum on an EEA outcome or indeed on any other exit outcome (and that this would be widely accepted)?
- The EEA Option has greater support in the Leave movement than is commonly imagined. Remainers have no insight into this as they only see/read what Leave spokesmen tell them. Of course the main Leave camps have publicly chosen a line that is not the EEA Option and even rejects the single market, but as noted, Vote Leave’s position on immigration is more nuanced than their position suggests. MEP Daniel Hannan, a figure considered by a great many Leavers (including by many in UKIP) to be among the Leave movement’s finest advocates, is also someone who has openly supported a number of positions that are relevant here: Of not getting animated by immigration; of associate membership inside the EU (with free movement); of defending the Norway Option (with free movement); and of promoting the Swiss Option (with free movement). Separately, the higher echelons of UKIP, including Nigel Farage himself, were toying with the EEA Option in the latter part of last year. I believe it’s partly why Arron Banks felt able to hold talks with Dr Richard North, an exponent of the EEA route out, which led to Banks’ adoption of the Flexcit plan in January (quickly dropped again because Farage rowed back from the EEA option). These are significant tips of a larger iceberg.
- The EEA option delivers what many Vote Leave people are actually saying: that there will be little change on exit. Some even happily quote Lord Stuart Rose on this front: about only gradual changes over five, ten and even fifteen years.
- An EEA option is the only one that has the potential to reunify the country — Remainers and Leavers alike.
- When announcing the EEA approach in say two years’ time (on a very pessimistic timescale), there will be no mood for another referendum. Partly because of point 3 but also because of the experience and proximity of this current one. There will certainly be no mood in the governing Conservative Party (who will cheer an EEA deal to the rafters) but that is also true of MPs as a whole. The country at large will also be in no mood.
- The very announcement of the EEA approach will confirm that no ‘better deal’ could be done at this stage. That’s what will be stated and spun. For the time being, Economics will have won its battle against immigration…. as it arguably already has in the opinion polls.
- The EEA option comes with an extra safeguard on free movement that no EU member has. That will be part of the ‘sale’ to the electorate. In particular, it will be stated that the power over EU/EEA free movement does now lie with the House of Commons and that the Commons “has decided to maintain it for now”.
- The EEA option addresses the proposition on this referendum’s ballot paper, which makes no mention of free movement.
- The EEA option will be described by the government as an ‘interim’ position to allow us to at least get out and thus addressing the Leave vote on 23rd June. All in lieu of a longer term deal.
- The deal will be agreed just before a general election. Come the time, it may well be suggested that if any voters are unhappy with the deal, they can make their feelings known during that election [recall that immigration and free movement barely registered in the general election of 2015].
- The centrifugal forces across the EU throughout this whole process will be strengthening. Voices in other EU states will be coming out declaring support for Britain and suggesting that their country follows. Leavers in this country who get animated by immigration will sense that events are slowly moving their way, regardless of the precise details of the EEA deal.
Of course, despite all of this some people still won’t be satisfied. Indeed some people will never be satisfied and will wallow in perpetual anger. Such people want to massively limit or better still stop immigration altogether. Yes, those people will feel betrayed.
But those people — the core anti-politics group that infests the comments section of Breitbart London— are in a very small minority. And given that UKIP is already very split and losing money and members, a deal that actually gets us out would pile even more pressure on them. A second referendum, which just to remind you I’d be comfortable with, would finish them off altogether with a resounding vote supporting the deal.
But whatever happens — second referendum or not — the time will have finally come for the Leave movement to confront the minority illiberal poison within it.
If only it had done that long ago.