Dokhlam and Indo-China affair
As long as it is about China’s aggressive posturing, the last instalment about the Dok La crisis that I had put up makes sense. But then, is this all about China? Or do we have something for us here as well?
There are a few more facts that have come out about this issue. And there would naturally be some assumptions based on them. Here we go:
#1 — Dokhlam has been in China’s control. Always. Bhutan has been claiming it since 2000. Bhutan’s map was drawn by India in the 60s, where they had included Dokhlam within Bhutia territory. China has been fussing around this region for infrastructural development etc since some time now; this flare up is a sudden late-addition. So, this whole fiasco is based on maps that New Delhi draws.
#2 — Bhutan and India DOES NOT have a military pact. The 2007 Friendship Treaty no longer entitles or empowers India to handle their foreign affairs. They are only supposed to coordinate on matters of national importance based on this treaty. So India rushing its troops to the area, when Bhutan govt is conveniently sitting mum, is a little blurry affair (there is no official confirmation on the Bhutan Request too). The contact that I refer to (I will call him Mr LG) says that this is akin to China sending troops to handle Siachen on behalf of Pakistan.
#3 — The issue spills over into a rather touchy territory now that China has said that if this persists, they’re gonna bring in the 1890 Anglo-Chinese Convention and the borders defined under it. That surely won’t sit well with New Delhi because out of the 4000 odd kms discussed there, 1890 defines this junction by putting Dokhlam into Chinese territory. But Bhutan wasn’t a part of this agreement. So technically that makes this a Bhutan-China border dispute.
So, inference this far is that New Delhi has stepped into a Bhutan-China border dispute, based on maps that New Delhi has drawn and circulated. Furthermore, once 1890 opens up, then the 1975 annexation of Sikkim by New Delhi would definitely open up. This, China had so far kept its mouth shut about only in its attempt to “develop and strengthen Sino-Indian ties”. Now that they appear a little pissed, they might say “fuck ties”. And if they do THAT, then the only patch in the 4000 km long disputed border that is accepted by both parties, and is a definitive strong ground for India militarily (probably that is the reason why New Delhi has gotten adventurous in Dok La), gets thrown into a mess.
Why New Delhi is doing this: To maintain superiority along Sikkim border, or to secure Bhutan under its influence (seems to me the likeliest of reasons; India is anxious to leave Bhutan alone for the fear of “losing” whatever little leverage it has on the state), or to display its 56” muscularity to China, I have no idea. But the fact remains that with China getting more and more aggressive with its BRI and SCO chapters, this has been India’s response so far. While a pullout of its troop doesn’t mean a loss of face, since technically this is foreign territory, and since China has expressed its desire to discuss India’s exact concerns about this area, what New Delhi does remains to be seen.
Now for the other part of the story.
The OIC (Organization of Islamic Conference’s Council of Foreign Ministers — a congregation of 57 nations, no less!) have, on July 11, passed a resolution regarding Kashmir. And it is well known that New Delhi doesn’t entertain ANY THIRD PARTY except the USA, on Kashmir. This is Islamabad’s handiwork for sure. Perhaps this is its idea of building pressure on India now that the world is largely moving into a multi-polar model with an increasing onus on the regional parties to settle their pending issues… or make a mess of it. Either way. Interestingly, China has, acknowledging the OIC resolution, for the first time, expressed its desire to play a role if required in the Kashmir resolution and Indo-Pak border settlement.
This is ominous. Because China has ALWAYS steered clear of Indo-Pak rivalry when it came to major crossroads. When 1971 happened, China, stayed off despite USA begging it to attack India. Then, there was another time when OIC tried to highlight Kashmir to the UN. China had stayed away at that time too. Mr LG says that the then PM Mr Narshima Rao and an outstanding duo of two IFS officers had managed to squash that with the help of Iran and… yes… China!
Since then, till this 11th July, China had always maintained its stance on Kashmir, which has now started wavering. This is a permanent member of the UNSC, that can initiate the whole process there. And push comes to shove, we know who China sides with, but we don’t know who USA (our recent friend) sides with, when. And we do know the cost of US “friendship” as well.
This is a rather crucial period for India’s FP. A time has come to move away from domestic posturing more than ever, and take a look at the collective result of “muscular diplomacy” with China. Like India has its vulnerabilities in opening up multiple war fronts, China too has some. It is a little tangled across the Korean and the Japanese side, the SCS, and its Western Provinces. And rather than looking at ways to exacerbate the already-strained relations, New Delhi would be doing itself a great favour by pulling the troops out from there for some or other strategic quid pro quo in that region, and getting Beijing to wash its hands off the OIC resolution once more, like it did before.
Relation between nations is all about leverage.
