An Al-Qaeda Dream Come True
As Kabul falls to the Taliban, it’s safe to say that this is without a doubt the most significant day for al-Qaeda since 9/11. After two decades of relentless counterterrorism pressure from the United States and allies, al-Qaeda’s central leadership was in dire straits just weeks ago. Global leader Ayman al-Zawahiri has been nowhere to be seen in many months and much of al-Qaeda’s command has been killed in an intense spate of U.S. strikes in Afghanistan, Syria, Yemen since 2017. In all likelihood, those losses have been the result of years of hard work by the intelligence community, slowly and methodically penetrating al-Qaeda’s networks and taking them apart, bit by bit.
Watching the Taliban sweep across Afghanistan and now Kabul is a dream come true and it couldn’t come at a better time for al-Qaeda. For the first time in years, not only does al-Qaeda finally have some breathing space, it’s being gifted an enormously significant safe-haven in which to rebuild. For al-Qaeda, an opening of this significance isn’t fate, it can only be God-given. Al-Qaeda’s central leadership will now look to rebuild itself. Zawahiri’s deputy, Sayf al-Adel, is currently in Iran and will undoubtedly be exploring avenues for a return to Afghanistan, alongside other members of the group’s Shura Council. Operationally, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) will likely pick up the reins as the pointy end of al-Qaeda’s South Asian spear, reinforcing old ties with Afghanistan-based jihadist allies with regional reach, into Uzbekistan, China, Pakistan, India and further afield.
The Taliban-Al-Qaeda relationship is as firm as it’s ever been — the idea that diplomacy in Doha would sever a decades-old association sealed through an irreversible oath of religious allegiance was absurd. That claim took far too many policymakers as fools. The Taliban’s political positioning may have evolved somewhat over the years, but relationships like that are far more resilient.
Beyond al-Qaeda, the Taliban’s victory — and its remarkably swift nature — is likely to have profound implications for the jihadist movement worldwide. In recent years and particularly since the Arab ‘Spring,’ jihadists associated with al-Qaeda have evolved into increasingly locally-oriented insurgencies. In investing locally and pursuing goals shared by local communities, these groups have embedded more deeply in their environments than ever before. Some have embraced political activity, advocated strategically for peaceful activism, engaged with nation state governments, and built genuine localized credibility. For many of them, the Taliban model has increasingly been one to aspire to and recent developments in Afghanistan demonstrate why.
With the Taliban now transitioning into power, there are already signs that United Nations bodies inside Afghanistan are seeking to acquire the Taliban’s permission to operate. Regional and international governments will build upon recent exploratory talks with Taliban emissaries, looking to establish some sort of diplomatic ties. Turkey’s government appears to be openly looking for a constructive relationship with a Taliban government. If there was ever going to be an example of the “mainstreaming” of jihadist ideology, this is it. And if recent trends elsewhere are anything to go by, the Taliban won’t be the last in seeking to do so.