It Did Happen Here

The roots of Trump’s rise owe more to American populism than European fascism.

(As originally published on March 21, 2016)

“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves.”

Is it too cliché to quote Shakespeare? I’ll take the risk in this case, because I think it’s totally appropriate. With that line from Julius Caesar, Brutus and Cassius discuss the violent removal of a popular dictatorial leader who threatens to overthrow their republic…and while my own thoughts about Donald Trump’s ascendance are not so dire or grandiose, I agree with Cassius in the conclusion that the fault is ours alone.

There’s been a lot of hyperbolic rhetoric, especially on Facebook and other social media, describing Donald Trump as a fascist. I typically resent any characterization of an American politician as Hitler or a Nazi, but I admit that Trump’s rhetoric has made the comparison attractive. Along with being excessive, though, I think that comparison misses the mark. He certainly has much in common with the nationalist parties which have sprung up in Europe over the last 20 years in reaction to economic misfortune and increased migration, but these parties aren’t really fascist either. Populist, yes, but not fascist.

Fascism as an ideology is a very specific thing, so let’s be clear in describing it. Fascism, though admittedly reliant on xenophobia and tough guy rhetoric appealing to the masses, had a particular goal in mind: the total takeover of the government by one party and the mobilization of society towards economic and military production. American populism- which better describes what Donald Trump has been tapping into- may share some attributes but nonetheless differs significantly in its goals from fascism.

To paint that picture, we can be a little more precise in describing what exactly populism is. Drawing from my own understanding of the American populist movement, I would outline three major charateristics:

Radical economics

Major populist movements, thoroughly relying on popular (and typically working-class) support, appeal to workers’ dissatisfaction with economic conditions. Populist movements naturally spring up regularly during times of great economic division and inequality. Two of the most successful periods for American populism were, after all, the Gilded Age of the late 19th century and the years following the stock market crash of 1929. Buoyed by the dissatisfaction of the workers in these poor periods, populist leaders propose strident changes to improve the conditions of their constituencies and to level the playing field. These include major regulatory initiatives, restructuring of markets, protectionism, and even Marxist-style public takeovers of industries. The populists of the 1890s advocated the government ownership of the railroads and strict currency regulations. Trump, in one of the few policy proposals he’s actually offered, has argued for massive protectionist tariffs on imported goods (even as the rest of his economic agenda remains unclear).

Targeting the elites

As so much of the populist agenda is aimed at dismantling existing economic structures, it makes sense that populists lay much of the blame for the country’s problems at the feet of the political and economic elite. Populists of all eras, including in the 1890s, the 1930s, and even with George Wallace’s candidacy in 1968, explicitly framed their campaigns as opposing existing elite structures in “the east” and in Washington. Trump has continued in this tradition, often calling Washington politicians incompetent and remarking that their ineptitude in dealmaking is responsible for the economic woes of the working class… while blaming business elites for moving jobs overseas. He and Wallace would undoubtedly find common ground on the Alabama governor’s description of east-cost intellectuals as “pointy-head college professors who can’t even park a bicycle straight.”

Vilification of the “other”

As noted, populist leaders rely on the ardent support of a vocal group of followers. So just as they enrage and motivate their supporters through their attacks on the elite class, populists of all eras have used xenophobia and the vilification of minority groups to embed fear and anger to incite their followers. For the populists of the 1890s and 1930s, the targets were Jews, Irish and other European workers. For George Wallace, of course, it was black Americans gaining voting rights and economic liberties. For Trump, the list of “others” is long. He’s notably attacked immigrants, and his proposal of a total ban on Muslims entering the United States obviously fits the bill as well.

Republican solace

I think it brings some comfort to know that we’ve seen something like Trump before in this country. But while Trump is certainly more of a populist than a fascist, this isn’t to say that populism cannot bequeath fascism. Hitler and the Nazis used all of the typical characteristics of populism to withering effect in their takeover of Germany in the 1930s. Upton Sinclair’s 1935 novel It Can’t Happen Here, describes an American populist leader (styled after Huey Long) becoming president only to initiate a fascist takeover of the government. And as inconsistent and hypocritical as Trump is on policy, one has to wonder what he would actually set out to accomplish upon becoming president (and don’t forget the affinity of his supporters towards authoritarianism).

Thankfully, the history of populism in this country also provides some insight into how they are typically defeated. Federalist 10 describes in detail how the republican nature of our government is able to check a popular uprising exactly like has been seen in populist movements. Our government was designed specifically to neutralize dangerous popular factions that would otherwise emerge in a more pure democracy. As Madison writes, in a large republican government, “you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other.”

And when you look to the national electoral record of populist candidates, the results are encouraging. William Jennings Bryan lost three elections. George Wallace lost four. And when it comes to Trump, his national negatives point to a sizable general election defeat. The sort of issues that are prioritized in these popular movements often carry a regional or niche flavor, and often don’t extend to all communities of the country. While populist candidates could perform well in a strict democracy where they would simply need a plurality of voters, the electoral college makes it very hard for that candidate to win nationally.

None of this is to assert that the economic concerns held by Trump’s supporters aren’t real, or that the American government shouldn’t take significant steps to correct them. After all, Bernie Sanders and his supporters represent their own kind of populism, though without the xenophobia, in reaction to economic inequality. The best that our government can do (and has done in the past) is to recognize the points articulated by these movements, if not their divisive rhetoric, and integrate them into a more positive political dialogue.