‘Foxhounds for the IAF’ — Busting the Myth Bubble
Over the past few days, I encountered an ongoing myth on the internet, the Russians offered the MiG-31 (NATO Reporting: “Foxhound”) to India sometime around when the MiG-25R (NATO Reporting: ”Foxbat”) was retired from service, and the ‘IAF Rejected this offer’. Unfortunately, for my keen eyes and mind, I couldn’t but wonder as to why the IAF did not accept the aircraft, let alone get the offer in the first place. This blog aims to shatter myths around these alleged claims. Read to find out…
A few days ago, I came across this article, which made several wild claims, one of which being “Following the decommissioning of the MiG-25, Russia offered India the MiG-31 along with Ultra Long Range Missiles…” and that “…the IAF decided against acquiring it. Instead, they opted to increase their orders for the Su-30MKI…” [1]
Now before I head on to debunk these claims, I had to confirm whether these happened in the first place or not. So I decided to run a small fact check and find out the veracity of these statements.I could only find three articles which could verify this claim (see ‘Original sources for claims’ section for their links). Furthermore, what ticks me is that the first article I’m writing in apropos to, has cited Agence France-Presse (AFP), a leading and reputed international news agency as the ‘original source’ (which in itself is very misleading!). When I had a look through their archives, I found no web article to support the citation.
Before we verify and justify the factuality of the question of importance, it is important to gain context on what the claim is all about. Reading the contextual sections is necessary to prevent the percolation of any preconceived biases and notions whilst making your own inferences out of this analysis.
Setting the Stage:
The predominant ideology during the early days of the Cold War dictated that strategic bombers were much safer when flown at higher altitudes, considering the increasing speeds of jet powered interceptors and the advent of the Surface to Air Missile (SAM). Whilst the B-29 enjoyed such an advantage during WWII. During the Korean War six years later, the Soviet built MiG-15s were able to fly higher and faster than the Superfortresses and intercept them.[2] [3] The first encounter between the MiG-15 and the B-29 over Korea, as accounted by prominent historian Yefim Gordon in his book Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15: The Soviet Union’s Long-lived Korean War Fighter (2001) is as follows:
“On 9th November, N I Podgornyy (67th lAP) and Maj A Z Bordoon (72nd GvIAP) shot down one B-29 each; Podgornyy also damaged an RB-29 but had to break off the attack when his fighter was hit and the oxygen system damaged”. [4]
This caused the need to increase the speed of bombers. Was this only limited to bombers? Certainly not, because this ‘Need for Speed’ was felt on both sides. As one side’s bombers became faster, the other either built faster and higher flying interceptors or SAMs that could shoot down higher flying targets. By the late 1960s, the Americans had built the Convair B-58 Hustler strategic bomber, which could fly at speeds in excess of 1,321 mph (2,125 km/hr or Mach 1.73) at an estimated height of 63,000 ft (19,300 m).[5] Apart from this threat of a supersonic nuclear bomber, the CIA also inducted another ace up its sleeve to conduct reconnaissance deep into the Soviet Union: the U-2 “Dragon Lady”. The U-2 had a never exceed speed of Mach 0.8 (987.84 km/hr or 613.81 mph) and a service ceiling of 72,000 ft* (21,945.6 m) [6]
The Soviets virtually had no interceptor capable enough to tackle these threats. The first such interceptor capable of such performance was the Sukhoi Su-9 (NATO Reporting: “Fishpot”). The Su-9 was capable of reaching a service ceiling of 65616.79 ft (20,000 m) and had a top speed of Mach 1.8 (2222.64 km/hr or 1381.08 mph). It was also capable of Mach 2.0 flight at that altitude with its afterburners engaged, albeit only for a short duration.[7] The Su-7 was however, still not capable of intercepting the U-2, at least on paper. This can be elucidated in the case of the U-2 that was shot down on the first of May 1960 over Sverdlovsk.
“…Powers took off at 0159Z in Art 360. He headed deep into the USSR, on the U-2’s twenty-fourth deep penetration overflight of Soviet territory. As he approached the Sverdlovsk Oblast, he was 800 miles east of Moscow. From there he would have exited Soviet territory via the high priority target area around Murmansk, headed for Bodø in Norway. Four hours into his mission his aircraft was struck by an SA-2”.[8] Whilst most sources credit this kill to a S-75 Dvina (NATO Reporting:SA-2 “Guideline”) Surface to Air Missile system, Stephen I Schwartz, Former Director U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project (Brookings Institution), in his letters to the editor for the TIME magazine dated December 22, 1997 wrote that:
“New information suggests that the plane was not actually shot down. In October 1996, Igor Mentyukov, a Soviet pilot, told the Russian newspaper Trud that he was sent over the Urals in an unarmed Su-9 and ordered to ram Powers’ U-2. According to Mentyukov, the American plane got into the slipstream of his Su-9…it started to flip him (the U-2) over; his wings broke off. Moreover, because of confusion, antiaircraft missiles fired at the U-2 were mistakenly aimed at Mentyukov’s fighter. At least one of these missiles destroyed another Soviet aeroplane. Mentyukov asserted that Soviet generals concealed these facts to avoid challenging Nikita Khrushchev’s faith in the efficacy of Soviet air defences. Had the Soviet anti aircraft missiles actually hit Powers’ U-2, Mentyukov said, Powers would have been killed”.[9]
MiG-25 “Foxbat” and MiG-31 “Foxhound”:
By 1959, the CIA was looking for a successor to the U-2 spy plane; it was to be more immune to interception, by being fast and not being detectable by radars. This aircraft soon evolved to be the Lockheed A-12 and eventually the Lockheed SR-71 “Blackbird”. The Blackbird has a top speed of Mach 3.2+ (2,200+ mph, 3530+ km/hr) at 80,000 ft (24,000 m) and a service ceiling of 85,000 ft (25,900m).[10] The intended replacement for the Convair B-58 was the prototype XB-70 Valkyrie, which had a top speed of Mach 3.1 ( 3,308.81 km/hr or 2,056 mph) at 73,000 feet and a service ceiling of 77,350 feet (23576.28 m)[11]
The Soviets, surprisingly, had started work on their next generation interceptor aircraft as early as 1959. Some even claim that plans to draw up a preliminary design were based around the A-5 Vigilante, after MiG OKB Chief Designer Artyom Mikoyan returned from the Paris Air Show that year. He had asked one of his designers to make something similar. However the latter is unconfirmed.[12] The MiG-25 only entered service in the year 1964. However, an interesting thing to note is that, the MiG-25 had two different purposes for the two forces it was to operate with: The Soviet Air Defence Forces (V-PVO) wanted a fighter interceptor aircraft, whilst the Soviet Air Force (VVS) wanted a tactical reconnaissance aircraft.[13]
The MiG-31 came as a natural successor to the MiG-25, through its own set of tribulations. The Soviets had a major disadvantage with the Foxbat:
- It lacked the necessary range to patrol the Northern borders of the Soviet Union, which were the most vulnerable to the Western reconnaissance aircraft. The Foxbat also lacked air to air refuelling capability.
- The earlier variants of the Foxbat lacked adequate “Look Down,Shoot Down” capability which refers to the ability of an aircraft to track and intercept aircraft that are flying lower than the said aircraft’s altitude. This was a huge concern for aircraft of those era as the radar wasn’t capable enough to distinguish between the target and ‘ground clutter’: radar signals that would echo after bouncing off the terrain, causing significant confusion.
- In 1969, the Stavka/Soviet Military High Command ordered the retrofitting of all MiG-25R (Reconnaissance variant) with secondary ground attack capability. These aircraft were retrofitted with the Peleng Navigation Complex and redesignated as the MiG-25RB (Reconnaissance Bomber). The MiG-25RB has subvariants such as the RBK, RBS etc.[14] [15]
- On 6th September 1976, Sr. Lt. Viktor Belenko defected with his MiG-25 to Japan, which compromised sensitive information regarding the aircraft such as its radar, sensor parameters and the IFF (Identify Friend or Foe) transponder codes.
The MiG-31 was developed as a counter to the then contemporary threats, notably the F-14A Tomcat (with its AN/AWG-9 Fire Control Radar and the AIM-54A Phoenix Air to Air Missiles), the FB-111A Aardvark fighter bomber, the B-1A/B Lancer Strategic Bomber and the SR-71 Blackbird. The aircraft had to be multirole and have long range aerial threat detection and interdiction capability. This challenge was overcome by integrating the BRLS-8B Zaslon complex, which has a radar and a fire control system that can detect 24 targets and track 6 of them simultaneously within a range of 200km. Zaslon has a Pulse Doppler, PESA (Passive Electronically Scanning Array) radar. The MiG-31 carries the R-33 LRAAM. It also features an encrypted data link system that can communicate with nearby friendly aircraft and vector them towards a perceived threat, acting like an ‘early warning’ setup.[16]
IAF and the MiG-25:
Nicknamed the “Garuda”, the Indian Air Force inducted the Foxbat in August of 1981, which it used extensively to keep tabs on its Western neighbour Pakistan.. 10 MiG-25s were procured: 8x MiG-25RBK’s (KP351 through KP356; additional airframes KP312 and KP3106) and 2x MiG-25RU (DS361 and DS362).[17] KP356 was lost in an accident on August 3, 1994. All of these were the reconnaissance version.[18]
Despite remaining in service for almost 25 years, very little is known about its service history due to its classified nature. Excerpts of a few missions have been published occasionally, such as the tracking of an eclipse in 1994, the alleged breaking of the sound barrier over Islamabad and medium altitude reconnaissance mission during the Kargil conflict. The type was eventually retired in May of 2006.[19] [20] [21]
The 90’s for the IAF:
Before we go on to conclude as to why the MiG-31 was not accepted and what’s the rationale behind such a decision, we need to understand as to the timing of such an offer to India, and what were the circumstances within India at that time? As per Air Mshl Anil Chopra (R), PVSM, AVSM, VM; the Russians had written letters to the Indian government in the late 1990s, offering the MiG-31BM to India (which was under development at that time). However no response was provided by the Indian government.
So with that said, what was the 90’s decadelike for India? From my understanding, India and its defence manufacturing complex were impacted by 5 significant events:
- 1991 Gulf War: The Gulf War made the IAF high command reconsider its means and methods to fight future wars. The war saw extensive use of Airborne Early Warning and Control Systems (AEW&CS), Electronic and Signal Intelligence gathering and Warfare (ELINT, SIGINT and EW) and Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs). By 1990, the Iraqi military was considered to be the 4th largest on earth, however the coalition air forces managed to decimate a force of that size through the use of superior technology. IAF started to emphasise on procuring more ‘force multipliers’ and strategic assets such as AEW&CS, Mid-air refuellers and true multirole aircraft.
- 1991 Indian Economic Crisis: The Indian economy reached a certain point when its foreign reserves were mostly depleted in the 1990s. This overall stalled the national economy, causing adverse effects on the budgetary allocations to the military, which the IAF was only able to recuperate from in the first decade of the 21st century.
- The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991: As of 1991, majority of the equipment operated by the Indian Air Force were of the erstwhile Soviet origins, which meant that the IAF witnessed a shortage of spare parts and supply of new equipment in general. This brought about a change in the attitude of the IAF, to first diversify the origins of their equipment, and give more emphasis to local manufacturing.
- 1997 Pokhran Nuclear Weapons Test: The weapon tests resulted in India becoming a nuclear power, and at that time, the IAF was the only force capable of delivering a nuclear weapon amongst all Indian defence forces. This test also attracted foreign sanctions, which meant the IAF had to rely more on indigenous production wherever applicable.
- 1999 Kargil Conflict/Operation Safed Sagar: The conflict brought about a very important concern: the IAF was underprepared for high altitude air warfare. It also highlighted the deficiencies in the legacy aircraft platforms of the IAF and the need to modernise the fleet.
“Major problems with the availability of spares and support from the ex-USSR affected operations severely during the period 1991–1994. Peacetime daily serviceability rates declined from an average 70–72% in the preceding decade to as low as 60% for some types. The MiG-29 and An-32 fleets were particularly hard hit. In the case of the former, serviceability had declined to as low as 55%….Pilots averaged a mere 120 hours/year in 1992/93, compared to 180–200 hours in 1988/89 and today. Total annual flying hours declined from 256,200 hours in 1991/92 to 239,000 hours in 1993/94. A recovery began only in 1994/95 and in 1997/98, the IAF crossed the 300,000 hours mark… Sensationalism in the media notwithstanding, the 1990s have been the safest decade in the IAF’s history even as flying hours soared post-1994. Indeed 1997/98 saw the IAF’s lowest ever accident rate. Moreover, between 1991 and 1998, IAF attrition (1.07 per 10,000 hours) has remained well below that of its principal adversary (PAF: 1.37 per 10,000 hours). India’s economic revival since the mid-1990s together with changed geopolitical circumstances has allowed the IAF to take up its long overdue upgrade and reorganisation programs with vigour”.[22]
Why doesn’t the Foxhound ‘Fit the Bill’?:
There is a clear difference between why the IAF operated the MiG-25 and why it would want the MiG-31. Simply put, the MiG-25 had a dedicated reconnaissance variant, but the MiG-31 is purely a fighter bomber. To fulfil that requirement is why the IAF decided to purchase the Sukhoi Su-30MKI.[23] The reasons to purchase the Su-30K/MKI are very straightforward:
- It is a comparatively newer platform which was developed post 1991, whereas the first MiG-31s entered service in 1981
- There is more scope for user specific enhancements as Sukhoi OKB was marketing the platform as a highly customisable aircraft, which would integrate non Soviet/Russian avionics and weapons
- Could be procured in large numbers as it was a tactical weapon with strategic capability.
- The Su-30 is ‘supermaneuverable’, meaning it could perform maneuvers that were previously considered unorthodox as per the laws of aerodynamics. The aircraft is equipped with Thrust Vectoring Controls, which allows it to perform tight turns. The aircraft also has a Thrust to Weight ratio of more than 1, which means the aircraft can fly almost vertically, without losing power or stalling. The MiG-31 on the other hand, is huge and can only pull a maximum of 5G’s in a hard turn, which is quite sluggish if the aircraft has to be employed for tactical fighter-bomber missions.
But doesn’t the MiG-31 have its own advantages too? Then why not procure them as well? Here’s why it wouldn’t be feasible:
- Has no real purpose: With the MiG-25s retiring from service, the IAF began outsourcing its strategic reconnaissance requirements to satellite imagery, which was much cheaper to procure and less time consuming. The IAF has access to platforms which are capable of conducting tactical reconnaissance through means of integrated pods, such as the Vicon 18 or Litening. With that being sorted, there is also no need for an interceptor as there are already aircraft like the MiG-29 and Su-30MKI in service, which the IAF is already accustomed to.
- A serious logistical issue: What most common critiques don’t take into account whilst looking for procurement is the factor of logistics. In economics, there is a concept called ‘Economies of scale’, which loosely translates to the fact that the more of a product is manufactured, the lower its production and maintenance cost becomes. This issue was most noticeable in the IAF during the 1990s, when the IAF didn’t have much problem procuring alternative spares suppliers for aircraft like the MiG-21, MiG-23BN and MiG-27, which were more numerous in numbers. However, the same IAF faced difficulties procuring spares for aircraft such as the MiG-23MF and MiG-25RBKs, which the IAF operated a single squadron each, and the MiG-29, which was operated by three squadrons. Now the real question is: how many of these would the IAF procure: one squadron (each sqn has 18 aircraft)? Two squadrons? Considering the enormous size of the aircraft, and its rather ‘unique purpose’, it would cost the IAFa lot to maintain these aircraft, let aone procure the ground equipment and train crew to man the platform.
- An unmatched domain: Some of the key USP’s of the Foxhound are that it’s got a massive range of 3000 km, has a massive radar that can detect targets from 200 km away and can allegedly deploy anti-satellite missiles.These might be suitable for a country as vast and powerful as Russia, but what kind of threats does India face? India’s main threats in the airspace domain are more or less tactical in nature: fighter planes, helicopters and larger transport and special purpose aircraft. The same applies to both Pakistan and China. India has more airfields close to these threats, so air defence range does not qualify as a reason. Plus, the Su-30MKI too has capability to refuel mid-air and a ferry range of 3000 km, which is the same capability offered at a seemingly cheaper price tag. India currently does not face the threat perception wherein it has to use an aircraft to launch missiles at a satellite.
- Cannot substitute for an AEW&CS aircraft: One of the points that the Russians have emphasised on is the capability of the Zalson Complex to detect targets at longer ranges and use datalink to communicate with the MiG-29/Su-30MKI the target parameters, but what is its feasibility again? We have to keep in mind that the IAF is diversifying its fleet, which also includes European and even American platforms. In that case, the MiG-31’s capability to datalink would only be restricted to aircraft of Russian origins, which is a logistical and strategic handicap for the IAF. A large radar with a long detection range on a fighter aircraft cannot replace the need for an AEW&CS aircraft completely. Considering that the IAF is a force with global strategic aspirations, relying on fighter aircraft for airborne aircraft detection would certainly fall inadequate. Also AEW&CS aircraft were successful in tracking aircraft on the ground during Operation Southern Watch, which is certainly something a fighter aircraft cannot accomplish merely with its radar, from a long range.[24]
On a side note**: Many so called ‘experts in defence’, who claim that the MiG-31 or the Su-30 is a ‘Mini AEW&CS’: let’s keep in mind that the Voenno Kosmicheskiy Sily (Russian Aerospace Force) is facing a shortage of AEW&CS aircraft. It currently has approximately 10x Beriev A-50M (NATO Reporting: “Mainstay”) aircraft, of which 6 are in operational condition.[25] For a large country like Russia, which has to guard its Northern Boundaries and the Far East, apart from its ‘Special Military Operation’ in Ukraine, is facing a shortage of such type: what makes one think that a group of MiG-31s or Sukhois can provide situational awareness in this situation? Well, if that certainly was the case, then the Russian government could’ve easily called for increasing the production of these ‘Mini AEW&CS’, right?
Conclusion:
The MiG-31 certainly is a great aircraft, fulfilling its capabilities to the best of its potential. Even over Ukraine, the aircraft has been successful in launching Cruise missile strikes on Ukraine, with no air to air losses. However, unfortunately, the aircraft isn’t certainly a ‘one size fits all’: it could solve Russia’s problems but it isn’t the right fit for the kind of environment India is in. Any thoughts of procuring an aircraft, solely because of what it is capable of doing, without paying any importance to the relevant and predominant regional security dynamics, is nothing but wishful thinking! One may wish as to ‘we could have done this’ or ‘we could have done that’, might account for an interesting academic exercise, but it may or may not justify a good decision in reality.
References and Sources:
[4] Gordon, Y. (2001). Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-15: The Soviet Union’s Long-lived Korean War Fighter (p.62). Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing.
[6] Wright, K. (2021). We Were Never There: Volume 1 (p.5). Europe@War series. Solihull, UK: Helion & Co
[7] Dabrowski, K. (2022). Defending Rodinu Volume 1: Build-up and Operational History of the Soviet Air Defence Force 1945–1960 (p.16). Europe@War #20. Solihull, UK: Helion & Co. (eBook ISBN: 9781804510001)
[8] Dabrowski, K.; p.60
[9] Schwartz, S. I. (1997, December 22). Letter to the editor: Stephen I. Schwartz, Director U.S. Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, Brookings Institution, Washington. Time. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20091017212434/http://205.188.238.181/time/magazine/article/0%2C9171%2C987578-3%2C00.html . Accessed 11 June 2024
[10] https://pacificcoastairmuseum.org/aircraft/sr-71-blackbird-nose/
[12] Gordon, Y. (2007). MiG-25 Foxbat: Guardian of the Soviet Borders: №34 (Red Star) (pp. 5–6). Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing. ISBN: 978–1857802597
[13]Wings of Russia Studios MiG-25 AND mIg-31 special
[14] Gordon, Y. (2007). pp. 41–47
[15] 931 OGRAP : MiG-25RB “Foxbat-D” / MiG-25RU “Foxbat-C”
[16] Gordon, Y. (2020). Famous Russian Aircraft: Mikoyan MiG-31 (pp.10–24). Manchester, UK: Crecy Publishing. ISBN: 978–1910809419
.[17] Gordon, Y. (2007). pp. 115–117
[18] Bharat Rakshak Accidents Database — KP356
[19] Aircrew Interviews. (2022, October 9). Flying the IAF MiG-25 Foxbat | Sumit Mukerji (Part 2) [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xiFkhr5ZHgU&t=226s (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[20] Krishnan, R. (2019, March 6). Foxbat fury: When IAF MiG-25s flew unchallenged over Islamabad. BusinessToday. https://www.businesstoday.in/opinion/columns/story/foxbat-fury-when-iaf-mig-25s-flew-unchallenged-over-islamabad-174740-2019-03-06 (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[21] Aroor, S. [Shiv Aroor]. (2020, August 23). Untold Story Of IAF MiG-25 Foxbat [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dH9JiRtuW18 (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[22] Chattopadhyay, R. (2000, July-August). The Indian Air Force: Flying into the 21st Century. Bharat Rakshak Monitor, 3(1). https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/today/contemporary/flying-21stcentury-rchatto/ (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[23] Webmaster. (2010, August 23). Sukhoi Su-30 K/MK/MKI. Bharat Rakshak. https://www.bharat-rakshak.com/IAF/aircraft/specs/sukhoi-30/ (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[24] The Operations Room. (2022, March 12). The Violent Reality of a No-Fly Zone — Operation Southern Watch 92 YouTube. https://youtu.be/aCpb5FnxZIQ?si=loHQHzKaMJTr-P45 (Accessed 12 June 2024)
[25] Cooper, T. (2024, January 16). Ukraine War, 16 January 2024: Scratch one A-50. Substack. https://xxtomcooperxx.substack.com/p/ukraine-war-16-january-2024-scratch?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTEAAR0zgxwYpi2EOeSNKbzCu61V8OPi7134m0Co5JE69sSuzwKXyHE3wqAKecw_aem_AV3xll7mWrJdkbVdPKsk3wgZsXJxh0y0z9kmAnklQgnfFazu-tK0S7I5_vWWNncKPLT4DwO1NkTSrNSyOa1UATkT&sfnsn=wiwspwa (Accessed 12 June 2024)
Original Sources for Claims:
- “MiG-31 Foxhound: Why Russia’s ‘Super Interceptor’, That Can Shoot Satellites, Fire Hypersonic Missiles, Found No Buyers In India & China” by Eurasian Times (Published date: April 24, 2023, Accessed on: June 8, 2024)
- “Why India refused to buy the MiG 31” by sajeevpearlj.blogspot.com ; retrieved via Facebook (Published date: August 19, 2015, Accessed on: June 8, 2024)
- ‘I was the first foreign pilot to fly the Mach 2.8 MiG-31 interceptor, here’s my story: By Air Marshal Anil Chopra (Retd)’ by Hushkit.net (Published date:December 18, 2020, Accessed on: June 9, 2024)
