This is one of my favorite pictures of all time.

“Let Me Live That Fantasy”


The Kansas City Royals are in the American League Championship Series. According to FanGraphs, the Royals currently have the best chance* (about 30%) out of any team to win the World Series, and are a strong favorite to be the AL representative in the World Series. How did this happen? And how can the Royals keep this train going?

As great as some of the individual performances have been, I think Dayton Moore deserves to be recognized first. He has been criticized and called to be fired countless times by many (myself included). The James Shields Trade was brutally bashed from the moment the news broke. The signings of Jeremy Guthrie and Jason Vargas were not wildly popular moves. The development of the greatest farm system ever has not exactly gone as planned. Yet here we are in the ALCS. THE ALCS. THE ROYALS. Dayton Moore is certainly not a perfect general manager. But he has done something that no general manager has done in almost 30 years, and that is get the Royals to the playoffs. The playoffs are largely a crapshoot, although there is some evidence that teams with better pitching and defense have a slightly better chance of success. Dayton Moore was able to get the Royals into the crapshoot with a possible slight advantage over teams with more potent offenses.

The James Shields trade was undoubtedly worth giving up baseball’s top prospect. This trade exemplifies a trend with Moore—an emphasis on run prevention over run scoring. The Royals run prevention all starts with their defense. The defense is what has allowed Jason Vargas to have the best ERA of his career and Jeremy Guthrie to perform close to his prime-year production and James Shields to have two of the best three seasons of his career. The Royals defense makes each pitcher’s numbers better, and it makes Moore’s other huge emphasis—the bullpen—even stronger.

What Moore has essentially done is turn each game into a six inning contest. If the Royals are ahead after six innings, they are almost certain to win with their dominant bullpen. Basically, the Royals just need starters that can get through six innings without getting blown up, because they will generally win the last three innings. On the leaderboard for AL pitchers with the most starts of 6+ innings pitched, the Royals have FOUR in the top 30, with James Shields tied for first with 30 starts of 6 or more innings. The Royals were 65–4 in the regular season when leading after six innings. That’s a win percentage of .942. For reference, the average win percentage for all other AL teams when leading after six was .871. So if the Royals had an AL average bullpen, they would have been about 60–9 rather than 65–4 in games where they led after six innings. That’s a five win difference, which is pretty massive. If we take this another step, the Royals were 11–58 (.159) when trailing after six innings. The AL average excluding the Royals? .126. In games where the Royals were tied after six innings, they went 13–11 (one game over average). Now, let’s add these up:

  • Royals when leading after six: 65–4 (.942)
  • Other AL teams when leading after six: 861–128 (.871)
  • IF the Royals had an average bullpen leading after six: 60–9
  • Royals when trailing after six: 11–58 (.159)
  • Other AL teams when trailing after six: 123–850 (.126)
  • IF the Royals had an average bullpen trailing after six: 9–60
  • Royals when tied after six: 13–11 (.542)
  • Other AL teams when tied after six: 166–160 (.509)
  • IF the Royals had an average bullpen tied after six: 12–12 (.500)

If we only include games where the Royals were leading or trailing after six innings (i.e. take out games where they were tied after six), that is a total of 138 games. The Royals total record in these 138 games was 76–62. The expected record of an AL team without the Royals’ late inning performance? 69–69. If we include games where the Royals were tied after six, we get to the Royals final record of 89–73. If the Royals were average after six innings, the record moves to 81–81.

The Royals were able to add 8 wins by being elite in the last three innings of games. This data correlates well with WAR—bWAR has the trio*** of Herrera, Davis, and Holland at 9 wins above replacement, while fWAR has them at 6.8. The average of the two is 7.9—effectively the 8 wins above an average team that we found above.

Whether or not Dayton Moore intended to focus the result of each game on the first six innings matters not. The Royals are in the freaking ALCS, and I do not think anyone really cares if the results on the field are coming from the exact players that Moore was planning on.


Cutting each game down to a six inning contest largely explains how the Royals earned enough wins to get into the playoffs, but it does little to satisfy the palette of those wondering how the Royals have won four straight playoff games, most of which have been nail-biters. In my opinion, the biggest contributor for these four wins is luck (or maybe destiny, if that makes you feel better). Timely hitting (and untimely hitting for opponents) has been a major factor, and those numbers would level out over a larger period of time.

While the playoffs are mostly a crapshoot, Nate Silver of ESPN’s FiveThirtyEight has done some research into postseason results, and—according to a NYTimes article^ from 2007— “found that a power-pitching staff, a good closer and a strong defense were the most important factors in winning [postseason] series.” If you include the bullpen, one can surmise the 2014 Kansas City Royals possess all three of Silver’s key ingredients for postseason success. These ingredients, combined with some good fortune, have led the Royals to four postseason wins, and are a big reason why they have as good of a shot as any other team to take home a World Championship.



Beat the O’s.