Japanese Militarism and Foreign Policy

Reading “The Way of Subjects” alongside “Goodbye Asia” brings up a lot of stark contrasts and some through lines between the two works. The commonality of both is in that the prime justification for each policy was self-determination in the face of European imperialism. The differences between the two — that is, between assimilation with the West versus Western cultural expulsion — can primarily be explained by Japan’s growing military and nationalism.

In “Goodbye Asia,” the goal of ensuring self-determination is achieved through assimilation with Western powers, adopting their cultural and political tendencies to avoid a “civilizing” Western invasion. We see as much in what Fukuzawa supposes would happen to Asian countries who fail to adopt Western culture, which he asserts will be shortly “wiped out from the world, with their lands divided among the civilized nations.” (Fukuzawa 352) Plainly one can see that the preservation of sovereignty is a principal motivation in adopting Western culture.

In “The Way of Subjects” on the other hand, we see the same trend in the assertion that “Defense is absolutely necessary for national existence.” (“The Way of Subjects” 438) Yet unlike Fukuzawa’s philosophy, “national existence” is not ensured through acquiescing to Western cultural trends, but through the creation of a “Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere” (“The Way of Subjects” 437) through military conquest and the subsequent ousting of Western influences, both economic and cultural. Here, Japanese sovereignty is preserved not through acquiescence to Western culture, but through its expulsion from East Asia.

The agent responsible for this change in mentality is most likely military industry. At the time of the writing of “Goodbye Asia,” Japan’s war industries had an output capacity that lacked the capacity to become a world power by colonial conquest, as Western powers had done. In the absence of a potent military defense, its only hope to escape invasion was to assimilate into the fold of Western nations. By the 1940s however, things had drastically changed. Japan’s war industry now dwarfed its counterpart of 50 years prior, and militaristic fervor was at an all time high. Whether or not Japan actually possessed the military or industrial capacity to build such a Co-prosperity Sphere across Asia is not necessarily relevant, since a universal belief in such among the Japanese public and political leadership — which was certainly present in this time — would have the same outcome. Thus, bolstered by the expansion of their military-industrial complex, Japan now felt confident in adopting a stance of confrontation rather than supplication when it came to foreign policy, viewing this as a way to establish a sphere of influence in the Pacific unfettered by Western colonies.

This explanation, of the growth of the military industries in Japan, along with an increase in military fervor, best explains the radical shift from calling for the adoption of Western cultural practices to the expulsion of them. It also explains why the main priority of the Japanese government — that is, national sovereignty — remains the same in both sources.