If God is Sovereign, am I truly free?

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The dilemma of the relationship between God’s sovereignty and human freedom has challenged the Christian faith for millennia. How the believer views the relationship between the two “has a direct bearing on how they respond to various issues in their lives.”¹ Yet so often, rather than wrestle with the challenge, we are quick to avoid it altogether

Here, you’ll find a brief overview of the subject and a suggested perspective that neither undermines God’s sovereignty or the reasonable self-determination of man.

An Antinomy

God is sovereign. In other words, He possesses “ultimate authority and power.”² He does whatever he pleases (Ps. 135:6), works out all things in agreement with the purpose of His will (Eph. 1:11), and determines the steps of a person (Prov. 16:9; Judg. 14:1–4).³ God’s sovereignty dictates that He is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and free from limitation, for any deficiency in these areas would render Him less than supreme and thus not sovereign.⁴

At the same time, the Scriptures declare that humans can exercise free will. Man is free to make choices without external coercion, and the Lord will ultimately bring judgment considering them (Matt. 25; Rom. 2:1–6; Rev. 20:11–13).⁵ Jonathan Edwards notes that the will is “That by which the mind chooses any thing.”⁶ Since the mind can make choices, the will appears to be free. However, this presents Christians with an antinomy, which J. I. Packer defines as “an apparent incompatibility between two apparent truths.”⁷

If humans are entirely free to do as they please, the sovereignty of God is called into question. On the other hand, if God predetermines all choices and outcomes, the free will of man is potentially undermined.⁸

Without thoughtful consideration, Christians risk emphasising one to the exclusion of the other; Packer describes this as a “Scylla and Charybdis of error.”⁹ How is one to reconcile this antinomy? Christian responses fall within a spectrum of either Calvinist or Arminian beliefs.

Calvinists are generally determinists; that is to say, they emphasize God’s sovereignty over human free will to differing extents. Strict determinism “means that things happen. . . strictly by virtue of external forces.”¹⁰ Calvinists believe this to varying degrees, culminating in a fatalistic approach.

In contrast, Arminians are ordinarily indeterminists, emphasizing the autonomy of humans to similarly differing extents, culminating with the most muscular perspective: that a person’s act “is not causally determined” by external forces in any way whatsoever.¹¹ Bruce Reichenbach helpfully proposes six “puzzle pieces” in order to conduct a fruitful study of the topic:

1. God’s omnipotence,
2. God’s omniscience,
3. God’s relation to time,
4. God’s sovereignty,
5. God’s providence, and
6. Human freedom.¹²

By analyzing both the Calvinist and Arminian perspectives in light of these pieces, one can go a considerable distance toward a healthy theology of God’s sovereignty and human free will.

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1. God’s Omnipotence

God is omnipotent. He has “unlimited authority to bring into existence or cause to happen whatever he wills.”¹³ Indeed, His power is so great that all things are possible (Luke 1:37). He can do exceedingly more than humans can comprehend (Eph. 3:20), holding all things together (Col. 1:17) and sustaining all things by His powerful word (Heb. 1:3). As such an all-encompassing power is a facet of God’s sovereignty, God could effortlessly and fatalistically determine all facets of life — yet, the Scriptures say, he allows humans to make choices.

However, before addressing this in more detail, an important distinction must be made. God cannot do all things. For example, “an omnipotent being cannot create a circle that is a square nor cause another person to perform a free act.”¹⁴ The limits of possibility bind even an omnipotent being. C. S. Lewis puts it well:

His Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to Him, but not nonsense. . . the intrinsic impossibilities are not things but nonentities.¹⁵

With this in mind, Thomas Aquinas defines God’s omnipotence well: “He can do all things that are possible absolutely [emphasis added].”¹⁶

The all-powerful nature of God provides some challenges regarding human free will. The Arminian indeterminist perspective suggests that man has unfettered free will, which means that God’s sovereign work over creation is dependent on specific human choices. A contradiction is evident:

a) God can whatever He wills to happen.
b) God is dependent on human choices to bring about what He wills.

Both premises cannot both be correct without forming what Lewis refers to as an intrinsic impossibility, which even an omnipotent God cannot will into existence. Thus, either a) or b) must necessarily be false. Scripturally, the evidence suggests that the Arminian indeterminist position falls short. On the other hand, the Calvinist position allows for the will of humans to fall under the will of an all-powerful God.

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2. God’s omniscience and 3. God’s relation to time

As well as being all-powerful, God is omniscient; His knowledge is perfect (Job 37:16). All the treasures of wisdom and knowledge are found in Him (Col. 3:2), and He knows our words before we speak them (Psa. 139:4). Indeed, God knows everything (1 John 3:20) — past, present, and future (1 Sam. 10:2; Acts 2:23). However, the Calvinist and Arminian positions begin diverge on the understanding of how God’s omniscience relates to time.

In general, the Calvinistic determinist position asserts that God’s omniscience means He foreknows all things. Human destiny was planned “before the beginning of time” (2 Tim. 1:9; Tit. 1:2; Eph. 1:4; 1 Pet. 1:2). Not only that but “all that he has in his word committed himself to do will infallibly be done.”¹⁷ While the Calvinistic perspective offers a view that is congruent with God’s omniscience, it creates some difficulties regarding human free will. If humans “cannot do anything other than God knows, we are not free.”¹⁸ At best, human free will is limited in some capacity, and at worst, it is restricted altogether.

The Arminian indeterminist suggests several options. The most extreme solution to reconciling God’s omniscience with human free will is a theological framework known as “open theism.” This view argues that “God does not know things that cannot [in their opinion] be known, such as the free acts of people that have not yet occurred.”¹⁹ The upside of this perspective is that it allows indeterminists to uphold the concept of human free will, but the costs are great:

1. God would not be omniscient, as His knowledge would be less than perfect.
2. God’s knowledge would be restricted by time, or to put it another way: He would be the God in time rather than the God of time, which would render Him less than omnipotent.
3. Open theism renders all predictive prophecy — a large portion of Old Testament Scripture — to guesswork rather than foreordination. Prophecy must come to pass or God’s omniscience is again called into question. This surely means that some form of determinism is true.²⁰
4. If open theism is correct, eternal security is impossible. A believer would still be able to reject their faith as their choice is entirely free. Anything less, and “they would not be free in the indeterministic sense.”²¹ As a result, open theism is untenable.

Several Jesuit, Lutheran, and Arminian theologians suggest a different position known as Scientia Media — a middle knowledge.²² Advocates of this view suggest that “God foreknows not only everything that will happen but also all possible outcomes.”²³ God can therefore be omniscient, proponents believe, because He knows everything that could happen, while humans could still have indeterministic freedom. However, Louis Berkhoff deftly and concisely dismisses this view: “. . . it is objectionable, because it makes the divine knowledge dependent on the choice of man, virtually annuls the certainty of future events, and thus implicitly denies the omniscience of God. It is contrary to such passages of Scripture as Acts 2:23; Rom. 9:16; Eph. 1:11; Phil. 2:13.”²⁴

Regardless of where one finds themselves on the Arminian spectrum, a restriction of God’s omniscience or a constriction in time is a necessary outcome to elevate free will to its highest possible place. Both options run contrary to the teachings of Scripture. He is no potter who has no role in determining the outcome of the clay (Rom. 9:19–21).²⁵ Indeed, God is not limited in such a way: “He has us in his hands; but we never have him in ours.”²⁶ As a result, total unencumbered free will is only available to humanity if one abandons the Scriptural reality of God’s omniscience that transcends the bounds of time.

At this point, there is a case for an omnipotent, omniscient God who transcends time or humanity with unrestricted free will. There cannot be both. The total freedom of humanity appears shaky, but as yet, the antinomy is unresolved. But what of God’s sovereignty and providence? It is not easy to see the complete picture with just half of the puzzle pieces.

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4. God’s Sovereignty and 5. God’s Providence

To restate a previously mentioned point: God’s sovereignty dictates that He is necessarily omnipotent, omniscient, and free from limitation. If He were deficient in these areas, he would not be sovereign.

Accordingly, He is the only being in existence that is wholly free. Humans may experience some level of free choice, but the sovereignty of God constrains it. R. C. Sproul puts it this way: “I have freedom to do things as I please, but if my freedom conflicts with the decretive will of God, there is no question as to the outcome — God’s decree will prevail over my choice.”²⁷ This is made profoundly evident in the analogy of the Potter and the clay.

In Jeremiah 18:1–6, a potter worked on a jar out of clay. It became flawed, so he made it into another jar instead. In response, the Lord says, “House of Israel, can I not treat you as this potter treats his clay? . . . Just like the clay in the potter’s hand, so are you in my hand house of Israel” (Jer. 18:6 CSB). It appears to be a strikingly Calvinistic picture of God’s sovereignty. However, a few verses later, God suggests that he may relent from His plans if the people listen to Him (Jer. 18:8–10). In this picture, the Arminian may certainly have a case for free will within God’s sovereign plans. One can gain broader insight from combining this passage with Romans 9.

As believers questioned the justice of God, Paul declares that the Potter has absolute sovereign right over the clay to make one piece of pottery for honour and another for dishonour (Rom. 9:21). In truth, much of Romans 9 reveals God’s sovereign power over creation. The believer sees a picture of a God who “has the perfect right to do with His creation (including men) as He wishes, just as the Potter has utter sovereignty over the clay.”²⁸

In tandem with His sovereignty, God also exercises His providence: his divine involvement with all created things (Gen. 50:20; Prov. 16:33; Prov. 16:9; John 6:37; Rom. 8:28; Phil. 2:13).²⁹ The Westminster Confession of Faith explains God’s providence as follows:

God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, from the greatest even to the least, by His most wise and holy providence, according to His infallible knowledge, and the free and immutable counsel of His own will, to the praise of the glory of His wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy.³⁰

In His omnipotence, omniscience, transcendence of time and sovereignty, God has absolute authority to providentially influence and perhaps, at times, even control His creation. In some cases, He hardens hearts (Ex. 7:3; Deut. 2:3; Josh. 11:20; Rom. 9:18). In others, He goes as far as providentially causing chains to fall off imprisoned apostles, inanimate gates to swing open, and rendering several soldiers oblivious to his escape (Acts 12). It seems the soldiers did not have indeterministic freedom at this point.

How exactly does the free will of man correspond to the providential, sovereign work of the Creator? To over-emphasize the providential work of God, Arminians say, is to minimize His love. Norman Geisler, who describes himself as a “moderate Calvinist” (but whose position actually fits squarely into Arminianism), puts it like this: “A loving God will not force anyone against their will to love Him or to worship Him. Forced love is not love; forced worship is not worship. Heaven will not be composed of robots.”³¹ Similarly, Arminians argue that if humans cannot make their own choices with complete freedom, judgement by God for sin is cruel since He providentially ordains it. These are strong arguments, but not indefensible.

Firstly, the Calvinist might defend claims of an unloving God by challenging the demand that God’s love be indiscriminate. Should this be the case? James White observes in the Arminian position that “while man has the freedom to love those closest to him with a particular love that is not given to anyone else, God is not granted this freedom.”³² Once again, Arminians risk limiting the Potter rather than the clay. God does indeed love all, but He does not love all the same.³³ Thus, he can providentially foreordain those particularly loved believers to desire and thus make a conscious choice to love and worship Him in light of His own love lavished on them.

Regarding the problem of evil, this is perhaps one of the strongest arguments that indeterminists put forward. However, it assumes that total freedom is necessary for a choice to qualify as free. This study has established that the Bible resolutely declares God’s sovereignty, and as a result, the creature cannot have total free will without some sort of divine limitation on the Creator. By combining all that has been discussed so far and relating it to the concept of human freedom, it is possible to answer the problem of evil and arrive at a satisfactory conclusion regarding God’s sovereignty and human free will.

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6. Human Freedom

To rightly understand the human will, it is helpful to go some way toward understanding God’s will. Of course, it is impossible to fully understand the mind of God (Rom. 11:34), but one can recognize in Him both His decretive and His preceptive will. God’s decretive will is “what he has determined to be. . .[a] particular determination that this or that will transpire.”³⁴ It is this will to which God’s providence primarily refers. God’s preceptive will is that which is revealed through His law, showing us the way that God desires for us to live.³⁵ God’s decretive will does not fail, but His preceptive will may not always transpire. For example, the Lord wills for believers not to sin, but all have fallen short in this regard (Rom. 3:23), living contrary to God’s preceptive will. Man, however, is manifestly unable to live contrary to God’s decretive will. In this sense, human free will cannot be absolute.

Though they use different terminology, Jonathan Edwards and Augustine offer important distinctions concerning human freedom. In a helpful paraphrase by R. C. Sproul, they propose that “man still has the ability to choose what he wants, but lacks the desire for true righteousness. He is naturally free, but he is morally enslaved.”³⁶ To put it another way, they suggest that man’s moral ability of freedom — or desire — is influenced either by God, inherent sinful nature, or other external forces within God’s preceptive will. “External forces” refers to unalterable and not insignificant constraints such as time, or place of one’s birth. Therefore, his natural ability of freedom remains untouched, and in this sense, humans are free to make their own choices, but the desire to make those choices is affected. The mistaken assumption is that a choice must be absolutely free for it to be a genuine human choice.³⁷

Regarding the pervasive influence of sin, Augustine closely analysed Adam’s freedom before the Fall and distinguished four possibilities which are useful for contemporary discussion:

1. Posse pecarre — able to sin
2. Posse non-pecarre — able not to sin (or to remain free from sin)
3. Non posse pecarre — unable to sin
4. Non posse, non pecarre — unable not to sin³⁸

In his pre-Fall state, Adam was both able to sin and able not to sin (1 and 2). Only God is unable to sin (3), not because He is powerless to, but because “God has no inner desire to sin.”³⁹ Like humanity, God’s desires impact His choices. Without Jesus’ death, resurrection, and ascension, Humans are unable not to sin (4) because of the sinful nature inherited in light of the Fall. Indeed, even believers wrestle with the sinful nature before the new heavens and new earth (Rom. 7). In short, humans do have choices within God’s preceptive, but not His decretive will. Still, the desires that cause such choices cannot be considered wholly free as myriad factors externally influence them.

For the Arminian, minimizing the influence of the sinful nature risks falling into the classic Pelagian heresy, while minimising the role of God’s decretive will once again results in a limitation of His sovereignty. The Arminian position is again untenable, necessitating a view of God that is unbiblical. But though they see God in a more biblically accurate light, can Calvinists avoid the risk of excessively minimising human freedom within the bounds of God’s preceptive will?

The answer is yes, but one must first find safer ground by eliminating the terms free or freedom from the discussion and instead following the path of Augustine, who said that “God has given [the believer] ‘reasonable self-determination.’”⁴⁰ In other words, every choice is both free and reasonably determined. “To be able to choose what I want by virtue of self-determination,” Sproul writes, “does not destroy free will but establishes it.”⁴¹ The addition of the word “reasonable” is essential, as only God is completely and unequivocally self-determining. Ultimately, human desire always determines choice within reasonable parameters. Without the influence of desire, it is not choice but coercion. In all circumstances, both believers and non-believers can exercise reasonable self-determination in a given situation, even if external influences hold sway over desire. Thus God can be sovereign while humans can direct their own will.

It is here that one can find an answer to the previously mentioned problem of evil. God’s decretive will is assured, but His preceptive will is not. Within these bounds, many factors influence human desire (though God’s providential guidance is incalculably stronger than all others). However, the human still makes a reasonably self-determinate choice and is accordingly responsible under God’s judgment.

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Reconciling the antinomy

The antinomy described at the outset was as follows:

“If humans are entirely free to do as they please, the sovereignty of God is called into question. On the other hand, if God predetermines all choices and outcomes, the free will of man is potentially undermined.”

This study has established the unquestionable sovereignty of the Lord God Almighty by virtue of His omnipotence, omniscience, and transcendence of time. By no means is this a complete survey of God’s sovereign character, but it is enough to recognize that any limitation in these areas commits a severe hermeneutical error. It is precisely such a limitation that Arminian indeterminists attempt in pursuit of boundless human freedom, which amounts to limiting the Potter for the sake of the clay and is indefensible. At the end of the Calvinist spectrum, fatalistic determinism risks annihilating human choice in the process of preserving God’s sovereignty. In order to reconcile the antinomy, one must have a proper understanding of human freedom.

The fallacy in the premise above is that humans are entirely free. Only the sovereign God possesses such unfettered free will. Indeed, even if God did not exist, no human would have such freedom, as there are many other constraining factors at work. Nevertheless, the Lord does not coerce the human will so that it can no longer make choices. Within God’s decretive and preceptive will, man has reasonable self-determination. External influences such as the providential hand of God, the sinful nature, time, and even the context of one’s birth profoundly impact the desires of man; this in turn impacts choices (to greater or lesser extents). Man is still reasonably able to do as he pleases, which is the essence of self-determination. The reconciled antinomy is perhaps best presented as follows:

Humans possess the ability to reasonably self-determine their own choices within the bounds of God’s sovereignty.

In light of this study, the Calvinist perspective appears to be the most likely. Christians may therefore respond to the challenges and trials of this life with utter confidence in the Sovereign Lord’s providential influence. However, it is crucial to conclude by recognizing the ultimately incomprehensible mystery of an omnipotent, omniscient, sovereign God. While humanity has much to gain from wrestling with such challenging issues, one must find solace in knowing that answers on this side of eternity are mere educated guesses, at best. Therefore, it is right to actively and continually choose the humble, faithful pursuit of the Lord in all things and at all times.

Notes

[1] Basinger, D. and Basinger, R., “Introduction” Predestination & Free Will (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), loc. 29, Kindle.

[2] Evans, C. S., Pocket dictionary of apologetics & philosophy of religion (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2002), 110.

[3] Pearce, T. P., “Sovereignty of God,” Holman Illustrated Bible Dictionary (Nashville, TN: Holman Bible Publishers, 2003), 1523.

[4] Boice, J. M., Foundations of the Christian faith: a comprehensive & readable theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 117.

[5] Sproul, R. C., Can I Know God’s Will (Lake Mary, FL: Reformation Trust Publishing, 2009), 49.

[6] Edwards, J., Freedom of the Will, 2012 ed. (Chandler, AZ: Brighton Publishing), 7.

[7] Packer, J. I., Evangelism And The Sovereignty Of God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2012), 17.

[8] Sproul, 48.

[9] Packer, 31.

[10] Feinberg, J., “God Ordains All Things,” Predestination & Free Will (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), loc. 147. Kindle.

[11] Sproul, R. C., “Chosen by God,” Ligonier, accessed August 15, 2021, https://www.ligonier.org/learn/series/chosen-by-god/what-is-free-will

[12] Reichenbach, B., “God Limits His Power,” Predestination & Free Will (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1986), loc. 1007, Kindle.

[13] Elwell, W. A. and Beitzel, B. J., “Omnipotence,” Baker encyclopedia of the Bible (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1988), 1588.

[14] Reichenbach, loc. 1074, Kindle.

[15] Lewis, C. S., The Problem of Pain (London and Tonbridge, The Whitefriars Press LTD, 1940), 18.

[16] Reichenbach, loc. 1074, Kindle.

[17] Packer, J. I. Knowing God (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1973), 89.

[18] Reichenbach, Kindle Location 1105.

[19] Grudem, W. Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 2020), 227.

[20] Feinberg, loc. 296, Kindle.

[21] Feinberg, loc. 305, Kindle.

[22] Berkhoff, L., Systematic Theology, 3rd ed. (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 68.

[23] Letham, R., Systematic Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2019), 459–460.

[24] Berkhoff, 65.

[25] White, J. The Potter’s Freedom, 2nd ed. (Lincroft, NJ: Calvary Press, 2009), 71.

[26] Packer, Knowing God, 92.

[27] Sproul, 48.

[28] White, 214.

[29] Grudem, 420.

[30] “WCF Chapter 5 Of Providence 5.1–5.4,” The Westminster Standards, accessed August 16, 2021, http://thewestminsterstandards.com/wcf-chapter-5-of-providence_5-1_5-4/

[31] Geisler, N. Chosen But Free (Bloomington, MN: Bethany House Publishers, 1999), 102–103.

[32] White, 302.

[33] Robinson, J., “Does God Love Everyone The Same?,” The Gospel Coalition, accessed August 15, 2021, https://www.thegospelcoalition.org/article/does-god-love-everyone-the-same/

[34] Letham, 251–252.

[35] Ibid., 253.

[36] Sproul, 36.

[37] Grudem, 829.

[38] Sproul, 33–35.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Grudem, 231.

[41] Sproul, 37–38.