Did we divide ourselves and blame the British?

Many writers and historians are of the opinion that the British divided India. Two examples below:

Forgotten Atrocities: Memoirs of a Survivor of the 1947 Partition of India: “The British empire followed a policy of ‘divide and rule’ … The British partitioned India and created the Islamic state, Pakistan and a secular India”

The Great Partition: “Partition…stands testament to the follies of empire, which ruptures community evolution, distorts historical trajectories and forces violent state formation from societies that would otherwise have taken different — and unknowable — paths.”

That the British had a divide and rule policy and that they split up India before leaving has become part of the popular narrative, at least in India. The British role in India’s division is brought up by the press and well known personalities even today.

Indian Express, Oct 24, 2016: “History’s bitter divide British-sowed enmity still inflames Indians and Pakistanis”

But now let’s read what the British had to say about the partition of India. The Secretary of State for India and Burma (The Earl of Listowel) delivered a speech on the Indian Independence Bill in the British Parliament on July 16, 1947 and had the following to say:

“I must apologize to your Lordships for speaking at considerable length about the past, but as this will be the last occasion when Parliament will discuss British responsibility for India, it is perhaps not altogether inappropriate that we should examine our consciences… It is a matter of great regret that British India will reach maturity as two nations instead of one, and that the unity from which so many blessings have sprung in times past will soon be broken. But the dilemma with which we were faced made self-government impossible without partition.

When it became clear that the Cabinet Mission Plan for an Indian Union would never be accepted, and that there was no alternative form of common government to which Hindus and Moslems would consent, we had either to agree to implement their separation, or to remain indefinitely in control of India, until such time as the two communities had composed their differences and decided to live together. The deadlock between the parties has… always been a formidable obstacle in the path of constitutional advance. It is surely better that India should be divided by mutual consent, than that she should remain united against her will, and be thrown ultimately into the convulsions of civil strife, as the only possible means of securing the form of government her peoples desire. It is greatly to be hoped that, when the disadvantages of separation have become apparent in the light of experience, the two Dominions will freely decide to reunite in a single Indian Dominion, which might achieve that position among the nations of the world to which its territories and resources would entitle it.”

The three key takeaways from this speech were:
1) Two particular triggers for the partition were a) the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan and b) lack of options besides partition that both Hindus and Muslims would consent to. We will have to explore both of these further.
2) British politicians at least at the face of it, were regretful about partition and felt it was a dilemma. The sceptic in you would obviously not want to believe what a politician says in public. But whether or not the British truly regretted India’s partition is immaterial as long as we are able to find out what led to the partition in the first place.
3) British wished that once the disadvantages of partition have become apparent to Indians and Pakistanis they will decide to reunite. This is quite surprising and a well forgotten theme.

Let’s explore the failure of the Cabinet Mission Plan and lack of options besides partition among Hindus and Muslims. But before we do that we have to understand the demographics of the time. India had 400 Mn people, of which 90 Mn were Muslims, another 80 Mn were of “depressed classes” — a reference to backward castes and another 16 Mn were Sikhs.

The UK Cabinet Mission of 1946 was formed at the initiative of Clement Attlee, the British Prime Minister at the time, and included Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of Board of Trade, and AV Alexander, the first Lord of Admiralty. The purpose of the Cabinet Mission was to put in place a plan that would transfer power to a new independent unified India. At this point, Britain was eager to transfer power as it had promised independence in return for support by British Indian troops in the second world war and, perhaps more importantly it no longer had the resources to sustain its vast civilian and military infrastructure in the country. The impact of various movements of the non-violent freedom struggle of course also had an impact, and so did the armed struggle of Indian National Army. The reasons for British finally deciding to give up on India require a separate exploration.

The Cabinet Mission had two primary objectives: determine the nature of the interim government and determine the long term constitutional framework of India. While Congress wanted to deal with the first topic, the Muslim League wanted to deal with the second one beforehand. One of the key conditions of the interim government was that both the Congress and Muslim League had to agree to the way its formed.

Sir Stafford Cripps on 18 July, 1946 presented to the British Parliament his account of what transpired with his mission. He divided the experience of the Cabinet Mission in India into four periods:
1. Arrival of Cabinet Mission to end of April,1946
2. End of April to 16th May, 1946 and issuance of first statement
3. 16th May to 16th June, 1946 and issuance of second statement
4. 16th June until departure on 29th June, 1946

In the first period, the Cabinet mission conducted formal interviews with “those communities, sections, parties, and individuals…” who they felt could assist in solving the various problems at hand and it enabled them “ to appreciate the feelings and the vastly differing desires of the very diverse population of 400,000,000 people with whose representatives” they were negotiating. He goes on to say, “a difficulty here was, of course that the Muslim League were committed up to the hilt to an independent, fully sovereign Pakistan as a separate entity, while the Congress were equally strongly pledged to a unitary India, though they had stated that they could not compel the people of any territorial unit to remain in an Indian Union against their declared will.”

This makes one thing clear, that the Muslim League, at the time of the Cabinet Mission was already wanting a fully sovereign Pakistan as a separate entity while the Congress wanted a united India.

During the second phase of the Cabinet Mission, Congress and Muslim League decided to come to the negotiating table in Shimla. They were to discuss the proposed plan of the Cabinet Mission, which had been worked out with the two parties already. The plan was as follows:

“A Union Government dealing with the following subjects: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. There will be two groups of Provinces, the one of the predominantly Hindu Provinces, and the other of the predominantly Muslim Provinces, dealing with all other subjects which the Provinces in the respective groups desire to be dealt with in common. The Provincial Governments will deal with all other subjects and will have all the residuary sovereign rights.”

The predominantly Muslim provinces included Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan and Bengal.

Once the parties met in Shimla, their differences instead of reconciling grew further apart. Both sides issued statements that were further away from the starting point. Sir Cripps also mentions, “it is perhaps worth stating that, contrary to allegations which were made in some quarters in India, we had not gone out to India with any cut and dried plan. We went out with open minds, since our object was not to impose a plan on India, but to help the Indians to agree a plan among themselves.” He also says that they released a statement on 16th May, which devoted 11 paragraphs to express the British view on the impracticality of a wholly sovereign Pakistan. While the statement of 16th May did not meet all the objectives of either the Congress or the Muslim League, it presented a compromise that the British hoped would be accepted. It was a plan for a united post-independence India.

On 16th May, Muslim League, while reserving opinion on the Pakistan issue, accepted the scheme put forward by the Cabinet Mission. Congress though had quite a few reservations about the 16th May plan. One of the points it was concerned about was whether provinces were compelled to join the Union or they could stay out. And the second point concerned the European vote, i.e. that vote of the European diaspora of India. Congress was of the opinion that the constitution should be of and for Indians and the Europeans should not have any say at all. As these initial reservations cleared up, the main critical question ended up being the form and shape of the interim Government.

Now came the third phase of negotiations.

The original structure of the interim government as proposed by the Cabinet Mission and Viceroy was: twelve person body composed of:
- five representatives from the Congress,
- five representatives from the Muslim League and
- two representatives of minorities (with at least one Sikh).

Sir Cripps writes, “As will appear from the correspondence in Command Paper 6861, the Congress took strong exception to parity between the two parties, and parity at this stage became the foremost obstruction to progress.”

The parity in question which became the main issue was to be achieved along the following three lines: between Muslim League and Congress, between Muslims and Hindus on a communal basis and between Muslims and Hindus other than scheduled castes.

The Cabinet Mission tried to balance this by adding a sixth representative to Congress from the “depressed classes”. Now the interim government’s composition would have been thirteen members as follows:
- six representatives from Congress (including one from “depressed classes”),
- five from the Muslim League, and
- two from minorities (with at least one Sikh).

Sir Cripps states: “This proposal Mr. Jinnah was prepared to put to his Committee and it would, I think, have been accepted by them, but Congress were not satisfied with it. At this stage we tried to get a meeting between Pandit Nehru and Mr. Jinnah in the hope that at such a meeting a compromise could be achieved, but… that attempt proved abortive.”

Finally the Cabinet Mission expanded the interim government proposal to fourteen members, and on 16th June issued a plan for an interim government which was to be composed as follows:
- six from Congress (including one from “depressed classes”)
- five from the Muslim League, and
- three from minorities (one Sikh, one Indian Christian and one Parsee)

The Viceroy at this point had an unofficial and tentative list of names from both sides. So the third stage of negotiations finally came to an end. Both the Congress and Muslim League had remained undecided about this interim government proposal.

Congress still could not consent to this because it was “very much troubled by the type of parity that still remained between Muslims and Hindus, other than scheduled castes, and also by the inclusion of Sir. N. P. Engineer.”

Congress wanted the ability to substitute one of its Hindu representatives by a Muslim one. However, a letter by Jinnah was leaked at this point which turned into a public spectacle. It said, the Muslim League would never accept the nomination of a Muslim other than a Muslim Leaguer, i.e. the Muslim League claimed to have exclusive and full right to represent the Muslims of India.
Congress finally came out and turned down the last interim government proposal of June 16th put forward by the Cabinet Mission, however in spirit they agreed with the May 16th statement.

Jinnah on the other hand thought it was an acceptable plan and was disappointed by Congress’ rejection.

Finally all negotiating parties seem to have got exhausted and instead of a representative interim government, an official British caretaker government took control, setting the clock back to the days prior to Morley-Minto reforms.

Sir Cripps adds, “in the ultimate stages the issue came down to a very narrow one, upon which neither party were prepared to give way, whether the Congress could nominate a Muslim as one of their representatives in the Interim Government”

Churchill, while sitting in opposition, in his remarks, said “the Muslim community feel themselves deeply, aggrieved by what they regard as a departure from the terms of Paragraph 8 of the statement of 16th June made by the Cabinet delegation and the Viceroy. This statement runs as follows: In the event of the two major parties or either of them proving unwilling to join in the setting up of a coalition government on the above lines, it is the intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an interim government which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the statement of May 16th. The Muslim League agreed to enter this, and when the Hindu Congress members refused, or it broke down on this point of procedure, I understand that the Muslim League made a violent complaint.”

So the Cabinet Mission failed because of the hostility between the Congress and Muslim League and particularly over the representation of Muslims in the constituent assembly.

This raises two questions:
1. What was the reason the Muslim League was so concerned about representation of Muslims in the constituent assembly? and
2. Why did the Muslim League raise the question of an independent Pakistan in full force after this incident?

To understand Muslim League’s apprehensions about the constituent assembly and a united India, one of the few primary sources we have are Jinnah’s speeches. In his address in Lahore in 1940, this is what he had to say:

“We had many difficulties to face from January 1939 right up to the declaration of war. We had to face the Vidya Mandir in Nagpur. We had to face the Wardha Scheme all over India. We had to face ill-treatment and oppression to Muslims in the Congress-governed provinces. We had to face the treatment meted out to Muslims in some of the Indian States such as Jaipur and Bhavnagar. We had to face a vital issue that arose in that little state of Rajkot. … Before the war was declared the greatest danger to the Muslims of India was the possible inauguration of the federal scheme in the central Government … After the war was declared, the Viceroy naturally wanted help from the Muslim League. It was only then that he realised that the Muslim League was a power… And it is quite clear from the attitude of Mr. Gandhi and the High Command that they have not yet recovered from that shock.”

Jinnah went on to further say, “But it must be freedom of all India and not freedom of one section or, worse still, of the Congress caucus — and slavery of Mussalmans and other minorities….Situated in India as we are, we naturally have our past experiences and particularly the experiences of the past 2 1/2 years of provincial constitution in the Congress-governed provinces. We have learnt many lessons. We are now, therefore, very apprehensive and can trust nobody.”

He further goes on to criticize Congress’ plan to have an independent India’s government elected by full adult franchise. “Apart from all that, suppose we do not agree as to the franchise according to which the Central Assembly is to be elected, or suppose the solid body of Muslim representatives do not agree with the non-Muslim majority in the Constituent Assembly, what will happen? … In the event of there being a disagreement between the majority of the Constituent Assembly and the Mussalmans, in the first instance, who will appoint the tribunal?…We come back to the same answer, the Hindu majority would do it; and will it be with the help of the British bayonet or the Gandhi’s “Ahinsa”? Can we trust them any more? …can you imagine that a question of this character, of social contract upon which the future constitution of India would be based, affecting 90 million of Mussalmans, can be decided by means of a judicial tribunal? Still, that is the proposal of the Congress.”

It is fairly clear from this that the Muslim League and Jinnah were concerned about representation because they felt they would be outnumbered by Hindus and they no longer trusted the Congress as a secular organisation. They instead believed Congress was a Hindu organisation doing what is in the best interest of the “caste Hindus” i.e. upper caste Hindus. He felt that had the Hindu majority come into power, it would have not made fair decisions acceptable to the 90 Mn Muslims of India. He points to recent treatment of Muslims for this mistrust. So to understand why the mistrust, we will have to look at these incidents. Additionally, Lala Lajpat Rai had mentioned, “I do honestly and sincerely believe in the necessity or desirability of Hindu-Muslim unity. I am also fully prepared to trust the Muslim leaders. But what about the injunctions of the Koran and Hadis? The leaders cannot over-ride them. Are we then doomed? I hope not. I hope your learned mind and wise head will find some way out of this difficulty.”

So there were two parts of the Muslim mistrust. Given past incidents they were unsure of fairness in a fully representative government where they were outnumbered 3:1. Additionally, there was a conflict of how the rules applicable would jibe with the religious scriptures.

The London Times said, “Undoubtedly the difference between the Hindus and Muslims is not of religion in the strict sense of the word but also of law and culture, that they may be said indeed to represent two entirely distinct and separate civilisations. However, in the course of time the superstitions will die out and India will be moulded into a single nation.”

Jinnah’s view was, “nationalities which are as divergent today as ever” cannot be expected to reconcile. He goes on to say, “it is extremely difficult to appreciate why our Hindu friends fail to understand the real nature of Islam and Hinduism…The Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literature[s]. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine together, and indeed they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions. Their aspects on life, and of life, are different. It is quite clear that Hindus and Mussalmans derive their inspiration from different sources of history.”

It is interesting to note that Jinnah himself had married a Parsi lady and was a fairly liberal Muslim. Most Islamic right wingers opposed Jinnah for a good part of his career. He was fully westernized in his language, education, dressing and thought process. However, he claimed to represent the wishes of Muslims. It is important to explore at this juncture the relationship between Hindus and Muslims.
One thing is undoubtedly clear, conflict between Muslims and Hindus had been around for centuries.
Historical survey of some major communal riots authored by Zenab Banu and reproduced in HinduNet mentions some of the below riots:
- 1713 AD in Ahmedabad over opposition to solemnize Holi on one side and cow slaughter on the other side
- 1729 AD in Delhi — a murder of a Mussalman by a Hindu for reason not known
- 1786 AD in Balpur — Muslims commit armed attack on Hindus who were busy with prayers
- 1851 AD in Bombay — publication of something inflammatory by a Parsi in a Gujarati newspaper
- 1886 AD in Etawah and Delhi — simultaneous occurrence of Ramlila and Moharram

And the list goes on…

Now let us look at the difficulties Jinnah claims Muslims had to face in the couple of years leading up to his Lahore speech in 1940.

Wardha Scheme was a resolution passed at a conference chaired by Mahatma Gandhi, that provided for every child in India to get free and compulsory education, in his or her mother tongue. The education further was to be around manual and productive work, including handicrafts. Dr. Zakir Hussain further chaired a follow-on committee and resolved, that there should be no place for English and religious education in the curriculum. Muslim League had a problem with the latter, as it felt religious education was of primary importance.

Vidya Mandir Scheme was a scheme to provide primary education at a nominal cost introduced in Central Provinces and Berar spearheaded by Pandit Ravi Shankar Shukla, Minister of Education at the time. The Muslim League opposed it because it neglected Urdu in favour of Hindi and made the singing of “Vande Mataram” compulsory.

According to some sources, “ill-treatment and oppression to Muslims in the Congress-governed provinces” refers primarily to Congress ensuring that Muslim League leaders stay out of government formation. Additionally, Congress started a “Muslim Mass Contact” movement trying to win away voters from the Muslim League. According to Indian Political Thought written by KS Padhy, the concerns regarding mis-treatment of Muslims in Congress led provinces were baseless. Congress had won clear majority in five provinces: United Provinces, Central Provinces, Madras, Bihar and Orissa. In Bombay, Bengal, Assam and NWFP, it had emerged as the single largest party. When the Congress accepted office, a Parliamentary Board was formed to supervise the work of the minorities and give them general guidance on policy. It consisted of Sardar Patel, Dr. Rajendra Prasad and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. Maulana Azad was responsible for parliamentary affairs in several provinces and every communal incident came up before Azad. He observed that all allegations levelled by Jinnah were absolutely false. Maulana Azad was even prepared to resign if proven wrong.

It is fairly clear that Jinnah was a politician of the first order. When the Congress started reaching out to Muslims and later decided to have one of its Hindu representatives in the Cabinet Mission proposed constituent assembly replaced by a Muslim, Jinnah saw his power and influence with the Muslim community fading away. There is reason to believe that a demand for a separate Pakistan came at this juncture. It was something greater than what the Congress could offer. Congress could offer only fair representation and equality. Jinnah could offer a separate state.

Rajmohan Gandhi, the grandson of Mahatma Gandhi, and a research professor at the Center for South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign sums up the reason for partition as follows (in his SC Bose lecture):

“If the British leave, who would rule whom? This became the burning question in India, and Indian history tells us that right from the 18th century there was always an Indian section, whether large or small, that feared or opposed the possible replacement of British rule by a dominant Indian group…given the existence of Muslim-majority provinces, that a journey towards independence that did not remove Muslim anxieties was bound to lead to Partition. I believe this conclusion to be valid irrespective of whether or not these Muslim anxieties were justified…RSS chief, M.S Golwalkar… said: “Germany has… shown how well nigh impossible it is for races and cultures having differences going to the root to be assimilated into one united whole… The foreign races in Hindustan… must lose their separate existence to merge in the Hindu race or they may stay… wholly subordinated to the Hindu nation.”

So here we have it. Cultural and religious differences had always existed. Occasional communal violence kept reminding people that they didn’t belong to the same side of the fence. For a long period, Muslim rulers had ruled India and later a (relatively) neutral third party had ruled. Now that the time for self-rule was coming, there was a worry that a truly democratic system would lead to a rule by the Hindus over the Muslims. To add to fears, some organizations made it clear that minorities would have to be subservient to the ruling majority. The Congress run provinces were run in a way that provided ample opportunities to the Muslim League politicians to stoke the fears of the Muslim electorate. The Muslim League additionally did not let competing Muslim viewpoints (like that of Maulana Azad) flourish and claimed exclusivity over the representation of Indian Muslims. Its initial battle for political power eventually became a call for a separate nation. Some of this was also fanned by the fears of the nawabs of UP and Bihar who were set to lose their fiefdoms in an Independent India. While the idea of a Pakistan to be carved out of the Muslim majority areas surfaced, it was not the Muslim majority areas that truly wanted its creation. The partition finally came down to the Congress not accepting the June 16th constituent assembly proposal of the Cabinet Mission. Had it been accepted, perhaps things could have turned out differently. But hindsight is always 20/20. At the same time, a country with a distorted quota based democracy system, would have had lesser chance of success. One thing for sure, we divided ourselves, not the British.

The question that is left unanswered is whether Muslims of India are really a different nation. If we listen to modern scholars such as Arif Mohammad Khan, the separate identity of Muslims is an unnecessary argument which has been wholly destructive for the community as well as India. Also no state had ever been created on religious lines. Pakistan has not been very successful in keeping together its identity in-tact as can be seen with the conflicts in East Pakistan and Baluchistan, as well condition of Muhajirs (Muslim Indian migrants to Pakistan). Perhaps countries formed based on ethnic and linguistic lines have a higher chance of cohesiveness. Had religion been a reasonable ground for nationhood, one would not have had several countries in Middle East — all of which are Muslim, yet carry separate identities based on ethnic and tribal distinctions. The other question is whether Muslims of India truly were anxious and wanted a separate state or could a constituent assembly proposal have worked its way to alleviate the fears. It is hard to understand how Muslim League got an authority to speak on behalf of all Muslims. Was it the Muslims of India voicing their opinion or a political elite that wanted to gain power using a large electorate (that just happened to be Muslim)? Perhaps the modern history of a post-independence secular India would suggest that India turned out to be better than it was feared to be. It remained secular, albeit with its share of problems.

In Earl of Listowel’s words, “when the disadvantages of separation have become apparent in the light of experience, the two Dominions will freely decide to reunite in a single Indian Dominion, which might achieve that position among the nations of the world to which its territories and resources would entitle it.” Have the disadvantages of separation become apparent? Is it time for a re-unification of the Indian subcontinent?