The story of Pat Robertson and how to take over a political party
Today marks the passing of Pentecostal religious broadcaster Marion “Pat” Robertson at the age of 93. As highlighted in my book, First to the Party, Robertson played a pivotal role in shaping the Christian Right movement in the United States. His 1988 campaign for the Republican presidential nomination compelled other candidates to actively seek the support of conservative Christians. Subsequently, Robertson founded the Christian Coalition, a highly successful conservative Christian interest group that exerted significant influence in Republican primaries.
Like other evangelical leaders, Robertson saw politics as a means to expand his religious influence, even if his own campaign fell short. While party nominations had been determined by voters since the 1970s, Robertson and other candidates sought to secure nominations with a stealthy and intense minority following. Prior to South Carolina’s crucial primary ahead of Super Tuesday, Robertson’s supporters infiltrated state party meetings, aiming to eliminate the primary and revert to an older nominating system that would give them an advantage at state conventions. The campaign hired a Baptist minister who discreetly engaged pastors, maneuvering to avoid detection by Republican Party officials. Robertson’s supporters on the ground, unaware of the larger convention system plan, were encouraged to attend county conventions, identify fellow Robertson supporters with colored hats, and cast their votes based on simple “thumbs up” or “thumbs down” signals. In this case, moderate state Republicans disqualified enough delegates who hadn’t met the voter registration deadline, preventing them from gaining a majority at the state convention. But Robertson’s influence on the state and national party was profound.
Although George H.W. Bush ultimately defeated Robertson in 1988, his campaign recognized the need for an evangelical Christian outreach strategy that future Republican presidential candidates would emulate. After Robertson’s surprising second-place victory in an unusual Michigan primary in 1986, Bush responded by building a network of evangelical Christian supporters. Initially, campaign manager Lee Atwater’s strategy for winning Super Tuesday relied on securing endorsements from southern Republican officeholders. However, after the Michigan outcome, Atwater sought a list of 215 influential evangelical targets provided by evangelical outreach director Doug Wead. Bush successfully won over most of these targets, establishing an evangelical firewall that impeded Robertson’s progress. Commercial rivals like Jerry Falwell were happy to limit Robertson’s influence, and ministers of other sects worried about a Pentecostal becoming the face of conservative Christian politics. To counter Robertson’s support in target churches, the Bush campaign mobilized its own supporters to appeal to pastors to at least be neutral. The campaign also strategically enlisted individuals who pledged support to Robertson as delegates but later switched to Bush, making carefully timed announcements to maximize impact.
Robertson’s influence peaked after 1988 when he found the Christian Coalition. While Jerry Falwell’s Moral Majority focused on rallying people, the Christian Coalition organized challenges to politicians who did not follow its agenda. Mobilizing Christian bookstores, broadcasters, and churches, Robertson stitched together a network that could take over state party offices and withhold support from moderate and pro-choice Republicans. In 1988, Robertson’s campaign put on skits titled “How to Take Over a Party” that provided instructions to new voters on participating in party meetings and securing party positions to challenge more secular Goldwater-era Republicans. Unlike the predominantly Baptist membership of the Moral Majority, the Christian Coalition actively recruited leaders from diverse backgrounds, obtaining more Catholic participation than any other protestant-led Christian Right interest group. Ralph Reed, as the executive director of the Christian Coalition, broadened its appeal by integrating economic conservatism and reframing culturally conservative issues to align with libertarian or liberal values. The Coalition emphasized parental and student rights while opposing what it deemed as “special rights” for homosexuals.
At the state level, the Christian Coalition and allied groups displaced moderate Republican state party officials and legislators. Given the scarcity of volunteers, those consistently attending meetings were tasked with greater responsibilities and eventually ascended within the party ranks. Future South Carolina state chairman Drew McKissick remarked
“Your average county chairman of the party… [is] looking around for someone who can do a, b, c, and d… pretty soon you couldn’t get choosy about who you ask [to volunteer] because it’s so hard to find anybody… Half the time you can’t get anybody to do anything. Eventually, the guy who shows up and shows up and shows up and shows up gets asked to do something. And next thing you know, he’s running something. People who ask me, how do we end up with so many idiots elected? Usually . . . it’s just the guy who always came to the meetings. Eventually everybody gets promoted.”
Moderates lacked the advantages enjoyed by Robertson’s followers, including full-time Christian Coalition employees and a cohesive preexisting network organized for nonpolitical purposes. Mainline churches were too politically diverse to be effective recruitment grounds for moderate Republicans. The presence of cultural conservatives at party meetings caused some moderates to disengage, feeling alienated by what they perceived as an uncompromising stance and shrill tone. Huckabee’s communications director told me that Christian conservatives were “the people that understood the rules, that knew what it was gonna take to get their people on to the central committee and state chair . . . They stuck with it long enough to make that happen. The other people stayed home and said ‘to Hell with it.’ ”
Pat Robertson’s political career exemplifies several significant aspects of American political parties since the McGovern-Fraser reforms. Firstly, his Christian Coalition demonstrated how a strongly networked group with intense beliefs can have outsized influence. More recently, Donald Trump’s supporters have similarly taken control of state Republican meetings, often dissuading opponents through confrontational tactics. Secondly, Robertson foreshadowed the crucial role Christian conservatives, previously divided along sectarian lines, now play in Republican Party politics. Lastly, Robertson’s presidential campaign marked an early instance of leveraging presidential candidacies for personal career advancement.
