Negative Effects of Iron Triangles on US Defense Programs: Three Specific Examples

Iron triangles are the mutually beneficial relationship between Congressional Committees, the bureaucracy, and interest groups. Interest groups give electoral support to members of Congress and receive friendly legislation and oversight. Congress funds and politically supports the Bureaucracy and in return receive policy choices and execution. The Bureaucracy gives low regulations and special favors to the interest groups and gets congressional support via lobbying. The problem with this is that all three of these groups benefit but the national interests aren’t preserved as these groups simply attempt to benefit themselves.

Special interest groups, iron triangles, and the military industrial complex have dominated military spending for the last 3 decades. Eisenhower was the first to address the military industrial complex. In his valedictory address to the American people, Eisenhower said, “Until the latest of our world conflicts, the United States had no armaments industry. American makers of ploughshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. But now we can no longer risk emergency improvisation of national defence; we have been compelled to create a permanent armaments industry of vast proportions. Added to this, three and a half million men and women are directly engaged in the defence establishment. We annually spend on military security more than the net income of all United States corporations. This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence — economic, political, even spiritual — is felt in every city, every state house, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. … In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist” (Naughton, 7/28/17).

All of this turned out to be true. The 10 presidents, since Eisenhower, have spent more on its military industrial complex than all of the other nations combined (Naughton, 7/28/17). Groups in the military industrial complex who try to promote defense spending are known as interest groups. The goal of interest groups is to influence public policy in their favor.

In the Department of Defence, iron triangles have become a problem and large sums of money are wasted due to them. There has been $12 billion invested in just 26 Littoral Combat Ships with no proven combat ability, $458 million paid out inappropriately for travel expenses, $375 million paid for Missile Defense Agency targets that weren’t used or didn’t work, a $8 million expenditure for the Navy’s experiments with alternative fuel sources for its Great Green Fleet, $12 million for defective spare parts that will need to be replaced or refunded, and $1 million for travel claim reimbursement for unauthorized expenses at casinos and strip clubs (McCain, 1–15). All of this is due to iron triangles which allows for no competition and therefore no reason to spend efficiently or save money.

There are three eminent examples of the results of iron triangles: the F-35, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, and the M-1 Abram tank. These are unnecessary and overly expensive programs that exist due to interest groups. Iron triangles are prevalent in the United States and are the reason many defense programs were created.

The most prominent example of the iron triangle and the figurehead for wasted military spending would be the Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II. In 1996, the F-35 was created as a military jet built to serve the Air Force, Marines, and Navy. This meant the United States could cut the expense of creating and maintaining specialized aircrafts for each branch of the military. However, “the most expensive weapons project in American history has missed deadlines, smashed budgets, and faced questions regarding its technical abilities” (Stewart, 7/28/2017). Contrary to what was originally believed, the cost of modifying one design to fit the requirement for the Air Force, Marines, and Navy, such as taking off of aircraft carriers, have spiraled. Engineers continue to grapple with problems with the computers, sensors and electrical system, and that’s after $400 billion of investment into the F-35 program (GAO, 7/28/2017). The F-35 has missed deadlines and has become far more expensive than originally estimated.

In April of 2014, a congressional study of the F-35 program pegged the cost of the program at $5.1 billion for the year. But there were additional hidden costs for design fixes and the plane’s’ engines (Gault 2015). A Senate Appropriations Committee report on 2015 appropriations explained the actual cost of the F-35. In 2014, they estimated the US spent $4 billion for F-35As, $928 million for F-35Bs and $1.9 billion for F-35Cs (Gault 2015). That’s almost $7 billion for just 34 new planes, and the program still hasn’t been cut (Gault 2017). This proves that despite going past budget, interest groups have been able to keep the F-35 program relevant.

The Pentagon estimated that the lifetime and sustainment costs for the US F-35 fleet, then projected at 2,443 units not including prototypes, at $1.45 trillion (Vucetic, 3). Furthermore, a cut in this program would not be viable. A significant budget cut is likely to be followed by a number of small cuts and the bad news could quickly pile upon itself quickly. F-35 supporters are concerned about the program going into a “death spiral,” which occurs when budget cuts reduce the number of planes ordered, producing an increased unit cost, which then causes further cuts, and so on (Vucetic, 10).

Despite sounding illogical, this program has actually become far too expensive to cut. Congressional lawmakers are aware that this project supports 133,000 jobs, which will grow to 260,000 when full-scale production begins, in 45 different states (Weaver, 7/28/2017). Lawmakers are fully aware of the loss of jobs cutting this project would cause and therefore are reluctant to do so. Additionally, many of the US’s Allies have made commitments to buy F-35s and canceling the program would damage American prestige. For these reasons, the Pentagon has committed to producing 2,400 fighter jets, and analysts believe they could ultimately weaken America’s aviation advantage (Weaver 7/28/2017).

Nimitz-class nuclear powered aircraft carriers are the second examples of iron triangles. When Congress approved the first ship in 2007, it was expected to be ready by 2015 and cost $10.5 billion (Kheel, 7/28/17). By the time 2015 rolled around, the first ship was expected to cost $12.9 billion and was only going to be ready by May 2016 (Kheel, 7/28/17). Originally, the second ship was expected to be ready in 2019 and cost $9.2 billion. Today, the estimate stands at $11.4 billion and is expected to be ready in 2024 (Kheel, 7/28/17). Senator McCain states that the reason these estimates were so bad is due to “unrealistic business cases, poor cost estimates, new systems rushed to production, concurrent design and construction, and problems testing systems to demonstrate promised capability. All of these problems have been made worse by the absence of competition in aircraft carrier construction” (Kheel, 7/28/17).

Trump has vowed to expand the number of carriers from 10 to 12 and has promised to bring down the cost of building three “super carriers,” which has increased by a third over the last decade from $27 billion to $36 billion (Paltrow, 7/28/17). Despite this steep price tag, these ships aren’t invincible and can still be attacked. Defense analyst, Pierre Sprey, who worked for the US Secretary of Defense’s office from 1966 to 1986, even said, “Beyond a shadow of a doubt, a carrier is just a target” (Paltrow, 7/28/17). Trump also stated that he will increase the Navy’s fleet to 350 ships. The Navy currently has 277 deployable ships. The cost of a single new carrier is $10.5 billion without cost overruns (Paltrow, 7/28/17). Furthermore, many of its new high tech systems failed to work, including basic ones such as the “arresting gear,” which catches and stops landing jets (Paltrow, 7/28/17).

According to Senator McCain, these aircraft carriers may be useless, or at the very least a bad allocation of resources. He stated, “the department must study alternatives to the aircraft carrier to ensure we are getting the best capability while most effectively allocating our scarce resources” (Kheel, 7/28/17).

Another example of the iron triangle are the M-1 Abrams tank. The Army has almost 9,000 M-1s, and half of them are in storage (Gault 2014). Congressman Jim Jordan and Mike Turner, both from Ohio districts, have pushed for the creation of these. Turner chairs the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (Gault 2014). And the only plant in the country working on the M-1 Abrams tank are in Lima, Ohio (Gault 2014). This is no coincidence, the congressmen have been working towards these tanks to benefit their districts rather than what tanks should benefit, the national defence.

In the 21st century, tanks are becoming increasingly unnecessary. There has been an increase in the “number of non-state actors, such as terrorist networks, drug cartels and maritime piracy networks, and intra-state conflicts (e.g. civil wars) have assumed importance as new-age threats to the national security of present-day states” (Srikanth, 60). Terrorism does “not present large, fixed targets that can readily be destroyed” (Pillar, 7/28/2017) which means terrorists are exactly the type of enemy tanks are worse against. Furthermore, “with the terrorist threat now coming much more from groups than from states, there are even fewer targets to strike, either to damage terrorist capabilities or to deter future terrorism” (Pillar, 7/28/2017). This means that our biggest threat, terrorism, is not easily countered by military power.

Aircraft carriers have also become increasingly less efficient allocations of money. For example, the newest carrier, the USS Gerald R. Ford, which will be commissioned next year, costs $12.8 billion. Add the cost of the air wing, the support of five surface-combat ships and one attack submarine and 6,700 sailors. The bill for operating a carrier is around $2.5 million a day. China could build more than 1,200 of its premier anti-ship missiles for the cost of one Ford carrier and just one of those 1200 could achieve “mission-kill,” effectively removing the carrier from the fight for several months (Will, 7/28/17). At this point, an aircraft carrier of this magnitude isn’t worth it as during a time of war they could easily be “mission-killed.”

At this point, it is evident the reason these purchases are not due to the interest of the national defence. In fact, the majority of Americans don’t support increasing the military budget. Voice of the People, a nonpartisan organization, recently allowed registered voters across the nation to form defence budgets. After hearing pro and con arguments, more than half favored cutting spending at least $12 billion (Chadwick, 7/28/2017). In a 2016 survey, most voters proposed bringing down the budget down to their preferred $497 billion in 2012 (Chadwick, 7/28/2017). The majority of voters surveyed between December 2015 and February 2016 wanted defense cuts in almost every area of the military. They wished to cut ground forces by $4 million, nuclear weapons by $3 billion, air power by $2 billion, naval forces by $2 billion, and missile defense by $1 billion (Chadwick, 7/28/2017). Furthermore, they “sought no increase in any specific military area” (Chadwick, 7/28/2017). Finally, when given the ability to evaluate specific programs, the majority favored downsizing two notoriously expensive weapon system, the F-35 and nuclear-powered Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. The majority endorsed completely eliminating the F-35 program.

However, the majority of politicians believe they should increase military budget. President Barack Obama proposed to add $2.4 billion in 2017 to the current budget. This would mean a core spending of $523.9 billion plus another $58.8 billion for overseas contingency operations (Chadwick, 7/28/17). More recently, President Trump’s budget asked for $18 billion more than Obama’s plan which makes it $52 billion above the budget caps (Herb, 7/28/17). The House and Senate Armed Services Committees are planning to propose a budget of $640 for 2018, a $37 billion increase over the Trump administration’s $630 billion request (Herb, 7/28/17).

The only reason this disparity between politicians and the people exists is due to interest groups. Special interests lobbyists are funding those who favor increasing the defense budget. They are advocating for more money to go into the military-industrial complex.

There has also been a recent growth in the military industrial complex. “According to a study by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, private contractors make up 29% of the workforce in the US intelligence community and cost the equivalent of 49% of their personnel budget” (CIA, 16).

The growth of the military can be attributed to the rise of interest groups and, in turn, iron triangles. A program, initially seen by Boeing and the Air Force as a clever way to acquire a new tanker fleet without having the budget and buying the plane outright, has now developed a reputation as “the most significant military contracting abuse in 20 years” (Smith, 7/28/17). Three Boeing officials resigned due to connections with the controversy and two pleaded guilty in federal court to ethics violation. Air Force General Gregory S. Martin, chief of the Air Force Materiel Command, withdrew from consideration of a more senior post after publicly clashing with Senator McCain about the significance of the violations. James Rocher, a former executive at Northrop Grumman, was clearly hostile towards his former company’s competitor, Airbus, in multiple emails. Roche did not wish to contract Airbus and when asked by a colleague “but where will the competition come from,” referring to the Pentagon’s rule against sole sourcing contracts, Roche ignored him (Smith, 7/28/17). Ultimately, multiple executives were found guilty under ethics charges.

It’s not unreasonable to assume something similar happened in deals involving the F-35, the Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, and M-1 Abram Tank deals. The only difference is in these more recent deals no one was caught. The similarities are uncanny, they were overpriced deals with no real reason to continue other than helping congressmen or senators, the Department of Defence and large companies.

Some may believe that iron triangles don’t exist and the reason for this spending is as a stimulus to the economy. Government spending will always help stimulate the economy in some way. However, “reducing the size of government would lead to higher incomes and improve America’s competitiveness” (Mitchell, 7/28/17). Currently, scholars critique the over spending for two reasons relevant to defense: market distortion costs and inefficiency costs. Market Distortion comes from buyers and sellers in competitive markets determining prices by ensuring there is the most efficient allocation of resources, but certain government programs interfere with markets (Mitchell, 7/28/17). In the defense budget, scarce resources aren’t spent efficiently with much of the budget being wasted.

One possible solution to the problem of iron triangles can be addressed by limiting interest group spending. However, this went to the Supreme Court in 2009 under the case Citizens United v. Federal Election Commision and the Supreme Court held (5–4) on January 21, 2010 that freedom of speech “prohibits government from restricting independent political expenditures by nonprofit corporations, labor unions and other associations.

Another solution is voters need to better educated so they don’t reelect those who are working in favor of special interests rather than the national interests. However, this is extremely difficult to do as most Americans remain politically unaware.

Finally, this could simply be an inevitable part of liberal capitalist democracy. Special interest groups are well funded and well organized. The largest Defense interest group spends well over $29 million to fund politicians who work in their interests (Center for Responsive Politics). This is compared to the lack of efficiency in the Bureaucracy. There are currently 51 separate= federal organizations and military commands tracking the flow of money in terrorist networks. This can’t be the most effective way to keep track of terrorist money. (Avlon, 7/28/17)

“The military-industrial complex has a trump card to play with members of Congress and the public: nobody wants to argue with national security, especially when the very real threat of terrorism exists. This ain’t no phantom menace: more than 45 jihadist terror plots had been stopped before the 10th anniversary of 9/11. But the combination of real threat and opaque multibillion-dollar budgets leads inevitably to a lack of transparency and accountability” (Avlon, 7/28/17). This is a big problem with democracy, as members of Congress are obsessed with being reelected and cutting funding would mean their ultimate demise. Only officials who don’t have to rely on reelection can change the excessive funds. And in our representative democracy, there are very few who don’t rely on reelection.

To conclude, the United States has been influenced by interest groups through iron triangles. This is evident by the wasted money, unnecessary programs such as the F-35 program, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier program, and the M-1 Abrams tank program. People don’t agree with these programs and increases in defense spending, yet members of Congress still advocate for them. These programs don’t exist to make people safer, they exist simply to help the three groups in an iron triangle: members of Congress, interest groups, and the bureaucracy. Clearly, iron triangles have shaped policy in the defence industry and are the only reason why certain areas of the military industrial complex exist.

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