How Russia and the West try to influence and manipulate in Eastern Europe
The annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine have widely exposed the various methods, ranging from soft to raw power, that Russia has exercised in the past decades on the former Soviet Union territories. The same tools of leverage are still actively used and applied to Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova — three countries with common borders with the European Union, and which are currently members of the Eastern Partnership project. Initially, the Kremlin’s interest is in maintaining this approach to keep its sphere of influence in the region, but the Kremlin is, at the present time attempting to prevent the EU and NATO from moving east.
Part I Crimea: Annexation of Consciousness
The annexation of Crimeans’ consciousness has started a few months before the first protests of November 13, 2013 on Independence Square in Kyiv, that later turned into a revolution with the symbolic name of Euromaidan.
At the time when the whole country was officially moving towards signing the Association Agreement with the EU, in the summer of 2013, the cities of Crimea were filled with billboards with rather odd and unusual information on what would await the Ukrainians after signing this agreement, such as: “ Association with the EU is same-sex marriage, Association with the EU is the loss of jobs, Association with the EU is the transformation of Ukraine into a repository of European nuclear waste, Association with the EU is the rise in prices, Stop the Association with the EU.” To mention just a few examples of the myths on the European Union being formed in the minds of people by the pro-Russian political actors in Crimea. The party of Ukrainian leader Viktor Medvedchuk (by the way, who is the godfather of Vladimir Putin’s daughters) was particularly active in this process. Given the lack of any alternative information on the topic of the upcoming Association, the information attack had the desired effect on the Crimeans, and fear of Europe and a lack of understanding of how their future may unfold in this process have become quite significant among its citizens.
In the meantime, pro-Russian rallies increased in Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, joined mostly by retirees, demanding the Russian language to be the second official language. Most of these actions were organized by the, at that time, marginal Russian Unity party, funded by the Russian Federation. It was this party and its leader Sergei Aksenov, who later became a key player in organizing the annexation of Crimea. For this support, Aksenov became, with Vladimir Putin’s blessing, the prime minister of the so-called Republic of Crimea, a federal subject of the Russian Federation in the spring of 2014.
Russian media war in Ukraine
The information component of the media war unleashed by Russia in Ukraine is no less important than the military actions themselves. Disinformation campaigns can create a “ real armed conflict”, and this is exactly what the effect of the Russian propaganda was in Ukraine. First in Crimea, then in Donbas — starting from the small city Slovyansk in Donetsk region.
From the first days of the media war, the Russian media began to inflate negative emotions, sow insecurity and uncertainty in local civil society. The rapportage on the Ukrainian situation reveals the presence of manipulative tools in the media as a mechanism of manipulating and controlling people’s mindsets. Russian citizens who had fought against Ukrainian government forces have stated that their primary motivation to fight was the Russian television coverage of supposedly Ukrainian atrocities against Russian-speaking citizens. These reports were proven to be false by members of Ukrainian volunteer organization StopFake.
Russian propaganda aims to create as many versions of reality as it can — an apt example is the case of the downing of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 over Eastern Ukraine in 2014. Disinformation and manipulation in the media is a powerful weapon which can be very quickly pointed to any country at any time.
Reconstruction of Memory
Russia’s been successfully using historical memory reconstruction and cultural expansion in Belarus, as well as in Transnistria, the separatist-controlled region of Moldova. In 2013–2014, the Kremlin started to use precisely the same tactics both in Crimea and in Donbas.
The main narrative Russia used in these territories is the common Soviet past when everyone, as one-state citizenry, was speaking the same language, namely Russian. The Kremlin not only reconstructed a shared historical memory, but also tried to construct an idea of a single common future in the minds of the people in these territories,.
One of the spectres of Russian institutions and services in the political and cultural sphere is unification around the general idea of victory over fascism in World War II, and which in Russia is emphasized as the Great Patriotic War, with May 9 as one of the most sacred/memorial dates.
The mythologization of history, that prevails today in Russia and which is being transmitted to Belarus, Moldova and the separatist-controlled territories of Donbas and Crimea, is a very effective means of not only soft force, but eventually also a military force in these regions. After all, it was the struggle against fascism, that became one of the official reasons for the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of war in Donbas.
Russia and moving West
Western values increasingly influence post-Soviet states every year, which is utterly unacceptable to the Kremlin. Moscow regularly faces new challenges, and so it not only has to fight the economic battle with Western countries, but also wage an ideological and geopolitical war within the region. The Russian concern over the former Soviet republics’ gradual shift to the West is associated with President Vladimir Putin’s vision of his country as a superpower along with the EU, USA and China.
Therefore, over the past decade, Russia has responded with an embargo, a reduction in gas supplies, and/or other economic leverages to each diplomatic rapprochement between Brussels and the Eastern Partnership countries. The prevention of rapprochement between these countries with Europe is a purpose of such Russian Federation’s strategy.
This strategy also appears in the diplomatic and military operations of the Russian Federation in the region. For example, arms sales to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, military support and financing of separatists in eastern Ukraine since 2014, a special foreign policy regarding the unrecognized Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the desire to create a union state with Belarus, which already has Russian military bases on its territory.
Russia, imitating the EU
In most cases where Russia is trying to limit European Union’s soft power in Eastern Europe, it is creating alternative organizations, educational and cultural centers, as well as military-political unions, copying the formats already existing in European Union. The name of “Eurasian Union” naturally resembles the European Union, the “Eurasian Commission” resembles the European Commission, and its initiatives are largely modelled on Brussels. This strategy has already attracted two new members, or rather, distracted Belarus and Armenia from their ambitions in the EU, and the strategy is also receiving increasing support from Moldova and Azerbaijan, which are countries involved in the Eastern Partnership. For obvious reasons, the only disregard for any Russian Federation initiative in the region comes from Ukraine.
However, the fundamental difference with the EU structures is the alignment of forces within the organizations created by Russia: to have a complete cultural, economic and military superiority, and Russian is the only official language to be used. Another deliberate substitution of concepts: it is partnership externally, and Russian hegemony internally.
Thus, Russia hopes that it can become more attractive to Eastern Partnership countries rather than the EU, because it will rely on common geography, a collective Soviet past and traditional conservative values. The Kremlin, with the help of more effective soft power in the region, is striving to create a single Eurasian economic and cultural space for the realization of its geopolitical fantasies.
Moldova, the spin-off
In the context of a signed association agreement in 2014, the EU has invested millions in the economy and development of civil society in Moldova, but so far the results remain insignificant. At the same time, Russia offered Moldova a membership in its Eurasian Economic Union without any special conditions.
Both the EU and Russia do not stand aside from Moldova’s political situation. At the Moldovan presidential election of 2019, the main candidates also represented two opposite vectors. Pro-Russian candidate Igor Dodon built his campaign on anti-European, anti-immigrant and homophobic rhetoric, not avoiding widespread misinformation. Dodon also openly stated that he was striving to become the same leader for his country as Putin is in Russia. As a result, Dodon defeated his pro-Western rival Maya Sandu by a slight margin. In June 2019, Sandu became the Prime Minister of Moldova and immediately stated that the priority of her government would be establishing relations with the European Union. But she stayed in office for less than 6 months, because a vote of no confidence in her cabinet was announced in a parliament with a pro-Russian majority.
In November 2019 Maya Sandu was replaced by Ion Kiku from Igor Dodon’s orbit, which in fact led to a situation where all the Moldova key institutions are headed by politicians with a pro-Russian rhetoric. Kiku, the current Prime Minister of Moldova, has already stated several times that his government does not exclude a possibility of a suspension of its cooperation with the IMF and the EU.
Belarus, under pressure from Russia
The discussion about the union state of Belarus and Russia intensified again at the end of 2019. The Russian parliament prepared a draft of a ‘Concept For The Two Countries Legislation’ Approximation,” developing a road map for creating a single energy market, a single tax code, a civil code, as well as a foreign trade code. It included a plan to unify the accounting of property and social guarantees, to combine banking supervision, leaving 2 central banks, to partially combine payment systems, to create a single regulator of oil, gas and electricity market, and from 2021 introducing single access to public procurement.
In Minsk, people reacted to these initiatives with protests against Belarus’ integration with Russia. Demonstrators with national flags held placards with texts “ No to Russian fascism and banditry,” “ No integration,” “ This is not integration, this is occupation” and exclamations as “ Let Belarus live!”, while activists tore and burned Putin’s portraits.
Soon, President Lukashenko announced that he had agreed with President Putin not to discuss the creation of a joint parliament and government in the framework of negotiations on the Union State. At the same time, Lukashenko assured the Belarusians that he does not intend to surrender the country’s national interests during these negotiations, and to limit the negotiations to economic benefits only. According to President Lukashenko, Belarus is losing about $9 billion Dollars a year due to the fact that it is not fully allowed to enter Russian markets. In one comment, Lukashenko said: “We have our own country. We are sovereign and independent. I can’t betray and dissolve Belarus, even with our fraternal Russia,” while also expressing his desire of “living in embrace and harmony with the Russians.”
Unrecognized territories and Russian politics on them
The Kremlin has its own ideologist, Vladislav Surkov, for cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States, as well as the unrecognized republics in these territories. Surkov is associated with the supervision of separatist Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Donetsk and Luhansk people’s republic governments, the creation of pro-Kremlin youth organizations and parties, as well as the restriction of freedom of speech in Russia. Surkov is also the author of the sovereign democracy concept, a political course where Russia decides what is considered as democratic.
Less than 200 km from the external eastern border of the European Union lies the separate Transnistria territory. Moscow’s particular interest in Transnistria lies in the fact that, since the Soviet Union times, a large number of weapons has been stored on the Transnistria territory, which is currently controlled by the Russians. The Russian Federation military also regularly conduct joint exercises with Transnistria, which, of course, brings a lot of concern to the EU and NATO.
In the separatist regions of Moldova and Ukraine Russia operates along exactly the same scenario. In Transnistria, as in the self-proclaimed republics in Donbas, the army is one of the main employers for the local male population. The Kremlin provides funding for patching up the holes in these regions’ budgets, sells gas at a reduced price, and also enables people to obtain a Russian passport. Yet, at the same time, the local population suffers from unemployment, banditry and an unrecognized status. Young people experience problems with the recognition of education and diplomas, which complicates their mobility.
However, most young people living in a region of unrecognized status are constantly in a transitional period, looking for jobs somewhere in Russia. The education system is at such a level that many speak only Russian. There is also a tendency to travel to the EU for low-skilled work. To do this, they use their other -non-Russian- passport.
Culture, values and religion
In order to overcome the Western values’ influence in the Eastern European countries, Russia has developed an entire system of defensive mechanisms. Informational, educational and cultural projects are bundled together and the main narrative is the greatness of the Soviet past, the Soviet traditions and the Orthodox religious values. Western values, such as the protection of universal human rights and the desire for the rule of democracy and law, and in particular tolerance towards the LGBT community, feminism, and religious minorities, are aggressively rejected.
In Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, and the South Caucasus, the Kremlin has funded for decades the creation of cultural centres, non-governmental organizations, and other humanitarian initiatives through the Russkiy Mir Foundation, which promotes not only cultural and educational exchanges but also the formation of a correct, that is friendly and enthusiastic, attitude to Great Russia.
The Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which is linked in close cooperation to the Kremlin and the Federal Security Service, is also a robust tool of soft power for the Eastern Partnership countries. The ROC, coordinating its actions with the Russian government, is the bearer and distributor of traditional values, conservatism and right-wing traditionalism. The ROC’s ideology rejects modern liberalism and globalism, calling these phenomena a threat to the Russian world.
To conclude, the Eurasian ideology formed by the Russian state is a component of the Kremlin’s aggressive foreign policy along with hybrid and cyber attacks, as well as military operations in Eastern Europe.
Part II Decommunization
During the unrest in Ukraine in December 2013, when activists knocked down Lenin’s monument on the Kyiv central street, this may have been the moment that real decommunization started in Ukraine. It would seem that from this moment on, the mental rebirth of a new generation of Ukrainians started, which strove to completely get rid of the Soviet past and move towards the West. A wave of demolition of communist monuments swept across the country called the Leninfall.
A year and a half later (in 2015) a law on decommunization in Ukraine condemning the use of propaganda of Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes as a criminal offense. A few years earlier, a similar law also appeared in Moldova. Supporters of decommunization in Ukraine persistently reminded critics that this law is a response to Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and its participation in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, and that it is a strategic step in the state security of Ukraine against the backdrop of hybrid military operations by the Russian Federation. According to the advocates of de-Sovietization of Ukraine and Moldova, this process is also a step towards Europeanization and democratization of both states.
Unlike Ukraine and Moldova, Belarus remains faithful to the communist era. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, decommunization processes in Belarus stopped in 1994 with Alexander Lukashenko coming to power. “We were also ready to demolish monuments, to carry out decommunization, lustration — I stopped it. And we benefited from this,” said the President of Belarus in 2019. From the very beginning of his presidency, Lukashenko has stayed on the line of the pro-communist development of the state. The official information and ideological policy today continue to develop in this vein, which is preserved not only in the system of holidays associated with the communist past of the country, but also in the preservation of monuments and symbols of this period. Unlike neighbouring Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Ukraine, decommunization in Belarus, never got a chance to start and President Lukashenko still retains the image of the keeper of Soviet traditions.
NATO and war in Donbas
“Russia will do everything possible to prevent Ukraine and Georgia from joining NATO,” Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said in 2008. However, according to a survey in 2019, after 6 years of war, about 48.9% of Ukrainians would vote for Ukraine to join NATO in a referendum, if it would take place in the near future, and 23.2% would vote for legislative consolidation of the country’s non-aligned status.
The history of NATO and Ukraine relations is quite long, with several dramatic shifts over time. However, over the past 6 years, as can be seen from the survey, the opinion of Ukrainians from different regions has changed significantly. Moreover, Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas helped this and joining NATO became the strategic goal of foreign and security policies for Ukraine. At the same time, the Armed Forces of Ukraine are already conducting joint military exercises with NATO member countries, whose representatives also join festive parades for Ukraine’s Independence Day in Kyiv.
Ukraine announced its geopolitical goal of joining NATO in 2017 during the presidency of Petro Poroshenko and it was not the first time since the independence of Ukraine. The intention to join NATO was first discussed right after the Orange Revolution and at the beginning of the presidency of Viktor Yushchenko in 2005. However, the next Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovych, retreated again, when the government officially declared neutrality and stopped seeking NATO membership.
Ukraine’s entry into NATO has always been a point of dispute not only in domestic politics but also on the global stage. The subject was used as a myth and manipulation during the Russian annexation of Crimea and as the basis for initiating the conflict in Donbas. The manipulation of Ukraine’s ambition to join NATO is still used by Russians in the context of the ongoing military operations of the Russian Federation in Donbas. The Russian-backed conflict in Donbas is also one of the factors hindering Ukraine’s entry into NATO.
The situation in Moldova and Belarus is fundamentally different from the Ukrainian one.
Article 11 of the Constitution of Moldova enshrines its permanent neutrality: “The Republic of Moldova does not allow the deployment of the armed forces of other states on its territory.” Thus, despite the partnership with the Alliance in the matter of defence and cybersecurity, Moldova officially has no plans to join either NATO or the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization).
Belarus is a member of the CSTO military-political organization, which one also includes Russia, Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. However, the decision-making mechanisms in this organization do not indicate partnerships in the security sphere, but rather the ambitious plans of Russia in the region.
The EU Eastern Partnership
The struggle between European and Russian narratives intensified especially after the launch of the EU Eastern Partnership project in 2009, which was oriented to deepen cooperation with six post-Soviet countries in Eastern Europe — Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Armenia, Georgia and Moldova. At that time, each of these countries was differently prepared for integration; i.e. not only the level of economic development of each state, but also the support for democratic institutions and human rights. The EU, declaring its intentions to expand eastward in the framework of the neighbourhood policy, sought to maintain stability in these states, particularly in the countries having common borders with the EU. The Eastern Partnership’s goal was obviously not limited only to economic integration, but also contributed to the political rapprochement of Eastern European countries with the EU.
The financial assistance of the European Union in carrying out necessary economic and political reforms in these countries should not only lead to the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU, but also to the creation of a free trade zone, visa regime liberalization, energy sector development, the continuation of the anti-corruption fight, development of civil liberties and maintaining stability and security in the region.
Despite this, over the 10 years of the Eastern Partnership, the number of danger zones in these countries has only increased; now, five out of six countries have conflict territories. And, there is Russian interest in each of these conflicts.
This EU project in Russia, which was also offered to join it, was in fact regarded as a European intrusion on traditional regions of its influence. In Russia, the Eastern Partnership is considered an EU instrument, also supported by the United States, whose task is to weaken Russian diplomatic influence and strengthen the military influence of the EU/USA/NATO in the region using a step-by-step long-term strategy.
From the very beginning of the EU project, not all Eastern Partnership countries have clearly stated their European aspirations. Close ties between Belarus and Russia almost immediately ruled out any agreements with the EU. Armenia, under Russian pressure, abandoned its intention to sign an association agreement at the last moment. The fate of Armenia almost fell upon Ukraine, when the former president Viktor Yanukovych, in 2013 unexpectedly refused to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, which resulted in the Ukrainian Revolution.
Although, almost a year later, Ukraine ended up to conclude on an agreement with the EU in June 2014. In the same year, two more Eastern Partnership member countries followed — Georgia and Moldova. In addition, citizens of all three countries received the right to visit the EU for tourism purposes in a visa-free regime for up to 90 days per every 180 days. It also led to the fact that many low-cost airlines of these countries entered the market. This fact not only had an economic result, but also contributed to the fact that the residents of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia got the opportunity of budget travel to Europe: “EU soft power” in action as many of these countries’ citizens visited western countries for the first time.
As of today, Belarus is as far from this stage as are Armenia and Azerbaijan. Residents of these countries still need to get visas for tourism in the Schengen countries.
Among other notable achievements of Ukraine and Moldova in the framework of the Eastern Partnership, experts note a number of reforms carried out, without which it would not be possible to sign the Association Agreement and provide a visa-free regime. In particular, a program to support decentralization, reforms of public services, an anti-corruption reform package, a program to support small and medium-sized businesses and improving interpersonal contacts.
Particular attention in the framework of the Eastern Partnership is given to education. Every year, various EU funds are allocated for educational seminars, training and workshops for residents of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, as well as exchanges and scholarships for training and research at European universities. Most educational programs focus on the development of sustainable democracy, the importance of the rule of law, the value of freedom of speech and the protection of human rights. In Ukraine and Moldova, for example, this resulted in the emergence of a large number of young politicians with a pro-Western orientation.
As a result of the programs, many NGOs and individual groups of activists have been formed to organize actions to support of issues, relevant for European societies, such as the protection of women’s rights, the fight against climate change, the popularization of sports (through traditional EU marathons, etc.), the need for recycling, etc..
The protection of the rights of the LGBT community is a special issue. In almost all post-Soviet countries, LGBT people face a high level of negative stereotypes and social prejudice. In 2019, Belarus was ranking 137th out of 197 countries in homophobic sentiments. The positions of Moldova and Ukraine in this rating are much higher — 83 and 95, respectively, where in recent years, annual equality marches in support of the LGBT community rights were held, and where LGBT activists from the EU countries, as well as an increasing number of local LGBT participants, young local politicians and public figures attended.
Russia is actively using vindication of LGBT people’s rights for propaganda purposes, naming it a threat to traditional Orthodox family values, and entitling homosexuality as an illness. This narrative is widely used in the Russian media when commenting on the European aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus.
It becomes increasingly apparent that 10 years after its implementation, the Eastern Partnership needs to change its format and approaches. Ukrainian authorities are particularly active in declaring this, and are clearly outlining their ambitions for joining the EU and NATO. However, those who call for giving Ukraine the prospect of EU membership are still in the minority.
Such inactivity of the EU causes is an outrage to Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, the leading countries of European integration. In this context, proposals are to create two separate branches of the Eastern Partnership, that will provide a specific program for these three countries and a separate one for Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus.
As far back as 2016, the head of Lithuanian foreign ministry, Linas Linkevičius, pointed out that the “lack of content, unsystematic and insignificant results” [of the EU cooperation platform and 6 neighbouring states] “deepen distrust of the very idea of European Commonwealth.” A Lithuanian politician was then convinced that if the EU provided the most deserving states, such as Ukraine, Georgia or Moldova, with the prospect of membership, a united Europe would only benefit from this.
Conclusion
Moscow managed to create a formula of influence on the Eastern Partnership countries: a combination of soft and raw power combined with military force. In relation to Moldova and Belarus, this formula works almost without a glitch. Ukraine, with Western support, continues trying to withstand both military and ideological pressure from the Russian Federation.
The Kremlin feels relatively confident and unpunished for applying pressure, intimidation and aggression towards the Eastern Partnership countries. One of the reasons for this is the inability and unwillingness of the European Union to create and use hard power in response to the challenges that Russian policy creates in the region. Unlike the Russian Federation, the EU does not have a real political or military ambition concerning the Eastern European countries. The only soft power of the European Union, which is currently successfully operating in Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, is associated rather with economic and humanitarian factors than with political ones.
The European Union and the Eastern Partnership countries, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other, will increasingly meet new challenges in the future. Despite the fact that three states (i.e. Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) already have associate agreements with the EU, they also experience territorial conflicts initiated by Russia. Until these conflicts are resolved, they will block opportunities for a full-fledged movement towards inclusion in the EU. Russia, in turn, will continue to create the maximum number of obstacles on the European path of Eastern European countries.
Anastasia Magazova (Simferopol, Ukraine)
Journalist Anastasia Magazova graduated in 2011 with a master degree from the Faculty of Philology in Simferopol, Ukraine. She moved from Simferopol to Kyiv after the annexation of Crimea. Anastasia works as an independent journalist for numerous Ukrainian, German and international media, such as Radio Free Europe, Deutsche Welle, Hromadske, Courrier International, Ukrainska Pravda, N-TV, Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung und Die Tageszeitung.
Since 2013, she has written more than 300 articles about Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkey and Germany.
Originally published at https://medium.com on March 6, 2020.