Of Stealth, NGAD and Future Fighters
Will lessons from fifth generation platform programs drive the USAF to adapt as it builds its fleet of the future?
For decades, the United States military has had a singular focus on large, expensive “platform” weapon systems that have become the central focus for acquisition. Whether the aircraft carrier, the F-35 or the Abrams tank, force structure, systems and strategies have been built around these platforms. And these platforms continue to get more and more expensive. Are massive investments in expensive platforms the best way to ensure future security? On the military aviation front, the focus for years has been on investing in expensive stealth aircraft such as the F-35 fighter jet. This program has faced considerable scrutiny due to financial and operational challenges. Recent developments, including the U.S. Air Force’s exploration of a light stealth fighter concept, indicate a potential shift that could redefine how American air power is built in the future.
The F-35 program, once heralded as the pinnacle of fighter jet technology, has unfortunately become an easy target for those who point out the shortcomings in U.S. military procurement. Initially designed to be a versatile, multi-role aircraft capable of performing a wide range of missions, the F-35 has instead been cited as a case study in the challenges of developing cutting-edge military technology. For one, the program has faced significant cost overruns, with unit costs reaching approximately $82.5 million per aircraft. And this isn’t the actual, all-in price. Export orders usually expose those costs more clearly, and by the time you walk out of the dealership, you’re looking at a number closer to $120 million per aircraft.
But that is in the past, and there is nothing to do but to pay the price, whatever it may be. Truly concerning, however, are projections for the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, which suggest costs could soar to $250 million per unit. If true, such astronomical prices raise concerns about the sustainability of the financial commitment to the program, and ultimately, of the program itself. Think F-22 cancelation. In spades. What’s worse is that these escalating costs not only strain defense budgets but also have a direct impact on the military’s operational capabilities by limiting choice, compromising full-spectrum readiness, and delivering limited quantitative flexibility in the sense that fewer units can be procured and maintained.
And then there’s technical risk associated with these YOLO procurements. The F-35 program’s operational effectiveness has been hampered by significant technical challenges. The Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS), originally intended to streamline maintenance and logistics, has proven problematic to the point that it is being phased out in favor of a newer system, the Operational Data Integrated Network (ODIN). Despite these efforts, the F-35 fleet’s mission-capable rate remains at a concerning 50–60%, well below the Department of Defense’s target of 80% for mission-critical systems. Additionally, the F-35 has required frequent software updates and complex hardware maintenance, further contributing to the high cost and delays in reaching full operational capability. These challenges certainly underscore the difficulties of integrating advanced technology into military systems but they also highlight the risks associated with relying on a single, high-cost platform for a broad range of missions.
Operationally, too, the F-35 has encountered challenges. While it was envisioned as a high-tech solution for modern warfare, its actual use in combat has often been less glamorous. In Afghanistan, for example, the F-35 has been primarily used as a “bomb truck,” delivering precision-guided munitions in a low-threat environment. This utilization highlights a disconnect between the aircraft’s advanced capabilities and the practical needs of many current military operations. Deploying such an expensive and technologically advanced platform in low-intensity conflicts raises questions. Was this done only to ensure the platform’s relevance isn’t called into question? To win some validation just by participating? Even so, one must ask questions about the cost-effectiveness and appropriateness of using such a precious platform in roles where less costly alternatives could achieve similar outcomes.
Is this exquisite, bet-the-farm platform approach the only way of doing things? Let’s take a look at China for a bit of a contrast. China’s military aviation strategy emphasizes cost-effectiveness and rapid production. Chinese fifth-generation fighters, like the J-20, have been developed at a fraction of the cost of their U.S. counterparts. Many will be quick to suggest that the reason is because, “China stole our designs”. This is an easy out. Why does China build cheaper highways and bridges? Did they steal those designs too? The issue we must confront head on is the intolerably high cost of building in the USA. And that analysis is a topic for another article, or more appropriately, a book!
This lower cost basis allows China to induct a larger number of advanced aircraft into its fleet, potentially shifting the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region without taking on the financial burden faced by the U.S. China’s strategy reflects a pragmatic approach to military modernization, focusing on the ability to produce and deploy large quantities of reasonably advanced systems rather than pursuing the most cutting-edge technology at any cost. It enables the PLA to create both specific niche capabilities fit for purpose in context of their A2AD style of thinking, and a numerical advantage, which could be critical in any potential conflict in the region.
Not all is bleak. There have been a few encouraging words from the U.S. Air Force that suggest they might be reconsidering their approach to air power. Chief of Staff Gen. David W. Allvin recently presented a concept for a light stealth fighter at the Global Air and Space Chiefs Conference. This notional aircraft, while still designed for low observability, appears to be a smaller and potentially more cost-effective alternative to current platforms. Allvin’s vision emphasizes “building to adapt” rather than “building to last,” focusing on developing new iterations of common software that could be used across multiple platforms. This approach could reduce the relative importance — and cost — of hardware, making crewed fighters more “disposable” and focusing cutting-edge capabilities on rapidly evolving software. But the word “disposable,” and its cousin, “attritable” gets thrown around a lot in U.S. defense circles. In my mind, as a taxpayer, a $10M aircraft isn’t “attritable.” Nor should our anti aircraft missiles be costing $3M a round. But maybe that’s just me.
The shift Allvin seems to suggest aligns with previous suggestions from Air Force leadership. Former Chief of Staff Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr. had proposed a “clean-sheet design” fighter, described as a “four-and-a-half-gen or fifth-gen-minus” aircraft, which would be affordable enough to replace the F-16 and address concerns about combat mass in potential conflicts with peer adversaries like China. The emphasis on adaptability, cost-effectiveness, and rapid iteration reflects a growing recognition within the U.S. military that the traditional approach to developing and procuring high-end platforms may no longer be viable in an era of rapid technological change and evolving threats.
The increasing integration of uncrewed systems, particularly through the Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program, adds another layer of complexity to the Air Force’s future strategy. These uncrewed systems are expected to operate alongside manned aircraft, potentially reducing the need for more expensive platforms like NGAD and F-35 in certain roles. The CCA program envisions drones acting as “loyal wingmen,” capable of performing a variety of roles from surveillance to electronic warfare and even direct combat, thereby lowering operational costs and reducing risks to human pilots. This checks out with regard to the broader trend towards software-defined capabilities, where the adaptability and evolution of software are prioritized over the hardware itself. But the devil is in the details. And the price at which we end up buying these systems, not the prices we think we will pay at the inception of the program. If these systems are inexpensive and have software-driven sophistication, then they are likely to play an increasingly important role in shaping the future of air combat.
Perhaps this is the optimist in me, but could it be that the pitfalls of very expensive platforms like the F-35 and the projected costs of NGAD have forced a reevaluation of priorities? While high-end capabilities remain crucial for peer competition, is there finally recognition of the fact that one size doesn’t fit all? Will we actually take a more balanced, flexible, and cost-effective approach to air power? The exploration of light fighter concepts, coupled with advancements in software-defined capabilities and uncrewed systems, could well chart a new course for U.S. military aviation. The key will be finding the right balance between cutting-edge technology, operational flexibility, and fiscal responsibility to ensure U.S. air superiority in an increasingly complex global landscape.
This may require chucking the old ways out the window. I believe the DoD-approved technical term for this is, “adaptation.” Can we get some?
