Democracy versus Technology

Andrew Barisser
5 min readFeb 15, 2016

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by Andrew Barisser

Democracy is not the end game. Or at least it is unlikely to be. In the tumult of history, we could not reflect on any one government and safely say “that one was permanent” or “their system would stand the test of time”. It has never happened. All things are in a state of flux, even if that flux may be so slow as to be imperceptible over human lifespans. Later historians will smugly proclaim that “inevitable, historic forces” were at play during our present time that “would invariably lead to the great events that are known to have followed”. And yet we are unaware of them. Future events are more fickle than we would like to imagine. Those of the past are perceived as far more fixed than they ever possibly could have been.

So in looking at our own system of government, we should ask “What would our ancient forebearers have thought of our form of government?” What conclusions will appear obvious to our successors that are not today apparent? What taboos are there today that will be tomorrow’s conversational fodder?

Democracy. It is hailed as the last form of government we shall ever need. We have already achieved perfection, the thinking goes, ideologically if not in practice. While individual politicians may be reprehensible, while certain periods may embarrass us, surely the ultimate form of government has been found. We are taught this in school. Ours is the fairest of them all. Ours will last. Ours is the most righteous. The search is over; none is necessary.

I will commit this sacrilege; I contest that Democracy is any kind of ‘final state’ of government. It is not a holy path with one, final destination. It is not a natural end state arising from the Darwinian soup of governments. It is where we are now.

Democracy has triumphed around the world since the end of the Cold War. While most have portrayed this stunning advance as a final victory, I argue that it is a transient sign of the times. I’m not passing moral judgement. But perhaps it is a confluence of events, a preponderance of force, a passing Zeitgeist, that has led to the worldwide dominance of Democracy, rather than an inexorable trend of ideologies.

If there is one thing to disbelieve, it is long term historical trends. They are usually vacuous and always unprovable. And yet this is the undercurrent for the most typical explanation of our times; that Democracy is a better and more stable historic equilibrium. It is absurd. No one could possibly know such a thing.

Democracy has merits, surely. It has maximal buy-in from the constituents. That gives it a lot of legitimacy. But is it any coincidence that virtually every society discards democracy in times of serious danger? Of course not. Democracies may have a lot of buy-in from citizens, but they are not particularly effective in prosecuting wars on a pound-for-pound basis.

The military is dictatorial for that very reason. The old Bolshevik armies (and those of Revolutionary France) toyed with the idea of democratic ideals in the military; they were quickly abandoned because they were disastrous on the battlefield.

Enlightened dictatorships have worked wonders for some countries. The Turkish Republic achieved a century’s worth of modernization in just a generation under the patently dictatorial methods of Mustafa Kemal. Napoleon was a megalomaniac who could not stop starting wars, but he also created the Napoleonic code. Nobody could cut through the thick, Gordian knot of feudal legacy better than him.

How would Americans have voted about slavery in 1865? You don’t want to know the answer. How would all sorts of historical votes have turned out if you had actually let the people decide. A lot of “historically good” events took place because of dictators or dictatorial tendencies. Would you prefer that Japan had not begun modernizing in 1866? Surely the majority of Japanese at that time would have agreed.

What most people don’t want to acknowledge is that Democracy is not an ideological end-game; it is the product of mundane facts. Compare the years 1100 to 1800 AD. In medieval Europe, an armored man on horse was virtually unstoppable against nearly limitless peasants. No number of footmen could stop him. To construct a maximally effective fighting force, it was logical to invest resources in a few armored fellows on horseback. It was more effective to take hundreds of peasants and have them equip one knight, than for them to actually fight on foot. Should it be any surprise then that the nobility flourished at home? When military might was derived, according to the technological rules of the time, from a select few, it should be no surprise that government was also in the hands of so few, ie, a feudal monarchy. Technology and warfare drove the shape of government. Failed, alternative experiments would simply perish as states.

Contrast this with the year 1800. Technology had transformed warfare. Revolutionary France held off the entirety of Europe, acting in concert, because a citizen army was conscripted levee en masse. No select few aristocrats could defeat such a large force of citizens. It no longer made sense to devote resources to a few uber-soldiers. Strength came in numbers. For the next two hundred years, armies composed of masses of citizens would dominate. Only societies that could harness every able body could survive in such circumstances. Should it be a surprise, then, that democracies would dominate in such a world?

Now consider a future in which military strength is not derived from citizen armies. It stems from technological prowess. That technical capability comes from a small fraction of the population: the engineers, innovators, academics, and businessmen who have leverage over new technology. With the pace of discovery, this will only ever comprise a small, highly competitive group. It is this group that will build the drones, fighter-planes, rockets, etc, that will govern the outcome of future wars. It then stands to reason that it will be these people that will dominate society.

It is hard to grasp how irrelevant normal footsoldiers would be in a modern war. Cluster munitions can murder everyone within multiple square miles with utter impunity. No number of outraged citizens can stop this. The technologists will utterly trounce the masses in a future conflict.

The effect of technology on the domestic balance of power should give us pause. We are not in an ideological end-game. The triumph of this or that system is not subject to intangible, long-term trends, but to concrete, manifest forces in the present. Mundane inventions such as the crossbow, gunpowder, and the printing press, have upset the hallowed social norms of their own times. We would be foolish to think that such a thing could not happen again.

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