Does economic warfare work? Lessons learned from the Montgomery bus boycott
In light of recent efforts to sanction Russia as a deterrent towards continued aggression against Ukraine, a glaring reality is emerging: sanctions may not achieve much in the course of deterring conflict. Then again, sanctions have long been used, even against active trade partners, and often do little to influence substantial changes in political, military or diplomatic activity. The Montgomery Bus boycott was a remarkable example of using economic warfare as a means of achieving a political end, however, it was not without its own intrinsic challenges. If sanctions are to actually have value, then large-scale, consistent, and accurate economic warfare methods must be applied to institute change.
The Montgomery Bus Boycott was a pivotal, non-violent tactic in the burgeoning US civil rights movement. In response to the arrest of Rosa Parks on December 1, 1955, the boycott began as a one day effort on December 5 that continued until December 20, 1956. The boycott was successful for a variety of reasons. 70% of the patrons using public transportation in Montgomery, Alabama were African-American, and 90% of these patrons participated in the boycott during its duration. The Montgomery City Lines was estimated to have lost 30–40,000 fares each day during the boycott that exacted a significant financial toll. Ultimately, it was the US Supreme Court ruling that upheld the lower court ruling in the case of Browder vs. Gayle regarding the unconstitutionality of segregated buses. Montgomery buses were then forced to desegregate, the boycott ended and the Montgomery bus boycott became a hallmark example of non-violent resistance as a means of achieving a political resolution.
What were the key factors in achieving a successful political outcome from this boycott?
- consistent non-violent practices on behalf of the aggrieved party
- exceptional participation among Montgomery bus patrons
- specifically targeting an economic entity (the bus company) versus a political entity (the police department, mayoral office or state legislature)
- collective and legal opposition to the aggressor beyond the aggrieved party
- a willingness to participate in a protracted boycott
Sanctions, embargoes, boycotts and divestment are all strategies advocated to target specific persons, companies, political entities or nations as a means of non-violent deterrence. The problem is that sanctions, the preferred economic warfare tactic at the state level, rarely achieve successful outcomes for a variety of reasons:
- Sanctions often intensify aggression from the targeted party while having limited effect against those instituting aggression
- Sanctions can be met with retaliatory sanctions from the targeted nation while being hard to remove once implemented
- Sanctions do not achieve desirable outcomes within short time frames (Ex. less than a year)
Investigating the countries currently being sanctioned by the United States reveals a lack of consistency with which countries are sanctioned. Amid the notorious authoritarian regimes of Iran, North Korea, Syria and Venezuela, Cuba remains sanctioned despite there being a US embassy and improved travel access. Most of the countries being sanctioned, such as Mali, Nicaragua, Myanmar, Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen and Iraq, are in some state of political turmoil and economic distress such that sanctions only add insult to injury (here’s looking at you, Afghanistan!). The list of countries sanctioned by the EU generally mirrors those of the United States, with the exception of such countries as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Guinea Bissau and Libya; Russia and Turkey’s inclusion on the list make for the only economic powers potentially affected by sanctions. Ultimately, countries being sanctioned are those on the down-and-out rather than an exclusive list of prosperous-but-villainous threats that would change tactics because of a loss of investment and trade.
Failure to target specific entities is another problem with regard to sanctions. China has come under fire for its actions in Xinjiang against ethnic Uyghurs, leading to internment in forced labor camps, coercive population control measures and destruction of religious institutions. These human rights violations have occurred in addition to the reduction of civil liberties and increased arrests in Hong Kong, the continued detention and torture of ethnic Tibetans, and continued, questionable militarization of artificial islands in the South China sea. What was the response to these aggressive acts? An advisory to businesses operating in Hong Kong warning them that increased oversight by the People’s Republic of China has reduced information privacy, free trade and could incur legal risks and potential incarceration. The only other sanctions against China are to prohibit owning securities that are linked to Chinese military operations.
If the US sanctions communist countries such as Cuba and North Korea, two countries sanctioned primarily because of their civil-rights-negating economic platforms and not because of direct military threats to the US, then why doesn’t the US sanction communist-run China more heavily? Why is the extent of US economic opposition declaring China a security “challenge” and boycotting diplomatic representation at the Winter Olympics? Why is it that China, a country notorious for condoning and perpetuating the theft of US intellectual property, capable of acting with impunity when sanctions could deter that economically destabilizing activity? A failure to target Chinese companies consistently, or even to issue sanctions at a national level, does not demonstrate a commitment to using economics as a deterrent from aggression and legal manipulation.
Sanctions also falter because of a lack of consistency in who is being sanctioned. In the military conflict in Yemen, fought between the Saudi Arabian-backed Yemeni government and Houthi rebels, all sides, including the Saudi-led coalition, have been involved in human rights abuses including excessive use of force, civilian deaths, unfair trials, disappearances and forced detentions. Moreover, human rights violations within Saudi Arabia include executions for non-violent offenses, forced labor, restrictions in free speech and continued restrictions on women’s rights. If the concern is to limit humanitarian violations both within and beyond a nation’s borders, wouldn’t Saudi Arabia be just as liable to sanctions as Yemen? It should come as no surprise that the US has an over $285 billion trade deficit with China and that the US gets 5–6% of its oil from Saudi Arabia’s substantial (17% of world supply) oil reserves; risking substantial trade losses for American businesses deters large-scale sanctions against these countries.
The reality, however, is that sanctions won’t work if the targeted party continues to act in an aggressive manner. In Spain’s long fight against Basque extremists who sought independence but who relied on less savory tactics, 800 people were killed and thousands injured from bombings and murders. In the end, it was not sanctions issued against ETA supporters but a general disinterest among Basque activities towards violence as a path to independence that led to the decline of ETA. This is why efforts such as the boycotting, divesting and sanctioning Israel gain little footing given that Palestinians participate equally with Israelis in perpetuating violence in relation to the conflict. So long as both sides implement aggressive tactics, economic warfare does little to stop the violence, as was evident amid the many sanctions levied against Russia after invading Crimea.
Ultimately, sanctions default to the same underlying motive that was responsible for success in the Montgomery Bus Boycott: the power of large-scale, civic resistance against a political entity. The problem is that sanctions are levied by politicians against other politicians or political entities, not by the people themselves. When citizens invariably are affected, and suffer, because of these sanctions, their recourse is either to oppose the sanctioning entity or struggle to attempt to resist their own political entity. What good can citizens do if they suffer equally from their own political imposition and that from an opposing nation? What good can citizens do when countries facing financial or arms embargoes can shift their investments to other markets? Expecting citizens to do the dirty work as a means of ousting ruling parties while encumbered by ongoing sanctions creates little incentive for internalized political shifts.
The Montgomery Bus Boycott was an exceptional, though unfortunately rare, measure in economic warfare that could influence conflict resolution before conflict emerges. Implementing sanctions, boycotts and alternative economic measures must happen before, and hopefully to the exclusion, of violent resistance that only escalates conflict further. Economic warfare should target specific entities responsible for causing conflict or sustaining conflict, whether they are energy suppliers, goods suppliers or even financial institutions. Participation in any economic warfare must be largescale and nearly unanimous. Most importantly, economic warfare should be done without haste and a willingness to wait at least one year, if not longer, before collective participation and cooperation defy the aggressive entity. The greatest limitation is that with no world-wide legal framework can limit aggressive nations, only collective, cooperative economic participation that limits all trade activities to aggressive parties can stop powers from continuing. Ultimately, and unfortunately, in the midst of ongoing military conflicts such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, sanctions are too little, too late. However, if there is a lesson that can be learned from this conflict, and from efforts such as the Montgomery bus boycott, it’s that collective efforts towards equality, peace and justice are worth the wait.
