The Carnation Revolution: The End of an Empire and the Beginning of a New Wave of Democratization

Portugal experimented with democracy before it established another in 1975 with the overthrow of Marcello Caetano and the authoritarian regime. The First Republic lasted from 1910 until 1926 before succumbing to autocracy led by Caetano’s predecessor Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, who ruled until his incapacitation in 1968. Salazar oversaw Portugal and its empire with an iron fist, employing heinous and inhumane methods to control it and suppress opposition. Neutral in the Second World War due to its perceived inability to protect the colonies from which it reaped substantial benefits, the wave of democratization that swept through the former colonies of Britain, Belgium, France, and Germany hit the Portuguese empire simultaneously throughout Africa, and between 1961 and 1964 would ignite independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea that would plague Salazar and Caetano until the end of the regime in 1974. However, due to national pride, the promise of riches, and the stability of the Salazar regime, the wars were manageable, though expensive. Disaster struck Portugal as Salazar was incapacitated in 1968, and neglecting to plan for his succession, Caetano was chosen to rule, promising reform to quell the rising unrest at home about the overseas issue. He failed to deliver on these promises, exacerbating the conflict and giving rise to the social movement that would explode in the early 1970’s and culminate in the establishment of democracy. The urban social movement, fueled by these false promises, a declining secret police, and potential outside influence, combined with the autonomous, disgruntled, and dissenting military provided the death knell for Caetano and Portuguese autocracy in the mid-1970’s.

Portugal’s intention to continue to rule as a colonial power made sense, its empire appeared to be capable of bolstering the economy and public morale as it had in the nineteenth century. Similarly to the French and Algeria, the Portuguese viewed their colonies not as such, but ‘one state single and indivisible’ from the metropolis, largely due to the sentiments surrounding them and the role they played in economic stability and the establishment of a third empire in the last decades of that century, fueling nationalism and serving as a source of great pride for the country. Additionally, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea still appeared to be viable colonies, largely due to “the huge resources of Angola, the potential wealth of Mozambique, and the key position of both in the infrastructure of southern Africa combined with the presence of some 400,000 white settlers.” Even with Guinea’s deficiency of white settlement as well as economic benefit, Portugal’s greed in maintaining these large swaths of Africa was substantiated, especially considering the ‘campaign for Africa’ in 1915 that resulted in the conquest and control of all three facilitated a unified metropolis and a nation mobilized in the effort to hold these colonies. With the benefits and history of the recent past, the decision was clear for Salazar to hold on to the empire as long as it remained promising. However, the benefit would remain only in appearance and wishful thinking, as the wars that began in the early 1960’s would prove to be costly for the government, both in resources and public morale.

Between 1961 and 1964, war erupted in each of Portugal’s three major colonies, presenting a conflict that Salazar sought to avoid in the Second World War and would create a problem socially, militarily, and economically. Instead of extracting resources and benefit from Angola, Guinea, and Mozambique, the Portuguese government now devoted enormous amount of troops and capital into conflicts that would last more than a decade in each circumstance. By the time that the 1960’s gave way to the 1970’s, substantial change had begun in the regime, as Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was incapacitated by an accident in 1968 and Marcello Caetano replaced him as the dictator. Caetano promised reform upon his arrival but through either pressure from the established military and political elite, or pure inability to address these overseas issues, these promises faded, “which meant increasing military expenditure to a ruinously unacceptable level, growing war weariness and disappointment of the expectations raised in 1969–70 for genuine political reform.” Not only did Caetano renege on his promises, he further delved Portugal into a war that was quickly becoming unfavorable, rather than resolve the problem that now threatened to destabilize the country. Furthermore, Caetano implemented a system whereby militia officers could attain commissioned status, akin to service academy graduates, through brief training and extended overseas service, as a way to incentivize the continuance of the wars. This won him no favors, as the young academy graduates resented this program. Salazar managed to maintain morale in regards to the war as a way to uphold national pride and secure the standing of the indivisible Portuguese Empire, but his successor Marcello Caetano faced significant challenges due to his promised reform, reneged commitment to ending overseas conflicts, and resulting sway of opinion within the public, military, and government, formulating the sentiments that would contribute to the overthrow of the government in April 1974.

Marcello Caetano bears the brunt of the blame for revolution, the mistakes that he made to further the military and public resentment of the regime where of his own making. He benefitted from an example to emulate in Charles De Gaulle’s handling of the Algerian War nearly two decades earlier, as De Gaulle saw the inevitability of Algerian independence, and the endless war that would ensue. Rather than hold on to the colonies, Caetano, like De Gaulle, should have relinquished them, as he vowed to upon taking office. His relaxation and reorganization of the secret police failed to appease the people, as he thought it would, and served only to allow them to protest more fervently. While an act of good faith, Caetano did not need to do this, and in doing it he make progress toward his own downfall. The aforementioned program to expedite commission to officers that served in Africa only exacerbated the dissent among the ranks that being in Africa in the first place created, as well as the pre-existing record of slights and abuses that the military experienced at the hands of Salazar and Caetano. Surrounded by the contradiction of fighting against democratic ideas in Africa on behalf of an oppressive authoritarian regime, the military officers overthrew Caetano as De Gaulle did, but deprived Caetano the opportunity to negotiate a change of regime peacefully, instead resorting to violence. Overall, one could argue that Caetano created the conditions that led to his downfall as well as that of the Portuguese autocracy.

Salazar was able to succeed where Caetano failed, and maintain the power and control he enjoyed as long as he did largely due to the existence of the PIDE, the International Police for the Defense of the State, which held opposition in check from before the formation of the New State until Salazar’s death in 1970. The PIDE acted as the secret police for the regime and thus executed many tasks, from spying and inhibiting industrial growth to the torture and interrogation of guerrillas in the African colonies. Additionally, the PIDE was responsible for the enforcement of the one month window for opposition party to campaign for office. When General Humberto Delgado broke the rule, and “violation of this unwritten code in 1958 led specifically to the abolition of direct elections one year later, and quite possibly to Delgado’s assassination in 1965,” the PIDE facilitated the end of elections, and allegedly the assassination. Clearly, the PIDE has a considerable amount of power, emanating from the free reign that Salazar gave it to inflict his will, so how did the urban movement not get snuffed out before it had a chance to develop? Some would point to his successor Caetano’s abolition of the PIDE, but that was more in name than in practice, as the organization merely took on a new name. However, it changed more than in name, as its effectiveness declined sharply after its reorganization. Even if it had retained its former formidability, the unlikelihood remains that the PIDE could have halted the coup of 25 April 1974, as the military cohesion would have been an insurmountable obstacle to the continuance of the Caetano regime.

This cohesion resulted from a relative degree of autonomy that Salazar and then Caetano afforded the military, despite numerous attempted and failed coups throughout the regime of the New State. Interestingly, the military never received any repercussions from these affronts to the regime, maintaining freedom of action in a time when Salazar, the regime, and the PIDE strictly prohibited it elsewhere. Furthermore, as far as Salazar was concerned, “the military was allowed to discipline its own malcontents without regime interference.” With no repercussions or interference from the regime, the military evolved independently from the wishes of the regime. Not punishing the many for the actions of the few is a perfectly rational reaction, but in some instances the perpetrators were not even punished, as “in 1961 Colonel Francisco Costa Gomes (1914- ) was allowed to remain in the army- where he advanced to the rank of general- although clearly implicated in the 1961 coup attempt.” The discrepancies between the goals and values of the regime and the military created room for those who resented Salazar, and later Caetano, to promote and condone sentiments that would be crucial in the eventual overthrow of the autocracy. In allowing these proven enemies of the state to remain as key cogs in the machine, Salazar set himself up for dissention amongst the ranks, thereby weakening the state as a whole and sowing the seeds for future military action against the state, which is exactly what happened in 1974.

Though democracy emerged from the coup of April 1974, a democratic movement was not the determining factor, as junior members of the military seized power from the dictator and began the transition to democracy. The leaders of the revolution justified their actions as a response to the seemingly interminable wars to which the regime had subjected the country for the last decade or more, fulfilling the promise that Marcello Caetano made upon his assumption of power; to resolve the overseas issues of the empire. Saving the country from the seemingly perpetual and futile wars in Africa warranted the upheaval of the existing system, particularly when they met limited opposition from the existing regime. This left an opening for the surging urban movement that gained momentum in the late 1960’s, partially as a response to Caetano’s promise of reform, but also to changing social conditions. This movement “quickly burst onto the scene, cheering and supporting the plotters and storming to the most symbolic buildings of the deposed regime.” An interesting dynamic between the military and the people ensued, as the junior officers were just as surprised as anyone as to the intensity and rapidity of the crowd, and their intentions as to the implementation of new government were unclear. The movement that became known as the Carnation Revolution seemed to seize the opportunity created by the coup, and given the disarray of the government, achieved democratic change with relative ease and speed. In other words, the two groups, military and social, evolved separately but depended on each other and ultimately helped each other. The military relied on the sway of public opinion against the wars in Africa and the authoritarian regime in order to justify regime change, while the social movement would not have achieved the success that it did without the military coup. The interconnectedness of the two movements, as well as their creation by the same oppressive regime lead many to believe that this was no coincidence, that the social movement was not in fact autonomous.

The social upheaval that characterized the Carnation Revolution rose out of the poor section of the city, and demonstrates the capabilities of grassroots democracy, but many question to what extent it fueled itself. Until 1974–75 there was little opinion that it was the responsibility of the state to address the problems of the urban impoverished, but as the urban identities became politicized, and neighborhoods became the epicenter of mobilization over class and craft, the desire to improve the conditions of urbanity spread the cause of the social movement. However, these origins are subject to much speculation and doubt, leading to the question of was it a representation of the “popular desire to change the nature of political power and class relations, or was it the result of political manipulation?” As the movement swelled and absorbed the working class as well as the bourgeoisie, the complexion and purpose changed, as the movement “transformed itself from a limited ‘claim making movement’ making general demands to decent housing into a ‘protest movement’, which identified the state and municipality as the targets of political action.” Though the nature of the movement was obvious to adjust to the addition of these two distinctive groups, the goals changed drastically, leading to suspicion that the purpose of the movement changed as well, and therefore that external forces were now manipulating it. The military, the left, and communists are suspected to have at least a mild influence into the outcome of the movement, turning the movement started by the impoverished urban population from one to achieve their ends to a revolution on behalf of others.

More than a political revolution, the Carnation Revolution also constituted an attack on the elite of Portugal, seeking to displace the upper class that took advantage of the system embodied by Salazar. Many soldiers in the Portuguese army identified with the Africans they fought, beyond their democratic ideas, asking, “Why do we have to kill African people, peasants like us?” The elite chose to ignore these sentiments, as well as those of growing anti-war. This apathy would lead to their demise, as the peasants and military would contribute primarily to the Carnation Revolution. Combined with the economic downturn that struck Portugal in 1973, before the height of the revolution, the ruling elite suffered greatly from the events of that decade, and that weakness would facilitate their fall from grace. With no help to be anticipated from the government, the fall was quick and decisive. Ironically, the lack of unionization that categorized the period before the revolution allowed space for democratization where communism could instead have taken hold, much to the delight of the West and chagrin of the USSR. The role of workers and their late addition to the urban movement made it unique in one of many ways, and was perhaps a large contributing factor to the transition to democracy, established by the greedy capitalists that oppressed them under Salazar’s regime.

Amid the exuberance of the victory that it had just received, the urban movement lost much of the momentum that it had gained up to that point, further suggesting that the swell in the weeks leading up to 25 April 1975 emanated from external influence rather than its own merit. This deflation of the movement allowed the new government to gradually repeal the concessions that it had granted in the initial stages of reform. The poorest parts of Lisbon maintained similar levels of intensity and devotion to the movement when compared to those before the coup, but the greatest difference in the movement could be found in the middle and working classes, where decline in participation, much less intensity, was so stark that it was nearly nonexistent. The remnants of the movement that were still active took a defensive and reactionary stance in regard to the government, rather than the one of proaction it needed to combat these affronts to the ends it fought so hard to achieve. Struggle though it might, the movement never regained the influence that it enjoyed in 1974 and 1975, prompting the conclusion that the military or other outside forces exacerbated it and used it to their advantage.

Away from the contentious political arena of the Portuguese metropolis, ideas of replacing the autocratic regime spread as well, ironically fueled by the very ideas that soldiers were fighting against. By the time the 1970’s began, officers stationed in both Africa and Europe grew restless toward Salazar and then Caetano, and returned home triumphant when the coup of 25 April 1974 occurred, armed with the ideas they cultivated abroad. There was fear among many westerners that the revolution would result in communism, as exhibited in the New York Times on 13 July 1975. The concept of a communist, and Moscow influenced, state in the Iberian Peninsula terrified those in Washington, London, and Brussels, but the military and urban movement demonstrated enough democratic desire that the communist factions within Portugal drowned in the wave of democracy. Regardless, all were committed to the best interests of the country, and when that common goal seemed to be lost, “the Premier, Maj. Gen. Vasco dos Santos Goncalves, asks all to rise to their feet and pledge allegiance to Portugal.” Despite this, the existence of rival factions, particularly the communist ones, worried outsiders, but those involved provided assurances that all was under control. In an interview with the London Times, the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mario Soares asserted that he and other European leaders agreed, “that it was a good thing to be able to count on communist participation in the provisional government with a view to consolidating the democratic processes.” The provisional coalition government appeared capable of establishing longevity with the cooperation and commitment from all factions, a reassuring sign for the prospects of democracy in the Iberian peninsula, and the beginning of a third wave of democratization that would topple the Franco regime after his death in 1975 and establish another democracy. Portugal stands as a shining example of democracy coming from an unlikely source, autocracy, and the merits of coalition government despite opposition.

Though thrilled with the Portuguese transition from autocracy to democracy, Michael Harsgor provided an interesting perspective on the Carnation Revolution, classifying it as reminiscent of colonialism. Agreeing with the esteemed historian Manuel Lucena, he asserted that “the hallowed Carnation Revolution had essentially been a colonial operation: the brightest elements of the army, in process of losing the Ultramar had decided to conquer the metropolis as if it had been the one last colony left to be overwhelmed.” Harsgor continued to parallel the overthrow of Salazar to the establishment of colonies, but he draws a connection between two distinct and unrelated circumstances. More of a generalization than an argument, one could opine that the overthrow of any government was done as a colonial act. A connection existed between the dissolution of its overseas empire and Portugal’s transition to democracy, but the two were not the same category of political change, instead affected by similar influences and emerging from the shadows of an oppressive regime that faltered more than it forced submission in the end.

The collapse of the Portuguese autocracy proved to be a pivotal moment in history, as no one at the time could have predicted its outcome, much less the implications of its transition to democracy. Instead of more authoritarianism or a delve into communism, the democratization of Portugal catalyzed the third wave of democracy that would transform Southern Europe as well as the rest of Africa, namely the colonies that it relinquished when Caetano fell. The regime’s insistence on sustaining its empire longer than it needed to directly resulted in its own downfall, as it created the conditions that democracy required in order to establish and proliferate in a country that previously had precious little experience with it. However, whether or not the regime would have lasted had it pulled out of Africa before its wars for independence is hard to say, as the wars were necessary for the dissention to form within the military, the only institution with the capability to overthrow the government. Had Caetano fulfilled his promise of liberalization and resolution of the overseas issue upon his entrance into office, the likelihood of a peaceful transition to democracy would have increased, but through coercion or change of heart, he stayed in Africa, and thus precipitated the revolt that would end his regime. All of the problems that Caetano faced were exacerbated by his own actions, as dissent in the ranks of the military and unrest at home occurred only when provoked, and not naturally. The connection between the end of its overseas empire and the transition to democracy in Portugal in the mid 1970’s was a single man and his incompetence in the office into which he was thrust by the decapacitation of Antonio Salazar; Marcello Caetano.