As Vladimir Putin sends 16,000 troops to Crimea to likely follow through on his ultimatum, it appears that the annexation of the strategically important peninsula, whether de facto or de jure, is likely to happen. Since his earliest days in power, Putin, the man who said the fall of the Soviet Union was a “genuine tragedy,” has sought to remake his (perceived) once-great empire. The entire Ukraine, of course, is #1 on his shopping list, but the Crimea will do for now.
More interesting than his desire for the Ukraine, perhaps, is how he got what he wanted. To get it, Putin used his normal “playbook”:
fuel separatist sentiments, justify military action by asserting the need to protect ethnic Russians (or at least passport holders), and then “maintain the peace” by stationing Russian forces permanently. In effect, dismember your weak neighbors.
While doubtful, it may be that Putin knows something about mid-19th century American history when US President James K. Polk seized control of the Oregon Territory. If anything, the similarities are striking. On March 4, 1845, Polk laid claim to both Oregon and Texas. Speaking of Texas in his inaugural address, Polk said:
Foreign powers should therefore look on the annexation of Texas to the United States not as the conquest of a nation seeking to extend her dominions by arms and violence, but as the peaceful acquisition of a territory once her own.
Eventually, Polk’s claim to Texas led to the Mexican-American War in 1848. But the claim to Oregon ended much differently. In the same address, Polk exclaimed that the US “title to the country of Oregon is ‘clear and unquestionable.’” However, the claim to the Oregon Territory was at best dubious as many other countries, including Britain, Spain, and Russia (ha!) vied for control of that land. So how did the United States ultimately get the northwestern prize? Polk made sure “our people,” Americans, would move in to the territory “to perfect that title by occupying it with their wives and children.” It was the British that accepted joint occupancy in the territory until Polk decided to stir up nationalist sentiment with the “Fifty-four Forty of Fight!” slogan first espoused in his presidential campaign. Polk was even willing to risk war to have exclusive rights over Oregon. The British, risk averse at the time, did not want a large conflict and ceded the territory to the United States, lest violence break out.
Polk’s movements with Oregon are astoundingly similar to Putin’s in the Crimea. Putin, with the claim that Russians are in the region he wants, has justified protecting his own by sending his troops—or “peacekeeping forces”—to the peninsula (the same move was used in South Ossetia in 2008). Putin also stirred up nationalistic sentiment in Crimea for the idea of being part of Russia again.
Meanwhile, the Westerners that could “do something”—the United States or NATO—are being risk-averse and chose an isolation strategy, lest there be violence (history—and writing—repeating itself). The West made the same calculation as Britain did all those years ago: it’s nice to have, but it’s not worth fighting for. Thus, if history is any guide, Putin will get Crimea, his strategic maritime location. The most forceful maneuvers we can expect from those opposed to this land grab will be diplomatic and economic (which is not to say it will be ineffective, because it has the potential to be).
So are there any lessons to be learned from Oregon and Crimea examples? For one, it pays to be an avowed expansionist when you have risk-averse adversaries. Second, “bloodless coups” are possible if there is an appearance of a legitimate claim to the territory. Polk had to make his up by reigniting nationalist sentiment and sending Americans to the region; Putin already had a pro-Russia population in his prized land, but made them legally Russian via passports, just in case. Finally, if you want something that others want, move quickly. Polk made it known he wanted Oregon in March 1845 and achieved his goal in June 1846, which, in that time, was lightning fast. Putin saw an opening and moved in, illegitimately, in about a week. The time-frames are off, but the principle is the same.
By no means is this comparison meant to equate Polk with Putin; however, neither man could claim to be saint. And, of course, the international context and technology with which to see out these desires are completely different. But history provides us with the knowledge that it repeats itself, and what was once a good plan sometimes, but not always, could work again. While the moves Putin made are seen as part of his classic “playbook,” they’re not his original plays. Polk copyrighted all this on parchment years ago.
