When sanity meets insanity: The logic of nuclear weapons revised
How Russia’s “de-escalation” doctrine defies conventional logic — and deterrence
The logic of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence is funny — in a terrifying, horrifying, nightmare-inducing way. The logic of nuclear deterrence is not quite like anything else. On the one hand it’s complete, unadulterated madness, but on the other it is perfectly, pragmatically rational: Attack with nuclear weapons and expect to be attacked with nuclear weapons in turn.
Nuclear weapons tend to evoke strong emotions — and for good reason, being the most potent weapons of mass genocide we have ever devised — but the logic of how to use them and how to deter their use is ice cold.
To illustrate the mad logic of nuclear weapons, consider the calm, measured fear with which one normally sees strategists and decision-makers talk about escalation — that is, about conventional war between superpowers “escalating” or turning into nuclear war.
Then consider that in Russian nuclear doctrine the first use of a nuclear weapon can actually be understood as de-escalation.
That’s right. To Russian nuclear strategists, launching a surprise nuclear attack on a single city or military target is no longer seen as an apocalyptic event inviting nuclear retaliation, but a tool that can be used for de-escalating a conflict and coercing the opponent into ending the conflict on Russia’s terms. Given the conventional wisdom that any use of nuclear weapons will dramatically increase the likelihood of further escalation, de-escalating with a nuclear strike may sound like the musings of a raving lunatic. But the truly scary part is that its logic is actually sound.
While “escalating to de-escalate” has a very Soviet ring to it, in a cold, rational analysis “de-escalating” with a nuclear first-strike unfortunately makes a horrifying amount of sense. It could have a decent chance of actually working out as intended if used in a real-world conflict. Such as, say, in a nascent armed confrontation between Russia and NATO.
As counterintuitive as it sounds, de-escalation is a very real stratagem in Russian nuclear thinking, and one that the West hasn’t yet countered with an effective and credible deterrent. It therefore has a frighteningly realistic chance of actually being employed should NATO and Russia edge closer to open war. Which, in all likelihood, is of course the very reason why Russia has chosen to communicate the idea publicly rather than keeping it secret as an ace up its sleeve: The idea that nuclear weapons would be usable after all as actual weapons in a limited war is a powerful threat, and therefore a powerful way to deter one’s opponent.
With its nuclear “de-escalation” doctrine, Russia has effectively found a new way to make its nuclear weapons relevant again.
But why would a country with enough nuclear missiles to level most major cities in Europe and the United States need to beef up its deterrence with additional threats? Why does the threat of “de-escalating” Stockholm or Warsaw into irradiated rubble matter at all compared to the decades-old threat of leveling London, Paris, New York, and Washington, D.C., all in one fell swoop?
Much of it boils down to two unique characteristics of nuclear deterrence.
First, under the madness of M.A.D., or Mutually Assured Destruction, nuclear weapons may not actually be at all usable as weapons of war. They may simultaneously succeed in deterring their own use but utterly fail in deterring war between states that have them. The fear of all-out nuclear war could well end up only enabling a conventional war under a nuclear umbrella. Strategic nuclear weapons would become next to worthless.
Second, nuclear deterrence is not only not lost after a limited first use, but may actually be strengthened after the first nuclear strike has been launched. The idea of “de-escalating” a conflict with a nuclear attack depends on the assessment that, rather than evoking a retaliation-in-kind, the attack would actually invoke further restraint from the opposing party. This is not an altogether unreasonable assumption, as any retaliation could still be met with even greater nuclear annihilation — a fear strengthened by one side just having demonstrated its willingness to engage in nuclear mass murder.
So the logic boils down to this: If a madman held a gun to your head, would you take the opportunity to punch him in the stomach for shooting your neighbor’s cat?
That is the mad logic of nuclear weapons. That is the logic by which otherwise sane men can discuss a nuclear attack and call it de-escalation.
That twisted logic is, however, something that we must both comprehend and utilize if we wish to preserve our civilization in this increasingly unstable, multi-polar world of ours, where the decision to launch nuclear weapons may fall to the likes of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump. We may not be able to reason with a madman or a cold-blooded killer, but we may just be able to deter them.
