Eurasian Dominance ?
Russia and China’s plan for Eurasian Dominance
Introduction
China’s new foreign policy, introduced by Xi Jinping earlier this year, is “proactive”, “determined”, “unified” and “striving”. Xi’s new way of doing business is to shun low-profile politics, and be a decisive player in the world. Meanwhile, Putin is making waves, using this policy for an alliance. Shortly after Xi’s new policy, Russia signed a $165 billion deal with China to develop at least 80 bilateral projects across Asia, resulting in new pipelines, terminals and trade corridors connecting the Eurasian landmass, expanding their hegemony . Most interestingly, they believe that the countries have too much baggage, too much history, and too many principles for their agreements or alliance to succeed. However, geopolitics is ever changing and when someone says you can’t put a price on principles, well then maybe the offer was just too low.
Historical Aspect
In April 1997, a preceding meeting took place at the Kremlin. Boris Yeltsin hosted Jiang Zemin, and both jointly declared commitment to a multi-polar world, without hegemony, denouncing the monopolization of world affairs, presumably by the United States. But, at the height of the unipolar movement, there was little either could do about it other than stay out of each other’s way. Forgoing interior development and Central Asian expansion, China pursued a development strategy, centered on export-oriented manufacturing concentrated in its coastal Special Economic Zones. Russia, in the meantime, leveraged hydrocarbon wealth to complement Western industry, running a dozen natural gas pipelines into Europe. By 2011 the Russian — German Nord extreme project was brought online, and one decade later Europe was purchasing roughly half its gas from Russia accounting for two-fifths of Moscow’s state revenue. Yet, this strategy of energy interdependence contradicted Moscow’s terrestrial objectives. NATO and EU encroachment on its frontiers generated tensions, especially over Ukraine, and in 2014, the overthrow of a pro-Russian government in Kiev, prompted mosque to annex Crimea and stroke a separatist conflict in Donbas.
The Change
The United States did not fall asleep at the wheel, rather, it slapped sanctions on projects like Nord stream too, threatening to end them entirely, finding a common cause with his East European counterparts, who feared geopolitical marginalization. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine saw sanctions intensify causing a temporary 67 billion Euro deficit in EU Russian trade, but after Nord Stream was sabotaged in September 2022, Russian gas delivery fell off a cliff . With nothing left to glue Russia to Europe, the former started replacing its westward Industries with physical infrastructures going towards China. Now, Moscow and Beijing are aiming for 200 billion dollars in annual trade by 2024.
The first initiative is agriculture, proposed in 2012, the new Land — Grain Corridor, will connect Russian grain to Chinese markets, dodging the Black Sea route and reducing China’s dependence on North American and Australian grain (mostly, wheat) imports. The project’s Capital Investments, a total of 5 billion dollars will shift 7 million tons of grain annually from the Russian Far East, the Ural region, and the Siberian Federal districts. The bulk of this will cross the grain terminals at Zabaikal’sk, a railway shipment facility bordering inner Mongolia, and then into China. In return, Beijing is expanding its vehicle exports to Russia and collaborating on aircraft and science projects.
Energy Exchange/Trade
The Tap Root of integration, however, is the energy policy of both nations. China’s demand is set to absorb Russian Supply. Spearheading the operation, is the power of Siberian pipeline, overseen by Derzhprom and the China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC). Power of Siberia runs along the Chinese Coast, via Beijing to Shanghai. Gas delivery began in 2019, increasing by half throughout 2022. A Southern expansion will begin delivery in 2025. Meanwhile, the Power of Siberia — 2, connecting the Yamal peninsula. Gas fields via Mongolia to China will begin Construction in 2024. This pipeline will provide an outlet for gas fields, previously serving Europe, making it a direct replacement for Nord stream. If all goes according to plan, by 2030, Russian gas exports to China will hit 98 billion cubic meters, along with with 100 million tons of LNG.
De-Dollarization
Besides Energy, surging bilateral trade has also accelerated de — dollarization. Cross-border transactions are increasingly settled in Chinese Yuan. By late 2022, Yuan — Ruble trade eclipsed dollar transactions on some days. Moscow’s turn to friendly currencies has seen the Yuan’s share of trade leap from 10 to 45 percent on Russian currency markets. While dollar trade halved from 80 to 40 percent. Apart from softening Western sanctions this has bolstered Xinjiang as a cross-border settlement and financial center.
International Outlook
China and Russia have also begun backing each other’s global ambitions. The Russians would ignore America’s Asia-pacific alliances, and the Chinese would brush off American policy making in Europe, however, now Moscow and Beijing have developed more sympathy and understanding towards one another.
Take the AUKUS alliance as an example, the 370 billion dollar program to arm Australia with nuclear-powered submarines is ostensibly aimed at China, yet Moscow opposes the pact, as part of western efforts to encircle Eurasia, via interlocking groupings like NATO, Five Eyes and QUAD. To this end, China and Russia have responded with their own arrangements, including BRICS, the RCEP and SCO. Another example of shared Regional ambitions is Beijing piggybacking its Arctic ambitions onto Russia, which boasts substantial ports and other assets in the Arctic Circle by 2050. The North Pole is predicted to be ice-free, which raises questions over seabed resources, including oil, gas and uranium for China. This also means new Maritime routes, potentially reducing shipping times.
Be that as it may, there are still flies in the ointment. Though geopolitics is tying Russia and China together, there have been minimal soft power inroads. China’s cultural and media influence in Russia remains low-key, and though Russian coverage of China is generally favorable, the lack of real influence means warm relations could quickly chill. Should the bilateral relationship degrade, such tensions could emerge over Chinese inroads into Central Asia or its increasing influence over Vladivostok. A new bilateral deal affected from June 2023 seeks to promote development by allowing Goods bound for Chua Zhang, to pass through Vladivostok Terror free, but, Chinese nationalists have long craved the city which was annexed by the Russians. For the moment, though, each side is content to burn that bridge.
Conclusion
The grand scheme of things, Russia’s European aspirations are dead but its Asian aspirations have been given new life. Its Partnership of Convenience with China, is evolving into one of necessity, and like all healthy marriages it has been enabled by strategic concessions in Central Asia and the Far East, Though some may refer Russia as China’s Junior partner, its massive size, resource pool, wealth, and nuclear arsenal will allow it to retain much of its political autonomy, not all, but enough. And that is a bargain Russia is willing to make since politics is the world’s second oldest profession, it closely represents Russia’s first.
