Labour Reform in France
The so-called ‘Jobs Bill’ being debated in France this week met fierce resistance from trade union confederations leading to a series of amendments such as the amount judges ask employers to pay in case of wrongful dismissals will no longer be capped.
The Government also withdrew a provision designed to allow small companies without union representatives to reach agreements with their employees on working hours. However the Government retained contentious measures designed to benefit larger companies such as groups of workers will be able to negotiate longer working hours with their employees and hold referendums if unions representing at least 30 per cent of the workers give consent.
Trade union density stands at 8% in France but the figure is misleading in that collective bargaining coverage stands at 98% for industry and company agreements. In fact this is the highest in the EU and directly attributable to the State’s role in regulating the labour market. Despite collective bargaining coverage being extremely high some agreements have rates which are below the level of the French national minimum wage. Individualised pay increases, which are not negotiated, also play an important role in setting the pay of many French workers. This is suggestive of a number of apparent contradictory dynamics painting a complex picture about what is actually going on in the French economy and labour market.
France has experienced powerful decentralisation, individualisation and flexible labour market dynamics consistent with a neo-liberal trajectory over a period of thirty years. Therefore the proposed reforms by the Socialist Party to the labour market should be viewed in this wider neo-liberal context. Howell (2006: 38) stated that the “…emergence of labor market and workplace flexibility could not take place without the active role of the French state, and a state-led restructuring of industrial relations institutions.”
In 1995 in an agreement between employers and several of the trade union confederations regarding collective bargaining called for greater autonomy of industrial relations from the State. The statement, proposed a three-year experiment during which time firm-level agreements on single issues could be signed by either an elected employee representative — a member of a works council, or the employee delegate, or an employee mandated by a national trade union in small firms in which there was no union delegate. This was considered an important innovation because Howell and Kolins Givan (2011: 243) state that “ …for the first time, it authorized non-union labor representatives to sign collective agreements, though it was simply a recognition, and post hoc legitimization of a practice that had evolved since the Auroux legislation. The accord also permitted firm-level agreements to be signed that contained derogatory clauses, ones less favorable than industry or inter-professional agreements”.
In 2004 loi Fillon reforms enshrined and embedded firm-level agreements and flexibility measures following the passing of the aforementioned Auroux Laws in 1980’s. The new rules contributed to the increasing decentralisation of collective bargaining illustrated by changes to widening workplace representation; autonomy for the firm, and, derogation from collective agreements. The Fillon reforms introduced two major changes: to be valid collective agreements must have the support of (or not be opposed by) a majority of representative trade unions or of unions representing a majority of employees; and collectively agreed norms were changed to allow firm-level agreements to derogate from sector-level agreements except in relation to areas governed by legislation.
These reforms were followed by the Aubry Laws which implemented the 35-hour week between 1998 and 2002. The reforms authorised the use of a mandating procedure and alternatives to collective bargaining in the negotiation of a reduced working week. In smaller firms with no union representation firm-level agreements had to be signed by a mandated worker of a nationally recognised trade union confederation or through a majority vote at the firm approved by a local labour-business commission. Importantly the successive legislative reforms illustrated their non-partisan nature as both Socialist and Centre-Right Governments in France embedded a widespread network of firm-level agreements and associated institutions.
Approximately 2 million workers were covered by such firm-level agreements in 1983 which doubled to 4 million by 2002.[2] The number of firm-level agreements thereafter accelerated with the number increasing from under 15,000 a year to 31,310 in 2012 with 36 per cent of those dealing with wages.[3] As part of this trend towards the individualisation of industrial relations workers have also turned to industrial tribunals to seek the resolution of workplace grievances — subject to amendments in this week’s debate. In 1995, tribunals dealt with more than 155,000 new cases with only 1.3 per cent of those being brought forward by employers. New cases continued to rise as trade union representation in the workplace retrenched rising to a peak of 202,000 in 2008.[4] The representation of trade unions in workplaces continues to vary widely as in 2005 only 38 per cent of workplaces employing more than 20 people had a trade union delegate. This number varied between 23 per cent of those employing less than 50 and 97 per cent of those employing more than 500.[5]
As a result of these successive reforms Parsons (2013: 534) states that French industrial relations have: “…undergone significant decentralisation and flexibilisation since the 1980’s, as part of this movement, the institutional positions of unions has improved, but they have become structurally weaker.” France’s growing collective bargaining coverage statistics from 77.4% in 1980 to 98% per cent in 2013 — highest in the EU — evidence the reforms to a degree have been negotiated and to varying degrees achieved in agreement with various trade union confederations, employers and the State. For trade unions in France the levels of density and bargaining coverage like countries operating the Ghent system however also highlight greater degrees of sensitivity to the influence of the State and political parties — in doing so it crystallizes political action options open to trade unions in light of industrial and structural weakness. My next article will focus on Finland and the reforms being enacted to dilute the power of trade unionism where density is the highest standing at 74%.
[1] Statistics provided by Andolfatto 2004 cited by Howell and Kolins Givan (2011: 245).
[2] Statistics provided by Eurofound.
[3] Statistics provided by Ministère de la Justice et des Libertés 2006 cited by Parsons (2013: 201).
[4] Statistics provided by Pignoni and Tenret (2007) cited by Parsons (2013: 198).
