Bridge Over Troubled Water — The Collapse of Bridge 11 under 1976 Rainstorm

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Content:
1. Shing Mun River Flood Control Scheme
2. Hong Kong Government’s Reaction to Natural Disaster
3. Gurkha Engineers
4. “Attack of Ellen”
5. Passengers, Fresh Food and Diesel
6. Road to Reconstruction
7. Government’s Internal Review
8. Appendix
9. References
10. Afterword

We hereby express our greatest gratitude towards the then Acting Chief Engineer, Railway Division Mr. V. J. Mansfield and the then Assistant Engineer Mr. Mak Chai-kwong. Their valuable assistance is irreplaceable for us. It is impossible to finish this article without their help.

1. Shing Mun River Flood Control Scheme

The Shing Mun River originates from the mountain streams around Tai Mo Shan and passes through two reservoirs located in the Shing Mun Valley before reaching Sha Tin. It then flows out to the sea near the Sha Tin Sewage Treatment Works. As the majority of Sha Tin New Town is located on the river banks, the Shing Mun River can be considered the central axis of the town. However, if we go back to a time when the shores of the Shing Mun River had not been reclaimed, and Sha Tin Hoi, also known as Tide Cove, still covered the area opposite the present-day Sha Tin town centre, the river’s catchment area only extended to the location of the Hong Kong Bible Research and Education Centre where the former Tai Chung Bridge was located. Today’s Shing Mun River is significantly different from its past counterpart.

As for the two reservoirs in the upper reaches of the Shing Mun River, the northern one is the Jubilee Reservoir, also known as the Shing Mun Reservoir, which was completed before World War II. The southern one is the Lower Shing Mun Reservoir, built in the 1960s as part of the Plover Cove Water Scheme. After the construction of these two reservoirs, the Shing Mun Reservoir primarily serves as a storage for fresh water, while the Lower Shing Mun Reservoir has functions such as regulating the water level of the Shing Mun Reservoir and providing flood control for the downstream area of the Shing Mun River and reinforcing the dam of the Shing Mun Reservoir.

In the 1960s, the Shing Mun River was still a natural river channel. Due to fluvial erosion, the river would wash away the sand and gravel along its banks, which would then deposit on the riverbed, reducing the capacity of the downstream channel over time. Additionally, with the construction of two reservoirs upstream, heavy rain could cause the reservoirs to overflow, posing a constant risk of flooding for residents downstream of the Shing Mun River. As more and more people settled along the banks of the river, the need to address this ticking time bomb situation became urgent.

In 1966, the Hong Kong government announced plans to remove the sediment accumulated in the riverbed of the Shing Mun River as a starting point for the Shing Mun River Flood Control Scheme. The flood control scheme began with dredging works as the first phase, followed by acquiring land on both sides of the river to straighten the channel. The final phase involved expanding the land resumption area to further improve the Shing Mun River channel. To address the problem of land resumption which would affect residents, the government established resettlement areas in Pak Tin to accommodate affected residents. In addition to these measures, the Hong Kong government also established a Shing Mun River flood warning system internally. The Police Force, Water Supplies Department, and Tai Po District Office prepared an evacuation operation known as “Operation Noah’s Ark.” Once the Shing Mun Reservoirs and Lower Shing Mun Reservoir reached the alert levels, various departments would initiate the evacuation of residents downstream.

In a political report submitted to New Territories District Commissioner K.S. Kinghorn, the Tai Po District Officer T. J. Bedford, who had to contend with the villagers, expressed the views of the Tai Po District Office on the flood control scheme. The report dated in March 1967 stated that the flood control scheme was already viewed as a “fait accompli’’ for the Tai Po District Office, and it not only would require a significant allocation of resources from the district office to assist in coordination with various departments and residents but also rely on the “sympathetic understanding” of the Sha Tin Village Committee (the predecessor of the Sha Tin Rural Committee). Bedford was likely concerned about the process of land acquisition in the future and believed that it would be a difficult process, potentially provoking discontent among the villagers and even triggering resistance against the government.

However, Bedford’s tone changed when he pointed out that during this year’s wet season, in response to the crisis of the possibility of the two Shing Mun overflowing, the Tai Po District Office would need to evacuate up to 13,000 residents living along the banks of the Shing Mun River. This was already the issue of greatest concern for Bedford. Although he had confidence that the evacuation operation could be completed in a timely manner before the flood arrived, the resources of the district office and the police force would face a tremendous burden. While the warning issued by the New Territories Administration to evacuate the villagers was well-intentioned, the operation of evacuating villagers for several days to avoid floods would inevitably trigger significant backlash. Bedford was concerned that the resulting discontent from the evacuation operation could affect how the public would perceive future water capital projects undertaken by the government.

Unfortunately, Bedford’s concerns were not unfounded. On August 12, 1969, the Shing Mun River experienced another flash flood, and the Ta Kung Pao (a local leftist newspaper) strongly criticized the government’s incompetence, accusing the flood of occurring because the floodgates of the Shing Mun Reservoir were opened without prior warning. The government clarified in the newspapers the following day that the gates of the Lower Shing Mun Reservoir only led to the Sha Tin Water Treatment Works and did not connect to the Shing Mun River below the dam. The cause of the flood was simply the overflow of the reservoir.

Afterwards, the sight of more than 130 affected victims huddled inside Sha Tin Public School shocked the government’s Information Officers, who were present for the coverage. The Public Relations Division of the Information Services Department privately submitted a letter to the Defence Secretary, questioning whether the government had prepared enough resources internally to handle the relief efforts for the victims after natural disasters.

This flood added a small episode to the beginning of the Shing Mun River Flood Control Scheme. It further confirmed the extremely poor condition of the Shing Mun River at that time, where residents on both sides had to mobilize for evacuation during the rainy season. Apart from the physical and financial burdens, they had to take shelter in unfavorable temporary shelters, waiting for the flood crisis to pass.

Fast forward to 1976, the Shing Mun River Flood Scheme was already halfway completed. The stretch of the river in the Pak Tin and Heung Fan Liu had been straightened, and the riverbanks and riverbed were reinforced with concrete to reduce sedimentation. As the reinforcement work near Tai Wai and the Lion Bridge had been completed earlier, it was now time to carry out the improvement project on the section of the Shing Mun River near the Tin Sum Nullah.

Due to the need for land acquisition, it is inferred that the project for the section in Tai Wai was scheduled to start at a later time. The main objective of the project was to straighten a segment of the Tin Sum Nullah in front of the Old Che Kung Temple, as well as to modify the junction between Tin Sum Nullah and Shing Mun River to improve the hydraulic conditions in that area. Before the flood in 1976, various improvement works were being carried out on the western bank of the Shing Mun River, ranging from the railway bridge to the vicinity of the Lee Uk Tsuen Garden №2 today.

2. Hong Kong Government’s Reaction to Natural Disaster

In 1968, seven Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Hong Kong, and Laos) formed the Typhoon Committee under the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Initially, the committee focused on exchange of meteorological information. In 1971, the World Meteorological Organization arranged James R. Hickey, a member of the American Red Cross, to prepare a consultant report. The report reviewed the disaster planning efforts of the member countries.

The consultant report pointed out that Hong Kong’s disaster planning seemed to revolve around internal circulars prepared by the Colonial Secretariat every spring. Although the consultant believed that these internal notices were not comprehensive emergency plans and even considered them somewhat rough, this demonstrated the need to understand the government’s plans for natural disasters through internal circulars from various departments. In fact, the report also criticised the standard of the government’s disaster relief efforts being low. This indicates that the aforementioned situation, where disaster victims were not properly accommodated, did exist at that time.

At the time, the Colonial Secretariat oversaw departments responsible for the environment, public works, and finance, functioning like a central government. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the internal notices of the Colonial Secretariat to understand the contingency plans at that time. However, if the focus shifts to Tai Wai in the New Territories, things become more complicated.

The New Territories Administration (NTA), a government department responsible for managing the New Territories, had a lower position compared to the Colonial Secretariat. However, its influence within the New Territories was comparable to that of the Colonial Secretariat. Due to historical reasons, NTA was in charge of land administration and liaison with local representatives in the New Territories. Being deeply rooted in the New Territories, NTA wielded influence disproportionate to its position. Moreover, different government departments relied on the assistance and cooperation of NTA when exercising their power in the New Territories. Therefore, the internal circulars of NTA could not be ignored.

Regarding the special status of the New Territories, it can be seen in the arrangements for requesting assistance from the British Armed Forces stationed in Hong Kong during disasters. In November 1961, David Luddington, the Defence Secretary, stated that in the event of a disaster, the Defence Secretary would serve as the communication channel between government departments and the garrison in Hong Kong. If unable to contact the Defence Secretary or in critical situations, the Heads of Department (similar to department heads today) would contact the Deputy Colonial Secretary or Colonial Secretary to liaise with the British garrison.

However, in December of the same year, David Harold Jordan, the succeeding Defence Secretary, stated that if an emergency occurred within the New Territories, the district officers in the New Territories could request disaster relief from the military based on first aid relief principles. If the requested unit agreed to deploy or forwarded the request for consideration to Headquarters Land Forces (HQLF), the district officer would then notify the defence Secretary of the request.

A month later, David Ronald Holmes, the New Territories District Commissioner, made a slight adjustment to the process, stating that the New Territories District Commissioner or the Deputy District Commissioner would be responsible for notifying the defence Secretary retrospectively, rather than the district officers as mentioned by Jordan previously.

The procedures for future implementation can refer to the Office instructions №1/73 — Tropical Cyclones and Other Natural Disasters issued by the Tai Po District Office in 1973. This instruction directly quoted General Circular №16/72 issued by the Colonial Secretariat in 1972.

In simple terms, in the event of a natural disaster occurring in the urban area, requests for deployment of troops need to be made by the Heads of Departments to the Colonial Secretariat or the Security Branch. In the New Territories, lower-ranking District Officers have the authority to request military assistance. In extreme situations, the guidelines even allow for an approach where District Officers can directly request assistance to the garrison.

Before delving further, let’s briefly introduce the Civil Coordination Centre (CCC) and the POLMIL mentioned previously. Firstly, the government’s response to natural disasters during that time largely inherited the framework previously used for handling internal security events.

The CCC was initially established within the Colonial Secretariat to address internal security incidents. However, its scope was later expanded to cover various emergency situations, including typhoons and other natural disasters. According to a guide dated August 1975, the responsibilities of the CCC were as follows:

1. To give guidance to Government Departments and public utilities and to co-ordinate their emergency operations as necessary.
2. To make and seek decisions on important policy matters and to inform Heads of Departments and public utilities of these decisions.
3. To obtain reports from Departments and public utilities on their operations during an emergency and to assist them in overcoming their problems.
4. To arrange the call-out of auxiliary forces and liaise with Headquarters British Forces Hong Kong (HQBF) as required.
5. To obtain decisions on urgent financial matters.
6. To provide the Governor and senior Government officers with information and advice on civil aspects of the emergency, and to prepare periodic situation reports as required.
7. To liaise with the Information Services Department regarding public announcements concerning the emergency.

The CCC was located in the Main Wing Basement of the Central Government Offices, adjacent to the Secretary for Security office. The staff consisted of civil servants selected annually from various government departments, who took turns on duty according to a rotating schedule.

The CCC maintained communication with the outside through both public and private telephone lines and had a very high-frequency (VHF) radio network for external communication. If necessary, the Fire Services Department could also set up a radio station within the center, connecting to their own wireless network.

Regarding the POLMIL, as the name implies, it is an organization operated by personnel from the military and the local police force. The design concept of the POLMIL aimed to have commanders from both the military and the police coordinate with each other within the same office, and then convey their respective orders and actions down through their established chains of command. During internal security incidents, staff members from the Security Branch, known as Defence Operations Staff, and political advisors dispatched from London would also provide advice on political matters within the POLMIL.

The Colony POLMIL is situated in the New May House in the Police Headquarters compound. Their responsibilities were cited as follow:

1. The issuing of Joint and Single Service orders based on policy decisions by the Governor’s Committee and Joint Emergency Control Committee (JECC), thus providing a link between policy making and operational levels of the Internal Security organisation.
2. The provision of an information centre for the receipt and dissemination of information on major incidents and operational developments, in particular, keeping the Security Branch and Headquarters British Forces informed of the situation。
3. The co-ordination of action by the 4 districts, and the allocation of Police/Military reserves and resources to these districts.

There are 4 District POLMILs under the authority of Colony POLMIL. They are command posts which are normally located at Police District Headquarters. The responsibilities of District POIMILs were cited as follow:

1. The issue of Joint and Single Service Orders based on directives and orders received from JECC and/or Colony POLMIL (New Territories District POLMIL may also receive directives and orders from Police, Army, Government Committee New Territories (also known as PAGENT)).
2. The Command and Control of all operations conducted within respective boundaries.
3. The reporting of all information of operational significance to Colony POLMIL.
4. The maintenance of close liaison with other Districts in order to ensure that coordinated operations ordered by JECC and/or Colony POLMIL are efficiently carried out.

Detailed information of the 4 District POLMILs are as follow:

As for the Royal Air Force, since all police districts may require assistance from the RAF, a Commander will be assigned to liaise with the various district POLMILs.

Due to the need for inter-departmental joint operations and the mobilization of a significant number of disciplinary forces and military personnel for both natural disasters and internal security incidents, the system previously established to handle internal security incidents was directly repurposed by the Hong Kong government to respond to natural disasters. Consequently, the system in place for coping with natural disasters had a strong defence element.

Regarding disaster response in the New Territories, reference can be made to two standing departmental instructions issued respectively on May 16, 1973, and May 24, 1974, by the NTA, which share similar content.

The function of the District Offices under NTA is:

1. To coordinate the work of all Government Departments in their respective districts and to restore conditions to normal as soon as possible;
2. To survey and report the extent of the disaster and damage including damage to boats other than fishing boats and the state of communications;
3. To coordinate the efforts of voluntary basics in the relief of disasters;
4. To make arrangements for temporary accommodation of the homeless;
5. To arrange for emergency feeding both locally and through the Social Welfare Department.

The function of the NTA Headquarters is

1. To advise District Officers and Departments on their operations in the light of the general situation and allocate priorities where necessary;
2. To assist the District Officers to carry out their function particularly by securing funds and assistance from other departments as may be added;
3. To determine matters of policy as they arise.

As NTA is fundamentally not a department responsible for rescue operations, it is explicitly stated in the standing departmental instructions that staff members of the district offices are forbidden to participate in any search and rescue work. It is emphasized that search and rescue operations are the responsibilities of the Hong Kong Police Force and the Fire Services Department, while the duties of district officers are limited to commanding.

The Hong Kong Police Force will be responsible for collecting, integrating, and disseminating information to NTA and other departments during natural disasters, such as the aforementioned Civil Coordination Center. Within the New Territories, the New Territories District POLMIL located in Shek Kong will arrange for police officers equipped with radios to patrol the New Territories. The information collected by beat officers will be gathered and integrated by the Frontier Divisional Police Headquarters in Fanling, as well as the two Divisional Police Headquarters in Tsuen Wan and Yuen Long, and then transmitted to other departments, and vice versa.

In addition, a staff member from the Yuen Long District Office will be dispatched to the New Territories District POLMIL to facilitate communication between NTA and the District POLMIL.

Basically, both the New Territories and the urban areas are under the jurisdiction of the Civil Coordination Center located in the Central Government Offices. However, there are different arrangements in the New Territories again.

Presumably, because the infrastructure and government system in the New Territories were still not as developed as in the urban areas in the 1970s, the military also allocated additional manpower for handling various natural disasters in the New Territories. On one hand, the 48th Gurkha Brigade stationed in the New Territories appointed liaison officers for each district in the New Territories. During Typhoon Signal №8 was hoisted, they would be stationed at the headquarters of NTA, Yuen Long District Office, Tsuen Wan District Office, and Tai Po District Office, and establish radio stations there. As for the Field Offices located in Sha Tin and Tuen Mun (Note: these two Field Offices were later upgraded to district offices), the military would only dispatch liaison officers to set up radio stations upon receiving requests. These radio stations would maintain communication with the 48th Gurkha Brigade. The liaison officers would also be responsible for coordinating all military-related rescue and repair operations with NTA.

On the other hand, the 48th Gurkha Brigade had previously arranged dedicated units on standby for various areas in the New Territories. The aforementioned 1973 Standing Departmental Instructions for NTA regarding tropical cyclones and other natural disasters stated that the 48th Gurkha Brigade had designated an infantry battalion for each of the Yuen Long and Tai Po districts, and was prepared to mobilize for disaster relief when needed. However, no similar arrangements were found in later standing departmental instructions.

When it comes to the decision of deploying troops for disaster relief, the government generally adopted a conservative stance internally. As early as 1961, the Defence Secretary, David Luddington, reminded various government departments that the War Office (Note: At that time, the British armed forces were not yet integrated under the Ministry of Defence) had the final say on matters related to charges. He also stated that if the involvement of troops extended to beyond that required to meet the immediate crisis, the Hong Kong government would likely be charged, including the work performed by the troops during emergency situations. Implicitly, it seemed that Luddington advocated for departments to avoid requesting military assistance easily. If it was indeed necessary to deploy troops, they should take over the disaster relief work from the military as soon as the most critical situation had passed to avoid incurring high costs in the future.

Subsequently, from the Colonial Secretariat to the district offices, the issue of payment after requesting the deployment of troops was mentioned in all internal circulars. The citation from the aforementioned 1972 General Circular №16/72 issued by the Colonial Secretariat had been largely followed.

Officials in the New Territories seemed to have a relatively open attitude towards mobilizing the military for disaster relief. As early as 1965, in the standing instruction for Yuen Long District Office, the Yuen Long District Officer at the time, David Akers-Jones, mentioned that the military had “very heavy rescue equipment on call” and cited bulldozers and motorized flat-bottom boats as examples. The 1973 standing departmental instructions of NTA also stated that the Gurkha Engineers stationed at Perowne Barracks in Tai Lam could provide “professional, technical, and material assistance.” It can be seen that officials in the New Territories seemed to have a more open attitude towards the deployment of the military for disaster relief, and their focus was not solely on the potential charges they might incur.As for how to request military assistance, the 1973 standing departmental instructions of NTA mentioned that it could be requested from the New Territories District POLMIL. In conjunction with Security Branch Circular №4/74 issued in the same year, it can be inferred that it refers to situations where it is not possible to contact the Civil Coordination Center or the Security Branch, thus direct contact can be made with the New Territories District POLMIL located in Shek Kong.

3. Gurkha Engineers

Although the name “Gurkha Engineers” (GE) may be less well-known, but the name “Queen’s Gurkha Engineers” (QGE) which has been adopted since 1977, may be more commonly used. The Queen’s Gurkha Engineers received the honorific title of “Queen’s” on the 25th anniversary of Queen Elizabeth II’s Coronation in 1977. Prior to that, the Gurkha Engineers had been stationed in the East of Suez, including Hong Kong.

The formation of the Gurkha Engineers can be traced back to the Tripartite Agreement signed in 1947 between Britain, India, and Nepal which determined the future of the Gurkhas in the British Army at the time. Each Gurkha soldier in the ten Gurkha Rifles Regiments within the British Army had the option to choose allegiance to either Britain or India, or even choose to retire. However, in the 6 Gurkha Rifles Regiments designated to be under India, some Gurkha soldiers who were on leave at the time did not receive the message and were unable to respond. These Gurkha soldiers, upon joining the British Army later, did not choose to join the regular infantry regiments but became the core of the newly established Gurkha Engineers.

In 1948, the Gurkha Engineers were formed in British Malaya and participated in subsequent events such as the Malayan Emergency and the Konfrontasi in Borneo.

According to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Defence Cost Agreement 1976, signed in London on December 18, 1975, the strength of the combat units (also known as teeth arm elements) for the British Army stationed in Hong Kong at that time were as follows:

• 1 British Infantry Battalion
• 3 Gurkha Infantry Battalions
• 1 Gurkha Engineer Squadron (along with other training units)

Additionally, other documents mentioned that there were 2 Gurkha Engineer Squadrons stationed in Hong Kong at that time. However, only one of them had the capability to undertake engineering tasks during crises, while the other could only serve as a regular infantry unit.

On the other hand, in the newspaper of the Gurkha Engineers Association, the commandant Lieutenant Colonel J. H. Edwards RE stated in 1975 that despite the manpower reduction requested in the defence review, Gurkha Engineer was still able to retain 2 engineer squadrons in the future. Furthermore, the succeeding commandant, Lieutenant Colonel John Speight RE, mentioned that the training objectives for the end of 1976 were to ensure that both engineer squadrons could be transformed into regular infantry companies during internal security incidents.

On November 2, 1977, the Headquarters British Forces Hong Kong (HQBF) completed a report that examined the equipment available for deployment by the local garrison in overseas disaster relief efforts. The two Gurkha Engineer Squadrons had nearly identical heavy equipment configurations, with both having the same number of cranes and tractors. The 68 Gurkha Field Squadron even had an additional 10 kVA generator. This suggests that the actual role of the two field squadrons seemed to be rather fluid. Without further information, it is difficult to determine which Gurkha Field Squadron was available for assistance during natural disasters in 1976.

The equipment used by the mentioned Gurkha Field Squadrons did not differ significantly from the equipment used by other British Army engineering units at the time. Of note was the tractors used, specifically the wheeled tractor. The British Army had two types of wheeled tractor: the Medium Wheeled Tractor and the Light Wheeled Tractor. The Light Wheeled Tractor was the military version of the A500 tractor manufactured by the British company Muir-Hill, while the Medium Wheeled Tractor was the 645 model tractor manufactured by the American company Allis Chalmers. Both types were widely used by the British Army’s engineering units during the Cold War era.

Portal: The fourth image depicts a Medium Wheeled Tractor that served in Northern Ireland.

Portal: A preserved Light Wheeled Tractor which previously served in the British Army of the Rhine.

4. Attack of Ellen

Before we delve into the events of Ellen, let’s provide a brief introduction to today’s main character: the Bridge 11 located in Tai Wai. According to reports in Ta Kung Pao later, the Bridge 11 was completed as early as 1909, signifying that it had been serving train services between Tsim Sha Tsui and Canton via the Kowloon Canton Railway (KCR) since the railway was completed. This masonry arch bridge was fortunate to have survived the Battle of Hong Kong during the Second World War, escaping significant damage amidst the war. As the Kowloon Canton Railway underwent modernization projects, double tracks were laid on the bridge, indicating that the Public Works Department had no plans to demolish Bridge 11, and highlighting its structural stability.

On July 19, 1976, officials from the KCR, Sha Tin District Office, and personnel from the Drainage Works Division discussed the modification work regarding the carriageway under the western end of the Bridge 11 (near the present-day T.W.G.Hs Sin Chu Wan Primary School). This project was part of the Shing Mun River Flood Control Scheme and aimed to transform it into a pedestrian walkway similar to the one on the opposite bank.

On July 21, the contractor of KCR began their work, excavating the existing road surface and exposing the bridge abutment of the 11th Bridge. However, on July 28, the project was temporarily halted for unknown reasons, possibly due to the worsening weather under the severe tropical storm Violet. The project resumed on August 15, and workers used wooden trusses to construct a structure within the river channel to divert the flow of water beneath the nearest bridge arch. After removing the foundation of the original carriageway, the wooden structure used for diversion was also removed, fully exposing the concrete foundation of Bridge 11 in the river channel. The project continued until the 24th.

On August 20, satellite imagery showed a tropical disturbance located approximately 1,400 kilometers east of Manila. The maximum wind speed of this disturbance was estimated to be around 56 kilometers per hour at the time. After a day of intensification, the tropical disturbance developed into a tropical storm and was named “Ellen.” Ellen was moving northwestward at a speed of approximately 26 kilometers per hour, a speed that would later be considered by the Royal Observatory as “unusually high.”

Note 1: The classification of tropical cyclones used at that time for the Royal Observatory:

Note 2: The following uses daylight saving time, UTC+9, which is 1 hour ahead of the current local time in Hong Kong.

On August 22, Ellen crossed the northern tip of Luzon Island and entered the South China Sea around midnight the next day. The Royal Observatory raised Signal №1 at 10:25 a.m. on the 23rd, and Hong Kong began to experience the influence of Ellen’s rain bands from the evening of that day. As for the wind strength of Ellen, although no eye or eyewall development was observed in satellite imageries, data collected by a reconnaissance aircraft flying over Ellen at 11:45 a.m. on the 23rd indicated that Ellen’s maximum wind speed could be as high as 111 kilometres per hour, approaching the upper limit of the wind speed for a tropical storm. However, the centre of Ellen came very close to Pratas Island that afternoon, and the highest recorded wind speed there was only about 63 kilometres per hour, which is close to the lower limit of wind speed for a tropical storm.

At 10:45 p.m. on August 23, when Ellen was about 289 kilometres southwest of Hong Kong, the Royal Observatory raised Signal №3. At 6 a.m. on August 24, a ship located 80 kilometres southeast of Hong Kong reported that Ellen’s maximum wind speed had increased to about 85 kilometres per hour. Around noon, Ellen made landfall in the Shanwei area. Subsequently, the rainfall intensified, and the Royal Observatory issued Thunderstorm Warning at 8 p.m. that evening.

At 9:10 PM, the Royal Observatory issued a Thunderstorm and Heavy Rain Warning, indicating that the city is expected to receive rainfall of 50 millimetres or more per hour within the next 6 hours or less. The Thunderstorm and Heavy Rain Warning was subsequently extended multiple times until the afternoon of the 25th.

At 6:00 AM on August 25th, the Government Information Services issued a press release stating that the KCR announced temporary service disruptions due to landslides near Sha Tin Station and Tai Po Kau Station. Train services were only available between Kowloon Station and Sha Tin Station, as well as between Lo Wu Station and Tai Po Market Station.

At 8:25 AM, Bridge 11 collapsed due to flooding. According to reports from the Kung Sheung Daily, the prolonged rainfall had caused the Shing Mun Reservoir to overflow. The floodwater rose above the dam of the reservoir and continued to rush downstream. After the continuous impact overnight, Bridge 11 eventually gave way as the foundation stones were washed away by the flood, causing the entire bridge to tilt. A team of road clearing gang happened to be passing by Bridge 11 and witnessed the collapse. They immediately reported the incident to the KCR. The KCR personnel were likely inspecting the area near Sha Tin Station due to the earlier reported landslide in the vicinity, and coincidentally encountered the collapse of Bridge 11. It is worth mentioning that various sources indicate that at that time, a train happened to be on the bridge. According to Ho Kwok-chung, the Senior Freight Operations Manager of the Kowloon-Canton Railway Corporation, as recalled in the book A century of commitment: the KCRC story, the train came to a stop less than 10 metres away from the collapsed bridge.

At 10:35 AM, the Government Information Services announced that due to severe flooding and landslides in the Sha Tin area, drivers were advised to avoid using Lion Rock Tunnel.

At 11:10 AM, the Government Information Services reported that the Fire Services Department had received 40 special service requests in the past 24 hours, including 17 cases of flooding, 3 cases of building collapse, and 3 cases of landslides. The Ambulance Command also received a total of 422 calls, with 131 calls from Hong Kong Island, 199 calls from Kowloon, and 92 calls from the New Territories.

At 12:21 PM, KCR announced the resumption of services between Lo Wu Station and Sha Tin Station. In the evening at 6 PM, they declared that the service between Lo Wu Station and Kowloon Station would likely remain suspended for the next few days. They urged citizens to use Sha Tin Station to take northbound trains to reach Lo Wu.

After continuous heavy rain for half a day, reports of landslides and flooding surged to 314 cases by 2 PM that day. The torrential rain continued relentlessly. The Hong Kong Observatory briefly cancelled Thunderstorm and Heavy Rain Warning at 5 PM but reissued it again at 9 PM. The Thunderstorm and Heavy Rain Warning was finally lifted at 6 AM on the 26th.

On August 25, Hong Kong was hit by torrential rain brought by Ellen. Prolonged rainfall caused both Shing Mun Reservoir and Lower Shing Mun Reservoir to overflow, and the floodwater flowed into the Sha Tin Hoi along the Shing Mun River. Due to ongoing construction work near Bridge 11’s abutment, the foundation was exposed in the river channel. The more than 60-year-old train bridge could not withstand the sudden rush of floodwater, causing it to tilt and shift.

As there were no signs of the heavy rain from Ellen stopping, the immediate priority was to ensure that the condition of the railway bridge did not worsen, to prevent downstream residents from being affected if the floodwater broke through. It’s worth noting that less than 200 metres away from Bridge 11 was the village Lok Wo Yuen (located approximately at the intersection of today’s Che Kung Miu Road and Chui Tin Street). If Bridge 11 collapsed, the consequences would be unimaginable.

At that time, the conditions in Sha Tin and throughout Hong Kong were extremely adverse, continuous heavy rain led to widespread flooding and landslides. On one hand, the Highways Division under the Public Works Department had dispatched workers to clear the debris-covered Tai Po Road. On the other hand, the Railway Division, which also fell under the Public Works Department, sent personnel to inspect the condition of Bridge 11 together with engineers from KCR. According to reports from the South China Morning Post, engineers had placed 1,000 sandbags weighing 50 pounds each around the bridge abutment in an attempt to withstand the raging floodwaters. Still, an engineer from the KCR expressed pessimism about the situation. Firstly, the floodwater from the Shing Mun Reservoir showed no signs of stopping and even appeared to be increasing. Secondly, if the water level rose again, Bridge 11 would likely collapse. The South China Morning Post further reported that the Shatin District Office had sent personnel to warn residents in Lok Wo Yuen village that evacuation might be necessary in the future.

The Ta Kung Pao newspaper added that the railway authority believed that constructing a new bridge would be time-consuming. Therefore, they hoped to reinforce the currently unstable Bridge 11. They planned to use concrete to seal the most severely damaged arch of the bridge, which should be the one closest to the Tai Wai end of the bridge, in an effort to strengthen Bridge 11 during the flood. Assuming the entire project could proceed uninterrupted around the clock, a preliminary estimate suggested that it would take three weeks to complete. This estimate definitely did not account for the current situation of flooding in the Shing Mun River.

Mr. V. J. Mansfield, the Acting Chief Engineer/Railway at the time, told us that the Railway Division had not yet taken over the project concerning Bridge 11. The engineers near the train bridge were likely from KCR, which resulted in their more cautious approach of saving the heavily damaged Bridge 11.

At noon on August 26, Wong Mang-ki, the Acting Principal Government Highway Engineer, reported the overall situation in Hong Kong to Gordon Sapstead, the Acting Director of Engineering Development.

On August 27, Bryan O’rorke, the Principal Government Civil Engineer, reported to Gordon Sapstead on behalf of the Civil Engineering Office. He stated that there was no longer any hope of repairing Bridge 11. Regardless of the demolition plan for the old bridge, the government now had to make a choice: whether to construct a temporary railway bridge or a permanent new railway bridge. The Railway Division was currently exploring the possibility of utilising existing concrete piers and piles to construct a new railway bridge.

It is worth mentioning that it appeared the Hong Kong government had already abandoned the task of dealing with Bridge 11 on its own. O’rorke mentioned that discussions had begun with the Army to explore the possibility of airlifting a “Bailey Bridge” from Hong Kong Island as an urgent measure. The Bailey Bridge is a truss bridge constructed using prefabricated metal components. It was invented by British engineer Donald Bailey during World War II with the purpose of quickly providing the military with a means to cross various terrain obstacles.

The Bailey Bridge, due to the need for transportation and assembly in war zones, had highly standardised components and was lighter than traditional makeshift bridges, ensuring that soldiers could assemble the bridge manually. Moreover, the length of the Bailey Bridge could be adjusted according to the specific requirements, ensuring that it could meet the needs of the troops at that time. Therefore, considering the construction of a temporary railway bridge using the Bailey Bridge was a reasonable idea.

However, the Bailey Bridge also had its drawbacks. Firstly, it was designed as a temporary bridge, so its structure was narrow, allowing only single-track traffic if used for vehicles. Additionally, due to the need for lightweight transport, the Bailey Bridge had a lower loading.

Mr. Mansfield later recalled the situation at that time, stating that after personally inspecting the site on the 25th, he had given up on the idea of saving Bridge 11 and instead considered building a completely new railway bridge. The temporary plan would be using the military’s Bailey Bridge to span the original site of the railway bridge. However, the Army’s perspective was that if the temporary plan were adopted, they would also need to construct a double-span bridge using the Bailey Bridge. Since their Bailey Bridge was currently being replaced, the current inventory was insufficient to build such a bridge. Mr. Mansfield also had reservations about the load-bearing capacity of the Bailey Bridge. He pointed out that even though tanks could safely pass over the Bailey Bridge, the weight of a diesel locomotive was much heavier than tanks, with a difference of at least 20 tons. The discussion about using the Bailey Bridge or not came to an end at this point.

Reginald Gregory, the General Manager of the Kowloon Canton Railway, later stated that although there was enough space to set up a temporary railway bridge at the location of Bridge 11, there were other geographical constraints hindering this option. On the evening of the 27th, at 8:17 PM, the government officially announced that a new bridge would be constructed to replace the damaged Bridge 11.

However, the first sign of the government’s decision to demolish the bridge did not come from the evening’s press release. Mr. Mansfield, who had taken charge of the site, discussed with the assisting military personnel how to demolish the bridge. At that time, someone suggested using explosives to demolish Bridge 11 quickly to start the repair work as soon as possible. However, engineers from the army were concerned about the potential collateral damage caused by the explosion and rejected the proposal. It is unclear whether due to the urgency of the situation, Radio Television Hong Kong (RTHK) had already announced on the evening of the 27th, at 5 PM and 5:15 PM respectively on the Chinese and English channels, that the Tai Wai Railway Bridge would be blown up the next day at noon. The broadcast likely warned nearby residents about the loud noise that would occur and announced the evacuation of nearby residents.

However, the situation quickly took unexpected turns. At 8:17 PM, the government’s Information Services Department announced that the Public Works Department would construct a new bridge, stating in the press release that Bridge 11 was damaged beyond repair. The subcontractors of the Public Works Department and the Gurkha Engineers who arrived later immediately began the work of dismantling the railway bridge. The Information Services Department also specifically mentioned that the dismantling operation would not involve the use of explosives and there would be no loud noise.

It was not until 8:50 PM that the Police Public Relations Branch of the Royal Hong Kong Police Force officially announced to the media that the blasting operation to destroy the Tai Wai Railway Bridge had been cancelled, and the previously announced evacuation operation was also cancelled. The personnel at the Information Services Department made handwritten annotations on the notification with a ballpoint pen to clarify that the earlier warning about loud noise would not occur.

From the above, it is evident that there was considerable confusion within the government at the time. The decision to cancel the blasting operation of the Tai Wai Railway Bridge was not announced immediately. The earlier press release only briefly mentioned that the authorities had abandoned the use of explosives. It was only after almost half an hour that the government officially announced the cancellation of the blasting operation.

On August 28th, senior officials from the Public Works Department visited the site of the demolition work on the railway bridge in Tai Wai. Acting Director of Public Works, William Bell, and the Acting Director of Engineering Development, Gordon Sapstead, accompanied by Acting Chief Engineer of the Railway Division, Mr. Mansfield, inspected the site.

Bell expressed confidence that train services crossing the Shing Mun River would be restored in four weeks. Mr. Mansfield mentioned that piling work would commence in two days. Gurkha engineers and their heavy equipment would be responsible for removing the bridge deck, leaving only the arches. The contractors from the Public Works Department would then join in to complete the remaining dismantling work. The piling work would not wait for the completion of the dismantling but proceed simultaneously. Mansfield also indicated that although there were initial concerns about having enough materials to construct the new bridge within a short time, the supply issue seemed to have been resolved.

Note: Bell’s account was the only occasion that the target of 4 weeks was mentioned.

Mr. Mak Chai-Kwong, who was an Assistant Engineer of the Railway Division at the time, mentioned in the book “Parallel Time and Space in Shatin” (沙田平行時空半世紀) that in order to find suitable materials for the construction of the new double-span bridge, the Railway Division turned to the temporary steel flyover previously built at the “intersection of Prince Edward Road and Waterloo Road”. He also pointed out to us that he used to pass by that temporary bridge on his way to work, so it immediately came to his mind. Due to space limitations, only a brief description of the background of that steel flyover can be provided at this time.

Note: The address of the Railway Division at the time was 19, Whitfield Barracks, Austin Road, Kowloon.

The temporary steel flyover was indeed located at the intersection of Prince Edward Road West and Waterloo Road. The bridge, approximately 300 metres long and reaching a maximum height of 12 metres, was manufactured in Japan and then transported to Hong Kong. The entire construction process was completed within 90 hours. The Government Information Services praised it as an “Instant Flyover”, and the Hong Kong government recorded this achievement in its 1973 annual report.

The mentioned flyover was dismantled around the end of 1975 and subsequently stored in the warehouse of the Government Supplies Department. The Railway Division would later transport it to Tai Wai for use in constructing a new bridge on the current Down Line of the East Rail Line.

As for the other section, the Railway Division purchased precast concrete beams that were already manufactured and under production from the “Construction company of the Tai Wai Highway Project.” According to a document sent from the Highways (New Territories) Division of Highways Office to Mr. Mansfield, on September 3rd, during a meeting at the Tai Wai construction site, the Highways Office agreed to provide seven concrete beams and other components, while the Railway Division would be responsible for the transportation costs and other related work. The Highways (New Territories) Division stated that the relevant financial expenditure would be sended to the Railway Division later, indicating that the Railway Division would bear all additional costs.

Now, what is the “Tai Wai Highway Project”? Given the considerable length of the required concrete beams, it is inferred that the only project of such scale in the vicinity is the Lion Bridge widening project. As luck would have it, a letter dated October 25th finally provided a definite answer. An attachment signed by Chief Highway Engineer Kwok Wai-kai confirmed that after Bridge №11 was damaged by floods, the Highways Office transferred seven prestressed concrete beams from the Lion Rock Bridge widening project to the Railway Division for the expedited repair of the railway bridge.

Note: At that time, the government internally referred to the current Lion Bridge as “Sha Tin Bridge.” It is inferred that this was because there was only one modern vehicular bridge in Sha Tin at that time.

Therefore, it is speculated that when Mr. Mansfield mentioned in the press release on August 28th that the issue of “availability of suitable materials” has been solved, he was referring to the Railway Division finalising the preliminary design and necessary materials. They planned to construct a single-track railway bridge on the Shing Mun River using steel beams and precast concrete beams brought over. Later on, they would arrange for the construction of another track. Mr. Mak also recalled that at a very early stage, around one week after the incident, the Railway Division provided all parameters to two structural engineers, Mr. Wong Yai-chow and Mr. Kwei Chi-shun, believed to be from the Structural Design Division of the Highways Office, to design the new bridge. Another assistant engineer, Mr. Tse Po-ming, discussed matters regarding the concrete beams with the Highways Office during the aforementioned meeting held on September 3rd at the Tai Wai construction site. It can be seen that the reconstruction plan for Bridge 11 took shape at a relatively early stage.

With Ellen’s departure, the rainfall also finally began to decrease. Now, the government and the Kowloon Canton Railway are about to face the chaotic railway service and reconstruction work.

5. Passengers, Fresh Food and Diesel

Before the fate of Bridge №11 was officially announced, the Hong Kong government had already faced great chaos brought by the typhoon. On the morning of August 26th at 5:50 AM, while the government Information Services Department announced that the service between Kowloon Station and Lo Wu Station would not be restored for the next few days, Clive Oxley, the District Officer of Tai Po, had already given an interview to the press, stating that the branch line at Wo Hop Shek and the siding near Fanling Station would be opened to unload livestock, as well as vegetables, to ensure a stable food supply.

Note: Clive Oxley was concurrently appointed as the District Officer of Sha Tin and Tai Po starting in July 1976, and he ceased to be District Officer of Sha Tin in September of the same year.

After the fate of Bridge №11 on Shing Mun River was sealed, a difficult problem now needs to be addressed: a large number of passengers and goods are unable to cross Shing Mun River. Due to the abrupt severance of the Kowloon Canton Railway, passengers from the urban area need to find alternative routes to cross Shing Mun River.

On the evening of August 29th at 10:55 pm, the Information Services Department announced that train services between Kowloon Station and Tai Wai would be restored in the next few days. Free shuttle buses would operate between Tai Wai and Sha Tin Station, allowing passengers to transfer to northbound trains at Sha Tin. The following day, the Kowloon Canton Railway announced that the aforementioned service would resume on September 1st, with service frequencies following the holiday timetable at that time. As the spokesperson of the railway authority pointed out, passengers were advised to walk towards the front of the train within the train compartment and then disembark at the temporary platforms in Tai Wai. It was inferred that the boarding point for the free shuttle bus should be located at Tsuen Nam Road, the current roadside parking area. It’s worth mentioning that at that time, South China Morning Post reported the free shuttle bus service between Tai Wai and Sha Tin was operated by Kowloon Motor Bus with nine buses.

Portal: Mr. Tymon Mellor’s article posted on The Industry History of Hong Kong Group contains two accompanying pictures, showcasing the temporary station in Tai Wai and the shuttle buses operated by Kowloon Motor Bus:

• Temporary Station in Tai Wai
• Shuttle Buses operated by KMB

However, you may have also heard that China Motor Bus subsequently joined in providing the free shuttle bus service. The reasons behind it, however, were quite farcical. On September 2nd, the Hong Kong Star newspaper reported a shocking news titled “SHATIN — TAIWAI RIDE — AT YOUR OWN RISK”: it turned out that the railway authority’s free shuttle bus service was not covered by any third-party insurance.

According to the Hong Kong Star, the Transport Department has confirmed that the shuttle buses between Sha Tin and Tai Wai are not covered by third-party insurance. If passengers are injured, they will have to bear all the expenses themselves. Kowloon Canton Railway has taken remedial measures by posting notices at the boarding points in Sha Tin and Tai Wai, notifying passengers about their risks.

According to a spokesperson from the railway authority, there has been a longstanding disagreement between the KCR and Kowloon Motor Bus (KMB) regarding liability. KCR has been urging KMB to provide third-party insurance for passengers on the shuttle buses, while KMB holds the opposite view, believing that KCR should reimburse all compensation costs in the event of an accident.

After some back and forth, KCR has been in discussions with China Motor Bus (CMB) to explore the possibility of changing the operator of the shuttle buses. CMB agreed to provide third-party insurance for passengers on the shuttle buses traveling between Tai Wai and Sha Tin. A spokesperson for CMB announced that the shuttle buses will commence operations on September 3rd.

On the other hand, due to the failure of food supplies reaching Hong Kong via the railway, the prices of food items have started to rise in anticipation of the approaching Mid-Autumn Festival. In order to enhance the capacity for handling goods, KCR had begun planning to establish two additional temporary freight unloading points, hoping to improve the food supply. These two temporary freight unloading points were located at the level crossing on Tai Po Road — Tai Wai section and the work-in-progress Fo Tan siding. Regarding the Fo Tan siding, the current Fo Tan Freight Yard was constructed in the 1970s to connect with the neighbouring China Resources Fo Tan Oil Depot. After obtaining consent from China Resources, KCR temporarily postponed the project there and instead opened it for unloading freight trains from China.

At that time, according to a report by the South China Morning Post, “thousands” of freight wagons were stranded on the Shenzhen side, and it was believed that the Hong Kong market was also concerned about the supply of staple food items. The Information Services Department released a press release on September 3rd, reassuring the public by stating that the number of pigs transported to the slaughterhouses in Cheung Sha Wan and Kennedy Town had returned to pre-flood levels. A spokesperson from the Urban Council stated that although the number of pigs imported plummeted from an average of over 7,000 on a normal day to 80 on the day of the bridge collapse (25th), the number rebounded to over 12,000 the next day, and an average of over 9,600 pigs were transported to the government slaughterhouses per day in the following week. The spokesperson from the Urban Council stated that although the railways were blocked, pigs destined for Hong Kong had been redirected through other land border crossings. KCR’s General Manager R. E. Gregory also added in the same press release that the Ho Tung Lau Depot had been opened for unloading freight trains. The three temporary freight depots can handle approximately 70 freight cars per day, and the two aforementioned temporary freight unloading points in Sha Tin and Fo Tan will be opened in one to two weeks. According to a report in Ta Kung Pao on the same day, the freight yard at the level crossing in Sha Tin will start operations in the afternoon on that day.

To strengthen the handling capacity at the northern section of the Kowloon Canton Railway, Gregory also revealed that they were considering transporting one or two diesel locomotives to the northern section by sea, in order to assist the four locomotives stranded there. As sea transportation was required, Gregory mentioned that they would choose to transport the lighter diesel locomotives, weighing 71 tons. Coincidentally, at that time, KCR’s annual report listed only two diesel locomotives weighing 71 tons: №51 “Sir Alexander” and №52 “Lady Maurine.” In other words, the “Sir Alexander” locomotive, which is currently preserved in the Railway Museum, had the possibility of being transported by ship via sea route from Kowloon to Tai Po Kau.

After all, the Kowloon Canton Railway is a major artery for food supply and foreign trade in Hong Kong. Recognizing the significance of the matter, the Hong Kong government has accelerated the repair work on the railway bridge. On September 8th, Governor Murray MacLehose and the then British Ambassador to Beijing, Edward Youde, visited the construction site in Tai Wai to inspect the progress. They were accompanied by Acting Chief Engineer of the Railway Division, Mr. Val Mansfield, Principal Government Civil Engineer, Mr. Bryan O’rorke, and General Manager of the Kowloon Canton Railway, Mr. Reginald Gregory.

During the visit, the Governor learned that the demolition work had been completed, and the piling work was currently ongoing day and night. After inspecting the Tai Wai site, the Governor and his entourage proceeded to the Ho Tung Lau Depot to inspect the goods unloading operations.

On September 11th, Reginald Gregory was interviewed by the Government Information Services. He mentioned that there were currently a total of five temporary freight yards handling goods from China, and the unloading capacity had finally returned to the level before the flooding. Gregory revealed during a lunch meeting with the Victoria Rotary Club on September 21st that the railway authority had decided to abandon the plan to transport locomotives to the northern section. He stated that the new bridge was expected to be completed in three weeks, and for now, the focus was on ensuring the smooth operation of all locomotives. Shipping locomotives by sea was deemed too risky. It is estimated that the decision was influenced by the fact that the throughput of the temporary freight yards had roughly offset the impact of the flooding. Therefore, KCR decided to proceed cautiously until the completion of the new bridge.

The flooding also led to some Chinese goods entering Hong Kong via water routes. On September 13th, Chinese travel agencies issued a notice stating that some goods could be shipped from Guangzhou Huangpu Port. Two days later, the South China Morning Post added that the cargo ship Huang Shan, arranged by Chinese travel agencies, could carry the equivalent of 80 freight wagons and was expected to arrive in Hong Kong on the 15th. This shipping arrangement was also part of the plan to handle the backlog of goods in mainland China. Fresh food would be prioritized for rail transport to Hong Kong, supplemented by shipping to expedite the processing of food stuck in China.

During the lunch meeting, Gregory also revealed that the Chinese government was quite concerned about the progress of Hong Kong’s repairs. Various Chinese institutions expressed “sympathetic understanding” to KCR and cooperated together to eliminate any negative impact on railway services. Railway staff from both Hong Kong and China also cooperated for the first time at an unofficial level, with the station masters of Shenzhen and Lo Wu stations exchanging information and coordinating train operations.

This level of cooperation was partly driven by practical considerations. Gregory estimated that as of September 8th, there were still 1,000 to 1,500 freight cars stranded in Shenzhen. Even before the flooding, the Kowloon Canton Railway only handled 140 freight wagons per day. Gregory himself estimated that it would take until November to clear all the backlog in Shenzhen. It is believed that the challenging situation at the time compelled both Hong Kong and China to make further adjustments. On one hand, they engaged in unprecedented cooperation, and on the other hand, China dispatched the ship Huang Shan, which was originally responsible for long-haul routes, to transport goods to Hong Kong.

Another interesting item that became particularly noticeable during the chaos was diesel. How exactly did Chinese diesel enter the local market?

Going back to 1971, the Land Development and Planning Committee (LDPC) agreed to start drafting the development plan for Sha Tin Area 16, which is known as today’s Fo Tan, to align with the ongoing development of Sha Tin Town Centre (Area 7). In July 1972, the Crown Lands and Survey Office drafted the Outline Zoning Plan LST/57 for internal circulation within the government. In LST/57, the land of today’s Sha Tin Cold Storage 1 and 2, as well as the site of Pak Sik Godown, were reserved for slaughterhouses and railway freight yards. However, since this plan was coordinated with the development of the town centre, the completion of LST/57’s proposed plan was expected to begin gradually in 1974 at the earliest.

However, things were starting to change. In October 1973, the Yom Kippur War broke out in the Middle East. During the same month, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) imposed an oil embargo on the Western camp led by the United States, triggering the first oil crisis. Although Hong Kong was not directly affected by the oil embargo, and even the United Kingdom was not one of the targeted countries, the market panic caused by OPEC’s production cuts could not be ignored. The Hong Kong government established the Oil Policy Committee responsible for providing weekly reports on the latest situation to Governor Murray MacLehose.

According to the data from the Commerce and Industry Department, Hong Kong had already been importing kerosene from China before the oil crisis. In 1973, an average of about 530 tonnes of kerosene was imported monthly. As for diesel, it was only intermittently imported before the oil crisis, with each import quantity being roughly half of what it was after the crisis erupted.

On December 17, 1973, Deputy Colonial Secretary M. D. A. Clinton stated that the Hong Kong government currently did not have a clear understanding over the amount of fuel imported by FEOSO, who was the agent for China National Petroleum Corporation in Hong Kong. The government’s emergency plan still indicated that future fuel supplies from China were “possible.” However, Clinton estimated that the government would resolve the issue of not knowing the quantity of fuel imported from China in a short period of time, suggesting that there would be further discussions with the Chinese side regarding expanding imports.

The Oil Policy Committee, led by Clinton, held its 11th meeting on January 21, 1974. During the meeting, Clinton reported he had been following the discussions held between the representatives from China Resources Corporation and committee member J. D. McGregor. Clinton was also preparing a memorandum for the Executive Council meeting on January 29 to discuss arrangements for granting land to China Resources for the construction of oil storage facilities. Director of Oil Supplies R. Porter, who also attended the meeting, pointed out that over 5,000 tonnes of fuel oil had already been exported from China to Hong Kong, indicating that Hong Kong had begun large-scale imports of fuel from China.

The minutes of the next meeting stated that the Hong Kong government had approved the granting of land to China Resources for the construction of an oil storage facility, which would later be completed as Fo Tan Oil Depot. Although the record of the Executive Council at the time is not unclassified, a confidential enclosure of a file from the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office explains the decision made by the Executive Council in 1974.

From 1973 to 1974, the Hong Kong government had been in negotiations with China Resources regarding the possibility of importing fuel from China to stabilise the fuel supply in Hong Kong. The condition set by the Chinese side was that the Hong Kong government must provide land for the construction of a separated oil storage and distribution facilities. Eventually, the Executive Council agreed to grant two parcels of land located in Tsing Yi and Sha Tin through a private treaty grant. These lands would be used for the future Nga Ying Chau Oil Depot and the Fo Tan Oil Depot respectively.

Portal: Nga Ying Chau Oil Depot in 1976

However, the Chinese and British sides were unable to reach a consensus on the land premia. The government, considering the “heavy expenditure required for tank facilities” and “China’s willingness to help Hong Kong”, decided to grant the aforementioned two parcels of land to China Resources at a price lower than the market value. The land price was set at 10 Hong Kong Dollars per square foot, which was deemed the upper limit acceptable to China Resources.

The memorandum from the Executive Council also mentioned that China Resources had later “honoured its side of the deal” by increasing the import of fuel to Hong Kong from 1.9 million barrels in 1974 to 11.9 million barrels in 1978. At that time, China Resources’ pricing was also below the market price, and it was based solely on the Singapore posted prices until 1980.

Note: In 1979, 63% of the oil imported into Hong Kong came from Singapore.

The aforementioned memorandum of the Executive Council reveals that the import of Chinese fuel to Hong Kong in the late 1970s was a result of the oil crisis. The Hong Kong government granted land to China’s state-owned enterprises at a low price in exchange for their import of fuel at a discounted rate, aiming to stabilise the fuel supply in Hong Kong.

From the perspective of the Hong Kong government, importing Chinese fuel seemed like a justifiable choice. At that time, Hong Kong heavily relied on electricity generated from burning fuel oil, with nearly 60% of the oil being consumed by power companies. In the government’s contingency plan, measures were considered to save energy that may seem unimaginable to us.

Some measures being considered were:

• Restricting the use of elevators
• Ceasing the use of floodlights at sports facilities during the night
• TV broadcasts shutting down at 11 PM
• Mandating a 5-day workweek in offices
• Limiting the opening of shops, eateries, and entertainment venues to 6 days
• Water rationing
• Suspending tram services

Some measures that were implemented later included:

• Under the Emergency Regulations Ordinance Chapter 241 of the Hong Kong legislation, the Emergency (Control of Petroleum) Regulations 1973 was enacted on December 7, 1973. On the same day, an order was issued to limit the use of outdoor lights to only 3.5 hours each night.
• On December 21, 1973, the Emergency (Summer Time) Regulations 1973 was enacted, announcing the implementation of daylight saving time starting from December 30 of the same year.

On the other hand, in 1973, the Hong Kong government also had conflicts with other oil companies regarding the sale of oil products. For example, in November 1973, Mobil Oil notified its customers that due to a tight fuel supply, the company had no choice but to reduce the supply quantity of all orders by 12%, based on the supply volume from January to August. The Director of Oil Supplies R. Porter, reported to Deputy Colonial Secretary M. D. A. Clinton that when he learned about Mobil Oil’s intention to reduce the supply quantity, he had already discussed remedial measures with the representatives of Mobil’s Hong Kong branch. The local representative had conveyed his warning to the US headquarters, stating that the unilateral decision of the US headquarters might disrupt the Hong Kong market. However, the response from the US headquarters was only four lines, and two days later, Mobil Oil further increased the reduction to 20% in the formal notice.

Afterwards, the Hong Kong government faced considerable pressure due to the reduced sales from Mobil, with Sing Tao Daily accusing the government of tacitly allowing oil companies to gradually raise oil product prices by 40%. Subsequently, Clinton requested the Government Information Services to refute Sing Tao Daily’s report on November 29 with full effort. Clinton used strong language to describe Sing Tao’s report, stating that yesterday’s report was “utterly irresponsible, inaccurate and misleading”. Clinton was evidently angry and even proposed that the Government Information Services question Sing Tao about “who has paid them to say such nonsense and why they employ such incompetent reporters.”

After Porter sent a strongly worded letter to Mobil, they eventually retracted the previously announced restrictions in December. However, the impression of the American oil companies within the Hong Kong government was greatly diminished afterward. Porter directly pointed out that American oil companies were only governed by their US headquarters. If the Hong Kong government intervened in their arrangements for transporting oil, it would invite retaliatory measures such as reducing fuel shipments to Hong Kong. As a result, many oil tankers only temporarily bunkered the fuel oil they transported in oil depots in Hong Kong. Given that the Hong Kong government was powerless to resist this, Porter explicitly stated that the power to dispose of the fuel delivered to Hong Kong should be controlled by the Hong Kong government, not these oil companies. In the response from the Economic Branch, Porter’s suggestion to regain control over fuel was supported. Economic Branch cited Clinton’s opinion that the Hong Kong government is currently “relying very much on their (Mobil and Shell) goodwill”, with Shell being even more significant.

Looking at China, since the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, China has been continuously trying to break through its diplomatic predicament, with Japan making the fastest progress in this regard. After signing the “Japan–China Joint Communiqué” in 1972, Japan established formal diplomatic relations with China and began importing crude oil produced by the Daqing oil field. Japan became Chinese oil’s first customer. At that time, China was still in the midst of the Cultural Revolution, and Vice Chairman Lin Biao had recently died in a plane crash in Mongolia.

With the outbreak of the oil crisis, Japan increased its oil imports from China and assisted in the construction of oil pipelines for oil transportation. In March 1974, after Hong Kong began importing Chinese fuel on a large scale, the fuel orders for that month were delayed by one month. The Economic Branch pointed out that most of China’s railway tankers were unable to transport fuel from inland refineries to the port on time because they needed to transport Japan’s crude oil orders. The Economic Branch stated that FEOSO guaranteed solemnly that the order would be delivered to Hong Kong on time in April. They even rented an oil tanker from Japan to handle Hong Kong’s order during the gap between ship schedules.

It seems that China, as a newly emerging oil-exporting country, was indeed able to satisfy its customers, at least its first customer, Japan, should have recognized this. Considering that the traditional oil companies in Hong Kong were unable to solve the problem of fuel shortages and had an unpleasant experience when cooperating to deal with the oil crisis, it seemed to be a practical approach to explore the possibility of purchasing oil produced by China. Introducing fuel produced by China not only stabilised Hong Kong’s fuel supply but also introduced a new competitor that challenged the traditional oil companies’ dominance. As a result, Hong Kong became the second customer to import large quantities of Chinese oil after Japan. The import of Chinese diesel fuel by Hong Kong also rapidly increased, from importing over 3,000 tons per month to over 6,000 tons a few months later, and even approaching a monthly peak of over 20,000 tons in the following year.

Although the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries announced the lifting of the oil embargo in early 1974, the internal view of the Hong Kong government was that the oil supply situation would not improve in the short term. In a brief drafted by the Commerce and Industry Department for Governor Murray MacLehose, it was pointed out that the Hong Kong government believed that the increased oil production by Arab countries in the future would flow to the previously embargoed countries, which actually caused more concerns for the Hong Kong government. Therefore, the Hong Kong government did not expect to relax the regulations on fuel products and energy in Hong Kong in the short term.

In order to facilitate the long-term plan of importing Chinese diesel fuel by rail, the Hong Kong government applied for funding from the Finance Committee under the Legislative Council in early 1974 to construct a siding in Fo Tan and a spur line in Hung Hom for future fuel unloading operations. The location of the siding in Fo Tan is where the current MTR Fo Tan Freight Yard is located, and the location of the spur line in Hung Hom is adjacent to the sea, at the former Kowloon Freight Yard, which is now the Hung Hom Stabling Sidings. The arrangement for unloading diesel fuel at the Hung Hom spur line was temporary, and the task would be completed once the Fo Tan siding was completed.

However, not everyone was pleased by such an arrangement. As the plan occupied the location designated for the slaughterhouse previously to build the oil sidings, not only did the infamous pig wagons have to continue unloading pigs at the freight yard of Mong Kok Station, but the pigs also had to continue their long journey to the slaughterhouse in Cheung Sha Wan. This situation greatly frustrated officials in Kowloon.

On August 10, 1974, the KCR welcomed its first diesel freight train from China, marking the beginning of diesel unloading. In 1976, when the flood caused by Tropical Storm Ellen destroyed Bridge №11, the unfinished siding at the oil depot and the inability of trains to reach the Hung Hom spur line in Hung Hom created a need for a solution for unloading diesel freight trains under the shadow of the oil crisis.

On September 4, R.E. Gregory wrote to Frederick Morphet Watson, Director of the Fire Services, notifying him that the railway had initiated preparations to unload diesel at Tai Po Kau. In the letter, Gregory stated that representatives from the Fire Services Department had inspected the selected site at Tai Po Kau the previous day and had no objections to the location. On September 10, the Fire Services Department replied, confirming their agreement with the arrangement.

The selected location was not Tai Po Kau Station as mentioned in previous online information but an approximately 220-metre-long seawall outside Tunnel №5. The diesel would be unloaded from the tankers and pumped through pipelines to the barges moored nearby.

On September 16, the Marine Department informed China Resources that they conditionally agreed to the unloading of diesel at Tai Po Kau. China Resources had to implement four preventive measures:

1. All staff are made aware of the dangers of oil pollution
2. Adequate and safe lighting is provided at night
3. Drip pans are placed under all hose connection
4. All craft to have oil dispersants on board

On September 23, Gregory wrote to the Commanding Officer of the Emergency Unit of the New Territories Police District. He requested that officers be dispatched to guard the diesel unloading operation which started after the last train. Gregory stated that the relevant train was expected to arrive at the unloading point outside Tunnel №5 at 12:30 a.m., and the unloading operation was expected to continue until 3 a.m. The train would then be hauled to University Station for parking and depart northbound at 6:06 a.m. the following morning. Gregory hoped that the Police Force could provide officers to protect the train until its departure the next morning.

Although Gregory stated in the aforementioned letter that the arrival date of the diesel freight train was the night of September 25, in an interview two days later, he postponed the arrival date to the evening of the 26th. On September 28, the South China Morning Post reported that the diesel freight train finally arrived late on the 27th. The 16-car-long diesel freight train unloaded approximately 800 tons of diesel in the early morning at Tai Po Kau, with the assistance of four barges. The South China Morning Post also pointed out that due to giving way to the freight cars carrying fresh food, the diesel freight train arrived so late.

The railway authorities indicated at the beginning of the month that the throughput of the temporary cargo yard had roughly offset the impact of the floods, but the diesel freight train would not enter the city until the end of the month. The priority of the diesel freight train did not seem to be high, and on the other hand, the situation with other freight cars stranded in mainland China was also quite severe.

6. Road to Reconstruction

Mr. V. J. Mansfield, Acting Chief Engineer of the Railway Division, stated that after the government decided to entrust the Railway Division with the responsibility of reconstruction, Secretary of Environment Allen Armstrong-Wright immediately called to inquire about the time needed for the reconstruction. At that time, Mr. Mansfield replied that it would require six weeks, provided that he could mobilise all the necessary resources. He also received a “carte blanche”, authorising him to make all business decisions without being bound by procedures.

Afterwards, Mr. Mansfield contacted one of the contractors working for the Public Works Department to discuss how to expedite the demolition works. Although Mr. Mansfield offered generous terms, the other party expressed concerns about the lack of sufficient time to complete the necessary works and declined Mr. Mansfield’s offer. Due to the urgency of the situation, he had no choice but to accept the proposal from Mr. Henry Wong (黃兆龍), the owner of the company Henryvicy. Henryvicy took over the contract from the Railway Division, even though their company was relatively small at the time.

While the design for the new bridge had been decided early on, the major challenge was finding suitable materials and arranging for their transportation. Although it was mentioned earlier that the Highways Office’s Highway (New Territories) Division agreed on September 3 to provide seven concrete beams, they were initially not as generous as Santa Claus in meeting the requests. Mr. Mansfield mentioned that when he requested the concrete beams from the Highway (New Territories) Division’s Chief Engineer, Mr. A. D. S. MacDonald, he refused to lend the corresponding beams. It was only after Mr. Mansfield called the Acting Director of Public Works, Mr. William Collins Bell, and explained the urgency of the situation that Mr. MacDonald began discussing the handover of the concrete beams with him. Subsequently, they discussed the transportation of the concrete beams, and due to the large size of the components, Mr. Mansfield informed Mr. MacDonald that they didn’t need him to arrange vehicles for transportation. Mr. Mansfield also hoped that they could provide more concrete beams to meet the needs of the reconstruction, and the request was later granted.

Mr. Mak Chai-kwong also shared some details of the reconstruction works with us. The Railway Division had commissioned Chung Wah Shipbuilding & Engineering Co. Ltd., which was operating in Hong Kong, to assist with the welding work. He pointed out that due to the sheer size of some components, such as the iron cages for the bridge pier and the 2 pile caps and the steel frames composed of the temporary flyover’s steel beams, only shipbuilding companies could carry out such a large-scale welding project in a short period of time. As for why Henryvicy was chosen to participate in the reconstruction project, they were also one of the contractors for the Kowloon Canton Railway double-tracking project at the time. They not only had experience in railway engineering but also possessed the necessary equipment and capabilities to handle the reconstruction project.

Mr. Mansfield recalled that they wanted to ensure that the newly-built pier could withstand the erosion caused by the river water more effectively. As a result, they decided to use metallic columns for the new Bridge №11. Since the temporary flyover on Prince Edward Road West had already been taken out of storage, it was straightforward for the engineers to utilise the metal columns from the temporary flyover as well. The temporary flyover had been stored at the depot of the Government Supplies Department in pristine order, and thus, the markings painted during the flyover era remained clearly visible.

When the reconstruction project was in full swing, the Governor and his entourage visited the construction site in Tai Wai on September 8. Mr. Mansield mentioned that he never expected to meet the British Ambassador to Beijing, Mr. Youde, at Tai Wai. He speculated that Mr. Youde’s purpose for visiting was to convey the Chinese government’s concerns about the chaotic railway service and remind the Hong Kong Government of the political importance of restoring railway service.

Regarding the freight business of the Kowloon Canton Railway, there was a deeply rooted misconception that goods imported via the railway into Hong Kong were destined solely for Hong Kong. Even during the turmoil of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s, a considerable amount of Chinese goods were reexported through Hong Kong to other overseas destinations.

According to a paper titled “China’s Economic Relationship with Hong Kong” published by the British Ministry of defence in 1978, trade between Hong Kong and China was far more complex than the stereotypical image of solely food imports.

Indeed, China exported a significant amount of fresh food to Hong Kong, with 40% of the export goods being food and livestock. However, on the other hand, the variety of goods was quite diverse. The Ministry of Defence pointed out that in recent years, China’s exports have become increasingly diversified, including the aforementioned diesel, textiles, and even industrial machinery. Since 1976, textiles have accounted for approximately one-fifth of China’s total export goods. Surprisingly, the Ministry of Defence believed that during the Cultural Revolution, China’s exports to Hong Kong were only slightly dropped. Fresh food exports to Hong Kong maintained a relatively stable level, accounting for about half of the Hong Kong-China trade. The Ministry of Defence also noted that the decline in Chinese concrete exports to Hong Kong was due to pricing tactics on the Chinese side. China used its “near-monopoly” market position to raise concrete prices, leading Hong Kong customers to seek alternative sources and ultimately resulting in a decline in Chinese concrete imports.

In summary, Hong Kong-China trade was hardly affected by the Cultural Revolution and remained stable. The goods imported into Hong Kong were not limited to food; certain chinese goods, such as concrete, had a significant influence in the Hong Kong market. China had enough capacity to affect the Hong Kong market.

The annual reports of the railway authority also revealed a wide variety of imported goods, including construction materials such as concrete, cardboard boxes, steel bars, and ceramic tiles. Their import volumes were comparable to that of food.

Chinese goods were not limited to exports to Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s re-export business remained strong. In 1976, Chinese goods were the largest source of re-export trade in Hong Kong, accounting for 27%, with Japan following closely at nearly 15%. Even during China’s diplomatic isolation, many Chinese goods flowed through Hong Kong to countries that were previously hostile to China, such as Indonesia, the United States, and even Taiwan. The related re-export business steadily grew, and some countries experienced significant surges in 1976.

The Ministry of Defence also elaborated on China’s trade policy. The article mentioned that even though the hardliners within China became increasingly dominant from 1975 to 1976, they never expressed any strong opinions regarding Hong Kong-China trade. The Ministry of Defence believed that these hardliners were self-aware and understood that attacking Hong Kong-China trade would not bring any political dividends. As a result, the Chinese government maintained a consistent export policy. This indicates that China’s foreign policies, including diplomacy and trade, were pragmatic. After the Sino-Soviet split, China faced increasing diplomatic isolation. After four senior generals and Foreign Minister Chen Yi concluded that they needed to break the deadlock in China-US relations, China made a 180-degree shift in its foreign policy and began engaging with Western countries that were once labelled as “imperialist enemies”. In the case of Hong Kong, even after the rebel faction took command of Hong Kong-Macau policies in 1967, China continued to export goods to Hong Kong and lightly overlooked this self-contradictory policy. Not to mention after China’s significant shift in foreign policy.

Note: After the Coup of Huairen Hall in October 1976, the Old Guards purged the hardliners who Mao Zedong relied on during the latter half of the Cultural Revolution, thus ending the Cultural Revolution.

The goods that were stranded on the Chinese side at the time were likely not only destined for Hong Kong. The chaos in Hong Kong’s railways not only affected the goods imported into Hong Kong but also impacted China’s export orders. It is likely that Youde came to Hong Kong this time to show China’s concern for the progress of the project.

Although Sir Murray MacLehose and his delegation did not stay in Tai Wai for a long time, before leaving, MacLehose gave his direct phone number to Mr. Mansfield and told him that if there were any problems, he could seek his assistance. He also reiterated to Mr. Mansfield that the reconstruction of the railway bridge was of utmost importance and must be completed as soon as possible.

Although occasional problems were encountered in the subsequent reconstruction work, they were mostly resolved smoothly. However, Mr. Mansfield also pointed out that they encountered a rather complex problem at that time — Chairman Mao Zedong of China passed away on September 9. As Chairman Mao’s state funeral was scheduled for September 18, there would also be a 3-minute mourning period on that day. Mr. Mansfield arranged for a break for the construction workers and allowed those in need to mourn on their own. It was also the first time the reconstruction project had been halted since it began.

At noon on that day, Mr. Mansfield received a report from his Inspector of Work, Mr. Cheuk Chi Sun, that there were unidentified individuals loitering near the construction site. Shortly after, a man walked into the site office and identified himself as a superintendent from the Special Branch of the Hong Kong Police Force. The group of eight individuals he brought with him were exactly the suspicious individuals mentioned by Mr. Cheuk earlier, and their purpose for coming this time was to warn Mr. Mansfield that he might be under personal threat. The superintendent from the Special Branch mentioned that they had intercepted intelligence indicating that right-wing forces from Taiwan were planning to blow up the under-repair railway bridge during Chairman Mao Zedong’s state funeral. In the end, Mr. Mansfield decided to accompany them to the nearby Shatin Heights Hotel to monitor the situation at the construction site distantly. After enjoying his lunch, Mr. Mansfield returned to the construction site to continue the project, as the railway bridge had not been destroyed.

After the emergency repairs, the newly constructed single-track railway bridge finally began to take shape in September 1976. Mr. Mansfield , in an interview with the Government Information Services on September 27, stated that the progress of the reconstruction project was going well and was already more than halfway completed. Mr. Mansfield mentioned that despite being affected by adverse weather conditions earlier, they still anticipated that the project would be completed in the first week of October. As long as the weather permitted, the construction workers would proceed with the installation of the bridge structure.

Due to the impact of Typhoon Iris in mid-September, Hong Kong even hoisted the signal №8 typhoon warning on the evening of September 18. It can be assumed that the adverse weather conditions mentioned by Mr. Mansfield referred to the strong winds and rainfall brought by Typhoon Iris.

Mr. Mansfield continued to explain that the previous adverse weather unfortunately slowed down the progress of the project, but the weather was expected to improve soon. At that time, it would only take an additional two weeks to restore train services across the Shing Mun River. Mr. Mansfield also pointed out that due to the urgency of the situation, construction materials for the bridge had to be borrowed from other projects. He clarified for the first time the “material problem” mentioned in his previous interview, stating that the division lacked sufficient concrete beams. However, as mentioned earlier, the Railway Division had borrowed concrete beams from the widening project of the Lion Bridge by the Highways Office, and the remaining portion was covered with steel beams from the former temporary flyover on Prince Edward Road West.

On one hand, Mr. Mansfield candidly acknowledged that the design of this project was quite unconventional, but on the other hand, he assured the public that it was completely feasible from a technical standpoint. When passing by the Tai Wai railway bridge, one can observe the bridge on the side near Pavilia Farm. The grey portion represents the steel beams of the temporary flyover, while the lighter-coloured portion represents the common concrete beams.

On October 7, the government announced the completion of the new Tai Wai railway bridge and the resumption of train services on the following Monday (the 11th). In an interview with the Government Information Services, Mr. Mansfield stated that the reconstruction project now only had the remaining task of laying the tracks. The Kowloon Canton Railway would take over the task of track laying and arrange for a diesel locomotive to conduct a trial run after completion.

Mr. Mansfield continued to explain the design of the railway bridge, pointing out that under normal circumstances, the entire bridge would indeed be constructed using concrete. However, if the Railway Division insisted on using only concrete, the entire reconstruction project would be delayed by another two weeks. The special design was chosen in this case due to the urgency of the situation, while the construction of another track bridge would follow the normal bidding process.

Mr. Mansfield also mentioned that due to the use of multiple concrete and steel beams laid flat on the bridge pier, the engineers needed to ensure that the weight of the trains on the bridge was evenly distributed on each beam. Additionally, some of the concrete beams were lifted onto the bridge in less than a week after completion, which raised concerns among the engineers about the load-bearing capacity of the concrete beams. However, the results of the test conducted one day before the opening were very satisfactory, allowing everyone to be relieved.

Mr. Mak Chi-kwong also shared an interesting detail with us. When the newly constructed single-track railway bridge underwent the test, he was one of the engineers standing under the bridge observing the instrument readings. At that time, almost all personnel involved in the design and reconstruction of the railway bridge, from engineers to inspectors, were standing under the bridge. He joked that everyone dedicated their lives to the acceptance of the new bridge. He also recalled that engineer Kwai Chi-chun later pointed out that complex calculations were not necessary during the design of the new bridge because the structure would have sufficient safety factors and its simplicity would ensure the completion of the reconstruction work in a short period of time.

Note: According to online images, the locomotive trailing behind locomotive №55 during the test run on the railway bridge was locomotive №52 (#332)

After the completion of the single-track railway bridge, the Kowloon Canton Railway can finally resume normal operations. However, the damage caused by the flood months ago extended beyond the collapsed railway bridge. The floodwaters wreaked havoc, almost necessitating a complete restart of the river training works previously carried out near the railway bridge.

As the reconstruction of the single-track railway bridge falls under the sole responsibility of the Railway Division, other departments have little involvement. However, when it comes to repairing the Shing Mun River channel, each department is highly concerned about their respective responsibilities.

Firstly, in September, the Railway Division was tasked with repairing the river embankment and riverbed near the railway bridge. Bryan O’rorke, the Principal Government Civil Engineer, had instructed the Railway Division to cooperate with the Drainage Works Division to ensure that the repaired river channel meets the latter’s requirements.

However, some bridges spanning the Shing Mun River were also damaged by the flood, and their routine maintenance falls under the responsibility of the Highways Office. Considering this, on November 4th, Mr. O’rorke proposed to the Principal Government Highways Engineer that the relevant engineers from the Civil Engineering Office and the Highways Office should hold a meeting as soon as possible to discuss the repair works and ensure their prompt completion.

However, within the Highways Office, there is significant concern regarding the responsibility for the project costs. A. D. S. Macdonald, the Chief Engineer of the Highways (New Territories) Division, expressed to the Principal Government Highways Engineer that he believed it was inappropriate for the project to be funded by the office’s own maintenance allocation. He also pointed out that Mr. Mansfield, the Acting Chief Engineer of the Railway Department, had previously agreed to apply for funds from the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council to cover the repair costs using the allocation for the double tracking of the Kowloon Canton Railway.

He further noted that the main cause of the river channel damage this time was the underpass modification works carried out by the contractors from KCR in the river channel. Additionally, due to the discovery that a significant number of concrete slabs were torn apart and washed away by the flood, many departments had doubts about the effectiveness of the previously laid concrete slabs. The Drainage Works Division believed that the concrete slabs laid on the riverbed should be reinforced with fabric reinforcement and thicker concrete slabs should be used. Macdonald pointed out that the mentioned works should be classified as “improvement” or “reconstruction,” both of which are not within the purview of the Highways Office’s routine maintenance responsibilities. Instead, the Drainage Works Division should bear all the expenses related to the mentioned works. Since both the Drainage Works Division and the Railway Division were under the Civil Engineering Office, Macdonald believes that the Highways Office should not bear any engineering costs.

In its response to O’rorke’s letter on the 16th, the Highways Department adopted the same stance as MacDonald, stating that the restoration works for the Shing Mun River should be carried out by the Drainage Works Division and that it fell outside the jurisdiction of the Highways Office. Accordingly, the Railway Division informed the Chief Engineer of the Drainage Division that the scope of their RW1197A project would be expanded to include the damaged sections downstream a day later.

O’rorke instructed the Railway Division to charge the funds allocated for Typhoon and Rainstorm vote for the river channel repairs, while additional funding for reinforcing the river channel would need to be requested from the Deputy Financial Secretary. As for the division of the construction site, O’rorke accepted the suggestion of R. H. Lloyd, an engineer from the Railway Division, used a hydraulic drop, where the river level sharply decreases, as the boundary. The upper half would be the responsibility of the Railway Division, and the lower half would be handled by the Drainage Works Division. Ultimately, all repair funding would be applied for under the name of the Railway Division.

During the complex process of applying for funding within the Public Works Department, a small incident occurred. D. W. McDonald, Director of Public Works, made a phone call in December requesting the reassignment of funds originally allocated for the construction of the Cheung Chau Typhoon Shelter to repair the Shing Mun River. It is unclear whether McDonald misunderstood or if adjustments were made within the Public Works Department, he was eventually able to use funds from another project at the end of the month instead of diverting the Cheung Chau Typhoon Shelter’s fund. The Cheung Chau Typhoon Shelter successfully avoided becoming another “victim” of Tropical Storm Ellen.

On January 24, 1977, the Railway Division awarded a contract to construction company Lap Hing & Co. to be responsible for repairing the river channel near the railway bridge. The related works were scheduled to commence on February 1 and expected to be completed by April 25. Another contract was also awarded for repairing another section of the river channel.

As mentioned earlier, the Drainage Works Division believed that the strength of the originally laid concrete slabs was insufficient and initiated an investigation. They found that although the river channel underneath the railway bridge was damaged, this section, dating back to 1961, actually performed quite well. The Drainage Works Division believed that the earlier works underneath the railway bridge had compromised the structure of the river channel, leading to the floodwaters washing away the river channel near the railway bridge, with the damage expanding downstream. In other words, the damage to the downstream river channel did not stem from structural issues but from the breach caused by the upstream works.

Afterward, the Drainage Works Division consolidated information from various departments and found that the heavy rain brought by Tropical Storm Ellen was indeed intense but still far from reaching the design limits of the river channel. As you may already know, the standard for Hong Kong infrastructure is to withstand a once-in-200-year rainfall event, and the rainfall brought by Ellen fell well below this standard. According to information provided by the Water Supplies Department, the Shing Mun reservoir experienced an overflow in 1974 with a higher volume, surpassing the current situation by 25%. Therefore, the Drainage Works Division concluded that the Shing Mun River had experienced a similar situation in 1974, but the river channel remained intact during that overflow. Hence, it can be concluded that there were no design issues with the Shing Mun River channel. The current damage was an unfortunate incident.

Drainage Works Division’s final conclusion was that Typhoon Ellen’s rainfall did exceed the highest rainfall recorded within eight months, but the overall rainfall did not reach the once-in-200-year standard, and the capacity of the river channel was not exceeded.

Note: A 9-hour rainfall of Ellen considered a once-in-5-year event, a 12-hour rainfall considered a once-in-10-year event, and a 24-hour rainfall considered a once-in-100-year event.

Due to no major issues with the design of the river channel itself, the construction of another railway bridge began promptly. As the old Bridge №11, which was damaged beyond repair by the flood, was originally compatible with the Kowloon Canton Railway’s double-tracking project, there was a need for an additional railway bridge. This new bridge would provide an additional track for the rapidly-reconstructed single-track railway bridge. As the nature of the project was double-tracking, the Railway Division modified the content of the double-tracking project from Hung Hom to Tai Po Market. Some of the funds initially allocated for the remodelling of Sha Tin Station and the construction of staff quarters for the Kowloon Canton Railway staff were reallocated to the reconstruction of Bridge №11 and the repair of the Shing Mun River.

Following the standard procedure, the Railway Department published a tender notice in the Gazette on January 14, 1977. In March, they awarded the contract to Franki Pilling & Engineering (H.K.) Ltd. for the widening of Bridge №11. After the completion of the newly widened dual-track Bridge №11, engineers from the Kowloon Canton Railway proposed constructing a concrete pedestal to protect the metal columns of the previously completed single-track railway bridge. The proposed concrete connecting section can make the pier of Bridge 11 more streamlined.

The Civil Engineering Section of the Kowloon Canton Railway drew up design drawing BC/125/1 and consulted the Drainage Works Division on October 16, 1978. The Drainage Works Division replied on October 28 of the same year, stating that they generally accepted the design principles. However, they suggested that the design of the pedestal could be further modified to make it further streamlined.

7. Government’s Internal Review

Apart from the investigation conducted by the Drainage Works Division, the Hong Kong government also conducted a review of its own performance. Mr. G. T. V. Smith, who was on duty at the Civil Coordination Centre during the period from 9:45 p.m. on August 25 to 6:30 a.m. on August 26, reported on the situation in his report. He pointed out that two main incidents occurred that night, namely the malfunction of the teleprinter in the centre and the inconsistency between the casualty figures collected by the centre and those reported by hospitals. Mr. Smith also noted that the liaison officers dispatched by the Fire Services Department were able to effectively assist the Civil Coordination Centre in coordinating with the Fire Services Department. However, Department of Medical and Health did not send any liaison officers to assist. Therefore, Mr. Smith expressed concern that if the situation worsened that night and there were more casualties, the Civil Coordination Centre might not be able to effectively coordinate the diversion of casualties to various hospitals in cooperation with the Fire Services Department.

Mr. Smith also praised the personnel from the Security Branch stationed in the centre, stating that only personnels from the Security Branch could contact various disciplinary forces. He explicitly stated that such arrangements were necessary for the coordination of disciplinary forces’ actions in the event of natural disasters and internal security events in the future.

According to the meeting minutes of a conference held on September 15, 1976, it was also acknowledged that there was a need to discuss how to coordinate the statistical work on casualties in the future. This conference, which was attended by Acting Secretary for Security Mr. H. M. A. Bristow, confirmed the authenticity of the situation mentioned by Mr. Smith in his report. The meeting also agreed that there were deficiencies in the arrangements made by the Hong Kong government and that changes needed to be made.

Colonel Patrick Palmer, the Chief of Staff Headquarters British Forces, expressed reservations about the description of the deployment of the garrison for disaster relief in internal government circulars. In a letter sent to Acting Secretary for Security Mr. Bristow on September 14, Colonel Palmer stated that he believed the garrison could provide more assistance to the government during natural disasters, provided that the government had made the requests. Colonel Palmer believed that the internal government circulars relied upon by various government departments at the time over emphasised that the government might have to pay for the deployment of the Armed Forces for disaster relief retrospectively. Therefore, he attached an amended version to the letter, which emphasised that the Armed Forces would be deployed free of charge in situations defined as “emergency” at present, and additional charges would only be requested when the deployment of the Armed Forces was required beyond “emergency” situations.

Regarding whether any payment is required for the deployment of the Gurkha Engineers this time, Mr. Mansfield’s recollection does not mention any relevant documents. Based on Mr. Mansfield’s recollection and the letter from the Colonel, it is estimated that the army’s deployment this time is free of charge, the Hong Kong government does not need to pay any fees afterwards.

In Colonel Palmer’s letter, another issue is mentioned concerning the transmission of information from the disaster site to the rear. Mr. Palmer believes that in dealing with the heavy rain in Ellen, including the landslide in Sau Mau Ping and the arrangement for the blasting of the Tai Wai Railway Bridge, both the police and the military had unclear understanding of the situation at the scene. In light of this, he proposed sending a liaison officer to the Colony POLMIL to improve coordination between the military and police. As for communication between the military and the Civil Coordination Centre under the Colonial Secretariat, the Chief of Staff believes that the current arrangement of dispatching personnel from the Security Branch is sufficient, as they are also under the Colonial Secretariat. However, according to him, this deployment was not made during the Ellen rainstorm. Colonel Palmer believes that the lesson from this incident is to establish a communication channel with the military as soon as the Civil Coordination Centre is activated to ensure effective coordination in future disaster relief efforts. Referring to the report submitted by Mr. Smith regarding the operation of the Civil Coordination Centre, it seems personnels from the Security Branch on duty that night were not responsible for handling communications with the armed forces.

Since the Chief of Staff’s letter mentioned the Colony POLMIL which involved the Police, Acting Commissioner of Police Mr. R. T. M. Henry also expressed his views to Deputy Secretary for Security Mr. Bristow, on October 15. The letter mentioned that Mr. Henry also agrees that internal circulars can emphasise that the military can provide assistance free of charge in “emergency” situations.

As for the blasting operation at the Tai Wai Railway Bridge, Mr. Henry pointed out that at the time, the Civil Coordination Centre was already operational, and there was continuous liaison between the Colony POLMIL and the Civil Coordination Centre . The centre was reminded about the necessity of maintaining the supply of fresh food through New Territories. Regarding the blasting operation itself, Mr. Henry stated that even now (October), he is still unclear about the details of the operation being planned on that day. He only knew that the New Territories Police District had requested a large number of police reinforcements, and he was also glad that the blasting operation was not carried out in the end.

The statements from the Acting Commissioner of Police, the letter from Chief of Staff Headquarters British Forces, and the disarray shown in the government press releases all seem to indicate a problem: the situation in Tai Wai was not conveyed to the decision-making level in a timely and effective manner. Despite the adverse weather conditions, the frontline engineering personnel were still able to control the situation, and ultimately, there was no need to demolish the railway bridge using dynamite. It was very fortunate for the residents of Sha Tin.

After the dust settled, the Kowloon Canton Railway also submitted a reimbursement report to the Finance Committee of the Legislative Council regarding all expenses related to Bridge №11. During the meeting on October 13th, the KCR requested an allocation of 1.33 million dollars from the Finance Committee. The breakdown of the funds is as follows:

As for the expenses incurred by the Railway Division, this was discussed during a Finance Committee meeting in March 1977. The Railway Division reported that the emergency repair of Bridge №11 had cost a total of 4.25 million dollars, with 1.145 million dollars allocated for the demolition of the old railway bridge. The Finance Committee ultimately approved an additional allocation of 10.75 million dollars for the Kowloon Canton Railway’s Modernization Programme, along with other items.

8. Album

9. References

Drawing — BC/125/1
Drawing — ND 9E
Drawing — ND 20A
Drawing — ND 92
Drawing — ND 161 A-1
Drawing — RW 1186
Drawing — RW 1197B
Drawing — STM 8

O.Z.P. — LST/57

Survey Sheet (edited) — C-112-NW-C

Vertical Aerial Photo — 04387
Vertical Aerial Photo — 01174

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Government Gazette (1973–12–21), L.N. 245 of 1973, Emergency (Summer Time) Regulation 1973.

Government Gazette (1973–12–28), L.N. 261 of 1973, Emergency (Advertising, Display and Floodlighting) (Restriction) (Amendment) (№2) Order 1973.

Government Gazette (1976–04–02), G. N. 685 of 1976, Appointments.

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Hong Kong Star (1976–10–08), Shingmun bridge finished.

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South China Morning Post (1976–08–26), KCR services disrupted.

South China Morning Post (1976–08–26), Shatin bridge may collapse.

South China Morning Post (1976–08–27), Damage bridge to be inspected.

South China Morning Post (1976–08–29), New Bridge ready soon.

South China Morning Post (1976–09–02), Our food supply ‘derailed’.

South China Morning Post (1976–09–02), The train-bus connection…

The Hong Kong Police Force (2000–05–23), OffBeat №678, https://www.police.gov.hk/offbeat/678/01_index_e.htm.

2018 沙田節委員會歷史文物小組 (2019), 沙田平行時空半世紀. 星島雜誌集團有限公司.

大公報 (1969–08–12), 暴雨成災海壩咸田屢遭水淹 洪水浸七村沙田七千人失所, 香港公共圖書館 — 多媒體資訊系統, https://mmis.hkpl.gov.hk///c/portal/cover?c=QF757YsWv59H%2FuxqfBwEJNUaXb17th2E.

大公報 (1976–08–27), 沙田陸和園火車橋被冲毁 九龍至羅湖鐵路中斷 鐵路局表示修復工程需時三週 中大學生會長促有關方面加速修復工作.

工商日報 (1976–08–26), 城門河火車橋躉被冲毁 橋面翻側搖搖欲墜 及早發覺幸免出事 九龍至沙田一段火車路暫時封閉.

華僑日報 (1962–02–27), 闢建大埔頭至排頭坑輸水隧道, 香港公共圖書館 — 多媒體資訊系統, https://mmis.hkpl.gov.hk///c/portal/cover?c=QF757YsWv5%2FH7zGe%2FKF%2BFNqO%2BrC0Xtds.

華僑日報 (1962–12–18), 銀禧水塘增加食水儲量 擴大一倍, 香港公共圖書館 — 多媒體資訊系統, https://mmis.hkpl.gov.hk///c/portal/cover?c=QF757YsWv5%2FH7zGe%2FKF%2BFKxuhaxmQhgO.

華僑日報 (1969–08–13), 官方否認放水塘成災 撥款三百五十萬疏導濬深城門河, 香港公共圖書館 — 多媒體資訊系統, https://mmis.hkpl.gov.hk///c/portal/cover?c=QF757YsWv59f%2BqmPwqsIkGjWdO0WG%2BE0.

華僑日報 (1977), 1977 香港年鑑.

星島日報 (1973–11–29), 當局默許燃油分期加價四成 水陸公共交通收費全部未擬調整.

政府新聞處 (1975–05–01), 新聞公報, 港督幕後全力指導 策劃女皇訪港秩序.

政府新聞處 (1976–06–16), 新聞公報, 工務司署今宣布龐大計劃 為英軍另行提供兵房設施 以供軍部交還土地時應用.

歷史檔案館 Public Records Office (2023–12–19), 【回到1970年代】道路工程, Facebook. https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1088952722302525.

香港時報 (1976–08–29), 沙田火車橋趕工拆卸中 將另建新橋.

老劉說生活 (2021), 【清評網言】那年的中秋與國慶, https://www.sohu.com/a/494031587_121119259.

10. Afterword

The topic of Bridge 11 is much more complex than I originally thought of. Previously, my original goal was to only explain why Gurkha Engineers were involved in the demolition. The deployment of troops in peacetime always interested me. In the end, I even extended the whole topic to cover Sino-Hong Kong trade and the First Oil Crisis. Despite my limited understanding on these 2 topics, I hope I was able to elaborate their involvement in the affairs surrounding Bridge 11.

After a prolonged search of files, it is such a shame that no records were located to pinpoint who requested the deployment of Gurkhas. I can only assume that someone within the Colonial Secretariat made the request, as NTA seemed to be less active than I expected. At least, the normal procedures of requesting the deployment of armed forces is covered, and I should be satisfied with it.

The railway bridge also dragged a hidden gem to the front stage, the Railway Division under the PWD. At first, the new railway terminus gave rise to the Railway Section under Development and Airport Division. The duplication and modernization of KCR fueled the expansion of the Railway Section into the Railway Division. As most of the large capital work on the East Rail were completed by the Railway Division, it is a shame that most people would correlate these infrastructure with KCRC who maintain them. As the railway related department under the Highways Department has taken the planning role, the Railway Division was seemingly forgotten in the local history. There is a missing chapter of them in the local history.

Although 30-ish files had been gone through, there are details that are still very blurry. To be frank, I sincerely hope there more material can be located in the future to better illustrate these 6 weeks in the summer of 1976.

The chapter of the Railway Division, and their relation with Sha Tin do not end here.

Finally, I would like to express my gratitude to the staff of the GRS and HKUL Special Collections, as well as to all the friends who provided information and assisted in proofreading.