Anti-ballistic missile systems are still unreliable
North Korea recently launched three short-range ballistic missiles. Apparently one failed right after the engine ignited. The other two, however, flew successfully for approximately 250 kilometres before splashing into the Sea of Japan.
This is quite routine. After all, North Korea has dramatically stepped up its ballistic missile testing since Kim Jong-un assumed office. What was remarkale about the recent launch was the fiasco generated by the U.S. Pacific Command, which initially indicated that the two missiles which flew 250 km had “failed half-way”, and later revised its statements saying that they had succeeded.
This is embarrassing, to say the least. Anti-ballistic missile systems are expected to defeat ICBM’s during times of war, and they failed to even accurately report on short-range ballistic missiles.
I do not know what went wrong, but something must have gone wrong. And several lessons can be learnt from this incident.
The first is that ballistic missiles remain a viable means of power projection, whether conventional or nuclear. The second is that although ballistic missile defense is easy in laboratory conditions, they remain out-of-reach in combat conditions as of now. Therefore, any aspiring powers seeking to develop ballistic missile forces need to be foresightful when designing their ballistic missiles. In particular, ballistic missile designers need to take into account the sort of anti-ballistic missile systems that the missile will be expected to face 10 or 20 years in the future, and equip the missile with counter-measures accordingly.
And lastly, ballistic missiles, especially nuclear tipped ones, are for deterrence, not for war-fighting. Any attempt at a “preventive strike” or “pre-emptive attack” are wishful thinking at best.
