Would EH Carr would have found the Six Points of Hans Morgenthau far too realist for his liking?
Far from being too realist, Carr would have found Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism not realist enough for his liking. As a result of the different perspectives they have on realism’s place within the discipline of International Relations, both men establish a version of realism that exists to serve a different function from the other. Morgenthau’s realism attempts to paint a comprehensive picture of the international political sphere in order to determine the best course of action in any given situation. It does this by combining wide-ranging and normative perspectives with an objective evaluation of political decision-making. In contrast, Carr’s realism is unambiguously positivist in nature and does not embody the goal-oriented aspect of the International Relations discipline. While it is safe to say that Carr would not see Morgenthau’s six points as an accurate representation of the realist school of thought, the fact that they each proffer a fundamentally different interpretation of realism means that this observation is of negligible significance.
Carr and Morgenthau’s Different Perspectives on the Role of Realism
Before examining the issues Carr would have had with Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, it is necessary to understand that they have different ideas regarding political realism’s place within international political theory. By establishing this, it will become much clearer as to why Carr would have dismissed Morgenthau’s definition of realism as not realist enough.
To begin with, consider Morgenthau’s realism. He favours this theoretical perspective as he believes it to best portray the reality of international politics. In contrast, he sees the alternative school (which he describes in similar, albeit slightly different, terms to Carr’s utopianism) as representing the world ‘as people would like to see it,’ rather than ‘as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature.’ By not examining the moral and political order through a prism of abstract principles, realism passes the test that Morgenthau sets for a successful theory of international politics: remaining empirically-oriented so as to provide ‘order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.’ Given that he is a proponent of realism, it is is safe to say Morgenthau does not judge the utopian school to sufficiently pass this test. The corollary of this, then, is that he views realism as representing an incremental improvement in how we conceive of international politics; a theory that better understands and explains the machinations of polities in the contemporary international sphere.
This characterisation of realism’s role in international political theory is fundamentally different to how Carr places realism within international political thought. Rather than considering realism to be a superior theoretical approach to what had been previously practiced in the discipline, Carr posits realism to be an essential contrast to the utopianism that has proceeded it. Like Morgenthau, he sees realism as an evolution in international political theory. It would be wrong, however, to say that he considers it an incremental improvement, as taken alone it can lead to ‘the sterilisation of thought and the negation of action.’ In order to avoid this downside to realism, Carr advocates the balancing of realist and utopian thought. It is only when this is done that he believes the evolution of political thought achieves a level of maturity that validates it as its own distinct discipline. Once this stage has been reached, realism can provide ‘a necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism.’
Carr and Morgenthau arrive at these different conceptions due to the different way they each evaluate the utility of the utopian and realist schools. In judging both theoretical schools by whether they are ‘empirical and pragmatic’ rather than ‘a priori and abstract,’ Morgenthau examines both on a level playing field based on how best they offer a framework for analysis of international relations. In doing this, he assumes that they both serve the same function to international political thought. In his eyes, facts are independent and consistent in international politics, due to the facets of human nature that drive the forces central to international politics remaining unchanged across time.
Carr, on the other hand, conceives of the two schools as serving separate functions to such thought. In his view, utopianism represents the nascent stages of a discipline’s formation. During this stage, there is a strong imperative to establish the discipline despite there being no framework in place by which to understand it. Utopianism, therefore, embodies the purpose of the discipline of International Relations. When utopianism fails to achieve what it initially sets out to do, the emerging school of realist thought engages in ‘hard ruthless analysis of reality which is the hallmark of science.’
These different functions between utopian and realist thought are what Carr believes makes political science different from natural sciences; whereas the natural sciences can separate the process of purpose and analytical investigation due to the existence of immutable facts, political science cannot separate purpose and analysis. This, he asserts, is because political facts are shaped by context and perception, and are consequently not incontrovertible. As he succinctly puts it, ‘Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be.’ Thus, it is essential that International Relations comprises of bifurcated, yet equally vital, systems of thought: that pertaining to the discipline’s purpose (utopianism), and that pertaining to its analysis (realism). By separating these two schools entirely, a spectrum of thinking can be established in which the middle represents a combination of purpose and analysis that appropriately balances the competing tensions of political science.
Morgenthau never considers this distinction. Instead, he compares both schools of thought within the paradigm of the natural sciences, where facts are incontrovertible and a theory superior if it offers an improved means of analysis and deduction of such facts. Given this alternative conception of the role of realism in international politic thought, it is unsurprising that Morgenthau’s conclusions on political realism are different to Carr. As it turns out, his version of realism is not as realist as the version that Carr asserts.
Why Carr Would Have Found Morgenthau’s Six Points Not Realist Enough
To appreciate why Carr would not approve of Morgenthau’s realism, it is essential to understand the similarities and differences between each man’s explanation of the realist school of thought. First, let us examine Morgenthau’s perspective. He views realism as a school that understands the contemporary world to be the result of forces that have naturally evolved out of human nature. Consequently, it is an imperfect world due to the irrational nature of the human forces that shape it. Controlling these forces, however, is impossible, and as such improving the world can only be done via checks and balances that limit their destructive potential.
Morgenthau’s realism uses the concept of interest defined in terms of power to establish a rational, objective means of assessing all political decision-making. In establishing this mode of evaluation, foreign policy decisions can then be objectively compared in different times and contexts ‘regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesman’ while ignoring what he deems the fallacies of international political thought: concern with motives and ideological preferences. However, he concedes that despite the universal, omnipresent validity of interests defined by power, both interests and power are influenced by politics and culture at any given moment in history, and as such how they are conceived can change.
Carr emphasises a number of characteristics that would easily coalesce with Morgenthau’s realist framework. These include realism’s cynical nature, its focus on establishing inarguable facts, its concern with what the causes and effects of such facts are, and its belief in the overwhelming power of pre-existing forces and tendencies. Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Carr would have been partial to defining interest in terms of power. He saw realism as having a bureaucratic approach to thinking rooted in empiricism that could likely seamlessly adopt Morgenthau’s systematised method of appraisal. Although Carr believed the bureaucratic approach to analysis eschewed a standard formulation of principles in favour of intuition born from experience, the ambiguity this injects into any systematic approach can be reconciled with Morgenthau’s approach via Morgenthau’s principle that the concepts of interest and power change depending on political and cultural context.
Given these similarities, how are Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism not realist enough for Carr’s liking? The answer lies in Carr’s polarised dichotomy of utopian and realist thought. Because of Carr’s distinction between the functional purpose of the two theoretical schools of thought within the International Relations discipline, the value-driven and wider-ranging nature of Morgenthau’s realism conflict with the sterilised positivism of his own brand of realism. As such, Carr would have found two aspects of Morgenthau’s realism difficult to square with his own perspective: its normative nature and its multifaceted analysis of human nature.
In Carr’s realist school of thought, theory can only provide a codification of political practice. Whereas utopianism attempts to compel political practice to conform to its theoretical standpoint, realism can only determine the existing facts of reality in pursuing its own theoretical position. As a result of this, realism can legitimately claim to occupy purely objective grounds. It relies solely on what has already occurred to deduce what is likely to happen next. Its analysis, rather than being founded in abstract, conceptual ideas, offers a depiction of the international political sphere untainted by values or goals.
By doing this, Carr’s realism forfeits any role in declaring what should be in the international political sphere, concerning itself solely with what already is. The aspirational side of international political thought is left entirely to the utopian school. Consequently, his interpretation of realism is prone to representing ‘nothing more than a rationalisation of conditioned and predetermined purpose’ that has nothing to say about changing the course of events. The flipside of this, however, is that it remains a distinctly positivist examination of international politics.
In contrast, Morgenthau’s realist school of thought includes a normative quality. It is true that his realism is founded in viewing international politics through the lens of interest defined in terms of power, providing it with a rational, objective means of assessing facts that is positivist in its nature and thus not in conflict with Carr’s realist tenets. However, Morgenthau sees realism as being cognisant ‘of the moral significance of political action,’ with the tension between morality and political action being an integral consideration from the realist perspective. Whilst he believes that the tension between universal moral principles and political action should not get in the way of such action being executed, he stresses that the state is subject to a different moral standard than individuals which is manifest in the moral imperative of national survival. By including a moralistic perspective within his realist doctrine, Morgenthau introduces an idealism that is antithetical to Carr’s perspective.
It is also relevant to note that Morgenthau’s realism considers manifold factors outside of the political realm. He asserts that realism takes into account not just ‘political man’ or ‘moral man,’ but also a variety of other aspects of human nature. Although all of these aspects consider interest defined in terms other than power, they all must be ultimately subordinated in favour of interest defined by power, which is what he views as making international politics a unique and novel discipline. In any case, by considering the variety of influences that inform human decision-making, Morgenthau broadens the scope of what political realism is capable of assessing in comparison to Carr’s model of realism.
Critically assess the following statement: EH Carr would have found the Six Points of Hans Morgenthau far too realist for his liking.
Carr and Morgenthau’s Different Perspectives on the Role of Realism
Before examining the issues Carr would have had with Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism, it is necessary to understand that they have different ideas regarding political realism’s place within international political theory. By establishing this, it will become much clearer as to why Carr would have dismissed Morgenthau’s definition of realism as not realist enough.
To begin with, consider Morgenthau’s realism. He favours this theoretical perspective as he believes it to best portray the reality of international politics. In contrast, he sees the alternative school (which he describes in similar, albeit slightly different, terms to Carr’s utopianism) as representing the world ‘as people would like to see it,’ rather than ‘as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature.’ By not examining the moral and political order through a prism of abstract principles, realism passes the test that Morgenthau sets for a successful theory of international politics: remaining empirically-oriented so as to provide ‘order and meaning to a mass of phenomena which without it would remain disconnected and unintelligible.’ Given that he is a proponent of realism, it is is safe to say Morgenthau does not judge the utopian school to sufficiently pass this test. The corollary of this, then, is that he views realism as representing an incremental improvement in how we conceive of international politics; a theory that better understands and explains the machinations of polities in the contemporary international sphere.
This characterisation of realism’s role in international political theory is fundamentally different to how Carr places realism within international political thought. Rather than considering realism to be a superior theoretical approach to what had been previously practiced in the discipline, Carr posits realism to be an essential contrast to the utopianism that has proceeded it. Like Morgenthau, he sees realism as an evolution in international political theory. It would be wrong, however, to say that he considers it an incremental improvement, as taken alone it can lead to ‘the sterilisation of thought and the negation of action.’ In order to avoid this downside to realism, Carr advocates the balancing of realist and utopian thought. It is only when this is done that he believes the evolution of political thought achieves a level of maturity that validates it as its own distinct discipline. Once this stage has been reached, realism can provide ‘a necessary corrective to the exuberance of utopianism, just as in other periods utopianism must be invoked to counteract the barrenness of realism.’
Carr and Morgenthau arrive at these different conceptions due to the different way they each evaluate the utility of the utopian and realist schools. In judging both theoretical schools by whether they are ‘empirical and pragmatic’ rather than ‘a priori and abstract,’ Morgenthau examines both on a level playing field based on how best they offer a framework for analysis of international relations. In doing this, he assumes that they both serve the same function to international political thought. In his eyes, facts are independent and consistent in international politics, due to the facets of human nature that drive the forces central to international politics remaining unchanged across time.
Carr, on the other hand, conceives of the two schools as serving separate functions to such thought. In his view, utopianism represents the nascent stages of a discipline’s formation. During this stage, there is a strong imperative to establish the discipline despite there being no framework in place by which to understand it. Utopianism, therefore, embodies the purpose of the discipline of International Relations. When utopianism fails to achieve what it initially sets out to do, the emerging school of realist thought engages in ‘hard ruthless analysis of reality which is the hallmark of science.’
These different functions between utopian and realist thought are what Carr believes makes political science different from natural sciences; whereas the natural sciences can separate the process of purpose and analytical investigation due to the existence of immutable facts, political science cannot separate purpose and analysis. This, he asserts, is because political facts are shaped by context and perception, and are consequently not incontrovertible. As he succinctly puts it, ‘Political science is the science not only of what is, but of what ought to be.’ Thus, it is essential that International Relations comprises of bifurcated, yet equally vital, systems of thought: that pertaining to the discipline’s purpose (utopianism), and that pertaining to its analysis (realism). By separating these two schools entirely, a spectrum of thinking can be established in which the middle represents a combination of purpose and analysis that appropriately balances the competing tensions of political science.
Morgenthau never considers this distinction. Instead, he compares both schools of thought within the paradigm of the natural sciences, where facts are incontrovertible and a theory superior if it offers an improved means of analysis and deduction of such facts. Given this alternative conception of the role of realism in international politic thought, it is unsurprising that Morgenthau’s conclusions on political realism are different to Carr. As it turns out, his version of realism is not as realist as the version that Carr asserts.
Why Carr Would Have Found Morgenthau’s Six Points Not Realist Enough
To appreciate why Carr would not approve of Morgenthau’s realism, it is essential to understand the similarities and differences between each man’s explanation of the realist school of thought. First, let us examine Morgenthau’s perspective. He views realism as a school that understands the contemporary world to be the result of forces that have naturally evolved out of human nature. Consequently, it is an imperfect world due to the irrational nature of the human forces that shape it. Controlling these forces, however, is impossible, and as such improving the world can only be done via checks and balances that limit their destructive potential.
Morgenthau’s realism uses the concept of interest defined in terms of power to establish a rational, objective means of assessing all political decision-making. In establishing this mode of evaluation, foreign policy decisions can then be objectively compared in different times and contexts 'regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesman’ while ignoring what he deems the fallacies of international political thought: concern with motives and ideological preferences. However, he concedes that despite the universal, omnipresent validity of interests defined by power, both interests and power are influenced by politics and culture at any given moment in history, and as such how they are conceived can change.
Carr emphasises a number of characteristics that would easily coalesce with Morgenthau’s realist framework. These include realism’s cynical nature, its focus on establishing inarguable facts, its concern with what the causes and effects of such facts are, and its belief in the overwhelming power of pre-existing forces and tendencies. Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Carr would have been partial to defining interest in terms of power. He saw realism as having a bureaucratic approach to thinking rooted in empiricism that could likely seamlessly adopt Morgenthau’s systematised method of appraisal. Although Carr believed the bureaucratic approach to analysis eschewed a standard formulation of principles in favour of intuition born from experience, the ambiguity this injects into any systematic approach can be reconciled with Morgenthau’s approach via Morgenthau’s principle that the concepts of interest and power change depending on political and cultural context.
Given these similarities, how are Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism not realist enough for Carr’s liking? The answer lies in Carr’s polarised dichotomy of utopian and realist thought. Because of Carr’s distinction between the functional purpose of the two theoretical schools of thought within the International Relations discipline, the value-driven and wider-ranging nature of Morgenthau’s realism conflict with the sterilised positivism of his own brand of realism. As such, Carr would have found two aspects of Morgenthau’s realism difficult to square with his own perspective: its normative nature and its multifaceted analysis of human nature.
In Carr’s realist school of thought, theory can only provide a codification of political practice. Whereas utopianism attempts to compel political practice to conform to its theoretical standpoint, realism can only determine the existing facts of reality in pursuing its own theoretical position. As a result of this, realism can legitimately claim to occupy purely objective grounds. It relies solely on what has already occurred to deduce what is likely to happen next. Its analysis, rather than being founded in abstract, conceptual ideas, offers a depiction of the international political sphere untainted by values or goals.
By doing this, Carr’s realism forfeits any role in declaring what should be in the international political sphere, concerning itself solely with what already is. The aspirational side of international political thought is left entirely to the utopian school. Consequently, his interpretation of realism is prone to representing ‘nothing more than a rationalisation of conditioned and predetermined purpose’ that has nothing to say about changing the course of events. The flipside of this, however, is that it remains a distinctly positivist examination of international politics.
In contrast, Morgenthau’s realist school of thought includes a normative quality. It is true that his realism is founded in viewing international politics through the lens of interest defined in terms of power, providing it with a rational, objective means of assessing facts that is positivist in its nature and thus not in conflict with Carr’s realist tenets. However, Morgenthau sees realism as being cognisant ‘of the moral significance of political action,’ with the tension between morality and political action being an integral consideration from the realist perspective. Whilst he believes that the tension between universal moral principles and political action should not get in the way of such action being executed, he stresses that the state is subject to a different moral standard than individuals which is manifest in the moral imperative of national survival. By including a moralistic perspective within his realist doctrine, Morgenthau introduces an idealism that is antithetical to Carr’s perspective.
It is also relevant to note that Morgenthau’s realism considers manifold factors outside of the political realm. He asserts that realism takes into account not just ‘political man’ or ‘moral man,’ but also a variety of other aspects of human nature. Although all of these aspects consider interest defined in terms other than power, they all must be ultimately subordinated in favour of interest defined by power, which is what he views as making international politics a unique and novel discipline. In any case, by considering the variety of influences that inform human decision-making, Morgenthau broadens the scope of what political realism is capable of assessing in comparison to Carr’s model of realism.
Why Carr Would Have Found Morgenthau’s Six Points Not Realist Enough
To appreciate why Carr would not approve of Morgenthau’s realism, it is essential to understand the similarities and differences between each man’s explanation of the realist school of thought. First, let us examine Morgenthau’s perspective. He views realism as a school that understands the contemporary world to be the result of forces that have naturally evolved out of human nature. Consequently, it is an imperfect world due to the irrational nature of the human forces that shape it. Controlling these forces, however, is impossible, and as such improving the world can only be done via checks and balances that limit their destructive potential.
Morgenthau’s realism uses the concept of interest defined in terms of power to establish a rational, objective means of assessing all political decision-making. In establishing this mode of evaluation, foreign policy decisions can then be objectively compared in different times and contexts ‘regardless of the different motives, preferences, and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesman’ while ignoring what he deems the fallacies of international political thought: concern with motives and ideological preferences. However, he concedes that despite the universal, omnipresent validity of interests defined by power, both interests and power are influenced by politics and culture at any given moment in history, and as such how they are conceived can change.
Carr emphasises a number of characteristics that would easily coalesce with Morgenthau’s realist framework. These include realism’s cynical nature, its focus on establishing inarguable facts, its concern with what the causes and effects of such facts are, and its belief in the overwhelming power of pre-existing forces and tendencies. Furthermore, it would not be unreasonable to expect that Carr would have been partial to defining interest in terms of power. He saw realism as having a bureaucratic approach to thinking rooted in empiricism that could likely seamlessly adopt Morgenthau’s systematised method of appraisal. Although Carr believed the bureaucratic approach to analysis eschewed a standard formulation of principles in favour of intuition born from experience, the ambiguity this injects into any systematic approach can be reconciled with Morgenthau’s approach via Morgenthau’s principle that the concepts of interest and power change depending on political and cultural context.
Given these similarities, how are Morgenthau’s six principles of political realism not realist enough for Carr’s liking? The answer lies in Carr’s polarised dichotomy of utopian and realist thought. Because of Carr’s distinction between the functional purpose of the two theoretical schools of thought within the International Relations discipline, the value-driven and wider-ranging nature of Morgenthau’s realism conflict with the sterilised positivism of his own brand of realism. As such, Carr would have found two aspects of Morgenthau’s realism difficult to square with his own perspective: its normative nature and its multifaceted analysis of human nature.
In Carr’s realist school of thought, theory can only provide a codification of political practice. Whereas utopianism attempts to compel political practice to conform to its theoretical standpoint, realism can only determine the existing facts of reality in pursuing its own theoretical position. As a result of this, realism can legitimately claim to occupy purely objective grounds. It relies solely on what has already occurred to deduce what is likely to happen next. Its analysis, rather than being founded in abstract, conceptual ideas, offers a depiction of the international political sphere untainted by values or goals.
By doing this, Carr’s realism forfeits any role in declaring what should be in the international political sphere, concerning itself solely with what already is. The aspirational side of international political thought is left entirely to the utopian school. Consequently, his interpretation of realism is prone to representing ‘nothing more than a rationalisation of conditioned and predetermined purpose’ that has nothing to say about changing the course of events. The flipside of this, however, is that it remains a distinctly positivist examination of international politics.
In contrast, Morgenthau’s realist school of thought includes a normative quality. It is true that his realism is founded in viewing international politics through the lens of interest defined in terms of power, providing it with a rational, objective means of assessing facts that is positivist in its nature and thus not in conflict with Carr’s realist tenets. However, Morgenthau sees realism as being cognisant ‘of the moral significance of political action,’ with the tension between morality and political action being an integral consideration from the realist perspective. Whilst he believes that the tension between universal moral principles and political action should not get in the way of such action being executed, he stresses that the state is subject to a different moral standard than individuals which is manifest in the moral imperative of national survival. By including a moralistic perspective within his realist doctrine, Morgenthau introduces an idealism that is antithetical to Carr’s perspective.
It is also relevant to note that Morgenthau’s realism considers manifold factors outside of the political realm. He asserts that realism takes into account not just ‘political man’ or ‘moral man,’ but also a variety of other aspects of human nature. Although all of these aspects consider interest defined in terms other than power, they all must be ultimately subordinated in favour of interest defined by power, which is what he views as making international politics a unique and novel discipline. In any case, by considering the variety of influences that inform human decision-making, Morgenthau broadens the scope of what political realism is capable of assessing in comparison to Carr’s model of realism.
Conclusion
The advantage of the realist school of thought in Carr’s view derives from its narrow conception of international politics. To him, realism merely represents one end of the spectrum that exists within the science of international politics. As such, it is important that it remains a positivist viewpoint: objective and far removed from the value-driven analysis that exists at the opposing utopian end of the spectrum. Morgenthau, on the other hand, conceives of realism as a comprehensive theory of international politics, making it necessary to analyse it through a prism of rationality whilst simultaneously allowing for the multifaceted and irrational aspects of human nature to be included in any analysis. In light of this, it is fair to say that Carr would find Morgenthau’s realism not realist enough for his liking. However, given that they conceive of realism from different perspectives, such a direct comparison is not particularly applicable.