American Foreign Policy and the Vietnam War
It’s said that US involvement in Vietnam was a simple one; fear of the domino effect — that if a country falls to a communist regime, then the neighboring countries were soon to follow — was the main cause. However, there are debates between historians on whether or not the United States had any choice but to go to war against Vietnam. Some, such as Claude G. Berube, argue that the United States had failed in its foreign policy with Vietnam — more specifically the OSS and the Viet-Minh — whereas some historians such as Gabriel Koko, in his book Anatomy of a War: Vietnam, The United States, and the Modern Historical Experience (Hopkins, 2000) argue that an escalation of war was the natural progression of America’s desire for global hegemony during the Cold War (Koko, 1985). This investigation will argue that, had foreign relationships succeeded between 1945 to 1950, US involvement in Vietnam could have been avoided. By looking at the OSS Deer team within Vietnam, letter correspondence between Minh and President Truman, and finally US betrayal of Ho Chi Minh, the failure of American foreign policy will become evident.
The OSS was a predecessor to the CIA, seeking intelligence in foreign countries; in May of 1945, the OSS Deer team was created to fight the Japanese which were occupying Vietnam at the time (Reynolds, 2007). The deer team worked closely with the Viet Minh, — becoming close after saving Minh’s life following their arrival at the camp — supplying intelligence on Japanese troop and supply movements. The collaboration grew until the Viet-Minh were helping rescue downed American pilots, and the OSS was supplying them with arms and radios. The OSS trained 50 to 100 guerrilla fighters to help ambush the Japanese, and their collaboration was an enormous success (Dnewbold, 2019).
Minh had hoped that a powerful ally such as the United States could help the Viet-Minh drive both the French and Japanese out of Vietnam. Minh disregarded the alliance that the US and France had in Europe and hoped that — due to the close relationship of the OSS and the Viet-Minh, and the shared drive for political sovereignty — that future collaboration would be secured (Mcdonald, 2012).
On August 16th, 1945, shortly after Japanese surrender, the OSS deer team had a celebratory dinner before their final departure. Minh was said to have told the OSS “I want to thank each of you for what you have done for us. We are truly grateful. You are welcome to come back at any time (Smith, 2019).”
The OSS and the Viet-Minh shared common ground regarding the Japanese, leading to a close relationship (Woolf, 2017). At the same time though, when viewed in a broader context, the United States was not fully invested in the Vietnam conflict at the time (Singh, 2009 ). Being spread thinly over the Second World War, they were desperate for allies. A memo from the White House in July of 1945 stated to “help anybody who will help us shoot at the Japanese. (Warner, 1972)” Thus the OSS was a subsection of a generalized war effort.
Nonetheless, trying to maintain good relations, Minh wrote to the US multiple times. His first letters, written on November 1st, 1945, proposed sending a delegation of 50 Vietnamese youths to the US to promote friendly cultural relations and to study at US universities (Fay, 2013). This is an evident sign of the strong alliance which Minh must have assumed. The nature of these letters turns quickly as French forces return to Indochina with no intention of leaving. On January 18th, 1946, Minh wrote a letter in which he begs the US for support in fighting the French forces (Fay, 2013). Minh had hoped that by having the US as an ally, the French would immediately cease all hostile activities. But, the US did not respond to Minh. This marks a decline in US relationships with Vietnam.
Then on February 16th, another letter arrives in which Minh cites the US’ guiding principles before, during, and after WW2, followed by asking for US aid to Vietnam in the face of French aggression (Fay, 2013). Minh asks what had been granted to the Philippines — “like the Philippines our goal is full independence and full cooperation with the United States. (Pentagon, 2011)” Once more, the US does not answer, but it shows the want and willingness on Minh’s part to collaborate and ally with the US. Instead, the US adopted a neutral policy of non-interference. This lasts up until the 1950s when the US authorized financial and military support towards France (Gary, 1972). It is also the last letter that Minh writes to the US.
The United States clearly had the option to become a close ally with Vietnam, their leader Ho Chi Minh was eager to have them cooperate and tried on multiple occasions to open lines of dialogue — as shown by the multitude of letters. Instead, they decided to ignore the advances and focus on their European allies instead. This is a failure of their foreign policy, as they would end up fighting the Viet Minh. The US refusing to become closer allies would prove an enormous factor in their decision to wage war.
Truman decided to abandon Minh and their alliance; shown by the ignoring of letters and lack of action from the American side. This was not entirely due to ideological differences. Minh even held a speech in front of newly independent Vietnam, in which he started by quoting Thomas Jefferson; showing how fiercely pro-American Minh was; celebrating Roosevelt’s anti-imperialist ideologies and the struggle for independence during the American revolution (Lindsey, 2016). Even with the VML so eager to cooperate, starting in the early ’50s, Truman would start to (initially) overtly support the French and then finally show his support publicly by giving both financial aid, as well as military troops towards the Vietnam conflict. The reasons for this abandonment are of two key natures: political and economical. While Major Thomas discarded the idea of there being a communist nature to the Viet-Minh back in 1945 (Balestrieri, 2017), by the 1950s — partly due to lack of help by the United States — the Viet-Minh were receiving both weapons and training by the Chinese army; a known communist country (Mcdonald, 2012). Thus Truman saw the Viet-Minh as a communist aggressor who was fighting their World War 2 ally: France. This leads to the economic reasoning behind Minh’s abandonment. Minh had hoped that an alliance could be built due to Roosevelt’s anti-imperialist beliefs. But following his death, and Truman’s new position of power, this was no longer the case. Following WW2, France was in economic ruin. By reclaiming ownership of Vietnam, France was looking to increase its own sources of income — Vietnam was valuable to them in that regard. For Truman, it was a question of helping an obscure Asian country or helping their ally rebuild themselves from the ashes of WW2 (Dnewbold, 2019).
Thus, by abandoning Minh and siding with France, the US forced themselves into a position where they would have no other choice but to intervene in the Vietnam war. Had they, for example, instead decided to follow through with Minh and give orders for the French to cease all hostile activities, the war in Vietnam could have been avoided — or the alliances would have looked quite different. Regardless, this failure in foreign policy was an enormous influence on their decision to go to war.
Based on the evidence presented in the essay, historian Claude G. Berube provides the most convincing argument; America’s failure to follow up on the foreign policy established in the year of 1945 was an enormous influence on its decision to enter the Vietnam conflict. By initially being an ally, the US paralyzed the Viet-Minh in their ability to defend themselves as they scrambled for US support as they were attacked by the French — as shown by the desperate letters Minh wrote to Truman. Finally, this led to the Viet-Minh being forced to look elsewhere; eventually turning to the Chinese for weapons and training. This marked the originally nationalist group as Communist to the Americans, thus making it easier for Truman to rationalize his abandonment of the relationship they had constructed through the OSS team. Had Truman decided to help and foster the Viet-Minh while they were still fiercely pro-American, we may remember Vietnam as a roaring success; not the 20-year quagmire of slaughter and human suffering.
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