Is neutrality possible for Belarus?
The Belarusian authorities plan to remove any reference to the neutrality of Belarus’s foreign policy from the Constitution, a new draft of which is due to be put to referendum soon.
This intention has motivated the Center for New Ideas to conduct a study of neutrality in the Belarusian context and propose several ideas for improving the country’s foreign policy in the medium term.
Even if the notion of Belarusian neutrality is formally removed from the Constitution, the concept is likely to live on after the current political crisis. Belarusian figures on all sides of the political spectrum and Belarusian society wish to avoid getting caught amidst tensions between Russia and the West, and they see a policy of neutrality (distancing the country from military/political conflicts and unions) as a way to improve the international position of Belarus.
For this reason, neutrality in some form or another will continue to occupy a prominent position in Belarusian political discourse. However, Belarusian neutrality remains poorly understood from an academic and political perspective.
Going the primordial way: How Belarus aspired to be neutral
In the scientific literature and expert discussions, three key conditions for achieving neutrality emerge: the desire of elites and society to pursue it, international interest in a given state’s neutrality, and the propensity of the state to pursue such a policy.
Although the Belarusian elites have supported neutrality in the past, their actions have generally been ad hoc; Belarus never really set the goal of becoming a neutral state. That said, since its independence, Minsk has become known as a centre of international life in the post-Soviet space — it was there that the collapse of the USSR became official and key CIS documents were signed.
The issue of neutrality was never a prominent part of Belarusian public discourse, and Belarusians therefore do not have a clearly formulated position on the question. Nevertheless, there is a clear demand from society to find a tenable model of balanced relations between Russia and the West.
If we look at Belarus’s interdependence with other states in the political, economic, and military realms, it becomes quite clear why the current government declares that Belarusian neutrality is unfeasible in the current context. After all, the linchpin of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime is the Kremlin’s support. Even setting aside Lukashenka’s dependence on the political and economic support of Russia, it is obvious that multiple aspects of the Belarusian state critically depend on Russia to function.
Assessing the costs and benefits of Belarusian neutrality shows that under current conditions, the benefits are more relevant for the West/EU and Belarus’s closest neighbours than for Russia. That said, Belarusian stakeholders should understand that even among its Western neighbours, the idea of Belarusian neutrality may not arouse much enthusiasm.
Possible costs and benefits of Belarusian neutrality
In terms of the costs and benefits of neutrality for Belarus itself, the main political benefits of equidistance between Russia and the West are more apparent in domestic policy than foreign affairs. Both the elites and society could unite under the national idea of an open country; this would remove the burden of geopolitics from various political camps in Belarus.
Likewise, the pursuit of a neutral course would allow Belarus to avoid conflicts, stop worrying about “enemies”, bolster its reputation by providing mediation services to help resolve international disputes, preserve or expand trade relations with competing states, and develop relations with individual countries, regions, or international associations on a priority basis. Efforts to attain neutrality could also stimulate the growth of the militaryindustrial complex.
The main obstacles that could potentially impede Belarus’s road to neutrality have to do with two factors. First, Belarus would need to take more responsibility for its own development. Second, it would need to deal with Russia’s negative reaction if Moscow were to perceive Belarus’s attempts to become neutral as a threat. This negative reaction could materialise in the military, political and economic spheres.
Recommendations
Given the situation in Belarus and the current geopolitical conditions it finds itself in, “classic” neutrality is hardly attainable, even after democratic transformation. At the same time, Belarus ought not to abandon the idea of neutrality as a principle enshrined in the constitution. Retaining this foreign policy orientation will allow it to unite society, although Belarusian stakeholders should remain realistic about the current state of affairs.
In practice, if the current (or more likely future) authorities wish to improve the position of Belarus in the international arena, they should aspire to neutrality as a long-term goal through a pragmatic policy of openness. This approach would allow it to bring the largest possible number of partners on board for cooperation, avoid international confrontation, and promote regional detente.
The following measures could be taken to implement a policy of openness: introducing a transparent model of discussion and decision-making in foreign policy; expanding economic, investment, financial and trade cooperation; improving relations with the EU and USA; creating a belt of neighbourliness and strengthening ties with partners from farther afield; removing the military threat in the region; developing alternative sources and routes for delivering energy; promoting Minsk as an expert and negotiation platform; re-branding Belarus as a place of new opportunities and services; and creating a barrierfree environment for international movement of people, goods, and capital.
In addition, the future government will need to convince Russia that the foreign policy Belarus chooses to pursue does not pose a threat to Russian interests. This challenge could be overcome through a portfolio of possible trade-offs. Measures could include refraining from issuing statements that refer to a Russian threat to Belarus, creating a positive image for Belarusian-Russian relations, and providing guarantees to preserve the status of the Russian language. In foreign policy, it is important to continue holding consultations in various areas and plan joint activities. In the military domain, it would be rational to preserve cooperation (at the same time, it is important to prevent Russian military infrastructure from developing on Belarusian territory).
In this context, Belarus must work to defuse tensions between the West and Russia and advocate for a reduction in military presence on both sides of the Belarusian-EU border. A more neutral foreign policy needs to be initiated by Belarusians themselves; however, for Belarus to pursue this path successfully, it is crucial that tensions between the West and Russia be eased.
