BP Macondo Disaster: It Will Happen Again
In that Macondo forgotten even by the birds, where the dust and the heat had become so strong that it was difficult to breathe . . . .
Gabriel Garcia Marquez, One Hundred Years of Solitude
Five and a half years have passed since a mammoth oil spill decimated the environment in the Gulf of Mexico in April 2010. This event became known as the BP Macondo Incident, taking its name from the oil giant, and BP’s ironically-titled oil prospect, Macondo, that was being drilled when disaster struck. Oil and gas under high pressure escaped inadequate sealing and containment technology and killed 11 aboard Transocean’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. The rig sank to the bottom of the Gulf of Mexico two days later. For 87 days, up to 5 million barrels of oil spewed into the Gulf of Mexico. The movement of the spilled oil continues to be studied today, and is estimated to cover approximately 1,200 square miles.
The world has moved on. The BP Macondo disaster ebbed to the back of our minds. After all the coverage of the lives lost and nature devastated, things seemed safer. They made it safer, didn’t they?
BP Macondo became a public tragedy on a very large scale. The oil spill became known as the largest in US history. It is considered the biggest environmental disaster in US history as well. Eleven people on board the Deepwater Horizon were killed and at least 17 others were injured. The media exposed this catastrophe as a massive and shocking failure. The American public and the world watched in helpless awe as oil flooded the Gulf of Mexico on live television. Esoteric oil and gas terminology such as riser, drill pipe, blowout preventer, drilling mud and ROV were unexpectedly thrust upon a confused audience. We hoped for a fast resolution. Yet T. Boone Pickens authoritatively told us that an easy solution was unlikely. The spectacle cultivated the ubiquitous question: Why can’t they just shut it off?
Victims’ families were crushed by loss and grief. The absence of information exacerbated the blow. They only knew their loved ones had experienced something indescribably horrible.
Outrage, blame, investigation, upheaval and deliberation ensued as the world tried to ascertain what had gone wrong — and why. The federal government needed accountability and safety going forward. It immediately put the brakes on offshore drilling. A six month drilling moratorium was enacted by the Department of the Interior. Changes to regulatory bodies followed. Serious studies were undertaken. Answers began to trickle out. Mistakes had been made. Risks had been stacked and compounded. Things had turned bad fast. The last line of defense had failed.
For many reasons, some known and others unclear, a huge blowout occurred at the Macondo well that horrific evening in April 2010. A blowout is the uncontrolled release of oil and/or gas from a well. In the early days of oil and gas, blowouts were the events recorded in old black and white “gusher” photographs showing fountains of crude oil. The extraordinarily high pressures encountered in modern oil and gas wells often present potential blowouts with lethal consequences.
Looking beyond all the circumstances, beyond all the assigned faults that caused the blowout, it becomes clear that the key apparatus of last resort that could have stopped this disaster failed to stop anything. This critical piece of equipment is known as a blowout preventer, a “BOP” in oil and gas vernacular. The job of the BOP is to bring together two massive blades, like a cigar chopper, in order to cut completely through a pipe partially obstructing an out-of-control well. When the BOP succeeds in its mission and severs the impeding pipe, the flow of oil and gas is stopped and a seal is formed in the well.
The BP Macondo blowout preventer was theoretically capable of sealing the well. Regrettably, it was not strong enough to execute its only assigned task. When the irreparable sequence of mistakes had occurred, the BOP was called upon to prevent the blowout at hand. Its function in those dire moments was to unequivocally halt the violent flow of high pressure hydrocarbons. The blowout preventer clanged its blades against a drill pipe in the well and stopped. It did not have the power to cut through the obstructing drill pipe. It did not stop the flow and seal the well. The well remained open. The blowout raged on.
Today’s standard industry BOP, such as the one present at Macondo, is based on vintage technology that has proliferated for decades in the oil industry. Oilfield equipment companies revere legacy products and accept change begrudgingly. The current industry BOP technology struggles to cut through certain objects, such as drill pipe, or drill pipe connections, that are required in a well during drilling. The toughest of these materials cannot be severed by state-of-the-art blowout preventers. In other words, the blowout of a well cannot be stopped if the blowout occurs while these items are intact inside the well.
The total time that such an irremediable blowout threatens a well varies widely from well to well. During the weeks required to drill a given well, there may be a total time adding up to many hours, or even days, that a blowout can occur for which the BOP is completely ineffective.
Disastrous failures such as the one at Macondo still present potentially deadly implications and vast environmental damage. Everyday drilling still carries virtually the same blowout risk as it did several years ago. A different set of facts may precede it, but another catastrophic blowout will happen and a slightly newer BOP will still be powerless to shut off the well. The BOP is a weak link, and its weakness is underscored as the oil industry drills progressively higher pressure wells.
The threat is alarming, and incongruous with the perception that things somehow became safer following Macondo. Sovereign governments and industry regulators, as well as oil companies, show genuine concern about the looming BOP safety issue. The inadequacies of traditional BOPs have become better understood and defined, but certainly not resolved. In the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board’s Investigation Report Volume 1, it is noted that during the BP Macondo incident, “pressures in the well had caused the drillpipe to buckle, which inhibited the BOP from sealing the well.” This finding begs the question as to why BOP equipment could be “inhibited” from sealing a well in the very emergency circumstances it is intended to address. Buckled drill pipe is cited as the reason that the BOP could not do its singular job. It would seem that an emergency catastrophe prevention device would be made to succeed in virtually all emergency conditions. Whether the drill pipe was buckled, thick or out of position should be immaterial.
The Deepwater Horizon Study Group (DHSG), formed by members of the Center for Catastrophic Risk Management (CCRM), issued a detailed report in response to the blowout of the Macondo well. In its Center Finding 4, it stated that “major step change improvements that consistently utilize the BAST [Best Available Safest Technology] are required by industry and government to enable high hazard offshore exploration and production operations . . . .” It is clearly understood that technology to prevent blowouts calls for step change, a radical change in technology to provide a better and safer preventive solution. In nearly six years, sadly, that step change in technology has not even started.
The Department of Interior’s Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), formed in the aftermath of BP Macondo, develops standards to enhance safety and environmental protection for US offshore oil and gas. BSEE aims to mitigate risks to humans and the environment. Public policy suggests that the offshore oil and gas industry needs to operate in order to produce energy, a benefit to society. BSEE’s work is important as it strives to make this necessary and beneficial industry safer. However, noble goals like safety are not easily achieved against a corporate machine with essential commodity output, a powerful lobby and an inclination to follow its own rules.
Following BP Macondo, the supporting oilfield equipment industry has avoided implementing significant change to technology and methods. The DHSG’s recommended “step change” has not occurred and in fact is nowhere on the horizon. Oilfield equipment companies have been unwilling to alter legacy technologies. Oligopolistic elements pollute an equipment industry of few players. In accord with historical practices, oilfield equipment makers are proceeding with small, incremental, iterative changes to traditional emergency safety equipment like the BOP. The handful of market participants leverage economic friction to protect revenues rooted in long-established product lines, parts and services. The legacy products carry tremendous inertia. Constraints are therefore placed on the development of new and better products. Users may dislike the aging product offering, but they have little power to demand change when the handful of manufacturers offer virtually the same products. A significant technological change that radically improves safety or environmental protection is unlikely come from within the established oilfield equipment industry.
The result is that BOPs remain inadequate, too weak to handle the toughest emergency jobs. The miniscule incremental improvements to existing technology fail — and will continue to fail — to address the real problem: another Macondo is waiting to happen.
The public would probably consider this risk unacceptable. Alas, the public does not know. The outrage over BP Macondo has quieted. The industry continues drilling wells with a substantial risk of blowout. Perception may have changed, but reality has not.
Somehow, we thought all this had become safer. A catastrophe happened. People died. Wildlife died. An uproar ensued. Victims seethed. Penance was paid. Promises were made to do better. Time passed. Attention shifted. The odd oilfield lingo passed out of our vocabulary. The oil and gas industry made things seem just a little bit safer. Technology became slightly less inadequate, but stayed basically the same. Nothing really bad happened again. Yet.
