THEORY OF WAR: AN ART INSIDE OF A SCIENCE

Comparing and contrasting the military philosophers Sun Tzu, Machiavelli, Jomini, and Clausewitz leads to the conclusion that war is both an art and a science. War is never simply an art or just a science and rarely equal parts of each. Warfare theory both developed from and was influenced by these four great military philosophers that has developed into modern military doctrine.

Modern doctrine has been sub-divided into three convenient levels of war; strategic, operational, and tactical. However, the actual physical conduct of warfare is not as easily relegated into these neat tiers of war. The conduct of modern battle is messier and weaves through all three levels of war, often in the same day.

Enlisted non-commissioned officers and younger commissioned officers more important than ever before and the importance of the tactical corporal has grown exponentially faster than doctrine can keep pace. Full spectrum operations now encompasses current military operational elements such as information operations, psychological operations, along with the integration of civilian leadership from disparate organizations.

For military and civilian leaders, this makes understanding the context and source of modern doctrine even more important in the current era of warfare. However, many modern leaders fail to understand both the relevance and importance of the source of military doctrine. This dilutes the practical connection that has developed between national leadership and the military arm of western countries.

Doctrine is Science Until the Battlefield.

In a scientific lab setting there is always an element of art in the manner in which experiments are conducted. Scientists develop a hypothesis, then seek to prove it through rigorous experimentation, capturing of results, and if everything goes as planned the proof of the hypothesis. The artistic elements of science are the study, research, and development of the hypothesis prior to the strict experimentation. This does not detract from the science if the theory is proven later in the lab.

Often these elements of art have lead to scientific innovation, discovery of new and improved procedures, processes, or treatments not previously considered until experimentation of the original hypothesis was conducted. Although the loss of lives in the science has been recorded, the losses do not compare to the losses recorded during the conduct of war. The field of battle is where the theory of warfare is tested and it is a much more unforgiving lab to prove a theory.

The theory of warfare has traditionally been developed in a soldier lead academia environment, by senior officers, often in review of the lessons learned while fighting the most recent wars and review of the previously held doctrine. This in turn becomes the hypothesis for how to train the country’s military forces, procure the proper equipment for the proposed most likely threat, and to fight and win the next war.

Assumptions must be made to account for the next wars probable enemy, the type of threat presented, a general geographic location, the terrain, and weather conditions in the likely enemies country. The purchase of cold weather gear is not important when a country is preparing to fight in the desert but wet weather gear, sturdy boots, and socks may be more important if the threat is in western Europe. The type of weapons to procure, ammunition to buy for training and war, and the type of vehicles are all affected by the terrain and general weather of enemy’s country. The list of considerations that can influence this study, transition, and evolving doctrine is almost endless but must be considered for any change in doctrine to take effect.

In these ways, warfare theory is similar to the development of a new scientific hypothesis. The artistic side of warfare theory is done during the times of peace between the wars, by officers and leaders who have some experience in fighting the most recent wars. Thus warfare hypothesis development follows a similar artistic evolution with study resulting in possible evolutions and improvements over the previously employed methods and theory. The next step to prove this hypothesis is done in simulated war games and exercises to prove them.

Missing Links of Modern Theory.

However, the modern development of doctrine lacks an important aspect necessary for the best employment of this warfare hypothesis. It is most often lacking detailed involvement from civilian leaders responsible for the control of the military forces. Today’s civilian leadership are briefed on general aspects of changes in doctrine and observe military exercises. Legislation is proposed in order to attempt to modify military accessions, procurement of equipment, and even attempts to force the military to fight as an interoperable and joint force.

The way civilian control of the military has evolved in the current era of warfare has grown far from the civilian control experienced during the common era of warfare shared by Clausewitz and Jomini. This separation is ever further in consideration of the Sun Tzu and Machiavelli individual eras of war. Common between all four is that they were writing as military leaders who had recently experienced contemporary war in defense of their nation.

Also common was audience they addressed, the civilian leadership of the country they had fought for and defended. However, in these long ago eras of warfare, the civilian leadership they addressed was much closer to the threat faced and thus more heavily vested over most of today’s civilian leadership. For example, in Clausewitz’s era the leaders of Prussia were faced with the enemy at their doorstep and thus in close proximity to the battlefield. They would have experienced many of the sights and sounds of battle, the ‘fog of war’ that Clausewitz addresses in On War, and some national leaders of previous eras were killed or injured in war.

Today’s separation between the battlefield and the civilian leaders who control the military offers a unique insulation from the fog of war. Attempts to exert directive civilian control of the military has been less successful in the modern era of warfare.

President Kennedy attempted to influence the Army in order to focus them on what he judged to be the most important threat facing the United States in the early 1960s. He went to the extraordinary length of calling all Army CORPS and division general officers into his office and asking them to focus on counterinsurgency training in preparation for small wars in the near term. Of course Army general officers were politically astute while meeting the president face to face and agreed without resistance to Kennedy. The Kennedy proposal was never fully embraced but enough doctrine was modified and changed to show the Army’s support of his focus.

Civilian disconnect from the military development of doctrine and training of the military forces cannot be interjected in times of crisis or national war. Involvement must evolve to be in the process earlier in doctrine development and consistent over the long term, prior to the next war in order to allow civilian leaders to best understand, influence, and offer concrete changes before the next conflict.

Increased U.S. senior civilian leadership control and influence during the artistic portion of doctrine development would help reduce the distance that has developed, from U.S. senior military leadership. This is necessary regardless of the next threat, their location or terrain, or the tactics that are developed to combat them.

Doctrines Failure During the Scientific Phase.

In the past twenty years of conflict in the Middle East, modern doctrine in the U.S., the wealthiest and most technologically advanced military the world has ever witnessed, has tested the doctrinal hypothesis and been found wanting. This is due to a myriad of inter-related factors. One of the seemingly most glaringly obvious factors which lead to a partial failure was the U.S. military inability to stay apace of the changing guerrilla enemy faced in both Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Northern Africa. Especially for the ground forces, the doctrine, training, equipping, and intelligence techniques prepared for the Soviet Union in Europe, not the enemy faced in the Middle East. The artistic and scientific portions of the U.S. warfare hypothesis should be judged at least a partial failure due to the inability of the U.S. military to adapt after the end of phase one operations in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Modern warfare has not strayed from many of the basic tenets of the great military philosophers. The need to mass forces is emphasized and just as important in kinetic maneuver battles. It was used to achieve overwhelming success early in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is also still relevant at the strategic and operational levels of war, getting all the forces, assets, and logistical support quickly massed as far forward as possible. However, the advantage of quickly massed forces at the operational tactical level became less important as the enemies left in the most current wars blended into their country’s population and environment. They became harder to locate using outdated tactics and techniques developed to fight large state on state warfare.

Technological advancements improved the speed of modern warfare. For instance, mobility has increased more than tenfold over the Napoleonic era of warfare. This allows for much faster movement and massing of forces where they are needed. Other technological advancements have also helped modern forces adapt to the changing battlefield environment. In many ways this has lead to negative affects, and an over reliance on technology.

A simple focus on preparing to fight the correct enemy with the right tactics, equipment, and techniques based on the lessons learned in the past two decades plus of war would help fix failing U.S. doctrine. Connecting this doctrine to coherent strategic guidance and concrete ends to purposeful warfare would be an improvement over the manner strategy has been handled in Iraq and Afghanistan. A whole of military honest review of modern doctrine is long overdue.

This review of modern doctrine should utilize technology to speed up the artistic review and proposed new warfare hypothesis. Doctrine and training developed must focus on building adaptable leaders at all levels capable of encouraging life long learning. The procedures and manuals produced must be readable, short and to the point so leaders will actually read the most current warfare theory.

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