Ukrainian Elan Is So Far Matching Russian Firepower

Christopher Robb
6 min readFeb 27, 2022

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Throughout history, there have been many examples of “experts” proclaiming a supposedly militarily superior force would roll over their supposed targets. For example, after Hitler’s victories on the European continent, many theorized the British would quickly succumb to the forces of the Third Reich. Instead, the threat of domination for the Nazis rallied an indefatigable and fearless resistance from the British people. As aid from their American allies came and helped foster their resistance, the cost for the Germans became too high and Hitler’s Operation Sea Lion had to be permanently postponed. The American Revolution itself was seen as a David vs. Goliath struggle between the world’s most powerful military and ragtag guerilla forces. At the beginning of the Civil War, many expected the South to quickly succumb, instead, their fierce resistance dragged the US into a slaughter that had levels of American casualties not yet exceeded by every war involving America since. Underestimating the level of enemy resistance has been at the core of several notable military failures throughout history.

The Russian military attempted its largest operation since the Battle of Berlin in 1945 when it invaded Ukraine on Thursday morning. An operation of the size and scope of Russia’s against Ukraine is never easy to plan, and the Russian political structure doesn’t exactly foster pointing out potential issues to superiors for candid discussion. Surely though, Russian planners did not count on the fierce level of resistance from Ukrainians who have armed civilians and also have used their western supplied Stinger, NLAW, and Javelin missiles competently and effectively. The western world has similarly been inspired to see the resistance of the nascent democracy, which is creating a virtuous cycle. Germany, which had previously banned sending weapons to conflict zones under any circumstance has lifted the prohibition to assist the brave fighters in Ukraine. Military aid is coming to the Ukrainians and Russia hasn’t even established air superiority yet. It appears, that a stolid resistance has formed that will be increasingly difficult to dislodge without ghastly costs.

Russian efforts so far have likely not involved the types of unmitigated brutality that their forces showed in Syria. However, this ‘light-touch’ was probably because Putin expected to be able to quickly co-opt forces friendly to the Kremlin to assist in replacing nationalist political leadership. Now that Ukrainian resistance has been widespread and effective, it may, unfortunately, be the most logical next step for the Kremlin to ratchet up violence. However, given how successful resistance has been so far and that the Russian military has been shown itself to be a beatable force, the escalation of violence by Russian forces at this point will likely be counterproductive by hardening the anti-Russian sentiment and attracting ever greater levels of support Ukrainians need to achieve a greater firepower parity with the seemingly ossified and less motivated Russian forces.

The most incorrect assumption of Russian planners appears to be their assumptions about Ukrainian morale and willingness to fight. Many of those who may have been reliable collaborators will likely have a much harder time achieving any political goals for the belligerent foreign forces and may endanger themselves if they try. For example, Russian plans likely expected the Eastern second city of Kharkiv to fall quickly. However, resistance has been stiff and major Russian attacks have been repelled so far. In Kyiv, several attacks have been repulsed and the initial attack to take an airfield to the Northwest of the capital was costly for the Russians. Ukrainians were able to destroy the airfield as well, limiting its usefulness to the invaders.

The Russian operational plans appear to have assumed resistance would quickly crumble, instead, they have now almost certainly gotten themselves into an intractable urban insurgency that any military would have trouble defeating without a terribly high cost. Russian forces took over a year to subdue Grozny, and that is much smaller than Kyiv or Kharkiv. Contrary to the expectations of many Western intelligence analysts, the Ukrainian resistance appears to be far more effective and highly motivated than anyone would have thought. Though it is early, the weathering of the initial onslaught means that the quick political victory Russia hoped for is now virtually impossible.

This is partially probably because the element of surprise was diminished due to the efforts of Western intelligence. Also, Ukraine has been preparing for this eventuality, if not always effectively, for the past eight years. Russian forces do have a lot of firepower, but Ukrainian motivation has so far been standing up to it. Like the elan of Napoleon’s revolutionary-era forces, the patriotic struggle linking veterans and volunteers is creating a stolid resistance that dramatically reduces the impact of Russian numerical and technological superiority. The country that was often at the center of the greatest military struggle in history, between the USSR and Nazi Germany on the Eastern front, is proving the time-honored lesson that so many militaries learn, that the motivation of the individual soldier is important and can often compensate for both technological and numerical advantage of adversaries. America learned this same lesson in Vietnam. The Soviets in Afghanistan.

French armies prior to the revolution and Napoleonic period were never particularly distinguished and their old-world structure made them generally evenly matched against other professional 18th century European militaries, if not inferior. However, after the revolution, the elan, or extreme enthusiasm, fervor, and bravery in combat, became a distinguishing factor of French forces. Despite having largely volunteer forces, the French were able to defeat professional European armies that often outnumbered and outgunned them with a mix of innovative tactics and flawless execution with the critical component of a highly motivated soldiery. The combination shook the foundations of the military balance and redrew the maps of Europe.

In the run-up to the Ukrainian invasion, many analysts predicted that in the unlikely event Russia actually chose to invade their neighbor to the West, a Blitzkrieg-style quick victory would be likely. The two quickest armored invasions in history were when the Germans invaded France and surrounded allied forces at Dunkirk, and the American-led “thunder-run” from the Kuwaiti border to Baghdad in 2003. The assumption that Russia’s heavy armored forces could make a pace even close to these, which were about 20 miles a day, was never a realistic scenario.

The ferocity of Ukrainian resistance, helped along by the personal bravery of Ukrainian president Zelensky, has shattered Russian plans to achieve a quick victory. Russia's military doctrine requires overwhelming use of artillery and armor, much of which will be arriving to besiege Ukrainian cities far behind schedule. Meanwhile, the advanced Russian forces like paratroopers are simply not enough to battle the Ukrainian forces augmented by highly motivated civilian volunteers whose high morale is reminiscent of the French revolutionary National Guard. These forces when paired with more veteran military units proved to be an equal match to even the best militaries of the day. We suspect this will be the case again. Russian forces, also appear to be demoralized, disorganized, and wholly unprepared to deal with the type of opposition they now face, which will only be getting better armed by the day.

Russian plans largely relied on advanced forces like paratroopers and special operations soldiers to help spread fear and break resistance. It appears the initial Russian plans have failed miserably. Russia wanted to use a combination of overwhelming “shock and awe” type force combined with co-opting forces within Ukraine friendly to the Kremlin to help organize surrenders of regions and to place Russian patsies in charge. Similar to US forces in 2003 who wrongly thought Iraqis would welcome them as liberators, the Russian military appears to have made a fatal political miscalculation that is being exacerbated by typical military logistics problems and personnel issues, including what appears to be low morale and quality of their soldiers.

If you’ve never been to Eastern and Central Europe, the road infrastructure isn’t that advanced and it’s difficult to get around by car efficiently, let alone to quickly move columns of heavy armor around. Furthermore, the infamous Raputitsa is just around the corner which turns much of the country into a mudflat. This was a major obstacle to both Hitler and Napoleon’s invasion of Russia via Ukraine in the past.

The Russian leadership expected this to be like Czechoslavakia in 1968 or Hungary in 1956. Instead, they have lured their forces into a trap that appears to be achieving exactly the opposite of its desired effect. The Russian state has again set itself up for a situation like Finland where resistance was far stronger than anticipated. It may even be the case that the Ukraine situation ends up more like the humiliating defeat at the hands of Japan at the beginning of the 20th century. Unfortunately, Putin’s demeanor and actions in the face of humiliation may produce ghastly risks that have been unthinkable for decades. Ukrainian resistance is inspiring and should be aided by the West. The high morale and elan of the nation’s citizen fighters are so far proving a match to superior Russian firepower.

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