The Precarious Position for the Peaceful Use of Space
The challenges of the 21st century require innovative strategies. Whether these challenges be in the form of political instabilities, environmental concerns, or physical threats, our ability to operate and to maintain national security has become increasingly reliant on space systems and the unique response capabilities afforded by the application of such systems. From monitoring capabilities to the way we navigate and communicate, space systems have become an integral asset to both the military and intelligence communities. However, while these systems have slowly become more and more crucial to our nation’s continued security and prosperity, space systems have proven to be something of a double-edged sword — although they have afforded strategic advantages, they have also introduced new vulnerabilities, particularly in the form of cyber threats and anti-satellite weapons (ASATs). Furthermore, the interconnectedness and reliance upon said systems across the public, private, and military sectors indicate that any vulnerabilities that arise in space systems implicate pervasive concerns for national security, and any catastrophic breaches could become systemic. That said, despite efforts to limit the use of space to peaceful and mutually beneficial activities, the militarization of space may be a forgone conclusion.
Subsequent to the Cold War, the U.S. held and maintained technological superiority in space. The momentum afforded by the victory of the Apollo program reinforced the U.S.’s competitive edge with the further development of space systems for use by the military and, later, the civilian and commercial sectors. That edge, however, has gradually eroded, as many nations have begun to develop their own spacefaring capabilities. Currently, over 60 nations and government consortia own and operate satellites, and of those, 10 have the capacity to launch independently. As a result, the political landscape for space operations is quickly changing, and with it the strategies for ensuring the security of participating nations.
Although treaties exist to promote the peaceful use of space, it is impracticable to enforce these policies given the ambiguity and elusiveness that surrounds the definition of “space weapons”. For example, anything in orbit, even small debris that is less than 10 cm in size, can cause severe damage upon collision. This is because of the enormous amount of kinetic energy possessed by the orbiting debris — not from its mass, but due to its great speeds (e.g., >17,000 mph in LEO). This poses a challenge for policymakers in classifying, let alone verifying, what constitutes a weapon in space. Given that even benign space systems can be maneuvered to disrupt or destroy neighboring satellites, thereby creating more debris in orbit, the line between what is and is not a space weapon is consequently blurred.
The potential to incur damage is not sufficient to declare any particular space asset a threat. It would be like trying to place bans on cars on the road because they can potentially damage other cars, either intentionally or by accident. In space, however, when a collision does occur, aside from the damage to the space asset itself, there will be ensuing debris, for which there currently exists no method of removal besides gradual orbital decay. This debris can have lasting consequences that may compromise future space missions — such as orbital insertions and positioning of new satellites and constellations, as well as the feasibility of human spaceflights, including the safety of astronauts on the International Space Station (ISS).
Although the seemingly “lawless” final frontier may currently be likened to the Wild West, it is not to say that the issue of liability is not addressed. Like drivers who are held accountable for their conduct on the roads, spacefaring nations are held accountable for their conduct in space. As per the Outer Space Treaty, although space is a domain that belongs to no nation alone but to all of humankind (Article II), objects placed in space are the responsibility of the appropriate nation (or, in the case of international agencies, the agency itself and all its affiliated nations), regardless of whether the mission is carried out by a governmental or non-governmental (e.g., commercial) entity (Article VI).
That said, barring the placement of WMDs in space, the deployment of conventional weapons remains unclear. However, according to an analysis published in the European Journal of International Law, it may be legally permissible provided that those weapons are utilized to benefit or serve the interests of all humankind — an ironic, but arguably foreseeable, situation.
Despite the unsavory implications of space weaponization, it is difficult to discount the fact that the development of many space systems, including the now ubiquitously applicable communication satellites, are rooted in military operations dating back to the Cold War era. Satellite communication (SATCOM) has evolved rapidly since its inception during the mid-1960s, and currently, nearly all of our military and surveillance satellites utilize this technology. There exists a suite of unclassified space systems that are currently operated or being developed by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). These include communication satellites, navigation satellites, early warning systems, as well as weather satellites, ballistic missile defense-related systems, and launch vehicles.
For the U.S., the development and use of SATCOM has proven to be an indispensable and integral part of military operations. Operation Desert Storm, of the Gulf War in 1991, was the first major military operation that made use of SATCOM, including the Global Positioning System (GPS) and high resolution satellite imagery. Since then, military reliance on such capabilities has caused the demand for SATCOM bandwidth to dramatically increase, resulting in the growth of SATCOMs in the private sector. It was during such growth that the infrastructure for the commercial use of space was established, enabling pervasive civil and commercial applications from precision farming to cell phones to automobile navigation systems (Military/National Security Space Activities).
Aside from direct military applications, space systems have also proven to be useful for intelligence communities and non-governmental organizations such as the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). CNS utilizes satellite imagery and geospatial data in conjunction with various computer modeling programs in order to gather and analyze data regarding nonproliferation and disarmament research. For example, with these data, the CNS has been able to locate, identify, and analyze WMD-related facilities around the world as well as create a geo-located map of nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile facilities for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). The information provided by these satellites is integral to not only maintaining national security, but also to international peacekeeping efforts.
The ability of CNS to disseminate and analyze such information in a timely manner is contingent on the integrity of the space systems. Should the space systems be compromised, the monitoring of critical threats and the surveillance of those regions within which those threats are emerging, would become much more challenging. In fact, any damage or direct attacks upon our satellite networks would have far-reaching implications across a wide variety of sectors, and the interdependent nature of many of those systems means that catastrophic damage to said systems could have a cascading effect across multiple fronts, affecting both the military and civilian organizations which utilize them.
“Satellite services are key targets for a number of cyber-security threats, as they support a critical level of national infrastructure functionality, and this is growing year by year,” (David Livingstone in Newsweek). In November 2014, the United States National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)’s satellite network suffered a cyber-attack emanating from China. This event served as a wake-up call in regards to the imminent threat of cyber-attacks on satellite systems — particularly, their ground segments. As data is constantly being transmitted back and forth between the ground and space segments of satellite networks, the opportunity for worldwide connectivity has, on the other hand, yielded the threat of interception and deception.
Another imminent cyber threat is GPS spoofing, or an attempt to deceive a GPS receiver by broadcasting incorrect GPS signals. As many military operations depend on drones, or UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles), which are guided using GPS, for reconnaissance and other types of missions, the risk of GPS spoofing is very much relevant. The December 2011 Iran–U.S. RQ-170 incident serves as an example of such risks. The incident entailed a GPS spoofing cyber-attack by the Iranian military on the U.S. Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel stealth drone that was operating near the Iranian city of Kashmar. “As a result of the Iran–U.S. RQ-170 incident, cyber security for U.S. and allied unmanned vehicles has risen to the top of the Pentagon’s priorities, and enabling technologies like multi-level encryption and cross-domain solutions represent hot markets in the U.S. unmanned industry,” (John Keller, editor-in-chief of Military & Aerospace Electronics magazine).
In addition to the more ephemeral threats of cyber-attack, there is also the more direct impact of physical attacks upon the satellite systems in orbit, and with it, the risk of collateral damage to the future of our capacity to safely launch and maintain a presence in orbit. For example, in 2007, the Chinese carried out an ASAT missile test, and the weapon successfully destroyed the satellite it had targeted. However, this single act, as a byproduct, created the largest source of trackable debris in orbit to this day, which may remain in orbit for centuries, (National Security Space Strategy: Unclassified Summary). These pieces of debris can be likened to shrapnel that orbit the Earth at extreme speeds, and are more than capable of tearing through the hull of another spacecraft, such as the ISS, which had a close call with the debris field in question in 2011, years after the Chinese ASAT test had been conducted.
Just as an attack on the satellite networks could have far-reaching and wide-ranging impacts across multiple aspects of our national security, one can easily imagine the possible chain reaction that could occur, should these weapons be deployed en-masse against orbital assets. Any further assets destroyed by the debris field would become a part of the debris field themselves, rendering us blind regarding the data from those satellites that we depend on, as well as incapable of replacing those satellites far into the future, at least by the methods we currently utilize. Regardless of national affiliation, should conflict spiral out of control to the point where weapons are made use of with anything approaching frequency to physically destroy orbiting satellites, the consequences would be dire.
Looking ahead, the global space industry will continue to rapidly expand as more and more countries continue to increase their space-based military and intelligence capabilities. According to a statement by Daniel Coats, Director of National Intelligence, in 2017, “Russia and China perceive a need to offset any US military advantage derived from military, civil, or commercial space systems and are increasingly considering attacks against satellite systems as part of their future warfare doctrine.” In addition to Russia and China, India has recently entered the global stage regarding space weaponization. In 2012, India stated that it possessed the technology for ASATs, and recently, on March 27th, 2019, India demonstrated its ASAT capability by successfully targeting and destroying its own satellite, Microsat-R, in LEO. The debris situation has been ascertained and is being monitored by the US Air Force’s Space Surveillance Network and US Strategic Command’s Combined Space Operations Center, but unlike the Chinese test in 2007, and according to officials from India’s Ministry of External Affairs,”[this] test was done in the lower atmosphere to ensure… [w]hatever debris that is generated will decay and fall back onto the [E]arth within weeks.” Still, this does not preclude more immediate threats to the ISS and other space systems in orbit, nor does it bode well for the future, as it sets yet another negative precedent that further threatens the sanctity of the peaceful use of space.
Although a deeper dive into the history of ASAT weapons and testing is required to fully investigate their current and future implications, India’s recent display of its technological capability has indicated that nations are continuing in the direction of space militarization despite the ubiquitous threats it poses to future space operations. Whether it be in the form of advanced cyber-attacks or ASAT weapons, denying or degrading existing military and civilian satellite networks is a real and present threat to national security. Staying ahead of the curve may mitigate near-term threats, but the proliferation of space weapons demands a more robust counter-strategy.
The most compelling reason for the development of weapons of any kind has been deterrence. With more and more nations participating in space operations, and considering society’s heavy reliance on space systems, it is imperative to not only protect national interests but also to preserve our modern way of life. There should be repercussions for mishaps as well as intentional acts of aggression. Nations should be compelled by more than goodwill to operate responsibly in space, thereby mitigating, if not altogether eliminating, the risk of incurring irreversible damage that could render space an inoperable domain for future generations. The peaceful use of space may be an ideal that we humans can only hope for, but the militarization of space is, unfortunately, the reality we have built.
