The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor — the Unanswered Questions
I was interviewed on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by Zofeen Ebrahim, for The Third Pole, which you can read here. That interview was well edited, and also features interesting answers to the questions from Michael Kugelman of the Wilson Center. In case of interest, though, below is the lengthier version of the answers I gave.
1. Despite a national level consensus over CPEC, why does distrust (mistrust) persist among political parties, provinces, the media and even the people?
CPEC is an initiative with substantial political, economic and strategic implications for Pakistan, yet there have been many unknown elements to it, whether it comes to the financing, the sequencing, the beneficiaries and even basic questions about which projects are really moving forward. In that sense, some level of mistrust is inevitable. While it isn’t possible to be completely transparent about every single detail of every deal, both the Pakistani government and the Chinese government could have done more to address the opacity around the scheme. There is politics in play too though: some provinces want a bigger share of the pie, some people want angles to attack the government, some want more of a say over how CPEC proceeds, and so on. The situation has improved since the start of 2016, both in terms of the information being released and the reduced intensity of the political infighting, but the stakes around it around high and I suspect that battles over the spoils, the credit, and the blame are never going to stop entirely.
2. Is this bickering coming in the way of the smooth execution of the various projects under CPEC? What should be done to gain a genuine support from all?
The bickering has not been helpful — it has been a major source of concern for the Chinese, who don’t want to be embroiled in political controversy and who have encouraged the government to do more to bring the provinces along. It initially made it harder to push plans forward in places such as K-P, and at points it has even resulted in a problematic level of uncertainty around the entire initiative. But the implementation challenges are now more about bureaucratic capacity and effective coordination than the political fights that clouded the first year. This is a mammoth undertaking and neither the Chinese side nor the Pakistani side have attempted anything quite like it.
In Pakistan, although the Planning Commission has a central role, much of the process is split between different ministries and decision-makers, with a number of ensuing turf battles, and despite the establishment of a CPEC committee, there’s still a sense that the whole thing is essentially a government initiative rather than one where national consensus is the paramount consideration. While there is much that is the prerogative of the elected government of the day, given the very long-term nature of the CPEC plans, there’s more of an onus than usual to build and maintain broad-based consent for the details of the scheme rather than just its general thrust. Implementation isn’t just a national-level issue though — privately, the Chinese side are critical of the fact that certain provinces that have made a lot of noise about the lack of investments coming their way have lagged behind others when it comes to doing their homework on their projects, for instance on land acquisition.
3. What can China do to crease out these differences?
The Chinese side could certainly help on the transparency issue, which would make a significant difference to perceptions. The Pakistani government often gets blamed for the secrecy around some of the projects but Pakistani officials are actually often quite eager to showcase some of them — the caution in a number of these cases comes from the Chinese government and Chinese companies. In general, Beijing would like to see a smoother implementation process, and an entity that resembles a “one-stop shop” for CPEC rather than the more diffuse arrangements that are currently in place — but it’s ultimately it’s a Pakistani decision how to manage a complex national project like this. Chinese officials have nudged the government to put new mechanisms in place but they need to tread a little carefully to ensure that it’s not just a way to circumvent the normal political process around an initiative like this. And a venture like CPEC is new for them too — the Chinese bureaucracy has faced its own challenges, from the approvals process to the flood of private firms that arrived to bid for projects in Pakistan. They’ve put vast, comprehensive investment packages of this sort in place at home but never abroad, on this scale and speed — they’re learning.
4. Should there be an independent and autonomous CPEC authority?
Many of the decisions around CPEC are inherently political in nature and so the elected civilian government should naturally have a leading role — it can’t just be hived off to a fully independent and autonomous body to make the critical calls. But a body that that can drive a more effective and inclusive implementation process, incorporating a role for the military and a role for the provinces, would have advantages for all sides, and could be maintained on a long-term basis. There is some concern that an “independent authority” is just code for taking the control away from the civilian government entirely — it would depend how it was constituted, who chaired and ran it and so on, but that needn’t and shouldn’t be the case.
5. Should CPEC’s security be handled by the army? There are rumours if the PM does not relent, it could lead to him having to step down. Pls comment.
CPEC consists of a wide array of projects, and the security measures required will vary considerably — some of them necessitate direct army protection, others may benefit from the army’s involvement in security planning. It appears that the Chinese are keen to have the army hard-wired into virtually all of the projects, given how central their security concerns are and the level of trust that they have for the army as an institution. Over the long-term though, it’s clearly not desirable for anyone if every road, power plant, and industrial park requires military protection. There are already plans for a second Special Security Division for CPEC protection, which adds up to a remarkably large number of personnel all in — around 30,000. There may be need for “iron-clad” security in the short-to-medium term but ultimately the CPEC projects will have to be more normalized if the Chinese and other investors are going to feel entirely comfortable. I doubt the rumours, but I would note — purely hypothetically — that, were anything like that to happen, it would be reputationally disastrous for China. If the flagship project of Xi Jinping’s “Belt and Road” initiative was directly tied to a weakening of civilian rule in Pakistan, there would be serious questions for many other governments around the world about their own involvement, and all the more so if China was seen to have provided even tacit encouragement.
