Conflicts in Official Accounts of the Cardboard Carton Prints

Updated, annotated, and illustrated text of my speech delivered at the Arlington JFK Conference in 2014

By Richard Bartholomew

Published: January 18, 2023

Thank you, Ed Tatro and David Denton, for inviting me to address this conference. The theme of this conference is “What we know now that we didn’t know then.”

But even informed students of the Kennedy assassination still do not seem to know that in late 1997 and early 1998, not just one, but three of Malcolm Everett Wallace’s fingerprints were matched to not just one, but four unidentified latent fingerprints, by not one but at least two Certified Latent Print Examiners — matches which prove that Mac Wallace handled at least two boxes used to construct the alleged sniper’s nest.

As the first, if not only, researcher Barr McClellan put in charge of troubleshooting the Wallace fingerprint evidence, I was privy to that evidence as early as September 1997. My source for Wallace’s Texas Department of Public Safety certified print card, the National Archives certified copies of the unidentified latents, and Asa Nathan Darby’s charts was John Fraser Harrison,¹ whom I called Jay. I had known Jay for three years by this time, and had spoken with him nearly every day either by phone, email, chat groups, or in person.²

Jay told me there was an examiner who made the match before Mr. Darby, a less experienced one who, after learning the implications of the match, feared for his safety and the safety of his family, and who declined to go on record or have his name connected with it at all. As a result, Jay searched for another examiner and found Nathan Darby. Upon learning about the context of the matches, Mr. Darby was brave enough to be named as the examiner. Had Mr. Darby not gone on record, Jay was prepared to seek yet another examiner. But that never became necessary.³

I personally chose to do my own thinking on the fingerprints, as I’ve done with all aspects of the JFK assassination that I’ve studied. At Barr’s request in 1997, I assisted his investigation by studying the FBI’s manual on fingerprint science so that I could troubleshoot any problems that might arise in that area for Barr’s book. As a result of learning how fingerprints are classified and identified, and with my training in art, and high-level aptitude in visual literacy, I was able to see Mr. Darby’s initial matches for myself.

By the time of our May 29th, 1998, Dallas press conference,⁴ a decision was made to withhold all but one match, and a misguided, eleventh-hour decision was made to withhold even Mr. Darby’s name from the public.⁵

All along, I strongly advocated full, immediate disclosure of all of the evidence in conjunction with turning it over to the proper legal authorities. At the December 1997 meeting between Jay, Barr and myself in Barr’s Houston office, I alone insisted that publishing the fingerprint evidence in a book sold for profit, long after it had been discovered, would be seen as profiteering at least, and obstruction of justice at most. Jay and Barr couldn't deny that, and we immediately made plans to turn the print evidence over to The Dallas Police, which was the law enforcement agency with jurisdiction.

The plan was to turn it over to the Dallas Police, then hold a press conference to prevent a cover-up. I was told by Jay, at the time he signed his affidavit Mr. Darby said something like, “I have my court suit ready,” meaning he was ready to publicly endorse his matches. Had he not agreed to be the examiner of record, we would have been back to square one, searching for another examiner willing to go on record. The purpose of the press conference was to reveal the fingerprint match evidence, which could only be done by naming the examiner who made the matches. All of our plans were for that purpose, and never changed, except secretly and apparently unilaterally, seemingly at the last minute. I was not privy to the wrongheaded and poorly executed decision to suppress Mr. Darby’s name from the public, and it is still mostly a mystery to me.⁶

Only one match at that time, Print 29, Box A, exceeded 12 points.

DPS print (top) matched by Darby to unidentified print from NARA (bottom).

That was Jay’s main reason for suppressing the other matches. When he told me to remove the references to the other matches before adding my monograph to the press packet, I protested. But I reluctantly went along.

My monograph, “Conflicts in Official Accounts of the Cardboard Carton Prints,”⁷ is an annotated chart I created during my work with the Mac Wallace fingerprints. The chart shows the numbers, locations and identifications of the latent prints from the alleged sniper’s nest boxes both prior to, and after the Mac Wallace print matches.

As my chart shows, a total of four fingerprints were identified by Mr. Darby (sic) as Wallace’s, one from Box A, and three from Box B. Numerically, the chart can be confusing because “Print 22” is actually two prints, both matched to Wallace.

The following images are documents from my files related to the work I did as a member of the Texas Group investigation of Malcolm Everett Wallace’s fingerprint matches, and my editing and fact-checking for Barr McClellan’s October 22nd, 1997 first draft of his book, Blood, Money, & Power.

In my task report, reference “(a)” was the certified copy of the Department of Public Safety 10-finger print card. Reference “(b)” was the certified National Archive copies of the Commission exhibits showing the latent prints. Mike Blackwell scanned them, and I enlarged them for Mr. Darby to mark his matches on. The hand-written numbered lines and circles pinpointing the matching points were put there by Mr. Darby. Before I was ever told about Mr. Darby, he had already studied the original certified copies and made his matches. In keeping with CLPE protocol, Mr. Darby used only those certified copies. Further following legal protocol, Mr. Darby signed his sworn affidavit regarding his matches. My graphic enlargements of the certified copies were done after he made the matches and before his affidavit, solely for Darby to use in marking exhibit charts to display in court (which never happened), to the press, reproduce for the press kit, in Barr’s book, and I think copies were included in the evidence Jay gave to the Dallas Police Department.

Checks, draft title page, print card

For this work, Barr paid me token fees: $250.00 for the editing and fact-checking; and $200.00 for the graphics.

McClellan first-draft, Exhibit L

Mr. Darby’s [sic] initial analysis determined nine points of match on Print 29 (CE 656, Box A, Wallace’s left little finger),

McClellan first-draft, Exhibit M

six points of match on Print 20 (CE 660, Box B, Wallace’s left thumb, four points of match on Print 22 (CE 660, Box B, Wallace’s left ring finger), and

McClellan first-draft, Exhibit N

three points of match on the second latent included with Print 22 (CE 660, Box B, a second impression of Wallace’s left little finger).

I researched and wrote my monograph as a personal study aid only. I wanted to see if I could learn how the FBI and the Warren Commission concealed and obfuscated Mac Wallace’s latent fingerprints from the alleged sniper's nest.

Here is what I learned.

Print 29, Box A (matched in 1998 to Wallace’s left little finger) was not included in the Warren Commission’s 1964 official list. The Commission listed 9 identifiable prints, and identified all of them as 8 for Dallas Police Detective Robert L. Studebaker and 1 for Oswald. Print 29 was hidden under the label “indistinct characteristics,” a non-category in the Commission lists. Had the Commission accounted for it as an identifiable print, there would be a “1” in the “Unidentified” column, instead of a “0.” So, Print 29, Box A is now accounted for as a 10th identifiable print, as well as a 10th identified print.

Print 20, Box B (matched in 1998 to Wallace’s left thumb) was also not included in the Commission’s 1964 official list. The Commission listed 7 identifiable prints, and identified all of them as 5 for Studebaker, and 2 for Forest L. Lucy, the FBI clerk who shipped the cartons from Dallas to the FBI Laboratory in Washington, D.C. However, the Commission seems to have made a mistake in that attempt to hide Print 20. Print 20 was labelled “unidentified,” a category in the Commission lists of identifiable latents. The Commission further accounted for it as an unidentified, identifiable print by mentioning it in the Report, on page 566. So, Print 20, Box B, was accounted for as an 8th identifiable print, and now as an 8th identified print.

Print 22, Box B (a single number for two latents matched in 1998 to Wallace’s left little finger and left ring finger) was not included in the Commission’s 1964 official list. The Commission listed 7 identifiable prints, and identified all of them as 5 for Studebaker, and 2 for Lucy, plus the obscured unidentified Print 20. As with Print 29, Box A, latent prints 22 were hidden under the label “indistinct characteristics,” a non-category in the Commission lists. Had the Commission fully accounted for them as identifiable prints, there would be a “3” in the “Unidentified” column instead of a “1.” So, Prints 22, Box B, are now accounted for as 9th and 10th identifiable prints, as well as 9th and 10th identified prints.

The fingerprint subtotal is now 24, and the grand total is now 32.

As far as I was able to determine, there were at least four ways by which the Warren Commission and FBI investigators hid Wallace’s identifiable prints:

Judging identifiable latents as not identifiable, thus excluding them from their accounting method.

Labeling multiple latents under one number, or not numbering them at all. Print 22, Box B is actually two prints, matched by Jay’s examiners to Wallace’s left little finger, and left ring finger. Keep in mind that print 29 was also matched to Wallace’s left little finger.

Labeling a latent as having “indistinct characteristics” — which is a non-designation that means neither identifiable nor unidentifiable. This appears to have been a tricky way to distract attention from an identifiable print, and allow for impunity should a subsequent examination catch the “error.” (This trick was used on Print 29, Box A — matched to Wallace's left little finger.)

Reporting numbers that differed from both their official itemized lists, and from testimony that was itself numerically inconsistent. (See comments B1 through B4.)

Finally, when I met Mr. Darby in person, I was able to see and concur with his additional analysis bringing the total on Print 29 to 34 points of match. I had even discovered some of those additional matches on my own before our meeting. I met Nathan Darby on October 25th, 2003. He showed me his updated chart for Print 29, on which he had marked 34 points of match — matches which prove that Mac Wallace handled at least two boxes used to construct the alleged sniper’s nest.

As for his other matches, I wrote in a 2006 Education Forum thread, “There was and is no universal standard. The FBI’s handbook on fingerprint science, which Barr gave to me for study at our December 1997 meeting, even stated that Bureau examiners are so highly trusted that a three-point match by them was acceptable to the FBI.”

In disagreements about fingerprint matches, the law defaults to the examiner with the greater experience and certification. That alone is what makes Darby unassailable, even on three points of match. CBS News 60-minutes did a report on FBI fallibility in fingerprint examination on February 11, 2009. The transcript is archived online.⁸

This quote jumps out: “For a second opinion, Wynn sent the evidence to another former FBI examiner, Vernon McCloud. Between them, the two experts had 75 years of fingerprint experience.”

And this one: “‘The underlying problem is not the evidence itself, but is who’s allowed to be qualified as an expert,’ said Malloy.”

Any emphasis on FBI fallibility, however, supports Darby, since, as my “Conflicts” chart shows, the FBI originally mishandled (to greatly understate it) the Wallace latents in 1963, and took a year before finally reporting their finding of no match on what Jay and Barr submitted to them in 1998. Shortly thereafter, you may recall, there was a widely reported scandal about systemic flaws in the FBI crime lab, potentially requiring many cases to be re-examined or overturned. There was little or no followup on that story that I can determine.⁹

Now you know what a few others and I have known for 17 years.

Thank you.

ENDNOTES:

1. Obituary of John Fraser “Jay” Harrison http://jfkcountercoup2.blogspot.com/2012/11/obituary-harrison-john-fraser-j-jay.html
2. You can see Jay, shortly after we met aiding me in my research of the suspicious station wagon, in my post, “Rambler Search Video”
3. The charted matches shown in McClellan’s book’s first draft exhibits were by the first — and still anonymous — examiner prior to October 22, 1997. Darby’s initial matches were made in January 1998. Harrison unnecessarily commissioned a third examiner, E. Harold Hoffmeister, in April 1998, as insurance after he carelessly leaked knowledge of the Darby match. (McClellan erroneously called Hoffmeister “A second print examiner” in Exhibit H of his book.) Harrison’s leak lead to three complications: ■ The Darby match going prematurely public. ■ The first attempts to debunk Darby by a group of California researchers, Special Agent Ed German with the Army Crime Lab, and Al Johnson (all of which were later invalidated—see McClellan, Blood, Money & Power, New York, NY, Hannover House, 2003, pp. 327-329). ■ The rushed, flawed press conference of May 29, 1998, by McClellan, Brown, and Harrison. (Glen Sample and Mark Collom, The Men on the Sixth Floor, 4th edition, Garden Grove, CA, 2011, pp. 206-227.)
4. John Kelin, “JFK Breakthrough?” Fairplay Magazine, Issue 23, July-August 1998, Accessed January 10, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20040310000639/http://www.acorn.net/jfkplace/09/fp.back_issues/23rd_Issue/breakthru.html
5. Walt Brown, who did not know Harrison, was initially chosen to be a spokesman only. Harrison asked me to call Brown to see if he was willing. I phoned him January 1, 1998, and recorded the call at Harrison’s request so he could hear Brown’s response while remaining anonymous. Harrison then arranged a meeting with Brown and revealed to him that the evidence was a fingerprint match.
6. I parted with Harrison, McClellan, and Brown after this failed press conference. I lost confidence in what had become more a mutual admiration society driven by large egos than a capable team of researchers. Having read McClellan’s 1997 first draft, I knew how poor his book was, and how much editing and education would be required to correct it. But I knew the “Fingerprint Investigation” (McClellan’s Appendix, pp. 323-332) was solid and would survive scrutiny—and it has. Walt Brown, after it was published, expressed his and Harrison’s regrets in a lengthy apology for his role titled, “CLARIFICATION Regarding Barr McClellan’s Blood, Money, and Power,” (http://manuscriptservice.com/DPQ/bmp.htm).
7. Richard Bartholomew, “Conflicts in Official Accounts of the Cardboard Carton Prints,” monogragh, Feb. 27, 1998. https://www.dropbox.com/s/j6tbnf06v6y1jrz/Conflicts.pdf?dl=0
8. Nina Eaglin, “Fingerprints: Infallible Evidence?” transcript, 60-minutes, CBS News, Jul. 16, 2003. Accessed January 10, 2023. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fingerprints-infallible-evidence/
9. Jarrett Murphy, “FBI Lab Flaws Traced To 3,000 Cases,” CBS News, April 16, 2003. Accessed Jan. 16, 2023. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fbi-lab-flaws-traced-to-3000-cases/