Hi Yuji!
I’m really enjoying the Theory of Model UN! I like how you’re applying game theory and economics to MUN, particularly in caucusing/lobbying/negotiation. MUN is such a “social laboratory,” it’s a wonder why more social scientists haven’t tried looking at MUN as an area for potential experiments. Within the MUN community, as you’ve pointed out, there’s been few attempts to apply social science and explain certain behaviors in MUN quantitatively. On a personal note, I thorough appreciate the game theory approach because that was one of my favorite classes in undergrad, with Professor Benjamin Polak.
For this article specifically, the key assumption that I think requires further explanation is how point values are assigned to each bloc. Given the assumptions you already explained above around a highly competitive conference, highly “rational” delegates seeking supremacy (e.g. awards), etc. understanding how “rational” chairs assign value to each bloc (and presumably individual delegates) seems key in order to understand how a bloc can “win” its respective game (and for an individual delegates to understand how to win an award).
In the article, you make the assumption that chairs “probably want to see collaboration, at least on some level.” I think this could provide further explanation, because the level at which they value collaboration would strongly impact the point values and potentially each bloc’s preferred outcome. Also, it’s possible (and, I believe, more likely than most delegates think) that the chair does not actually value collaboration. If they instead value an accurate and “realistic” portrayal of country policy, then the chair may actually not prefer to see mergers, if that merger leads to a compromised resolution that the chair believes its sponsors’ countries and governments would not realistically support.
In a committee or scenario where chairs value collaboration, then I think the game theory analysis above makes sense, in which case a “stronger” or “bigger” bloc would benefit from merging with a “weaker” or “smaller” bloc in order to demonstrate collaboration, even if that means watering down the “quality” of the resolution, or rather, creating a merged resolution that does not strongly support any individual country’s policies. Consequentially, the larger bloc, with the watered down resolution, is more likely to pass.
But in a committee where chairs value “realism,” then, in terms of game theory, the point values change. A bloc could still benefit from a merger, but only if the merged resolution strongly reflects the policies of the original sponsors (in the chair’s view). The challenge in this “game” is actually obtaining enough sponsors or support for a “strong” resolution (a resolution that strongly reflects a single bloc’s POV, rather than being watered down in order to appeal to everyone) in order to gain adoption.
In the collaboration game, a bloc benefits from merging in order to “appear diplomatic” and ultimately pass their resolution by a wide margin, even if that resolution is watered down. In the other game in which chairs value accuracy and realism (what I prefer to call a “competitive” game), a bloc benefits from merging if a) their resolution remains “strong,” and b) if it ultimately enables passage (presumably by a slim margin above simple majority).
The above reflects my own attempt to apply social science to MUN (specifically Negotiation Theory, hence the “Collaborative vs. Competitive” games), and is part of how we teach “MUN Strategy” at the MUN Institute and our “advanced” Best Delegate programs. I think you may be interested in using Game Theory to deeply explore both Collaborative and Competitive approaches to Model UN.
I welcome your thoughts, and thank you again for starting the Theory of Model UN! I look forward to reading more of your articles.
Best,
Ryan