With Kant in one pocket, and Hegel in the other, I walk towards the sun.

GYNOKRATIE IM GROßEUROPA: DEUTSCHLAND UND OSTPOLITIK IM MERKELS MITTELEUROPA

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2018–2019)

On the subject of Hegel, I remarked only that he must bear a large share of the responsibility for much German mystification of the state. Of course, I made sure to mention my belief in Kant’s theories. Helmut Schmidt, 1989¹

INTRODUCTION

Federica Mogherini, Cecilia Malmström and Margrethe Vestager are three powerful European political élites: The Troika presided over Großeuropa at the height of European political and economic power and the collapse of the European Union as the profit center of globalization, under the weight of the BREXIT. The world historical origins of the European crisis begin with Angela Merkel’s ascension to German power a decade before (the origins are found in the collapse of the Soviet Empire, and the post–Cold War Franco–German Éntente forged at Maastricht), and leading to the 2008 crash in Europe, which eventually results in the “German Consensus,” especially towards Greece: From out of Merkelismus comes the political and economic doctrine of Großdeutschland and Ostpolitik, whose world policy uplifts Germany as the profit center of Europe, around which all other Euronations revolve as satellites in Germanocentric “Consensus.”² In the name of German Social Democracy, Merkelismus makes Mitteleuropa (das Deutschtum) into the seedbed of Großeuropa: Germany and Ostpolitik constitute Mitteleuropa, which in turn forms the geopolitical basis of Großeuropa, and which ultimately results in Großdeutschland. Alas, since the Ukrainian crisis, Merkelismus is crushed under the weight of the BREXIT which together splinter Merkel’s dream of Mitteleuropa: The doomed effort to contain the disintegration of Berlin’s Großeuropa falls upon the shoulders of Federica Mogherini, Cecilia Malmström, Margrethe Vestager and the apparatchiki (der Merkel Apparat) of the Dieselgate aristocracy of Eurocentric Eurocracy. None can stop the BREXIT and save the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary³ abstraction of right in the world of today from the rise of the Industrial Revolution and Global freedom in the supremacy of American Liberty.⁴

Merkelismus as the basis of Mitteleuropa, in the form of Deutschland and Ostpolitik (Großmächte), is therefore the political and economic result of German Social Democracy as Gynakratie in Großeuropa: Merkelismus is European Bonapartism, as autocracy founded upon popular consent (H.A.L. Fisher). What is the secret of Merkelismus? As the fountainhead of Großmächte, Social Democracy is the mask which unites France and Germany into an indissoluble union, as the Franco–German Éntente, forged by 20th century French and German rulers, especially Helmut Schmidt and François Mitterrand, resultant in Maastricht. Without the mask of Social Democracy of the Grande Coalition, Merkel’s pangermanisme is evidenced as the political and economic policy of German Bonapartism in the form of corporate welfare (Airbus, Siemens, Bayer, Volkswagen, Deutsche Bank and so forth), and then the financial, commercial and industrial weakness of France appears before the eyes of the French electorate: Without the mask of Social Democracy over the hideous visage of Berlin’s Bonapartism, corporate welfare is another name for mortal corruption.

The mask of Social Democracy unites the Troika: Federica Mogherini, Cecilia Malmström and Margrethe Vestager are Social Democrat icons as gynocrats, who mask the Bonapartism and Machiavellianism of Merkel’s Eurocentric Eurocracy.⁵ What is the justification for Social Democracy, advanced by the Merkel Apparat, the Germanocentric European Bonapartists? “Without the ideological unification of France and Germany, Europe will collapse into intestinal warfare.” Europe will not collapse into intestinal warfare without the ideological unification of France and Germany, under the supremacy of the American superpower: The European Bonapartist justification of Social Democracy (reinforced with a very strong dose of inexact historiography) is therefore sophistry, which plays upon the fears of Europeans, in the name of Machiavellianism.⁶ Without Gynokratie in Großeuropa, the backers of Merkelismus will very quickly find themselves, not at the banquet tables, but in the gutters of public opinion, with the insects and vermin.

The inferior ruling classes of European modernity in the twentieth century, the mortal enemies of Western civilization (Athens, Jerusalem and Rome), are not wiped out after the Second World War, for Uncle Sam is preoccupied with the Soviet Empire and world communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, beginning with German reunification and Masstricht, these antediluvian ruling classes, especially in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, are unchained once more in the arena of European politics and economics, in the rise of Großeuropa, the reconciliation of western and eastern Europe, especially under the influence of the Francosphère and the Franco–German Éntente forged at Masstricht. The political and economic forces of Americanism were swamped after German reunification, first in Germany and then in central Europe: With this destabilization of Americanism in Europe during the 1990s, and the utility of the Franco–German Éntente during the civil wars in the Balkans, the inferior ruling classes gain a beachhead in Brussels. With the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon America, and the ensuing war on terror, the inferior ruling classes in Europe gain a much needed breathing space while Uncle Sam is greatly preoccupied around world, and thereby expand their beachhead in Brussels and Strasbourg into a rout of Americanism within the institutions of the European Union: From this contagion of modern European anti–Americanism, first in Mitteleuropa, and then in Brussels, comes the destabilization of Americanism in the European Union with the BREXIT. Behind these inferior ruling classes lurk their backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts, whose financial, commercial and industrial claws span across the Atlantic with globalization.

The backers of Merkelismus have not very quickly found themselves in the gutters of public opinion: The world historical task of the Merkel Apparat is the clearing away of the very last vestiges of modernity in the European Union after the Cold War, to nurture the seedbed of Americanism and the supremacy of the superior ruling class, in the Global integration between Europe and Asia, in the unification of the western and eastern hemispheres, as the rational planetization of world civilization in the mastery of American Liberty. The development of Eurasia really begins with the integration of western and eastern Europe, after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Empire as a world power: The strife between western and eastern Europe in this direction, is the work of the Merkel Apparat, which brings to fruition the Ukrainian crisis. The entire geopolitical conjuncture of the region is profoundly realigned upon a completely new world historical basis. On the European side of these historical determinations, the Merkel Apparat in Brussels is behind the new developments, in the name of continentalism as EU expansion in the rise of Großeuropa. The rise of Großeuropa therefore spells the doom of the Merkel Apparat, because the Ukrainian crisis in its turn is the seedbed of powerful new political and economic complexifications, which uplift superior ruling classes. The historical concretization of Eurasia as a political and economic reality within the sphere of Americanism means that the entire evolutionary course of European humanity is uplifted to a higher plane of financial, commercial and industrial freedom: The spiritual development of these powerful new forces, in conjunction with American Idealism, is the task of the twenty–first century.

The Global integration between Europe and Asia, in the unification of the western and eastern hemispheres, as the rational planetization of world civilization is the mastery of American Liberty? President Lincoln and the Civil War uplifted Americanism from out of the seedbed of the Revolutionary War, and established the American Idealist conception of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon a much higher plane of world history. President Wilson and the Great War uplifted Americanism from out of the seedbed of the Revolutionary War and Civil War, and established the American Idealist conception of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon an even higher plane of world history. President Roosevelt and the Second World War uplifted Americanism from out of the seedbed of the Revolutionary War, Civil War and Great War, and established the American Idealist conception of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon an ever higher plane of world history. President Reagan and the Cold War uplifted Americanism from out of the seedbed of the Revolutionary War, Civil War, Great War and the Second World War, and established the American Idealist conception of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon the greatest plane of world history: The birth of the Space Age and the rise of Cosmism.

These are the three phases of Americanism of the nineteenth, twentieth and twenty–first centuries, comprehended as moments of the world historical struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, in the strife between republicanism and monarchism unleashed in the almighty clash between the Industrial and French Revolutions (objective an subjective freedom) in the strife between reason and unreason, as the collapse of modern European right and birth of Global freedom: The Trump Revolution, as the twenty–first century inheritor of the American Idealist conception of the American World, is now implementing Americanism as the rational planetization of Western civilization in the supremacy of American Liberty.

The modern European political and economic struggles unchained by the Industrial and French revolutions ended in the twentieth century with the rise of world civilization, the fountainhead of which is Americanism:

“The wars of the French Revolution marked the transition to the nation–state defined by common language and culture … [The United States] have never been nation–states in the European sense. America has succeeded in forming a distinct culture from a polyglot national composition.”⁷

The world historical clash between Global freedom, the rational conception of right found in The Magna Carta and The Constitution of the United States of America, versus the last vestiges of European modernity (unchained in the political and economic strife between the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right and the conception of right found in The Magna Carta and Industrial revolution), as the strife between superior and inferior ruling classes, begins in the New World with the victories of George Washington and Abraham Lincoln in the Civil Wars, as the rise of American Liberty in universal history and the collapse of the British Empire.

The bloodstained chapters of American Idealism in the Civil Wars are the birth pangs of Global freedom from out of the womb of world history, — as the sublation of modern freedom from out of the ashes of the Holy Roman Empire and the clash between old and new Christendom, in the strife of ruling classes unchained by the Industrial and French revolutions. The notion of the Global world, the highest conception of Western humanity, is therefore clothed in the immediacy of the flesh and blood of universal history: Henceforth the conception of universal freedom as the sublation of subjective and objective freedom in world history is no longer an abstraction: Absolute Liberty in the world of today is Americanism, the rise of Global rational political and economic order, as the supremacy of the White House, Washington and Wall Street in the twenty–first century.

In the realm of political and economic ideas, the twentieth century world historical struggle between modern European right and Global freedom is advanced in the warfare between Kant and Hegel: This almighty clash between sophistry and philosophy plays out in the realm of modern European politics and economics in the power struggles between political parties, as the Left versus the Right. The world historical clash between Kantianism and Hegelianism in twentieth century politics and economics separated modern Europeans into hostile camps. This clash of ideas, which exists even today in the mindset of European humanity, but without any Global historical political and economic significance whatsoever, is withering away under the floodtide of Americanism in the world: The substance of the conception vanishes as a stage of world history, and what remains is merely the empty husk, as the twilight of modernity. What exactly does this mean in the philosophy of American Idealism? The World Wars and collapse of European modernity are the result of the political and economic warfare between the Left and Right in the twentieth century world historical struggle between modern and Global freedom, as advanced in the Kantian and Hegelian clash between superior and inferior ruling classes.

In North America these political and economic movements follow a less intense path, especially in Canada and Mexico: The disintegration of the British Empire and collapse of modern Europe as the center of world power entails the decline of British and European influence in the New World. The historical struggle for world supremacy does not end in the ruins of Berlin, but continues into the Cold War: Therefore the last remnants of European modernity linger for another half century, until the collapse of Soviet Communism. In Canada and Mexico, the late twentieth century world historical struggle between modern and Global freedom is also advanced in the clash between Kant and Hegel: This almighty clash between sophistry and philosophy plays out in the realm of modern Canadian and Mexican politics and economics in the power struggles between political parties, as the Left versus the Right. In the New World, the twentieth century world historical struggle between modern and Global freedom is therefore also advanced in the warfare of Kantians and Hegelians.

I/ FEDERICA MOGHERINI’S “GLOBAL STRATEGY”: EUROCENTRISM, MULTIPOLARITY AND LIBERAL INTERNATIONALISM

At first sight nothing would seem more disparate than the idea of nationality and the sane, rational, liberal internationalism of the great Königsberg philosopher. Of all the influential thinkers of his day, Kant seems the most remote from the rise of nationalism. Isaiah Berlin¹

Immanuel Kant appears to be well on his way to becoming the prophet of “progressive international reform” in the post–Cold War era.²

With the British referendum, the need for a common strategy was even greater than before … We need to focus on the immense untapped potential of a more joined–up European Union. We need to move from a shared vision to common action … The implementation of the Strategy is now under way in all sectors. Federica Mogherini³

The European Union’s “Global Strategy” of Federica Mogherini (from out of the political and economic complexifications of the European parliament designed to uphold der Merkel Apparat as the dominant European ruling class), as Eurocentrism, i.e., multipolarity (“a shared vision to common action … [Europe’s] hard and soft power”), is opposed to the unipolarity of American superpower, and is the twenty–first century mask of European anti–Americanism, which preserves the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of Großdeutschland at the expense of American finance, commerce and industry in Europe (especially the United States military–industrial complex), based upon the modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism (strategic reflection) of the Copernican revolution as Cosmopolitanism, i.e., Liberal Internationalism, — mortally opposed to the Western traditions of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

“With the British referendum, the need for a common strategy was even greater than before. We needed — and we still need — to look beyond this self–induced crisis of European integration and to focus on what binds us together: the shared interests and the values driving our common foreign policy; our unparalleled strength, as the First–World economy, the largest global [viii] investor in humanitarian aid and development cooperation, a global security provider with a truly global diplomatic network. We need to focus on the immense untapped potential of a more joined–up European Union. We need to move from a shared vision to common action … The twenty–eight Heads of State and Government have approved my proposals for implementing the Strategy in the field of security and defence. It is a major leap forward for European cooperation — and eventually, integration — on defence matters. The process leading to the Global Strategy has helped build consensus on a set of concrete measures and on their rationale. Instead of getting stuck into never–ending ideological debates or exhausting negotiations on revising the Treaties, we moved pretty steadily from principles to practice — to finally get things done, where it really matters. The implementation of the Strategy is now under way in all sectors, from fostering resilience to public diplomacy, from a more joined–up development cooperation to a rethinking of global governance. The European Union of security and defense can be a major building block to relaunch the process of European integration, but it cannot be the only one. Europe can deliver to our citizens’ and our partners’ needs only when it acts as a true Union, at national and European levels, with our hard and soft power, in our external and internal policies alike. Europe delivers only when it is united.”⁴

What is “Liberal Internationalism” as the Cosmopolitanism of Kant’s Copernican revolution?

“For Kant, no international order could promote a lasting peace between states which required the separate states to surrender their sovereign independence to an international state, or to a world government. Hence, he insisted that international peace could come about only through the voluntary acceptance by states of an international rule of law, where this rule of law presupposed, as the condition of its own legitimacy, the retention by the states that accepted its authority of the rights that were essential to their sovereignty and independence.”⁵

Modern right in the world of today is the European unfreedom of the Bonapartist ruling classes as Eurocentrisme:

“The statesmen of the French Revolution roused their fellow countrymen to the most astounding military efforts by announcing that France would compel all other nations to be free in the same sense as herself. Under Napoléon I, and more obscurely under his nephew, Napoléon III, France aspired to impose her suzerainty by force of arms upon the whole of Western Europe.”⁶

In the face of American Liberty, the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right is the great political and economic delusion at the very heart of Bonapartism (autocracy founded upon popular consent), variously espoused in the twentieth century world history as modern European liberalism, conservatism, republicanism, nationalism, socialism, communism, and so forth.⁷

Global Strategy as Eurocentrisme, the multipolarity of Liberal Internationalism as the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right (Bonapartism), is the erstwhile “world policy” of modern European imperialism in the struggle against the British constitutional monarchism of the Industrial revolution (Magna Carta),whether as liberalism, conservatism, republicanism, nationalism, socialism and communism, garbed in the pretty words of “humanitarian aid and development cooperation,” as European colonialism and neo–colonialism: Today the internal policy of Mogherini’s Global Strategy of European Bonapartism, as Eurocentrism, multipolarity and Liberal Internationalism, is primarily aimed at the pacification (soft power) of countries within the European Union, while the external policy of the Strategy is aimed at the neutralization (hard power) of any resistance to Liberal Internationalism around the world, in the rise of Großdeutschland as Europe’s dominant ruling class, especially resistance from erstwhile colonies located in the Americas, i.e., French, Spanish and Portuguese. European Union “Global Strategy” is therefore the foreign policy of der Merkel Apparat.

“The EU is neither a state nor an international organisation, but a hybrid mix between the two. Furthermore, the strategy that it produced was not limited to security but encompassed all dimensions of foreign policy in the broadest sense … The strategic reflection which gave birth to the EUGS did not involve only official stakeholders. The two elements of my job description — as the coordinator of the EUGS process and responsible for [4] outreach to think tanks — were always meant to be connected. The strategic reflection was meant to and did involve virtually all Member States including governments, ministries and parliaments, as well as the broader foreign policy community, from academia to think tanks, and from civil society to the media … [113] Global powers — notably the USA, the EU and China — play prominent roles.”⁸

Multipolarity is world power, according to the “strategic reflection” (modern European raison d’état, i.e., Machiavellianism) of Federica Mogherini’s Global Strategy: America and the European Union exist multipolarly upon the selfsame geopolitical plane of world history. In other words, the world historical relationship between America and Europe is wrongly conceived (deconceptualized) as the struggle between ruling classes in the outdated and surpassed fashion of the Kantian traditions. Eurocentric multipolarity is phantasized in contradistinction to the unipolarity of American superpower, as Kantian anti–Hegelianism versus Kantio–Hegelianism, otherwise as Kantio–Hegelianism versus Kantian anti–Hegelianism: The modern European power struggles between the Left and Right emergent from the decomposition of the Hegelian School (pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism within the political and economic arena of modern European world history), are the basis of the Global Strategy of Eurocentric multipolarity. The unipolarity of the American superpower, according to European Bonapartism, is either Kantian anti–Hegelianism or Kantio–Hegelianism, just as Eurocentric multipolarity is either Kantian anti–Hegelianism or Kantio–Hegelianism. Modern sophists who paper over this power struggle at the very heart of European Bonapartism’s Global Strategy, and downplay the political and economic clash between between multipolarity and unipolarity within European Union “strategic reflection” are themselves trapped within the cage of modern unreason: They will therefore never embrace the American Idealism of American superpower, and yet they are hopelessly divided in their efforts to overcome Americanism. Their intestinal conflicts and burocratic infighting, re–inventing the square twentieth century European wheel, accelerates the decomposition of the last remnants of European Bonapartism, while Americanism speeds forwards in the world of today.

The universal historical distinction of exact historiography and world history, between political and economic power and superpower is ignored and neglected by Bonapartist Eurocrats, so that the specious distinction between European multipolarity and American unipolarity is upheld, following the Kantian traditions, as Kantian anti–Hegelianism or Kantio–Hegelianism: The modern European idéologues and sophisters of the European Union use this Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian distinction at the EU Parliament, as la démocratie versus totalitarianism (Copernicanism versus metaphysics), in order to attract voters away from so–called Euro–skeptic parties, often named as far–right extremists and right–wing lunatics (Absolutists), who revolt against European asymmetrical federalism (la démocratie), — which upholds the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of Großdeutschland as der Merkel Apparat. Euro–skeptic parties are maligned and slandered in Brussels by Bonapartist Eurocrats in search of votes at the EU Parliament, as racist and racialist, since they reject misguided EU–policies, especially those aimed at the migration influx, as the result of the intestinal power struggles of modern European political and economic irrationalism: Euro–skeptic parties reject Bonapartism in Europe as modern European political and economic irrationalism, and follow in the unipolar footsteps of American Idealism, — the rational political and economic order of Americanism is their message in Central and Eastern Europe. The BREXIT constitutes the rejection of the modern European power struggles of multipolarity upon the historical stage of twenty–first century world history, — in favor of the unipolarity of American superpower as Global rational political and economic order, in the supremacy of American Liberty.

The strategic reflection of the European Union’s Global Strategy, encompassed all dimensions of foreign policy in the broadest sense, — the strategic reflection which gave birth to the Grand Strategy did not involve only official stakeholders, but also unofficial stakeholders, especially from European academic and media combines, and was elaborated with the BREXIT in mind, i.e., created in contradistinction to the political and economic traditions of the Industrial revolution: “The incredibly intense days between the decision of the UK voters to leave the European Union and the European Council of June 28th where I presented the Global Strategy … We did it the European way.” What is the “European way” of Federica Mogherini and her entourage? “With the British referendum, the need for a common strategy was even greater than before. We needed — and we still need — to look beyond this self–induced crisis of European integration and to focus on what binds us together: the shared interests and the values driving our common foreign policy; our unparalleled strength, as the First–World economy.” The strategic reflection of the European Union’s Global Strategy is based upon “unparalleled strength” as the “First–World economy,” — in other words, the financial, commercial and industrial power of Großdeutschland as der Merkel Apparat. The “European way” is strategic reflection that favors the Franco–German Entente as the center of European political and economic power, — the Copernican revolutionary justification of asymmetrical federalism (Eurocentrisme) in terms of the cosmopolitanism of Liberal Internationalism. As the European Union disintegrated with the BREXIT, as the political and economic traditions of the Industrial revolution recoiled from the modern European irrationalism of Bonapartism, according to Federica Mogherini, “the need for a Global Strategy became clearer and clearer to all.” The need for a Global Strategy became clearer and clearer to all, not in order to embrace Great Britain within the European Union, but only after the BREXIT. What kind of Global Strategy is this, whose principle aim is not the uplifting of the political and economic powers of the Industrial revolution within the European Union? Federica Mogherini’s Global Strategy is another name for European Bonapartism upon a grandiose scale, and its strategic reflection is nothing more than the modern European raison d’etat of the Copernican revolution.

“Reading Nathalie’s book, all the images and memories of these two years came back to me … The book testifies the unprecedented collective effort that has led to the text of the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy … I will never forget the hours after the referendum, the conversations with Nathalie and with my staff, with the presidents of the European institutions, with ministers from most Member States and with our British friends … [viii] As Nathalie shows, throughout the process, the need for a Global Strategy became clearer and clearer to all … Nathalie holds a very special place in this story: she has my gratitude not only for the incredible work she has done but [ix] also for the energy and the patience she has put in it, for our long conversations, her good spirits and her own ‘resilience.’ She [Nathalie Tocci] has set up, steered and accompanied this collective process, step by step. This book tells the story of the Global Strategy from a unique and privileged perspective. It provides the reader with a special insight into the debates and the decisions that shaped up the Strategy. In times of disillusion and disenchantment, it tells a different, true story about our Union: the positive story of a Union that delivers, together.”⁹

From the strategic reflection of A Fragile World (Eurocentrism, multipolarity and Liberal Internationalism), the ideological project aimed at the rehabilitation of Copernicanism is effectuated in order to sustain Liberal Internationalism as the backbone of Eurocentrisme as multipolarity or polycentrisme, and thereby uphold Großdeutschland (der Merkel Apparat) as the prius of European political and economic power. Wherefore? The world historical task of the Merkel Apparat is the clearing away of the very last vestiges of modernity in the European Union after the Cold War, to nurture the seedbed of Americanism and the supremacy of the superior ruling class, in the Global integration between Europe and Asia, in the unification of the western and eastern hemispheres, as the rational planetization of world civilization in the mastery of American Liberty. The development of Eurasia really begins with the integration of western and eastern Europe, after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Empire as a world power: The strife between western and eastern Europe in this direction, is the work of the Merkel Apparat, which brings to fruition the Ukrainian crisis. The entire geopolitical conjuncture of the region is profoundly realigned upon a completely new world historical basis. On the European side of these historical determinations, the Merkel Apparat in Brussels is behind the new developments, in the name of continentalism as EU–expansion in the rise of Großeuropa. The rise of Großeuropa therefore spells the doom of the Merkel Apparat, because the Ukrainian crisis in its turn is the seedbed of powerful new political and economic complexifications, which uplift superior ruling classes. The historical concretization of Eurasia as a political and economic reality within the sphere of Americanism means that the entire evolutionary advancement of European humanity is uplifted to a far higher plane of financial, commercial and industrial freedom: The rational and spiritual development of these powerful new forces, in conjunction with American Idealism, is the task of the twenty–first century.

Federica Mogherini’s “Global Strategy,” based upon the ideological project aimed at the rehabilitation of Immanuel Kant’s Copernicanism, in order to sustain Liberal Internationalism as the backbone of Eurocentrisme as multipolarity (the “Fragile World”) or polycentrisme, and thereby uphold Großdeutschland (der Merkel Apparat) as the prius of European political and economic power, flounders upon the clash between reason and unreason (Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel versus Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant) in the arena of twenty–first century politics and economics, — as modern European subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism.

“When faced with this world of disorder and of opportunity, two things are clear. First, global trends are neither linear nor preordained, but often the product of shocks and human choices. This highlights the uncertainty that lies ahead, but also the role of agency — including that of the EU — in moving forward. We may not fully know our future, but we can shape it … while promoting our interests and universal values. It is a responsibility dictated by history and an interest dictated geography. The very nature of the EU as a construct of intertwined polities gives us a unique advantage to help steer the way in a more complex, more connected but also more contested world.”¹⁰

By “democratic institutions, human rights and the rule of law”¹¹ and “our interests and universal values,”¹² Federica Mogherini’s entourage means, in contradistinction to American Liberty, the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right, i.e., modern European Bonapartism as autocracy founded upon popular consent. The “strategic reflection” of Federica Mogherini’s entourage serves the EU’s Global Strategy as an institutional and burocratic justification of the political and economic means deployed at home and abroad to preserve and advance the financial, commercial and industrial agenda of der Merkel Apparat as the dominant ruling class in Europe, — in the name of autocracy founded upon popular consent as the cosmopolitanism of Liberal Internationalism.

Eurocentrisme, the multipolarity of Liberal Internationalism, as the backbone of der Merkel Apparat, flounders upon the unipolarity of American superpower and the supremacy of American Liberty as universal freedom in the world of today: Federica Mogherini’s “Global Strategy” is therefore a pipe–dream. But even pipe–dreams have their function in the rise of world civilization as the supremacy of American Liberty. “Global Strategy” is the mask of modern unreason, which hides the bankruptcy of the fractured European Union as “Liberal Internationalism,” and pretends that everything in Europe under der Merkel Apparat is honky dory, which thereby ignores and neglects intestinal conflicts and burocratic paralysis, while evermore powerful political and economic complexifications uplift superior ruling classes into positions of Global supremacy upon the stage of world history, — in the name of the Western traditions of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, as the Americanism of twenty–first century American Idealism.

II/ MODERN FREEDOM: EUROCENTRISME AND THE MASTER RACE: LOCKE, LEIBNIZ, HUME AND KANT

The White race contains all impulses and talents within itself … The Negro … undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races. Immanuel Kant¹

At first sight nothing would seem more disparate than the idea of nationality and the sane, rational, liberal internationalism of the great Königsberg philosopher. Of all the influential thinkers of his day, Kant seems the most remote from the rise of nationalism. Isaiah Berlin²

The wars of the French Revolution marked the transition to the nation–state defined by common language and culture … [The United States] have never been nation–states in the European sense. America has succeeded in forming a distinct culture from a polyglot national composition. Henry Kissinger³

1/ Americanism Versus European Modernity

America in the nineteenth century is transformed by the Civil War, — the destruction of slavery as a political and economic institution, — the political and economic transfiguration of the theological and religious idealism of America’s clergy in the 1840s and 1850s, is completed in the 1860s: Modern European right, unlike American Liberty, is untransformed by the destruction of institutionalized slavery in the United States, and unfreedom in the Western world is justified by the modern European ruling classes emergent from the upheaval of the French Revolution and the Napoléonic wars, according to the ideology of superior and inferior human races. Modern European right as opposed to the tradition of Roman Law, is therefore the bastion of the sophistical doctrine of the master race: The wars of the French Revolution marked the transition to the nation–state defined by common language and culture (Henry Kissinger), a Machiavellian re–definition effectuated via the transcendental epistemological delusions (Kantian raciology) of the master race as Bonapartism, — autocracy founded upon popular consent as the power of the people and tyranny of the masses, — the dictatorship of the proletariat as Liberal Internationalism. The Machiavellianism unchained by the French Revolution, across western Europe as Bonapartism, in opposition to European monarchism and royalism as established in the Holy Roman Empire, is institutionalized as the Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right: The political and economic divisions unchained by the French Revolution and Napoléonic wars as modern Bonapartism, are institutionalized in European political economy as the world historical division given by the decomposition of the Hegelian school, between Left and Right, — at least until the collapse of European civilization in the middle of the twentieth–century. Modern right in Europe is therefore conceived as unfreedom in the face of American Liberty:

“Such were the leading principles of the Roman law … and such was the law of the continent of Europe wherever based on the civil law, till the adoption and spread of the Code Napoléon, first among the Latin races, and more recently among the nations of central and northern Europe … and would thus seem to have swept away at once the entire doctrine dependent upon the Roman system, which was based on a principle exactly the reverse.”⁴

Modern right is the European unfreedom of the Bonapartist ruling classes as Eurocentrisme: In the face of American Liberty, the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right is the great political and economic delusion at the very heart of Bonapartism, variously espoused as modern European liberalism, conservatism, republicanism, nationalism, socialism and communism:

“The renovation of Parliamentary government, the transformation of the conditions of the ownership and occupation of [xxxix] land, the relations between the Governments at home and our adventures abroad in contact with inferior races, the limitations on free contract, and the rights of majorities to restrict the private acts of minorities, these are only some of the questions that time and circumstance are pressing upon us.”⁵

Modern European civilization collapsed because it did not evolve to a much higher level of colonial and imperial freedom, — the political and economic order of European modernity was incapable of further developmental unification and coaxial integration, precisely because of modern unreason’s mortal opposition to the admixture of peoples, resultant from the sophism of the master race, which is the fundamental irrationalism of modern European political economy, as found in Europe’s liberal, conservative, nationalist, socialist and communist regimes, as the nation–state defined by common language and culture: Subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of the Kantian traditions serves the delusional purpose (subjective, relative and irrational) of justifying the political economy of the master race, — as the erstwhile mediaeval struggle between Christian and infidel ruling classes in the warfare of Western civilization against despotisme asiatique (Montesquieu), is phantasized by European modernity as the clash between superior and inferior human races.⁶ The Western philosophical tradition of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome is immune to the political and economic sophisms of modern European unreason, although modern irrationalism loves to regale itself with critical phantasms and delusions of religious warfare between Catholics and Protestants in European world history, it ignores and neglects the central role of modern Europe’s political and economic irrationalism in the fratricidal strife between modernism and mediaevalism, which places nations against nations, citizens against citizens, — in the name of Machiavellianism: Modern European unreason turns a blind eye to the world historical significance of the Renaissance, namely the place of Machiavellianism in the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire, and its rejection by Martin Luther in the rise of Protestantism, from out of the mediaeval clash between Western and Eastern civilization, unchained during the Crusades, and especially after the fall of Constantinople. The ideology of superior and inferior human races is upheld in the modern European arena of politics and economics by the followers of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as the central doctrine of scientific political economy (in stark contradistinction to the mediaeval feudalism of the Holy Roman Empire), in the modern European justification of colonialism and imperialism, and is opposed to the British constitutional monarchism of the Industrial Revolution, — which brought forth Americanism in the New World:

“The Industrial Revolution … is not only one of the most important facts of English history, but Europe owes to it the growth of two great systems of thought — Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism.”⁷

Machiavellianism and Bonapartism, the fountainhead of modern European unfreedom, as the polar opposite of American Liberty, is Eurocentrisme, — the political and economic irrationalism of the master race, the struggle between ruling classes as the clash between superior and inferior human races: The secret of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon the stage of modern history, in the universal historical clash between the political and economic powers unleashed by the strife between the Industrial and French Revolutions, in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Global civilization as the supremacy of American Liberty, is therefore the combat between Kant and Hegel as the historical self–unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom in the world. The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history.

The secret of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes upon the stage of modern history is the combat between Kant and Hegel as the historical unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom in the world? What a very strange and mysterious secret! The secret of Kant and Hegel does indeed sound very strange to some twentieth–century ears, deafened by the clamorous roar of anti–Americanism during the Cold War, they cannot hear very well the glorious symphony of American Liberty.

2/ Americanism: The Anti–Copernican Revolution

The Digital Revolution unchained, in the first decade of the twenty–first century, a worldwide intellectual upheaval: The most closely guarded secrets of our government run schools and universities were quickly uncovered before the eyes of the world, the most groundbreaking being the secret of Kant and Hegel. The great intellectual upheaval in philosophy that shook our twentieth–century academic temples to the ground, was first unleashed by the twenty–first century Digital Revolution, and begins with both Kant and Hegel:

“What is at stake in these discussions is not simply Kant’s views on specific topics but a complete reassessment of his contribution to the ‘project of modernity,’ inasmuch as Kant’s contribution to the construction of liberal internationalism is viewed as a core element of that project … Kant was indeed generally ‘opposed to the mixing of races’ and that his views on this matter are recorded in texts dating from the 1760s through the late 1790s.”⁸

At the very same time that two hundred years of traditional Kant scholarship around the world was upended and rendered obsolete, — the outdated and surpassed project of modernity as “Liberal Internationalism,” the Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, — the same situation occurred, in the reverse direction, with regards to Hegel:

“[Hegel’s] many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”⁹

While this knowledge of the bad Kant and good Hegel was a very closely guarded secret in the hands of a select few academic specialists and government bureaucrats during the twentieth–century, the information was disseminated around the world in the blink of an eye, thanks to the powerful technological and computational conjuncture unchained by the Digital Revolution: The result of the reassessment and reorientation of Kant and Hegel in academic philosophy during the past decade, is a complete upheaval of academia, within the sciences, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art, — the anti–Copernican Revolution. The twenty–first century Digital Revolution is a vast anti–Copernican reorganization of the Western world, aligned upon the conceptual axis of Americanism: Of course, with the invention of the modern printing–press, very few foresaw the vast reorientation of Western civilization upon the axis of European modernity, the rise of modern science and decline of Latin. European modernity did not replace the universalism of the Middle Ages, but is rather the movement of decomposition, which explodes the mediaeval world, in the realignment of humanity upon the universal road of Americanism.

In the world of today, the main weapon of anti–Americanism of the past hundred years is finally undone, — the modern European mask of Americanism collapsed under the hammer blows of the Digital Revolution. What else is the Europeanized Americanism of the twentieth–century but the pseudo–Americanism and anti–Americanism of the Kantian traditions, — as mortally opposed to Americanized Europeanism? The modern European sophistical distinction between the good Kant and bad Hegel is no more, at least in the minds of knowledgeable scholars and intellectuals: The veil of Maya is therefore lifted, and the genuine visage of Americanism is made visible before the eyes of Western humanity, as the rational conception of the American world, — the age of American Idealism is at hand, as the planetization of rational political and economic order, in the rise of Americanism as the Global supremacy of American Liberty.

American Idealism is the fountainhead of Global civilization. The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history: As the historical self–determination and self–unfolding (as well as scientific, philosophical, theological, literary and artistic) of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom, Americanism is rising upwards in the world of today, — in the genuine Hegelian meaning of reason, in the rational Hegelianism of the pure Hegel:

“Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”¹⁰

3/ The American Idealism of Joseph Alden

Where is this American Idealism found? In the world historical rise of Americanism, the nineteenth–century American Idealist philosophy of Joseph Alden teaches that “there is no such thing as a general infinite.”¹ Does the philosophical notion of the general infinite, according to American Idealism following the Civil War, entail that in nineteenth–century American philosophy there is no such thing as the World Spirit, as expounded by the genuine Hegel of rational (pure) Hegelianism?² We think not. American Idealism follows in the footsteps of Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel, while modern European irrationalism follows behind Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant: Western rationalism in America is the philosophical tradition of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, and is mortally opposed to modern European unreason, — especially that which portrays Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as embryonic Copernican revolutionaries of the ancient “French revolution” of the Peloponnesian war, or as diabolical monarchists and Catholics (dogmatists, metaphysicians and absolutists). Popular twentieth–century European scholarship is profoundly ignorant of nineteenth–century American thought, especially because many works of Americanism were hidden–away in the rare book departments of public universities, controlled by mortally corrupt politicians, their friends and families, — whose electoral success depends upon our collective ignorance, in the form of inert ideas, outdated and surpassed conceptions.

The American Idealism of Joseph Alden teaches that “we cognize infinite objects, and can thus form an abstract idea of infinity … the idea [of the infinite] is not definable.”³ That the idea of the infinite is not definable means that cognized ideas (conceptions), such as an abstract idea of infinity, or the conceptualization that we cognize infinite objects, are not themselves definable as dictionary definitions, but rather transcend the fields of lexicography, and englobe philosophy as both epistemology and ontology, conceptions which in the above passages are applied to the notion of rational theology.⁴ Joseph Alden does not therefore teach that the conceptualization of the idea of infinity is the conceptualization of the dictionary meaning of infinity found in lexicography.

“There has been a great deal written about the absolute and infinite which conveys no meaning to such as have not the faculty of understanding the unintelligible.”⁵ Joseph Alden attacks as sophistry the Kantian tradition, whose schools classify the idea of infinity as unintelligible, because amongst them “there has been a great deal written about the absolute and infinite which conveys no meaning”:

“Many assertions have been made for which there is no proof. For example, Mansel says: ‘That which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be conceived of as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.’”⁶

The conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of conceptions, ideas and notions of infinity is not itself definable as a dictionary definition, but rather transcends the field of lexicography, and englobes philosophy as both epistemology and ontology: We mean that conceptions, ideas and notions of infinity are not themselves conceptualized as mere dictionary definitions are conceived, because lexicographical cognition is inseparable from the rational conceptualization of the notion of the epistemological and ontological distinction between exact and inexact lexicography. When lexicographical cognition cognizes the science of lexicography, based upon the rational distinction between scientific and pseudo–scientific lexicography, the conceptual rationality of the cognition is not itself conceptualized in rational conceptualization as the mere definition of lexicography is cognized, found in such and such a dictionary, but rather transcends the field of lexicography per se. Of course, the modern European sophists of the Kantian tradition reject such conceptual rationality as unreason, but the political and economic irrationalism of European modernity is transcended and therefore refuted in the conceptual rationality of Americanism, as the supremacy of American Liberty in the world of today.

§1/ Let us examine this question in more detail, in light of our conception of the world: For what is more truly ours, than our conceptions, especially our conception of the world? For we conceive of the world, whatever name our preferences attribute to our conceptualization. Indeed, our conception of the world, as we conceive ourselves and the world, is our conception of ourselves and the world, but in the sense that we ourselves conceive of the world. We need not avoid the first person plural, for in the singular the same ideas hold sway. I conceive of the world, which is the conception of my world: The conception of my world as my conceptualization of the world. Yet the conception of my world is also the conceptualization of the world. For my world is the conceptualization of the world that is mine: My conceptualization of the world is conceptual. Our conception of the world, as we conceive ourselves and the world, is our conception of ourselves and the world, but in the sense that we ourselves conceive of the world. We therefore conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world. We may replace the word conception with any other term that we might prefer, perhaps the noun thought, whichever terminology is more congenial, but our conclusion remains the same: The world as our conception, our conceptualization of the conception of the world, is our conception of the universe.

Remarks: The ancient, mediaeval and modern skeptics doubt or deny the existence of the world, otherwise they doubt or deny the reality of knowledge of the world’s existence: They reject the conception of the world, For whatever is the existence of the world, but our conceptualization of the conception of the world? Skepticism does not here mean one’s skeptical nature, the skepticism of a skeptical nature. Skeptics that doubt the reality of the world, they do not doubt the reality of their doubt, and therefore they do not doubt the non–existence of the world: Their doubt is really legitimate, so they maintain. When philosophical skeptics doubt the reality of the world, therefore, they do not doubt or deny the reality of the rational world, upon which their doubt is founded, rather they reject a certain philosophical version of the universe: The philosophical skeptics give reasons for their doubt. Philosophical skepticism, so–called, is therefore the method and doctrine of the skeptical philosophy, which propounds the sophistical epistemology and ontology of skepticism.Skepticism affirms the non–existence of the world, and the non–existence of the conceptualization of the conception of the world: The skeptics are not skeptical of their skepticism. The skeptical “philosophy,” by which the skeptical methodology of doubt is used to attack their opponents the idealists, in order to reject the idealistic version of truth and reality, opposes the philosophical version of the rational world according to the school of Western Idealism: The sophistical method of skepticism therefore goes hand in hand with the sophistical doctrines of the skeptics.

Skeptics who affirm that they do not know, that they are devoid of knowledge, that they know that they do not know, that they know nothing, borrow from Kantianism, nay, they are themselves Kantians dressed in the garb of skepticism, in order to inculcate Kantianism in the guise of skepticism. That these skeptics know nothing therefore really means that in their eyes, the unknowable of Kant exists, while the “knowledge” that they know they do not know, is verbiage whereby they endeavor to advance the sophistical conceptions of their critical philosophy: Kantian skeptics use the methods of skepticism to advance the sophistry of Immanuel Kant. Skepticism draws the skeptical distinction between knowledge and ignorance, and feigns ignorance, to attack the idealistic version of knowledge of its philosophical adversaries, the school of anti–skepticism: Skepticism thereby conceives of what it allegedly doubts, — the conceptualization of the conception of the world. In their feigned ignorance they doubt or deny the existence of the world, but in their doubt and denial, they conceive of the rational world in order to affirm their ignorance, — in their so–called ignorance, they conceive of their doubt concerning the existence of the world. The doubt and denial of the existence of the world is itself an existential conception, since the conceptualization of doubt and denial is itself an affirmation of the power of reason, and the existence of the rational world. The suspension of judgement is itself an affirmation of judgement’s sovereign power of arbitration, — as the birth–pangs of a greater conceptualization of conceptual rationality.

Skepticism’s conception of the doubt of the existence of the world, as the skeptical difference between knowledge and ignorance, is the skeptical conception of the world as non–existent, the sophistical conception of the world as unknowable: Skepticism affirms the sophistical doctrine of the unknowable. Skepticism as a “philosophy” flounders upon the sophism that the rational world is unintelligible and that something unknowable exists: Skepticism ruthlessly pursued as an end in itself, is self–destructive of rationality. Skeptics who doubt everything must also doubt the veracity of their own doubts, lest they betray themselves and their philosophy, — a project which ultimately ends in the bottomless pit of sophistry. The doubt of the existence of the world is itself an existential conception: Skepticism was never a “philosophy” but always a purgative, in the service of something greater, a more all–encompassing, conception of the rational world. Skepticism is the corrosion that clears the crumbling conceptual ground, and therefore is an attack against a world that is passing–away in decomposition and disintegration, — as the rise of a far–greater conception of rationality. Skepticism is therefore found in the world historical strife between the Platonism and Aristotelianism of Rome and the Middle Ages, in the warfare between Christianity and paganism, as much as within the ancient struggles between Athens and Sparta, and the birth of Hellenism, from out of the Macedonian Empire, as the strife between Socrates and the materialists, — in Plato’s attacks against the Sophists. For this reason, healthy skepticism as rational doubt is really the seedbed of conceptual rationality, as the rejection of an earlier phase of cognition, as the fertilizer for newer, higher and ever–greater conceptions, — the ante–chamber of philosophical Science. The conception of skepticism, the skeptical doubt about knowledge of the world, is itself a conception of philosophy: The rational conceptualization of the conception of the history of Western philosophy, the philosophical history of the different schools of skepticism, conceives the conceptualization of the historical conception of skepticism. The conception of skepticism is conceptualized as the philosophical conceptualization of the world of philosophy: The conceptual realm of philosophy is a conception, is itself conceptually conceptualized, alongside the sciences, history, religion, literature and art, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world of conceptual rationality.

§2/ Our conceptions are conceptions of ours, as our conceptualizations: As conceptualization, our conception of the world is conceptualized as a rational conception, for we really and truly conceive the world, — namely our world. The conceptual rationality of our conceptualization of the world, as rational conception, is our conceptual rationalization of our world. The denial of this doctrine refutes itself, is self–contradictory, but we need not debate the veracity of our conception of the world in favor of our conceptions of the world, for the result is the same. The conceptual rationality of our conceptualization of the world, as a manifold, set or group of universal conceptions, is rationally conceptualized. Our conception of the world, as the conceptual rationality of the conceptual rationalization of our world, as our conception of the universe, is our rational conception: Our conceptual rationality is rational in the sense of our conceptualization of the conception of the world, the conceptual universe as the universality of conceptuality as the conceptualization of our conceptions:

Cartesius: “Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo … ea enim est natura nostrae mentis, ut generales propositiones ex particularium cognitione efformet.”⁷

Following the footsteps of Cartesius, the conceptualization of the rational conception of selfhood, is also the conceptualization of conceptual rationality:“Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo.” We conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world: Our conceptions of the world are the same. The form and content of our conceptualization of the rational conception of the world, is the universality of conceptual rationality. Again, we may qualify the phrase “conceptual rationality” as we fancy, but as the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world, these qualities themselves remain qualified by the category of universality. This is not so? The conception of our world is not our conception of the world? Indeed, whatever is or is not the case with regards to the world, is always so predicated and therefore conceived, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world.

§3/ A point of order: Our conceptions are conceptions of ours, as our conceptualizations. Our conceptualization of rational conceptions as forms of rationality, are conceptualizations of conceptions of rationality: Conceptions as forms of rationality are otherwise conceptualizations of conceptions, as the conceptualizations of rational worlds, they are conceptualizations. Forms of rationality, conceptualizations of rational worlds, are conceptualizations of conceptual rationality: Forms of reason are conceptualized rationally, are conceptions of the rational world. Rational worlds as forms of rationality, are conceptualizations of the conceptual rationality of the rational universe. We need not labour this point, for whether we replace the term reason with some other word, we are dealing with conceptualizations, as sensations, feelings, pleasures, satisfactions, even perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints, but always in the name of intelligibility, as the rational conceptions of the conceptualization of conceptual rationality, in the genuine Hegelian sense of rational (pure) Hegelianism, — in the conceptualization of conceptualization as causa sui.

§4/ What is the exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility? The exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility is precisely conceptual, as the rational conceptualization of the conception of conceptual rationality: When we conceive of the exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility, we conceptualize the rational conceptualization of conceptual rationality, as the conceptualization of the difference between the intelligible and unintelligible worlds, as the conceptual rationality of the rational universe. The conception of unintelligibility, when opposed to intelligibility, is always rationally conceptualized: The conception of unintelligibility is not itself an unintelligible conception. When we charge our adversaries of sophistical argumentation, we accuse them of being unintelligible, their demonstration is defective, because we know what unintelligibility is, — we conceive that our conception of unintelligibility is conceptualized. We do not accuse our adversaries of unintelligibility when we do not know that they are in error, as though we conceive of a non–conception:Their conceptions are lesser, while ours are greater, — a conceptual distinction which is rationally conceptualized as the rational conceptualization of form and content.

§5/ The conceptual form and content of rational conceptualization, the formal and material conceptualization of universality, as the conceptual universality of conceptual rationality, is universally conceptualized as our conception of the world: The rational conceptualization of the world as the conceptual universality of conceptual rationality, is therefore the conceptualization of conceptualization. The conceptualization of the conception of rational theology, is an instructive instance: Our conceptualization of the conception of philosophical theology as well as the conception of philosophical physics is the same, in the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world. In the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of theology, philosophical conceptions applied to theology are no more theological conceptions, in the modern European pejorative sense, than the application of philosophical conceptions to physics, in the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of physics, are themselves conceptions of physics, in the modern European non–pejorative sense. The conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world, conceives theological conceptions formally and materially: The conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality as the conceptualization of the conception of theology is universally conceived, formally and materially, as the rational conceptualization of churches, parishes, Sunday schools and so forth: As the conceptual complexifications of rational conceptualizations between priests and parishioners, and so forth. Rational conceptions of the priesthood are conceptualized in the cannons of ecclesiastical doctrine. Conceptions of theology are conceptually inscribed, universally conceived, as the conceptual complexifications rationally exemplified as the conception of organized religion. Is this not the same for all conceptual knowledge, including the conceptualizations of the sciences? The same remark holds good of pedagogy, jurisprudence, criminology, psychology, and so on, even the field of military science. The conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality, formally and materially, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of world, is the world of universal and particular conceptualizations: Our formal and material conceptions of the universal and particular world, rationally conceptualized, are themselves theoretical and practical conceptions, are themselves worldly conceptualizations. Whether or not entirely permissible, at this stage of the conceptual argument, our rational conceptualization, we pose the following question, which is not rhetorical: Where is theology ever found in the rational world, conceptualized rationally, without both priest and parishioner, or jurisprudence without both judge and accused? Even the scientists have their laboratories and conduct experiments upon their subjects.

§6/ We conceive of ourselves as rational conceptualizations: We conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world. Therefore our conceptualizations of our rational conceptions of ourselves are themselves conceived conceptually as the conceptual rationality of universal conceptuality. As such is the case, our conceptions of ourselves are themselves conceived as rational conceptualizations: They themselves are conceived conceptually. The manifold agencies of conceptual rationality conceive the conception of personhood: The rationality of the selfhood of personality is the universality of conceptuality. The universality of conceptual rationality, as the conceptual universe of truth and reality, is the rationality of the selfhood of personality as the universality of conceptuality, as formal and material self–conceptualization. We need not therefore refer to ourselves in the conceptual rationalization of rational conceptualization, as somehow “unconceived,” as apart from the world of rational conceptions: As conceptions of ourselves, the conceptual rationality of universal conceptuality conceives of the rational conception of our conceptual world as rationally conceptualized, as our conceptualization of ourselves and the world. Self–conceptualization conceives of the rational world as the conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality: The conceptual universe as causa sui.

§7/ Conceptualization of Americanism, in the rational Hegelian sense, is therefore the form and content of the conceptual rationality of the American world, as the struggle between subjective and objective freedom in world history, from out of the clash between Kant and Hegel, from which arises the absolute freedom of American Liberty. The substantial form, the concrete universality of American conceptual rationality, its developmental unification and coaxial integration, as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is found within the clash of ruling classes: From out of the womb of history, arise universal historical determinations, the amniotic complexifications of which constitute the embryonic development of the world. The worldhood of the American world, the realm of its universality as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is the conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism.

§8/ The conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism, conceives that the political and economic worldhood of the American world englobes North America, the United States, Canada and Mexico, not merely in the notional form and content of the political and economic geography of continentalism, but also as the central and innermost sphere of Americanism. Make no mistake, the conceptual relationship between the innermost essence of Americanism and its outermost conceptualization, englobes the entire Western world. The innermost and basic dynamism of Americanism, the essence of American conceptual rationality as causa sui, self–determination in the genuine Hegelian sense, namely the myriad relationships between the White House, Washington and Wall Street, englobes North America within the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.

§9/ Conceptualization, since rational conceptions possess a life and freedom of their own (self–determination as causa sui), therefore conceives of the political and economic worldhood of the American world as the rationalization between core and periphery, which conceptually arises from the very conceptual substrata of Americanism itself, — within concrete universality as the universal form of the immanence of the self–determination of American conceptual rationality. What is the rationality of personality, but the evolution of conceptuality? We must draw attention to the essential conceptual complexifications between the political economies of the West coast of the United States of America with Mexico, as well as between the East coast with Canada: This political and economic dynamism is always found within the rational calculations of the American political economy of the White House, Washington and Wall Street, as the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, — as America’s rational conception of itself.

§10/ For readers accustomed to the sophistical verbiage of twentieth–century Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, especially in the twenty–first century, how very foreign our language must sound, devoid of reverberations of American perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints of the world (standpunkt, perspektive, weltanschauung). Make no further mistake: The application of outdated and surpassed conceptions, as rational solutions to today’s political and economic challenges, is irrationalism: Modern European unreason in the Global world is undone in the rise of Americanism, having self–destructively cleared away from Western civilization’s universal historical ground, the political and economic delusions and phantasms of modernity, as the inescapable lesson of history, in the strife of ruling classes under the floodtide of American rationality.

3/ Modern European Unreason: Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant

C/ David Hume and the Master Race

I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. David Hume¹

The sophistical mind of David Hume, his inveterate mental weakness and conceptual perversity, is the victim of modern European political and economic irrationalism: For this reason Hume espouses the modern European sophism of superior and inferior human races. The Scottish Enlightenment is also inscribed within the world historical collapse of European modernity and the rise of Globalism, as evidenced by the contagion of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism in Scotland, Great Britain and the British Empire. Modern right is not Global freedom: The disintegrating hordes of modernity, the flabby minds of the earth, in the name of inexact historiography, follow the one–way road of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant into oblivion, and therefore cannot perceive that their self–destruction is the result of their own decadence, under the hammer blows of Americanism.

“I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturer amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the Whites, such as the ancient German, the present Tartars, still have something eminent about them, in their valor, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men. Not to mention our colonies, there are Negro slaves dispersed all over Europe, of whom none ever discovered any symptoms of ingenuity; though low people, without education, will [229] start up amongst us, and distinguish themselves in every profession. In Jamaica, indeed, they talk of one Negro as a man of parts and learning; but it is likely he is admired for slender accomplishments, like a parrot who speaks a few words plainly.”²

Some will exculpate David Hume from the charge of racism, undoubtedly in order to salvage the last remnants of Kantianism and Kantio–Hegelianism in the world of today (some, in their sophistical annals of modern European unreason, — Henry Louis Gates Jr., — even make Kant and Hegel equivalent with regards to modern racialism and racism, by referring to texts from the latter’s discredited editors):

“It is entirely fair to think poorly of Hume for the view that he does express. Though ‘le bon David’ no doubt had many virtues, ability to rise above the racial prejudices of his day was not one of them. But in condemning him in this regard, as I think we should, we ought not to make the mistake of believing that Hume’s philosophy itself is somehow racially coded. There is no reason to believe with Eze, that when Hume spoke of human nature he “meant only a white ‘we.’” Indeed, Hume’s philosophy — especially his emphasis on the universality of human nature — is incompatible with the racialism he expresses … Hume, it is true, was a racialist, and perhaps a racist, but Humeanism is neither.”³

Hume, it is true, was a racialist, and perhaps a racist, but Humeanism is neither?

“In 1753 Hume wrote ‘I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites.’ The history of this footnote displays the special contempt Hume reserved for blacks. Under criticism challenging his general claim that all non–white races — including blacks — were inferior to whites, he dropped the general claim but continued to insist on the specific claim that negroes were inferior. The revised footnote reads, ‘I am apt to suspect the negroes to be naturally inferior to the whites.’”⁴

David Hume reserved special contempt for blacks. Whatever it is that Andrew Valls views as “Humeanism,” is perhaps not racialist and racist, otherwise perhaps it is racialist and racist: “[David] Hume, it is true, was a racialist.” We eagerly await the magnum opus of Andrew Valls, perhaps entitled, “Humeanism: The True Philosophy of David Hume, — From a Kantian Perspective.” Until the day Andrew Valls advances a rational argument, the conclusion of which is, therefore the Vallsian interpretation of Humeanism is the true philosophy of David Hume (and therefore Hume is not a sophist), we hold our breath in the greatest of anticipation. We do not separate the historical David Hume from his sophistical Humean philosophy, but attach both together in the rational Hegelian conception of exact historiography and world history, in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism: David Hume, in the same tradition as John Locke and his sophistical philosophy, propagates racialism precisely because Humean sophistry is modern European political and economic irrationalism in the English–speaking world. Wherefore? David Hume (the racialist) in his writings on the modern sophistical category of human nature, propagates the abominable sophism that Negroes are “naturally inferior to the Whites.” Of course, it goes without saying, pace Andrew Valls, that David Hume does not really prove that Negroes are “naturally inferior to the Whites”: In the same vein as his philosophical sophistry, David Hume’s category of universality is itself sophistical. Indeed, the world historical proof that flows from Hume’s modern European unreason, is his demonstration of the mental degeneration of the English inferior ruling classes, especially in Scotland.

David Hume is a racialist (a theoretical racist), but he is not a philosophical racist (Andrew Valls), and therefore he does not practice racism (Hume is not a racist): Hume’s philosophy — especially his emphasis on the universality of human nature — is incompatible with the racialism he expresses. David Hume maintains that he possesses the mental power (the aptitude) to affirm that there actually exists a “natural” (philosophical) distinction between superior and inferior human races: “I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites.” That Hume’s affirmation of the racial inferiority of Negroes, as opposed to the racial superiority of Europeans, takes the form of a suspicion means that he possesses no rational proof to support his allegation, only the mental aptitude, — his subjective psychological state (subjectivity). That David Hume maintains he possesses no rational proof to support his allegation of racialism is not evidence that he denies (does not really affirm) that there actually exists a “natural” (Humean) distinction between superior and inferior human races, or that he suspends his judgement on the matter. Wherefore? In David Hume’s own estimation of himself, his “suspicion” is more than a mere opinion or hypothesis because bolstered by his self–proclaimed mental aptitude (subjectivism) as a great philosopher and master thinker.

David Hume is therefore a practical racist: He practiced racism by propounding that Negroes are “naturally inferior to the Whites.” David Hume’s racialist dogma, doctrine, teaching that Negroes are “naturally inferior to the Whites” is sophistry: Whether Hume propounds his racialist sophistry once, rather than emphasize it a thousand times, does not diminish its sophistical nature. David Hume does not advance a rational argument, the conclusion of which is, therefore Negroes are “naturally inferior to the Whites”: Therefore Hume’s racialism is not part of his Humean philosophy? Whether Hume advances a thousand bad arguments, or none at all, or repeats (emphasizes) his claim of universality a hundred times, like a broken record, — this is not philosophy, but sophistry: Andrew Valls’s sophistical distinction between racism and Hume’s racialism is sophistry, because like the latter, he himself ignores rational philosophical argument. Andrew Valls is not a philosopher, but a sophist because he advances no rational argument in support of his distinction between philosophy and sophistry, — nevertheless he asserts that David Hume is a philosopher, and that Humeanism is philosophy (which is the basis of his allegation that Hume is a racialist and not a racist). That David Hume emphasizes the “universality” of human nature is no rational proof that Humeanism is philosophy, and not sophistry: A fortiori, Hume’s emphasis on what he views as “universality” is no proof that he is a racialist, and not a racist. Wherefore? The sophism that there actually exists a rational distinction between superior and inferior human races is racialism and racism, regardless whether it is imagined, believed, propounded, uttered, written, broadcast, claimed, hypothesized, even suspected, — this at least is the verdict of exact historiography and world history in the 20th century.

Adolf Hitler and his murderous regime slaughtered millions of human beings in the name of the so–called “master race,” while David Hume merely preached the sophism of racial superiority and inferiority in his “philosophy”: The former was a very big racialist and racist, while the latter was a smaller one.

Those who affirm (especially in the guise of a “claim”) that the primitive civilizations of Africa and elsewhere are examples of inferior ruling classes, when compared to the advanced technological civilization of today, they ignore or neglect the rational distinction between mere corruption and decadence (mortal corruption). Views, standpoints, perspectives and outlooks of racial inferiority (sophisms), as propagated in the self–destructive movements of modern European unreason, in the Machiavellianism inherited from the Oriental despotism of Asiatic barbarism (“despotisme Asiatique,” Montesquieu) after the fall of Constantinople, and opposed to the Western humanist traditions of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, are inseparable from the popularization of Eurocentric political and economic irrationalism in the 20th century world: This at least is the verdict of exact historiography and world history, following in the footsteps of rational Hegelianism.

Western philosophy is mortally opposed to modern European sophistry.

We now turn our attention to another defender of David Hume’s sophistry: †Duncan Forbes and company downplay Hume’s modern unreason, in order to justify as natural their own degenerate British imperialist masters’ mortal corruption (“Europe’s Machiavellian relativism and selfishness,” Henry Kissinger),* especially at Whitehall, but also at Cambridge, and to a lesser degree at Oxford. In the name of Humean science (and the infamous Transzendentalphilosophie which was greatly influenced by the sophistical philosophies of Hume, Leibniz and Locke), Duncan Forbes and the modern British sophists follow in the footsteps of Immanuel Kant, the Great Sophister of European modernity:

“Hume’s science of politics included economics.”⁵

David Hume is a philosopher and scientist? Modern sophists thus obscure the rational distinction between mere corruption and decadence (appearance and reality versus appearance and delusion) in world history: As the victims of their own self–estrangement, the inferior ruling classes of the earth are therefore the flesh and blood that greases the cogwheels of world history:

“[Hegel’s dialectical] conclusions cannot be proved or disproved … [Hegel’s philosophy] is in danger of being destroyed or distorted if it is written down … The present edition of the introductory lectures on the philosophy of history has the advantage of bringing home the fact that so much of Hegel’s philosophy was talked.”⁶

So much of Hegel’s philosophy was talked?

“After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”⁷

The methodologies through which the editors of the Berlin edition assembled the transcriptions of Hegel’s lectures into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, are dubious at best?

“Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”⁸

Hegel’s editors sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered his classes?

“The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”⁹

Modern British sophists such as Duncan Forbes and Hugh Barr Nisbet corrupt exact historiography and world history in order to mask the rôle of their erstwhile élites in the collapse of the British Empire and European modernity:

“You can lay down all these general principles, but this is not a policy. Surely, if you are to have a policy you must take the particular situations and consider what action or inaction is suitable for those particular situations. That is what I myself mean by a policy, and it is quite clear that as the situations and conditions in foreign affairs continually change from day to day, your policy cannot be stated for once and for all, if it is to be applicable to every situation that arises.”¹⁰

The pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of Duncan Forbes and Hugh Barr Nisbet, and their entourage at Cambridge and other British universities, is the mask of modern European political and economic irrationalism in the world historical collapse of modernity and rise of Globalism in the 20th century world:

“The intellectual superiority of the Left is seldom in doubt. The Left alone thinks out principles of political action and evolves ideas for statesmen to aim at … morality can only be relative, and not universal … ethics must be interpreted in terms of politics; and the search for an ethical norm outside politics is doomed to frustration.”¹¹

The intellectual superiority of the Left is seldom in doubt?

“[Duncan Forbes] is perhaps best remembered by his students for the exhilarating lectures on Hegel and Marx which he gave at the University of Cambridge during the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s … [Forbes] perhaps played down rather too much the importance to Hegel of logical strictness and rigour … Forbes was deeply committed to [the impure] Hegel’s vision of political and social life.”¹²

Duncan Forbes is perhaps best remembered by his students for the exhilarating lectures on Hegel and Marx which he gave at the University of Cambridge?

“Hegel wants as much liberty as possible, and so does Marx. Hegel wants as little authority as is absolutely necessary, and so does Marx. And both want the maximum development of the individual. Marx’s tragedy, and the tragedy of not only Marx, was his failure to realize this.”¹³

Hegel and Marx both want as much “liberty” as is possible?

“[Hegel] was a thoroughly anti–critical, anti–revolutionary philosopher … Hegel’s teaching had been taken up by the Left in a one–sided and abstract way; and the great majority of people always prefer what one can become fanatical about, and this is never anything but what is abstract.”¹⁴

Hegel and Marx both want as much “liberty” as is possible?

Karl Marx: “My dialectic … is not only different from Hegel’s, but its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life process of the human brain is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of ‘the Idea.’ With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, [5] and translated into forms of thought … In its mystified form, [the Hegelian] dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it [the Hegelian Dialectic] is a scandal and an abomination to bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors because it [the rational Hegelian Dialectic] includes in its comprehension and affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it [the rational Hegelian Dialectic] regards every historically–developed social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than its momentary existence; because it [the rational Hegelian Dialectic] lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and revolutionary.”¹⁵

Hegel and Marx both want as much “liberty” as is possible?

“The absolute [of Hegel] became a stumbling–block to Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach and other members of the ‘Left.’ They rejected as an illegitimate interpolation the eternal subject of development, and, instead of one continuing God as the subject of all the predicates by which in the logic the absolute is defined, assumed only a series of ideas, products of philosophic activity. They denied the theological value of the logical forms — the development of these forms being in their opinion due to the human thinker, not to a self–revealing absolute. Thus they made man the creator of the absolute. But with this modification on the system another necessarily followed; a mere logical series could not create nature. And thus the material universe became the real starting–point. Thought became only the result of organic conditions — subjective and human.”¹⁶

Hegel and Marx both want as much “liberty” as is possible?

“The unfolded totality of the Hegelian school may be pictured in a brief compend. With the pseudo–Hegelians (Fichte, jun., Weisse, Brandis &c.) perception under the form of faith or experience, is the sole source of positive religious truth. On the extreme right of the Hegelian school, perception, (as with Hinrichs) is the absolute criterion of the results found by means of logical thinking; while Göschel gives it still a decisive voice in all religious affairs. Schaller, Erdmann, and Gabler, who form the pure right side, allow to religious perception a consultative vote, which however, like a good ruler with his subjects, they never leave unrespected. Rosenkranz, who ushers in the centre, proceeds for the most part in accordance with the voice of perception, but in some cases rejects it. In Marheineke, the perception is the witness, who can only speak respecting the fact, while the question of law or right can only be decided by speculative thinking. On the left of the centre, (that taken by Vatke, Snellmann and Michelet) the perception is a true–hearted servant, who must subject herself obediently to reason as mistress. Strauss, on the left side, makes her a slave, while with Feuerbach and Bauer she appears verily as a paria.”¹⁷

Hegel was a thoroughly anti–critical, anti–revolutionary philosopher: Global freedom is not modern European right. By leading their flocks into the wilderness of modern European unreason, twentieth century irrationalists such as Duncan Forbes and Hugh Barr Nisbet have cleared the political and economic ground of modernity in universal history, — for the supremacy of American Liberty in the Western world: American Idealism is the fountainhead of Global civilization. The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history (Hegel): As the historical unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom, Americanism is rising upwards in the world of today.

D/ Immanuel Kant and the Master Race

These introductory comments should well demonstrate their importance, not only for discussions of Kant’s role in the formative development of our modern concept of race, but also for our understanding of the development of the critical philosophy itself. There is much in these texts that does not make for pleasant reading; but perhaps the recognition of what seems so wrong to us in these texts — especially with regard to the theory of race that Kant does undeniably sketch in them — should make us that much more appreciative of the fact that Kant distanced himself from these views as far as he arguably did in the ethical and political works he published in the 1790s. Mikkelsen¹

Immanuel Kant produced the most raciological [racialist and racist] thought of the eighteenth century. Count²

It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.³

Modern apologists downplay Kantian raciology in the name of subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, in order to salvage the Copernican revolution, thereby preserving Liberal Internationalism as the ideological and electoral justification of the political and economic irrationalism of inferior ruling classes, in the combat between Americanism and anti–Americanism on the stage of twenty–first century world history.

Kant distanced himself from these [racialist and racist] views … in the ethical and political works he published in the 1790s, — Jon M. Mikkelsen: Kant’s racism is a “theory of race,” i.e., racialism, — but Kantian racialism is not profound error and falsehood? We must pose this question in light of the great evils of the twentieth century. Kant distanced himself from his theory of race in the 1790s, he therefore distanced himself, not from his racist sophistry, but his racialist views: What therefore is this historical fact that Kant “distanced” himself from racialism and racism (i.e., that which “does not make for pleasant reading”), — but another Kantian view? Kant’s theory of race is racialism, his racist views are not error and falsehood, but perspectives, outlooks and viewpoints: The historical fact that Kant “distanced himself from these views,” the historical fact that he distanced himself from racism, is an historical truth, maintains Jon M. Mikkelsen, but no mere Kantian point of view, similar to Kant’s racism, his theory of racialism. For the Kantian historical view that Kant is not a racist must answer the question of why, in the first place, Kant really needed to distance himself from views, perspectives and standpoints (and why Kantianism must therefore totally abandon modern European subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism) and must therefore uphold the conceptual distinction between good and bad views, and conceptualize what an historical fact really and truly is, or at least conceptualize the difference between views that require “distance” and views which do not: Otherwise Kant was a racist, a theoretician of racialism (someone who upholds the sophism of superior and inferior human races), but in the 1790s only from a distance, — and whether the distance is great or small, Kantianism is still racism and racialism, especially the transcendental Anthropologie, — in other words, Immanual Kant is the father of Kantianism, the transcendental bastion of modern European raciology, especially as found in the idéologues of Nazidom (Chamberlain, Rosenberg and Goebbels).

Our first question’s razor sharp fangs are the historical truth and reality, the absolute historical certainty of the Holocaust. We must therefore ask ourselves how is it that we come, really and truly, to know what views exactly that Immanuel Kant, the historical personage, distanced himself from, — in the Mikkelsenian cannons of biographical psychology: At least we must advance a rational argument which purports to demonstrate why such and such texts are really and truly trustworthy, and others are not so, with regards to their veracity as historical windows into the inner mental states that Immanuel Kant once possessed, — but is not such a psychologistic and solipsistic endeavor historically futile (as the basis of a refutation of the racialism and racism of Kantianism, i.e., a refutation of the charge that the critical philosophy is sophistry), by the very Kantian definition of views, perspectives and outlooks, in a word, opinions? Kantian defenses of Kantianism flounder upon relativism, subjectivism and irrationalism: The same remark holds good of Kantian defenses designed to exculpate Kantianism from the charge of racialism and racism. Shall we therefore conclude that the Kantian salvaging of the critical “philosophy” of raciology from the charge of racialism and racism is itself a twenty–first century raciological justification of the historical foundations of modern European raciology?

Jon M. Mikkelsen is not the only Kantian who downplays the racialist and racist doctrines of Immanuel Kant’s raciology, in the name of views, perspectives and standpoints (Kant’s opinions), in order to defend the “critical philosophy” from well–deserved attacks, — as the justification of the sophistical foundations of his very own modern European political and economic irrationalism: Pauline Kleingeld also downplays the racialist and racist doctrines of Kant’s raciology in the name of views, perspectives and standpoints (Kant’s alleged opinions).

“Although Kant’s Lectures on Physical Geography were published in 1802 , this edition cannot be regarded as reflecting Kant’s views around that time … the development of Kant’s views during the Critical period … the description of Kant’s account of race and racial hierarchy … Before the 1770s, too, Kant made derogatory comments about non–Europeans … For the full argument that there is a contradiction between Kant’s moral principles and his views on racial hierarchy, see my ‘Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race.’”⁶

According to Pauline Kleingeld’s downplaying of Kantian transcendental raciology, Kant merely posits a connection between racial differences and politically relevant mental and agential characteristics: Kant’s raciological sophisms are merely characterizations of the different “races.” Pauline Kleingeld in her downplaying of Kantian transcendental raciology, in order to pretend that the critical “philosophy” is not tinged with the sophistry of racism and racialism, places the word race in quotation marks, thereby suggesting (implying) that what Kant really means in his differentiation(characterization) of superior and inferior human races is not really Kantian racism:

“In Kant’s characterizations of the different ‘races,’ we find many passages in which he posits a connection between racial differences and politically relevant mental and agential characteristics.”⁷

Kant’s transcendental raciological sophistry, according to Pauline Kleingeld, is not racism (profound error and falsehood), his transcendental raciological sophisms are not racist (profound errors and falsehoods), but rather paternalism and instrumentalization, merely accounts, theses and assertions:

“Kant reportedly asserts that Native Americans are the lowest of the four races because they are completely inert, impassive, and incapable of being educated at all. He places the ‘Negroes’ above them because they are capable of being trained to be slaves (but incapable of other forms of education). Asians have many more talents, but still fewer than whites. Kant invokes this racial hierarchy — along with the thesis that non–whites are incapable of governing themselves, incapable of being magistrates, and incapable of genuine freedom, and that whites, by contrast, do have the requisite capabilities — to justify ‘whites’ subjecting and governing non–whites through colonial rule. Kant’s account contains a mix of paternalism (as with India, which would be ‘happier’ as a European colony) and instrumentalization (as with Native Americans and blacks, whose alleged ‘purpose’ is to serve as slaves).”⁸

Once Kant’s transcendental raciology is classified as sophistry (falsehood and error), the critical “philosophy” is exposed as sophistry. With the exposition of Kantianism as sophistry, the project of Liberal Internationalism is exposed as modern European irrationalism: The political and economic agendas of Liberal Internationalism in the world of today are thus bankrupted. The electoral bankruptcy of Liberal Internationalism endangers the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of inferior ruling classes (especially in the European Union) via the corrosive power of Americanism, in the rise of Global rational political and economic order. For this reason various European institutions controlled by the Bonapartists in Brussels are in the business of funding academics and educational authorities around the Western world (especially in America), in their endeavour to salvage modern irrationalism, and thereby retard the Americanization of Europe, — in the rise of world civilization and supremacy of American Liberty.

According to the modern European sophists in American academia (they are easy to detect, with all their talk of multipolarity and polycentrisme), the principles of Kant’s “philosophy” are not raciological, because his raciology (racialism and racism) is based on views, accounts and comments, while his “philosophy” is systematic: But the rational distinction between good and bad views is never elucidated except via the very Kantian categories that are themselves called into disrepute by adversaries, — as the subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of Kantianism. Where is the rational argument that Kant’s “philosophical” principles are not themselves mere views, like his views of raciology (racialism and racism)? “[Kant] is best understood not as a ‘system builder,’ but as a systematic philosopher.”⁹ The “notion” of Kant as a systematic philosopher, deployed in his defense by Mikkelsen, is not infected by Kantian subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism? The elucidation of Immanuel Kant’s personality, i.e., the “best understanding” of Kant’s past mental states, as a systematic philosopher, is not itself contaminated with subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, — in the name of psychologism and solipsism? Kant’s subjective idealism is used by Kantians to downplay the very raciology of his subjective idealism. Twenty–first century sophists: The Kantian transcendental “philosophy” has absolutely nothing to do with Kant’s racialism and racism, because his raciology is transcendentally unphilosophical, because his raciological views were not transcendental views, — raciological views are not transcendental views. Kant’s critics must prove, in order to make their case (according to his defenders), but only by using transcendental categories, that Kant’s raciology is transcendental, otherwise Kantianism is not raciological! The height of this absurdity is evident: Does anybody ever make the demand that proof of the racialism and racism of Hitlerism be established by using the raciological categories of Nazism?

Adolf Hitler and his murderous regime slaughtered millions of human beings in the name of the so–called “master race,” while Immanuel Kant merely preached the sophism of racial superiority and inferiority in his “philosophy”: The former was a very big racialist and racist, while the latter was a smaller one: “The White race contains all impulses and talents within itself … The Negro … undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races.”¹⁰

In simple words: Kantianism, the so–called critical “philosophy” of Immanuel Kant, is raciological sophistry.

Of course, our questions are not designed to suggest that the board of the State University of New York is in the business of perpetuating racism and racialism, only in protecting its intellectual reputation from the charge of modern European irrationalism, — thereby sustaining its endowments. Americanism, in stark contradistinction to Eurocentrisme as Liberal Internationalism, at least in the doctrines of Henry Kissinger, is a Harvard institution.

Kantians hold that Kant is a great philosopher, while anti–Kantians hold that Kant is a Sophist. Those academics who maintain that Kant is a great philosopher, and that they disagree with his philosophy (and that therefore they are anti–Kantians), really mean that they disagree with a certain interpretation of some element of Kantianism (but they do not reject Kantianism in general as sophistry): Precise examination of their “philosophies” proves that they themselves are actually Kantians in disguise, pushing Kantianism, or some version thereof, under some other name, i.e., existentialism, phenomenology, empiricism, and so forth, wherein are covertly imported transcendental arguments and distinctions under new names, — a tactic calculated to avoid serious criticism of their doctrines, which allows them to pass themselves off as intellectual innovators, especially in the arena of politics and economics. They are thereby saved from explaining how Kantianism is not raciology, saved from explaining the role of Kantianism in the Holocaust, and saved from explaining the difference between reason and unreason in twentieth century modern European history, especially the history of Genocide and nationalism:

“In The Myth of the Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual–Intellectual Confrontation of Our Age, Rosenberg’s claims that Kant’s religious philosophy was so popular with the Germans that ‘Kant’s words’ about ‘the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us’ (an allusion to the conclusion of Critique of Practical Reason) are in danger of being ‘reduced to triviality’ (197). That Rosenberg’s observation has some merit is clear from comments Adolf Eichmann made at his trial. During a police examination, Eichmann ‘declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty’ … Prominent Nazis such as Eckart, Alfred Rosenberg, and Adolf Eichmann read Kant, but most people from the Nazi period, [45] including Nazi élites, derived their view of Kant mainly from Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who is considered ‘the spiritual founder of National Socialist Germany,’ which is why Paul Gilroy rightly claims that ‘we can interpret Chamberlain’s work as he wanted it to be understood: As a strong bridge between Kant and Hitler.’ It is this link between Kant and the Nazis that has led prominent scholars to say that the German philosopher bears some responsibility for the Holocaust. As Berel Lang says: ‘Certain ideas prominent in the Enlightenment [and he specifies Kant] are recognizable in the conceptual framework embodied in the Nazi genocide.’ Or, as Charles W. Mills claims: ‘The embarrassing fact for the white West (which doubtless explains its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist [Kant] of the past three hundred years is also the foundational theorist in the modern period of the division between Herrenvolk and Untermenschen, persons and subpersons, upon which Nazi theory would later draw.’ Given Chamberlain’s comprehensive vision of religion, politics, and Germany, Rosenberg ‘hailed him as a pioneer and spiritual forerunner and viewed himself as Chamberlain’s true successor.’ In 1923, Joseph Goebbels read the Foundations, and when he met Chamberlain in 1926, he indicates in his diary how important Chamberlain was to National Socialism by referring to [46] him as a ‘spiritual father,’ dubbing him a ‘Trail blazer, pioneer!’ Chamberlain’s biographer, Geoffrey G. Field, notes that Hitler read the Foundations. But more importantly, Field indicates how crucial Chamberlain was by describing Hitler’s response to the famous writer’s public endorsement. After getting word of Chamberlain’s support, members at the Nazi party headquarters in Munich were euphoric, and Hitler was so giddy that he was supposedly ‘like a child’ … Hitler considered National Socialism to be based on idealism.”¹¹

In the rise of Americanism from out of the collapse of European modernity in world history, Nazidom is based on Kantian idealism?

Adolf Hitler: “Rational Idealism is profound Knowledge of the Unknowable.”¹²

The reason therefore that these Kantian and semi–Kantian idéologues of our bankrupt academia possess their government sinecures, as in the period of Nazidom, is not from intelligence, but rather from their political and family connexions: Of course they will argue that such behavior is evidence of intelligence, but only in mortal degeneration are corruption and criminality ever named as enlightenment.

Why is the Kantianism of Nazidom modern irrationalism?

“Kant inaugurated a Copernican revolution in philosophy, which claimed that the subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object; i.e., that knowledge is in part constituted by a priori or transcendental factors (contributed by the mind itself), which the mind imposes upon the data of experience. Far from being a description of an external reality, knowledge is, to Kant, the product of the knowing subject. When the data are those of sense experience, the transcendental (mental) apparatus constitutes man’s experience or his science, or makes it to be such.”¹³

“The subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object … [knowledge is] the product of the knowing subject”: The “Copernican revolution in philosophy” (the subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object) is not based upon Kant’s philosophical sophistry (knowledge is the product of the knowing subject)? De Vleeschauwer’s version of the Copernican revolution in philosophy, inaugurated by Kant, asserts that the subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object. Herman de Vleeschauwer, in the field of twentieth–century modern European world history, is therefore a good Kantian, and not a bad Kantian?¹⁴

“These principalities … are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”¹⁵

Higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, are exalted and maintained by God, the very highest power. Higher causation and rationality is the realm of the highest power, and is beyond the reach of humanity, civilization, and the rationality of Global political and economic order. What are the rational determinations of the highest power? We must abstain from speaking of them, for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish person to discuss them: The highest power of Machiavellism is the Absolute of Kant and modern European unreason. The highest power governing human actions, the fountainhead of all justice according to the Machiavellians, the dispensers of modern freedom, is the Unknowable of the modern irrationalists, Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant, — as well as their epigones.

From whence comes the Kantianism of Nazidom?

“The philosophical movement called Neo–Kantianism commenced in Germany in the 1860’s. Beginning with certain epistemological inquiries, it extended gradually over the whole field of philosophy. The individual thinkers who belong to this movement differ from each other in their interpretation of the Kantian doctrine as well as in the results which they reach from the Kantian premises. But, notwithstanding differences of detail, there is a certain methodical principle common to all of them. They all see in philosophy not merely a personal conviction, an individual view of the world, but they enquire into the possibility of philosophy as a science with the intention of formulating its conditions. They take their cue from the most general statement of the Kantian problem in the preface of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. But in returning to the fundamental aim of Kant, to lead philosophy ‘into the safe road of a science,’ Neo–Kantianism finds itself confronted with a new task inasmuch as it must face a different state of science itself.”¹⁶

From whence comes the Kantianism (Neo–Kantianism) of Nazidom, in the arena of twentieth–century modern European politics and economics?

“Especially after 1871, the contagion of Kantianism in France is remarkable … Around 1880, Kantianism becomes the powerful beacon of French moral and political thought, in the eyes of those who are followers of France’s republican creed: For republican thinkers who want to be freed from ‘superstition,’ Immanuel Kant’s philosophy must provide the means of indoctrinating France’s young people with strict morality and civics, self–sacrifice and patriotism: Intellectual disciplines which will eliminate ancient French religious traditions via the powerful secular religion of republicanism.”¹⁷

In the rise of Americanism from out of the collapse of European modernity in world history, Kantianism is the vanguard of the surpassed and outdated Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right: The “rationality governing human actions, the fountainhead of justice,” according to Machiavelli, the modern delusion of rationality and human reason, is the unreason of European modernity, the basis of the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right: Autocracy founded upon popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, therefore comes from the modern irrationalism of Kant, Hume, Leibniz and Locke, — and then ultimately from Machiavelli. Machiavellism, autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, is modern unreason in the world historical arena of European politics and economics.

Last remarks: Why is the Kantian raciological sophistry of Nazidom profound error and falsehood, especially as subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism?

“[158–159] According to Kant, we can never know anything but ‘phenomena,’ never a thing that exists independently of the mind. It cannot be but a subjective phenomenon, because the element of experience in it — the ‘impression,’ which is called the ‘matter’ of the object of a sense–intuition, is subjective, and the element of necessity and universality which is called the ‘form’ coming as it does from the mind, is likewise subjective. Hence the object before the mind, composed as it is by subjective elements, is wholly subjective. Yet Kant always calls such an object really objective. Because the term ‘objective’ always means for Kant, whatever contains a necessary and universal element. For such an element is the same for all human minds as they are at present constituted … [160] Now the ‘matter’ upon which these ‘apriori forms’ of the understanding are superimposed is the ‘phenomenal objects’ of ‘sense–intuition.’ The ‘phenomenal objects’ of sense are already an amalgam of ‘matter,’ — the sense–impression caused by the ‘noumenon’ plus the ‘apriori sense forms’ of ‘space’ and ‘time.’ Why are these ‘apriori forms of the understanding’ imposed upon the phenomena of sense? Because each of these sensuous phenomena are pictured by the imagination as either a substance, a cause, as one or many etc., and when they are so imaginatively pictured, the appropriate ‘apriori form of the understanding’ pops forth from ‘the fairy rath of the mind’ where live these ‘apriori forms’ and attaches itself to the sensuous phenomena and then we necessarily and universally are forced to think that such a sense–phenomenon is a substance, such another a cause, an accident, one or many etc. But in reality, of course, they are no such thing, for these ‘apriori forms’ give us no insight into reality.”¹⁸

What is the subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of raciological Kantianism?

“In the philosophy of Kant the necessary grooves or laws which the mind must follow in its operations of reason have their origin solely in the mind; they are of the mind and in the mind. [9] We must think, Kant would say, according to these necessary laws because our minds, antecedently to all experiences of reality, are constituted that way … Kant conceives the laws of thought as ‘forms’ native to the mind and therefore as having no objective value. Hence he calls the science of these ‘forms’ ‘Formal Logic.’”¹⁹

Raciological Kantianism, the modern unreason of Nazidom in the arena of twentieth–century modern European politics and economics, via the subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of Kant’s transcendental logic, is the vanguard of the surpassed and outdated Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right.

Nazidom Worships Napoléon Bonaparte

The rational Hegelian philosophy of genuine Hegelianism, on the stage of modern European world history, maintains that the critical “philosophy,” so–called, is the theoretical justification of Kant’s practical “philosophy,” his anthropology and physical geography, which together serve alongside his science of law, as the basis of Kantian political economy. Sophists of the Kantian traditions who maintain the contrary, namely that Kant’s “philosophy” is separate from his practical works, his anthropology and physical geography (which they allege are untranscendental aberrations), they falsely and wrongly separate the two spheres of activity, and therefore wreck the theory and practice of Kant’s critical project and Copernican revolution, and thereby they falsify and distort exact historiography and world history.

This last remark applies equally to those sophists who do not separate Kant’s theoretical and practical project of his Copernican revolution, but instead separate some elements of his practical philosophy from its theory, in the name of Kant’s views (opinions), but maintain the link between the critical theory and some of its practice: Thereby they corrupt Kantian theoretical practice in the name of practical considerations which are themselves alien (non–theoretical) to Kantian theory: For they must admit that their “concerns” to purify Kantianism of the corrupt influence of Kant’s alleged “opinions” are in no wise extracted from the Kantian corpus. They therefore stab Kant’s authentic Copernican revolution in the back. We in no way condemn their treasonous behavior, but only draw attention to the fact that their sanitized version of the Copernican revolution, while entirely satisfying their personal gratifications, in no wise replaces the authentic Copernicanism of modern European history, and most certainly does not cause its satanic nature to vanish from the historical annals of modernity, but rather serves as a mask, which hides the inescapable lesson of exact historiography and universal history in the Western world of today:

“Mind and its world are thus both alike lost and plunged in the infinite grief … Mind is here pressed back upon itself in the extreme of its absolute negativity. This is the absolute turning point; mind rises out of this situation and grasps the infinite positivity of this its inward character, i.e., it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self–consciousness and subjectivity … The realm of fact has discarded its barbarity and unrighteous caprice, while the realm of truth has abandoned the world of beyond and its arbitrary force, so that the true reconciliation which discloses the state as the image and actuality of reason has become objective. In the state, self–consciousness finds in an organic development the actuality of its substantive knowing and willing; in religion, it finds the feeling and the representation of this its own truth as an ideal essentiality; while in philosophical science, it finds the free comprehension and knowledge of this truth as one and the same in its mutually complementary manifestations, i.e., in the state, in nature, and in the ideal world.”²⁰

In fine, the academic stratagem, whereby Kant’s sophistical philosophy is first separated from his opinions concerning superior and inferior human races (the sophistical Kantian doctrine of the master race), and then this separation between his sophistical philosophy on the one hand, and his mere opinions on the other, is justified as a transcendental conception in the name of psychologism and solipsism (via some novel interpretation of transcendental idealism), fails miserably in the light of rational Hegelianism. For interpretations of transcendental idealism are themselves contaminated with the aforementioned irrationalism: Covertly imported within their corrupt categorial scheme is the very paralogism between “philosophy” and opinion which is in dispute, — in the name of subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism. Of course this covert operation is not always categorized via traditional Kantian terms, but is evidenced in the form of transcendental “argumentation,” — resultant in transcendental perspectives, outlooks, views, standpoints, and so forth. In other words, the so–called interpreters of transcendental idealism, in their projects to salvage the Copernican revolution, themselves “interpret” the sophistical critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, interpretations wherein they separate Kant’s alleged opinions from his philosophical sophistry: They psychologize and solipsize as “interpreters.” The phantasizing over what kind of mental states once occurred in the mind of Immanuel Kant at such and such a time and place, — in order to transcendentally justify the delusional separation between Kant’s sophistical philosophy on the one hand, and his mere opinions on the other, as a transcendental distinction, — is itself evidence of the complete intellectual bankruptcy of Kantianism in the world of today. The ideological project aimed at the rehabilitation of Copernicanism, in order to sustain Liberal Internationalism as the backbone of Eurocentrisme as multipolarity or polycentrisme, and thereby uphold Großdeutschland (der Merkel Apparat) as the prius of European political and economic power, flounders upon the rocks of psychologism and solipsism, — as modern European subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism.²¹ The extremely influential Kantian sophism that there exists a transcendental (certain and incorrigible) differentiation between superior and inferior human races, the transcendental “conception” of human races, is the fountainhead of modern European raciology, especially in the arena of politics and economics: Especially in the field of modern European history, the downplaying of Kantian racism and racialism (raciology), the transcendental “conception” (sophism) of superior and inferior human races, i.e., the sophistical transcendental justification of the political economy (modern slavery) of the master race (Eurocentrisme), as merely Kant’s view or opinion(such as the Kantian view or opinion that Kant is best understood as a systematic philosopher), is itself Kantian raciology in the world of today.

III/ THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AND MODERN UNREASON

A/ Copernican “Anti–Copernicanism”

From whence comes the motivation for the downplaying of Kantian raciology at the hands of our modern sophists? We must pose this question, which naturally arises in the conceptualization of the rational conception of twenty–first century American Idealism, as the conceptual universality of the powerful conceptualization of Western civilization, the traditional fountainhead of which is Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

The Digital revolution is the seedbed of the anti–Copernican revolutionism of American Idealism: The Copernican “anti–Copernicanism” of the modern sophists, especially in the European Union, is Kantian reactionism. The salvagers of Kantian sophistry attack Western philosophy in toto, as Eurocentrisme (Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hegel and so forth), in order to draw their fraudulent distinction between good and bad Kantianism: Thereby they endeavour to protect the critical sophistical philosophy of Immanuel Kant from the charge of unreason, — in the name of views, standpoints and perspectives. The sophistical operation of Copernican “anti–Copernicanism” consists in the drawing of a sophistical (subjective, relative and irrational) distinction between “good” Kantians (philosophers) and “bad” Kantians (sophists), and then results in the condemnation of the bad Kantians (irrationalists allegedly hiding in the transcendental “garb” of Kant) as racists and racialists, while praising the good Kantians (real Kantianism) as humanitarians: The Copernican “anti–Copernican” sophistical distinction between good and bad Kantianism is based upon an equally specious differentiation between real and false Kantianism. Their specious differentiation between so–called real Kantianism, as opposed to false Kantianism, is drawn up in the name of phenomenology, existentialism, empiricism, realism, scientific philosophy and so forth , — all of which is merely the same old modern European unreason (subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism) served upon a new platter: Modern sophists are abetted in the philosophical crime of Copernican “anti–Copernicanism” by the diminishing powers of anti–Americanism in the Western world, which in turn are facilitated by Oriental Despotism.²² Modern sophistry, in its doomed project to salvage the sophistical philosophy of Immanuel Kant, thus (1) ignores and neglects the genuine Hegelian distinction between exact and inexact historiography and world history, because it (2) ignores and neglects the rational Hegelian distinction between pure and impure Hegelianism, and (3) ignores and neglects the pure Hegelian distinction between pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, — serious faults which are by no means the only defects of the Copernican “anti–Copernican” reaction.

Why does Copernican “anti–Copernicanism” salvage the sophistical philosophy of Immanuel Kant in the world of today? The ideological project aimed at the rehabilitation of Copernicanism is effectuated in order to sustain Liberal Internationalism as the backbone of Eurocentrisme as multipolarity or polycentrisme, and thereby uphold Großdeutschland (der Merkel Apparat) as the prius of European political and economic power. Wherefore? The world historical task of the Merkel Apparat is the clearing away of the very last vestiges of modernity in the European Union after the Cold War, to nurture the seedbed of Americanism and the supremacy of the superior ruling class, in the Global integration between Europe and Asia, in the unification of the western and eastern hemispheres, as the rational planetization of world civilization in the mastery of American Liberty. The development of Eurasia really begins with the integration of western and eastern Europe, after the reunification of Germany and the collapse of the Soviet Empire as a world power: The strife between western and eastern Europe in this direction, is the work of the Merkel Apparat, which brings to fruition the Ukrainian crisis. The entire geopolitical conjuncture of the region is profoundly realigned upon a completely new world historical basis. On the European side of these historical determinations, the Merkel Apparat in Brussels is behind the new developments, in the name of continentalism as EU–expansion in the rise of Großeuropa. The rise of Großeuropa therefore spells the doom of the Merkel Apparat, because the Ukrainian crisis in its turn is the seedbed of powerful new political and economic complexifications, which uplift superior ruling classes. The historical concretization of Eurasia as a political and economic reality within the sphere of Americanism means that the entire evolutionary advancement of European humanity is uplifted to a far higher plane of financial, commercial and industrial freedom: The rational and spiritual development of these powerful new forces, in conjunction with American Idealism, is the task of the twenty–first century.

With Kant in one pocket, and Hegel in the other, I walk towards the sun.

Endnotes

1. Helmut Schmidt, Men and Powers: A Political Retrospective, New York, 1989, 295. [Italics added]

See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”

Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “Introduction: What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, London, 2016, 4. [Italics added]

See: “Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Dordrecht, 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”
Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Oxford, 2014, 32–36–36–36.

See: “[The] more sympathetic tradition in Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as accounts of Hegel’s attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state.”

Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel, Cambridge, 2003, ix.

2. See: “Angela Merkel’s conservatives no longer insist that the IMF continues to participate in Greece’s bailout programme, in a decisive change.”

Guy Chazan & Mehreen Khan, “Merkel’s Party Drops Insistence on IMF Staying in Greek Bailout: CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group Shifts Stance Over Fund’s Call for Debt Relief for Athens,” Financial Times, 31 May 2018.

Remark: The puppets of Berlin in the National Assemblies of the Euronations maintain their power in national elections with the assistance of the European Union under the vassalage of Bonapartist Germany in the form of handouts: The enemies of Germanocentric Europe (multipolarity) in the European Union are branded as right wing lunatics, extremists, racists and even Hitlerites. In their peaceful marches and protests across Germany, followers of the anti–Merkel movement are often physically attacked, psychologically intimidated and verbally abused. The lack of rational consensus under Berlin’s direction is the cause of the BREXIT.

3. See: “The doctrine of nationalism issued from the volcanic fires of the French Revolution, carrying its virile message of emancipation and defiance to the uttermost parts of the earth … On November 19th, 1792, the Convention resolved to ‘assist all peoples who wished to recover their liberty.’ This formula, which might seem quixotically unselfish, proved to be merely a cloak for aggression, since French soldiers and agents were the judges of whether the peoples were desirous of ‘liberty,’ which, it was assumed, could only be enjoyed by annexation to the French Republic.”

George Peabody Gooch (1873–1968), Nationalism, New York, 1920, 5–11.

See: “The statesmen of the French Revolution roused their fellow countrymen to the most astounding military efforts by announcing that France would compel all other nations to be free in the same sense as herself. Under Napoléon I, and more obscurely under his nephew, Napoléon III, France aspired to impose her suzerainty by force of arms upon the whole of Western Europe.”

Frank Morgan & Henry William Carless Davis, French Policy Since 1871, London, 1914, 4.

See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality [Social Democracy, i.e., Socialism].”

Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher (1865–1940), Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, 1908, 7–22–39–87–120. [Italics added]

See: “The history of France between the fall of Robespierre and the rise of Napoléon is full of instruction for those who believe in representative democracy as a universal panacea for the political distempers of mankind.”

Walter Alison Phillips (1864–1950), “Preface,” After Robespierre: The Thermidorian Reaction, Albert Mathiez, New York, 1965, vii.

See: “A glance at the product of the French Parliament since 1879 shows that France today, as well as England, is a land where ‘freedom slowly broadens down,’ if not from precedent to precedent, at least from statute to statute. To be sure freedom is a larger thing than acts of legislatures, but it is also larger than decisions of judges.”

James Thomson Shotwell (1874–1965), “The Political Capacity of the French,” Political Science Quarterly, 24(1 March 1909): 120.

See: “The [Russian] Revolution is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August 1914 … this war is at bottom a struggle for popular Government as well as for liberty.”

David Lloyd George in Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, 1967, 459.

See: “Why don’t the moderate liberals state that, if the Government continues their socialism and arbitrary ways, they cannot support them?”

Edward VII in Giles St. Aubyn, Edward VII: Prince and King, New York, 1979, 431.

See: “Now the Kantian traditions have gained power once more.”

Ernst Mach, “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition (1912),” The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, Supplement to the Third English Edition Containing the Author’s Additions to the Seventh German Edition, Chicago and London, 1915, xi.

See: “The awakening of the new age, namely, the ‘kingdom of the realized spirit’ (royaume de l’esprit réalisé), is the age of the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the French Revolution. A free will, albeit formal, whose content is created as it touches the real, is the Kantian principle: This principle of the Critical Philosophy, without doubt, is the very basis of the French Revolution (c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française). The Kantian principle brings practical results to the French Revolution. Kantian reason legislates for the collective will as well as for the individual will … The French Revolution made the bold attempt to begin with individual wills, with the atoms of will: The revolutionary philosophy of Kant attacks the collective will of the Ancien Régime for its abusive privileges.”

Charles Philippe Théodore Andler (1866–1933), “Préface: Hegel,” Le pangermanisme philosophique, 1800 à 1914, Paris, 1917, xliii: “L’ère nouvelle qui s’annonce, c’est–à–dire le ‘royaume de l’esprit réalisé,’ est celle, non seulement de Kant, mais de la Révolution française. Un vouloir libre, tout formel, dont le contenu se crée à mesure qu’il touche au réel, c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française. Ce principe donne des résultats pratiques dans la Révolution d’abord. La raison kantienne légifère pour le vouloir collectif comme pour le vouloir individuel … La Révolution fit cette tentative audacieuse de commencer par les vouloirs individuels, par les atomes du vouloir. C’est le vouloir collectif, l’Ancien Régime, que la philosophie révolutionnaire incrimine pour ses privilèges abusifs.”

See: “The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks one of the two key events after which we may take nineteenth–century philosophy to begin. The other event is the French Revolution, of which many people saw Kant’s philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, as the theoretical correlate. ‘Nineteenth–century’ philosophy … thus actually begins in the later 1780s and the 1790s, in response to Kant’s Critical philosophy and the French Revolution.”

Alison Stone, editor, “Introduction: Philosophy in the Nineteenth–Century,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Edinburgh, 2011, 1.

See finally: “The standpoint of Kantian philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”

Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Hegel, Chicago, 1960, Addition 86 = §135/129–Addition 152 = §258/141.

Eduard Gans, „Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Leipzig, 1911, Zusätze 86 = §135/318–Zusätze 152 = §258/349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben … Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

4. See: “The Industrial Revolution … is not only one of the most important facts of English history, but Europe owes to it the growth of two great systems of thought―Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism.”

Arnold Toynbee (1852–1883), “The Chief Features of the Revolution,” Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England, Popular Addresses, Notes, and Other Fragments, London, 1920, 64.

See: “The great object of the Political Economy of every country is to increase the riches and power of that country.”

Adam Smith, “Chapter 5: Of the Different Employment of Capitals,” Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Edinburgh, 1843, 153.

See: “In the investigation of the relation between the state and the specific elements of its essence, we finally arrived at the behavior of the state towards its individuals, the cells of its natural body.

Is the well–being of its individuals the true and unique purpose of the state? During different time periods, this doctrine is expressed in distinct ways: Increasing the sum of the privilege of happiness (Bacon), as the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of individuals (Bentham). Natural law and historical liberalism could give no other answer to the age–old question, since they derived the state from individuals alone. The answer is historically also explainable as the absolute negation of the absolutist police state, which knew its real responsibility for individuals, and in general its limitations of state power. Thus, the French Revolution believed that it had done enough to establish individual rights within a strictly fixed sphere of freedom and to assign to the state the position of a sentry on the periphery of this sphere. Others rehabilitated the reaction within [227] the form wherein the purpose of the state was contained for the protection of the legal order as such. Locke is the flag bearer of the former doctrine, and Kant is the great pioneer of the latter in the world of thought. However, whether the issue was pursued in one direction or the other, in the guarding of freedom or in the maintenance of order, — the answer was always determined solely by the relation to the individual … However, in the midst of this time, which is overflowing with martyrdom, we do not abandon the hope for a polity [232] which will also be able to care for something more than the panem et circenses of the elderly, the requirements of life and necessities of individuals. The nations also do not live only by the taste of bread, and still less by pleasure. Here lies the ultimate line of demarcation between materialism and idealism: In the conception of what should be, not in the conception of what is. The materialist gives the state as well as the individual another ambition than the satisfaction of expressing one’s purpose in life, and navigating with the least effort and least potential risk, alongside the favorable winds of the storms. The idealist is aware of the responsibility for the direction, and thus the course of the ship of state moves forward. And where does the course lead? “We wonder,” replies the button–founder to Peer Gynt’s question, on the “opinion of the master.” It is the deepest duty of statecraft to determine the meaning of the state, and then plot the course. Statecraft does not shy away from difficulties and hindrances, and even the great suffering that leadership encounters on the way. For one thing is certain: Only through such a journey does the nation earn the wealth which places peoples and individuals above fortune, which alone increases the value of life, in the fullest sense of the word, and which uplifts personal development (Persönlichkeit) to ever greater heights of achievement. The aim of the state is therefore to uplift the human capital, — whichever way fortune dictates, in other words: Ultimate happiness will come by itself.

In this study of the state as a form of life, [233] this must be our last word. We have seen that for compelling reasons, the state has made very little progress upon this course in our time, and is not really aware of such a concept. But we nonetheless believe in a higher type of state, which develops a rational aim, and which will strive towards this goal with reasonable measures.”

Rudolf Kjellén, “Schluß: Der Zweck des Staats,” Der Staat als Lebensform, Leipzig, 1917, 227–233; 227–228–231–232–233: “In der Untersuchung über das Verhältnis des Staats zu den besonderen Seiten seines Wesens sind wir zuletzt bei seinem Verhalten zu den einzelnen Individuen, den zellen seines natürlichen Körpers, angelangt.

Ist nun ihr Wohlergehen sein einziger und wahrer Zweck? Aus verschiedenen zeitabschnitten tönt uns diese Lehre in verschiedenem Ausdruck entgegen: Erhöhung der Summe des privatglücks (Bacon), größtmögliches Gluck für die größtmögliche Anzahl Individuen (Bentham). Naturrecht und der geschichtliche Liberalismus konnten ja gar keine andere Antwort auf die uralte Frage geben, da sie den Staat aus den Individuen allein ableiteten. Die Antwort ist geschichtlich auch erklärlich als absoIute Verneinung des polizeistaats des Absolutismus, der seine wirkliche Verantwortlichkeit für die Individuen und überhaupt seine Grenzen der Staatsmacht kannte. So glaubte die franzosische Revolution damit genug getan zu haben, dass sie die individuellen Rechte innerhalb einer streng fixierten Freiheitsphäre feststellte und dem Staat die Stellung eines Wachtpostens an der Peripherie dieser Sphäre anwies. Andere wieder kleideten die Reaktion in [228] die Form, das man den Zweck des Staats in den Schutz der Rechtsordnung als solcher setzte. Locke ist der große Bannerträger ersteren Lehre und Kant der große Bahnbrecher der letzteren in der Welt des Denkens. Ob man nun aber die Ausgabe nach der einen oder der anderen Richtung hin, im Bewachen der freiheit oder im Behüten der ordnung, suchte — immer wurde die Antwort allein durch das Verhältnis zum Individuum bestimmt … Inmitten dieser von Marthasorgen überströmenden Zeit lassen wir jedoch nicht von der Hoffnung auf einen Staat ab, [232] der auch für etwas anderes wird Sorgen können, als für die »panem et circenses« der Alten, Lebensnotdurft und Vergnügen für die einzelnen Individuen. Auch die Nationen leben doch Schließliche nicht von Brot allein, und noch weniger von Vergnügungen. Hier liegt die wirkliche Trennungslinie zwischen Materialismus und Idealismus: in der Auffassung dessen, was sein sollte, nicht in der Auffassung dessen, was ist. Der Materialist gibt dem Staat wie dem Individuum seinen anderen Zweck als das Glück, sich seinem Naturell nach aus zuleben und mit geringster Anstrengung und möglichst geringem Risiko mit dem günstigen Winde der Triebe zu segeln. Der Idealist ist sich der Verantwortlichkeit für den Kurs bewüßt, hier also für den Kurs des Staatsschiffs vorwärts. Und wohin foll der Kurs gehen? „Das soll man ahnen,” antwortet der Knopfgießer auf Peer Gynts Frage nach der „Meinung des Meisters.” Es ist die tiefste Pflicht des Staatsmanns, den Sinn seines Staats zu ahnen und danach das Steuer zu richten. Dann aber scheue er auch nicht vor den Schwierigkeiten und hindernissen zurück und den vielleicht großen Leiden, die ihm unterwegs begegnen. Denn eines ist gewiß: einzig und allein durch eine solche Fahrt gewinnt seine Nation das, was Volkern wie Einzelmenschen höher steht als das Glück, und was allein im tiefften Grund den Preis des Lebens bezahlt, und das ist die Verbesserung der Persönlichkeit zu immer größer werdender Vollkommenheit. Die Volksanlage zu vervollkommnen, ist also der Zweck des Staats — nachher mag es mit dem Glück werden wie es will, oder richtiger: dann kommt das wirkliche Glück von selbst.

Das muß unser letztes Wort in dieser Untersuchung des [233] Staats als Lebensform sein. Wir haben gesehen, daß der Staat unsere Zeit aus zwingenden Gründen sehr geringe Fortschritte aus einem solchen Weg gemacht hat und sich einer darartigen Ausgabe noch nichte recht bewußt geworben ist. Aber wir glauben dennoch an einen höheren Staatstypus, der einen Vernunftzweck klarer erkennen läßt und diesem Ziel mit sichereren Schritten entgegenstreben wird.”

See: “As for the famous Manchester School — the ‘minimisers’ stuck in Locke and Kant — they only wanted to make the reality of State power into no more than the supplier of legal protection and maintainer of the justice system.”

Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, Zweite Auflage, Leipzig, S. Herzel Verlag, 1917, 5: “Denn die berühmte ManchesterschuIe — die in Locke und Kant wurzelnden „minimisers” — wollte wirkliche im Staate nicht mehr sehen als einen „Rechtschutzlieferanten” und einen Aufrechterhalter der Rechtsordnung.”

5. See: “We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from all of them … the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli … Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State … those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood (sang des hommes répandu) as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine … The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress … Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.”
Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352: “Nous nous proposons un rapprochement, une comparaison, entre la doctrine de Machiavel, telle qu’elle ressort du Prince, et la doctrine de l’absolutisme, que nous essayerons de dégager, non pas de tel ou tel des théoriciens qui en furent les champions; mais de l’ensemble de ces théoriciens … les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel … Machiavélisme et absolutisme sont issus de situations historiques analogues. C’est là un premier point essentiel de notre parallèle. Cette situation inspire à Machiavel l’idée de la légitimité de tous les moyens destinés à atteindre un but d’intérêt public et à réaliser le salut de l’État … Tous ceux qui ont pu étudier Napoléon l de près, nous disent qu’il y avait en lui le Napoléon homme d’État, qui voyait dans le sang des hommes répandu un des grands remèdes de la médecine politique … Le Prince de Machiavel et les doctrines de l’absolutisme sont nés d’un même sentiment profond de patriotisme, à des époques et dans des pays où un souverain puissant était nécessaire pour faire cesser, sous sa domination, les désordres et la désunion, causes de la détresse nationale … Machiavel nous apparaît comme un patriote sans scrupule lorsqu’il s’agit de sauver l’État. Dans sa conception du gouvernement il se révèle à nous comme un politique soucieux du bonheur du peuple et respectueux de sa liberté.”

See finally: Napoléon Bonaparte & Abbé Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, 1816.

6. See: “For Hegel the nation was the highest authority, he believed that a divine force moved through nations, and a nation’s supremacy revealed its purpose. Nations were destined to struggle for supremacy. The past had belonged in turn to the Oriental world, the Greek world and the Roman world. His own times, Hegel believed, would witness the German era, the highest development so far. History was the process of struggle until in the end all conflicts would be resolved. Nationality would inevitably struggle with nationality and through the pursuit of power the national mission would be fulfilled. The divine purpose was bound to triumph so that the vanquished were not to be pitied for they fulfilled their purpose. Only the state that was right would win, thus might became right, a historical right that Hegel regarded more important than any other right.”

John Ashley Soames Grenville, Europe Reshaped: 1848–1878, London, 1986, 119–120. [Italics added]

See: “Hegel, who following Machiavelli made a cult of the state, taught that ‘the course of world history stands outside of virtue, blame, and justice.’”

Max Lerner, “Introduction,” The Prince and the Discourses, Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), New York, 1940, xli. [Italics added]

See: “Under the respective influence of Locke and Rousseau, the American Declaration of Independence and the French Declaration of the Rights of Mankind and Citizens (Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen) are characterized respectively by a greater idealized individualism and the power of an idealized collective ‘body’ to counterbalance outrageous individualism … Philosophers such as Kant, who were influenced by the French Revolution, defined themselves in rather metaphysical terms … Objects have no objective reality in the philosophy of Kant. Reality is the product of the relation between individual thought and external objects. Reality therefore exists as a function of the ideas that the individual projects on the external world. Therefore, exteriority is only the product of individual volition, and the desire to conceptualize the world as a real and infinite will … It must also be said that the reaction of Fichte and Hegel to the philosophy of the Enlightenment ‘created, during the Napoléonic wars, the foundations of German nationalism as well as those of National Socialism and Marxism, albeit modified’ … Thus the conceptual basis of Pan–Germanism was subjected to the consecutive influence of Herder, Fichte and Hegel and, with the defeat of France at Metz in 1870, German nationalist thought dictated its terms throughout Europe. French nationalism thus becomes the expression of German thought. This is Germanic natural hatred (la haine de la nature allemande), expressed in German nationalistic terms. European nationalism took shape in the light of the French Revolution during the first half of the nineteenth century, but towards the end of the nineteenth century, these selfsame nationalisms formed in the shadow of the German Counter–Revolution: One of the consequences of the racism inherent in this cultural nationalism is the rise of virulent anti–Semitism in Europe. In reaction to growing anti–Semitism in Europe, the European Jews created a parallel nationalism to fight their oppressors. In opposition to anti–Semitic oppression, Zionism rejects racist thought via its very own racist terminology: The Jew becomes the Self and the non–Jew becomes the Non–self.”

David Beam & Bruce Katz, “Les origines du nationalisme culturel,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 19.5(décembre–janvier, 1991–1992): 19–22–22–23–23: “Sous l’influence respective de Locke et de Rousseau, la Déclaration américaine et la Déclaration française se caractérisent respectivement par un plus grand individualisme idéalisé et par le poids d’un ‘corps’ collectif idéalisé pour contrebalancer l’individualisme outré … D’autres philosophes influencés par la Révolution, comme Kant, se définissent plutôt en termes métaphysiques … Pour Kant, les objets n’ont pas de réalité objective. La réalité est le produit de la relation entre la pensée de l’individu et les objets extérieurs. Donc, cette réalité existe comme fonction des idées que l’individu projette sur le monde extérieur. Par conséquent, le monde extérieur n’est que le produit de la volonté de l’individu à vouloir le conceptualiser, une volonté sans limite réelle … Il faut également reconnaître que la réaction de Fichte et de Hegel à l’égard la philosophie du Siècle des lumières «a engendré, pendant les guerres napoléoniennes, les fondements du nationalisme allemand ainsi que ceux du National Socialisme et du Marxisme, quoique modifiés» … Ainsi la base conceptuelle du pangermanisme subit l’influence consécutive de Herder, de Fichte et de Hegel et, avec la défaite de la France à Metz en 1870, la pensée nationaliste allemande dicte ses termes partout en Europe. Le nationalisme français devient donc l’expression de la pensée allemande. Il s’agit de la haine de la nature allemande, exprimée en termes nationalistes allemands. Alors que les nationalismes européens prenaient forme à la lumière de la Révolution française pendant la première moitié du 19ᵉ siècle, vers la fin de ce même siècle, ils se formaient à l’ombre de la Contre–Révolution allemande. Une des conséquences du racisme inhérent à ce nationalisme culturel est la montée d’un antisémitisme virulent en Europe. En réaction à l’antisémitisme croissant en Europe, les juifs européens fondent un nationalisme parallèle pour combattre leurs oppresseurs. Par opposition à l’oppression antisémite, le sionisme rejette, dans ses propres termes racistes, la pensée raciste: le juif devient le Moi et le non–juif devient le Non–moi.” [Italics added]

See: “[In The Philosophy of Right] the state so described is unlike any existing state in Hegel’s day. It is a form of limited monarchy, with parliamentary government, trial by jury and toleration for Jews and dissenters. In all these respects it differed from the contemporary Prussia. It has often been said by Hegel’s detractors that his book was written on the ‘dunghill of servility’ and that his ideal state is identified with the monarchy of Friedrich William III. Little historical knowledge and little study of Hegel is required to see that this is nonsense.”

Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, 1967, 302.

7. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, 1994, 806–808.

I/ Federica Mogherini’s “Global Strategy”

1. Isaiah Berlin in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 145. [Italics added]

2. Cecelia Lynch in Mark F.N. Franke, “Introduction: Kant in International Relations,” Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics, Albany, New York, State University of New York, 2001, 1–24; 18. [Italics added]

See: “Kant is indeed in ascendance as the seer for many scholars predicting and theorizing the possibility of a multipolar liberal international peace. The practical impact of his work in this domain is intensifying at a substantial rate.”

Mark F.N. Franke, “Introduction: Kant in International Relations,” Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics, Albany, New York, State University of New York, 2001, 1–24; 18.

3. Federica Mogherini, “Foreward,” Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics), Nathalie Tocci; Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E. Paterson, series editors, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, vii–ix; vii–viii. [Italics added]

See: “Reading Nathalie’s book, all the images and memories of these two years came back to me — but one above all: the incredibly intense days between the decision of the UK voters to leave the European Union and the European Council of June 28th where I presented the Global Strategy. The book testifies the unprecedented collective effort that has led to the text of the EU Global Strategy for foreign and security policy: over fifty public events in all Member States, countless rounds of consultations with governments, institutions, think tanks, experts and European citizens from all walks of life. All such work suddenly came into question after the ‘Brexit’ vote.

I will never forget the hours after the referendum, the conversations with Nathalie and with my staff, with the presidents of the European institutions, with ministers from most Member States and with our British friends. Through those hours, we realised the decision we were taking was not simply about the European Council’s agenda, it was not about procedures, nor was it about getting the best media coverage for the Strategy. We all realised there was one thing Europe could not afford after the vote, and that was uncertainty. With the British referendum, the need for a common strategy was even greater than before.

We needed — and we still need — to look beyond this self–induced crisis of European integration and to focus on what binds us together: the shared interests and the values driving our common foreign policy; our unparalleled strength, as the First–World economy, the largest global [viii] investor in humanitarian aid and development cooperation, a global security provider with a truly global diplomatic network. We need to focus on the immense untapped potential of a more joined–up European Union. We need to move from a shared vision to common action.”

Federica Mogherini, Ibidem, vii–viii.

4. Federica Mogherini, Ibidem.

See: “As Nathalie shows, throughout the process, the need for a Global Strategy became clearer and clearer to all. And six months after the presentation of the document, the twenty–eight Heads of State and Government have approved my proposals for implementing the Strategy in the field of security and defence. It is a major leap forward for European cooperation — and eventually, integration — on defence matters. The process leading to the Global Strategy has helped build consensus on a set of concrete measures and on their rationale. Instead of getting stuck into never–ending ideological debates or exhausting negotiations on revising the Treaties, we moved pretty steadily from principles to practice — to finally get things done, where it really matters.

The implementation of the Strategy is now under way in all sectors, from fostering resilience to public diplomacy, from a more joined–up development cooperation to a rethinking of global governance. The European Union of security and defense can be a major building block to relaunch the process of European integration, but it cannot be the only one. Europe can deliver to our citizens’ and our partners’ needs only when it acts as a true Union, at national and European levels, with our hard and soft power, in our external and internal policies alike. Europe delivers only when it is united.

In the days following the British referendum, the ultimate decision on whether to move forward with the presentation of the EUGS belonged to me — but the process leading to the decision was truly collective, just like the whole process leading to Global Strategy. We did it the European way. The process had to be inclusive, taking into account as many voices as we could. At the same time, inclusiveness had to go together with incisiveness: we had to avoid getting stuck on reciprocal vetoes, aiming for the most ambitious outcomes. I believe the Strategy manages to be both inclusive and incisive. It shows a united and decisive Union, Europe at its best.”

Mogherini, Ibidem, viii.

5. Charles Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice in the International Order (Studies in the History of International Relations), Münster/Hamburg, Lit Verlag, 1994, 71.

6. Frank Morgan & Henry William Carless Davis, French Policy Since 1871,London, 1914, 4.

See: Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821) & Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

7. See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality [Social Democracy, i.e., Socialism].”

Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher (1865–1940), Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, 1908, 7–22–39–87–120. [Italics added]

8. Nathalie Tocci, Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics), Federica Mogherini, foreward; Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E. Paterson, series editors, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 3–113. [Italics added]

9. Federica Mogherini, Ibidem, vii–viii–ix. [Italics added]

See: “It would be impossible to recall all the people who contributed to this work. My heartfelt thanks go to Javier Solana, for his guidance, encouragement and inspiration. Nathalie holds a very special place in this story: she has my gratitude not only for the incredible work she has done but [ix] also for the energy and the patience she has put in it, for our long conversations, her good spirits and her own ‘resilience.’ She [Nathalie Tocci] has set up, steered and accompanied this collective process, step by step. This book tells the story of the Global Strategy from a unique and privileged perspective. It provides the reader with a special insight into the debates and the decisions that shaped up the Strategy. In times of disillusion and disenchantment, it tells a different, true story about our Union: the positive story of a Union that delivers, together.”

Mogherini, Ibidem, viii–ix.

10. Nathalie Tocci, “Annex A: The European Union in a Changing Global Environment: A More Connected, Contested and Complex World,” Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics), Federica Mogherini, foreward; Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E. Paterson, series editors, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 103–130; 104.

11. Nathalie Tocci, Ibidem, 103.

12. Tocci, Ibidem, 104.

II/ Modern Freedom

Introduction

1. Immanuel Kant in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 148. [Italics added]

See: “The Negro … undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races.”

Immanuel Kant in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 148.

See: “[Kant] also warned, with reference to European breeding with either Native Americans or Blacks that race mixing degrades ‘the good race’ without lifting up ‘the bad race’ proportionately.”

Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 155.

2. Isaiah Berlin in Bernasconi, Ibidem, 145. [Italics added]

See: “Locke, of course, was not only familiar with the use of African slaves in North America, but helped to formulate the severe code whereby the freemen of Carolina had absolute power and authority over such slaves.”

Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 164.

See: “Immanuel Kant appears to be well on his way to becoming the prophet of ‘progressive international reform’ in the post–Cold War era.”

Cecilia Lynch in Mark F.N. Franke, “Introduction: Kant in International Relations,” Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics, Albany, New York, State University of New York, 2001, 1–24; 18.

See: “Kant is indeed in ascendance as the seer for many scholars predicting and theorizing the possibility of a multipolar liberal international peace. The practical impact of his work in this domain is intensifying at a substantial rate.”

Mark F.N. Franke, “Introduction: Kant in International Relations,” Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics, Albany, New York, State University of New York, 2001, 1–24; 18.

See finally: “For Kant, no international order could promote a lasting peace between states which required the separate states to surrender their sovereign independence to an international state, or to a world government. Hence, he insisted that international peace could come about only through the voluntaryacceptance by states of an international rule of law, where this rule of law presupposed, as the condition of its own legitimacy, the retention by the states that accepted its authority of the rights that were essential to their sovereignty and independence.”

Charles Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice in the International Order (Studies in the History of International Relations), Münster/Hamburg, Lit Verlag, 1994, 71.

3. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 806–808. [Italics added]

See also: “America serves its values best by perfecting democracy at home, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind … America’s values impose on it an obligation to crusade for them around the world … [American Idealists] envisioned as normal a global international order based on democracy, free commerce, and international law. Since no such system has ever existed, its evocation often appears to other societies as utopian, if not naïve. Still, foreign skepticism never dimmed the idealism of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, or Ronald Reagan, or indeed of all other twentieth–century American presidents. If anything it has spurred America’s faith that [modern European] history can be overcome and that if the world truly wants peace, it needs to apply America’s moral prescriptions.”
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 18.

See also: “In the post–Cold War world, American idealism needs the leaven of geopolitical analysis to find its way through the maze of new complexities.”
Henry Kissinger, Ibidem, 812.

See finally: “Americans, protected by the size and isolation of their country, as well as by their own idealism and mistrust of the Old World, have sought to conduct a unique kind of foreign policy based on the way they wanted the [old] world to be, as opposed to the way it really is … Modern diplomacy emerged from the trials and experiences of the balance of power of warfare and peacemaking … America, sometimes to its peril, refused to learn its [modern European diplomacy] lessons … Americans, from the very beginning, sought a distinctive foreign policy based on [American] idealism.”
Henry Kissinger, Ibidem, Jacket.

Remarks: In contradistinction, and mortally opposed to the philosophy of American Idealism, there exists in America an ever–diminishing quantity of the outdated and surpassed tradition of modern European political and economic irrationalism as anti–Americanism (which is sometimes used by corrupt politicians in state legislatures to debase federal power, especially under the influence of Mexican and Canadian Bonapartism, but is mostly found as the rotten purview of degenerate academia): Noam Chomsky was seduced very early by the philosophical sophistry of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant, namely “Europe’s Machiavellian relativism and selfishness” (Henry Kissinger), the subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of modern European unreason: Noam Chomsky maintains the ultimate realm of logical and linguistic truth and reality is unknowable; in other words, Chomsky’s program to revise and replace traditional grammar is deeply inspired by the Kantian delusion that the ultimate realm of truth and reality is unknowable; Chomsky endeavors to transform traditional grammar based upon his version of logical and linguistic phenomena, in order to lend credence to the highfalutin verbiage with which he clothes his modern European political and economic irrationalism, and to attack his adversaries as bad grammarians, namely as Hegelians (as conservatives, right–wing extremists and fascists). Chomsky’s 20th century modern European irrationalism has collapsed in the face of Globalism and the supremacy of universal freedom in the world of today.

“Nearly fifty years ago Chomsky argued for explicit rigor, for various levels of representation provided by a theory of grammar, and for seeking a precise evaluation metric to compare grammars … we can revisit this matter and many others in light of subsequent work developing theories of grammar and spelling out the details of Universal Grammar, now seen [by Chomskyians] as defining the language faculty … It has also spawned new approaches to old philosophical questions, notions of meaning and reference, and Chomsky has taken the lead in this area.”
David W. Lightfoot, “Introduction,” Syntactic Structures, 2nd edition, Noam Chomsky, New York/Berlin, Mouton de Gruyter, 2002, v–xviii; xvi.

Noam Chomsky, according to David W. Lightfoot, is not a sophist, but is a philosopher, among other things. We will evaluate how exactly Chomsky puts into political and economic language the so–called explicit rigor, levels of representation and precise evaluation of his grammar theory. A fortiori, Chomsky’s political and economic grammar is inseparable from his theory of grammar: We will uncover and expose this link. We will examine in detail some of Noam Chomsky’s sophistical philosophical arguments with regards to his “notions” of meaning and reference in the world historical realm of political and economic language.

We will discover that Chomsky’s sophistical notions (sophisms) of meaning and reference are advanced in the world historical realm of politics and economics as “logical and linguistic” justifications for the language of modern European political and economic irrationalism. Noam Chomsky’s anti–American sophisms of meaning and reference are therefore very dangerous delusions in the Global world of today, especially in the Middle East, but also in Western countries vulnerable to terrorist attacks, such as nations in southern and eastern Europe: The anti–American ideology of Noam Chomsky and his followers is a very serious threat to America and Americans in every corner of the Globe:

“The successful use of terrorism is not considered a scandal. On the contrary, it is welcomed and applauded, including large–scale state terrorism in the Middle East–Mediterranean region sponsored or carried out directly by the United States.”
Noam Chomsky, The Culture of Terrorism, London, 1988, 92.

For what reason these labors of American Idealism? The American victims of Global terrorism, and their families, must be financially compensated for the terrible pain and suffering they have endured over the years: Class action lawsuits must be launched against Noam Chomsky and his followers, the publishing firms and websites that have backed them, and the academic institutions that have employed them. Anti–Americanism has greatly fanned the flames of terrorism and violence around the world, and contributed to radicalization and extremism, the fertile recruiting ground of terrorist organizations. Noam Chomsky and his followers have provided terrorist groups and cells across the Globe with the sophistical and ideological weapons of anti–Americanism which have greatly contributed over the decades to the contagion of terrorism and violence against America and the Western world.

How many American lives have been ruined or destroyed by anti–Americanism around the world, and how much terrorism and violence were unleashed upon America in the past half–century, thanks to the anti–American ideology of Noam Chomsky and his followers?

4. Judah Philip Benjamin (1811–1884), A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law, London, Henry Sweet, 1868, 299. [Italics added]

See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … This is not the place for a detailed examination of the principles of Napoléonic law. It is well, however, to notice that the civil code alone was drawn up during the Consulate, that it is nearer both in time and spirit to the revolutionary law than are the codes which were compiled in a more perfunctory manner under the darker shadows of imperial despotism … in the codes, in the common system of administration, the foundations of a modern Italy were laid. And here the memory of Napoléon was not easily forgotten … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality [social democracy, i.e., socialism].”
Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1908, 7–22–39–55–87–120.

See also: “We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from all of them … the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli … Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State … those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood (sang des hommes répandu) as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine … The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress … Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.”
Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352: “Nous nous proposons un rapprochement, une comparaison, entre la doctrine de Machiavel, telle qu’elle ressort du Prince, et la doctrine de l’absolutisme, que nous essayerons de dégager, non pas de tel ou tel des théoriciens qui en furent les champions; mais de l’ensemble de ces théoriciens … les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel … Machiavélisme et absolutisme sont issus de situations historiques analogues. C’est là un premier point essentiel de notre parallèle. Cette situation inspire à Machiavel l’idée de la légitimité de tous les moyens destinés à atteindre un but d’intérêt public et à réaliser le salut de l’État … Tous ceux qui ont pu étudier Napoléon l de près, nous disent qu’il y avait en lui le Napoléon homme d’État, qui voyait dans le sang des hommes répandu un des grands remèdes de la médecine politique … Le Prince de Machiavel et les doctrines de l’absolutisme sont nés d’un même sentiment profond de patriotisme, à des époques et dans des pays où un souverain puissant était nécessaire pour faire cesser, sous sa domination, les désordres et la désunion, causes de la détresse nationale … Machiavel nous apparaît comme un patriote sans scrupule lorsqu’il s’agit de sauver l’État. Dans sa conception du gouvernement il se révèle à nous comme un politique soucieux du bonheur du peuple et respectueux de sa liberté.”

See also: “These principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … [Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion … [Rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated … It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance … Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 44–71–71–99–100–101–102–105. [1532]

See also: Abbé Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

See also: “The history of France between the fall of Robespierre and the rise of Napoléon is full of instruction for those who believe in representative democracy as a universal panacea for the political distempers of mankind.”

Walter Alison Phillips (1864–1950), “Preface,” After Robespierre: The Thermidorian Reaction, Albert Mathiez; Cathrine Alison Phillips, translator, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1965, v–vii; vii. [1931]

See: “There is a widespread impression that the French are a distinctly inferior race … A glance at the product of the French Parliament since 1879 shows that France today, as well as England, is a land where ‘freedom slowly broadens down,’ if not from precedent to precedent, at least from statute to statute. To be sure freedom is a larger thing than acts of legislatures, but it is also larger than decisions of judges.” [Italics added]

James Thomson Shotwell (1874–1965), “The Political Capacity of the French,” Political Science Quarterly, 24(1 March 1909): 115–126; 115–120.

See also: “Especially after 1871, the contagion of Kantianism in France is remarkable … Around 1880, Kantianism becomes the powerful beacon of French moral and political thought, in the eyes of those who are followers of France’s republican creed: For republican thinkers who want to be freed from ‘superstition,’ Immanuel Kant’s philosophy must provide the means of indoctrinating France’s young people with strict morality and civics, self–sacrifice and patriotism: Intellectual disciplines which will eliminate ancient French religious traditions via the powerful secular religion of republicanism.”

Albert Rivaud (1876–1956), “La diffusion du Kantisme,” Histoire de la philosophie: La philosophie allemande de 1700 à 1850: De l’Aufklärung à Schelling, première partie, tome 5, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, 273–276; 274. [1967]: “Il est remarquable que le Kantisme se vulgarise surtout après 1871 … le Kantisme devient–il, vers 1880, le symbole d’une pensée morale et politique profonde, aux yeux de ceux qui sont animés d’une foi républicaine. La philosophie de Kant doit fournir, à une pensée qui se veut affranchie de la «superstition», les moyens de répandre dans la jeunesse une moralité sévère, le civisme, le désintéressement, le patriotisme, toutes ces disciplines apportant un substitut républicain à l’ancienne formation religieuse, en somme l’armature d’une religion laïque.”

See also: “The awakening of the new age, namely, the ‘kingdom of the realized spirit’ (royaume de l’esprit réalisé), is the age of the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the French Revolution. A free will, albeit formal, whose content is created as it touches the real, is the Kantian principle: This principle of the Critical Philosophy, without doubt, is the very basis of the French Revolution (c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française). The Kantian principle brings practical results to the French Revolution. Kantian reason legislates for the collective will as well as for the individual will … The French Revolution made the bold attempt to begin with individual wills, with the atoms of will: The revolutionary philosophy of Kant attacks the collective will of the Ancien Régime for its abusive privileges.”

Charles Philippe Théodore Andler (1866–1933), “Préface: Hegel,” Le pangermanisme philosophique, 1800 à 1914: Textes traduits de l’Allemand par M. Aboucaya [Claude Aboucaya?], G. Bianquis [Geneviève Bianquis, 1886–1972], M. Bloch [Gustave Bloch, 1848–1923], L. Brevet, J. Dessert, M. Dresch [Joseph Dresch, 1871–1958], A. Fabri, A. Giacomelli, B. Lehoc, G. Lenoir, L. Marchand [Louis Marchand, 1875–1948], R. Serreau [René Serreau], A. Thomas [Albert Thomas, 1878–1932], J. Wehrlin, Paris, Louis Conard, Librairie–Éditeur, 1917, xxix–xlv; xliii: “L’ère nouvelle qui s’annonce, c’est–à–dire le ‘royaume de l’esprit réalisé,’ est celle, non seulement de Kant, mais de la Révolution française. Un vouloir libre, tout formel, dont le contenu se crée à mesure qu’il touche au réel, c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française. Ce principe donne des résultats pratiques dans la Révolution d’abord. La raison kantienne légifère pour le vouloir collectif comme pour le vouloir individuel … La Révolution fit cette tentative audacieuse de commencer par les vouloirs individuels, par les atomes du vouloir. C’est le vouloir collectif, l’Ancien Régime, que la philosophie révolutionnaire incrimine pour ses privilèges abusifs.”

See also: “The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks one of the two key events after which we may take nineteenth–century philosophy to begin. The other event is the French Revolution, of which many people saw Kant’s philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, as the theoretical correlate. ‘Nineteenth–century’ philosophy … thus actually begins in the later 1780s and the 1790s, in response to Kant’s Critical philosophy and the French Revolution.”

Alison Stone, editor, “Philosophy in the Nineteenth–Century,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Howard Caygill & David Webb, general editors, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1–12; 1.

See finally: “The standpoint of Kantian philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”

Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960, Addition 1–Addition 194, 115–150; Addition 86 = §135/129–Addition 152 = §258/141. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Eduard Gans, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911, Zusätze 1–Zusätze 194, 281–371; Zusätze 86 = §135, 318–Zusätze 152 = §258, 349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben … Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

5. John Morley (1838–1923), 1st Viscount Morley of Blackburn (1882) in William Hastie, “Translator’s Introduction,” Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science,William Hastie, editor & translator, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1891, vii–xliv; xxxviii–xxxix. [Italics added] See: John Morley, Studies in Literature, 1891.

See: “[158–159] According to Kant, we can never know anything but ‘phenomena,’ never a thing that exists independently of the mind. It cannot be but a subjective phenomenon, because the element of experience in it — the ‘impression,’ which is called the ‘matter’ of the object of a sense–intuition, is subjective, and the element of necessity and universality which is called the ‘form’ coming as it does from the mind, is likewise subjective. Hence the object before the mind, composed as it is by subjective elements, is wholly subjective. Yet Kant always calls such an object really objective. Because the term ‘objective’ always means for Kant, whatever contains a necessary and universal element. For such an element is the same for all human minds as they are at present constituted … [160] Now the ‘matter’ upon which these ‘apriori forms’ of the understanding are superimposed is the ‘phenomenal objects’ of ‘sense–intuition.’ The ‘phenomenal objects’ of sense are already an amalgam of ‘matter,’ — the sense–impression caused by the ‘noumenon’ plus the ‘apriori sense forms’ of ‘space’ and ‘time.’ Why are these ‘apriori forms of the understanding’ imposed upon the phenomena of sense? Because each of these sensuous phenomena are pictured by the imagination as either a substance, a cause, as one or many etc., and when they are so imaginatively pictured, the appropriate ‘apriori form of the understanding’ pops forth from ‘the fairy rath of the mind’ where live these ‘apriori forms’ and attaches itself to the sensuous phenomena and then we necessarily and universally are forced to think that such a sense–phenomenon is a substance, such another a cause, an accident, one or many etc. But in reality, of course, they are no such thing, for these ‘apriori forms’ give us no insight into reality … [166] Kant’s doctrines are destructively opposed to Catholicism. His teaching has been condemned by Popes Leo XIII and Pius X. His great work, ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ was placed on the Index, 11th June, 1827. Inconsistent with Catholic teaching are (1) Kant’s Metaphysical Agnosticism, which declares his ignorance of all things as they really are; (2) his Moral Dogmatism which declares the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; (3) his giving to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification; (4) diametrically opposed to scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind is Kant’s theory of knowledge which makes mind and thought the measure of reality rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought. Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The reversal of the order of thought and reality, Kant calls his ‘Copernican Revolution’ in his theory of knowledge.”

Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought: The English, Irish and Scotch Schools, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 158–159–166.

See: “Kant in his writings habitually ascribes to philosophical terms a meaning quite different from that which they traditionally bear … Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so.”

Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought: The English, Irish and Scotch Schools, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 159–166.

See: “Many modern authors use the name ‘Formal Logic’ instead of the usual Scholastic term ‘Minor Logic’ and the Aristotelian term ‘Dialectics.’ The philosophy of Kant has popularized the term ‘Formal Logic.’ But the Kantian concept of this part of Logic is essentially different from the meaning which Scholasticism has assigned to it. In the philosophy of Kant the necessary grooves or laws which the mind must follow in its operations of reason have their origin solely in the mind; they are of the mind and in the mind. [9] We must think, Kant would say, according to these necessary laws because our minds, antecedently to all experiences of reality, are constituted that way … Kant conceives the laws of thought as ‘forms’ native to the mind and therefore as having no objective value. Hence he calls the science of these ‘forms’ ‘Formal Logic.’ Scholasticism admits these laws are in the mind but not of the mind. They are rather engendered in the mind by objective reality. They put us therefore in touch with reality. Hence ‘Formal Logic’ does not mean to Scholasticism what it means to Kantianism.”

Michael Joseph Mahony, Essentials of Formal Logic, New York, The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1918, 8–9.

6. See: “We want to know how far Montesquieu was dependent upon the ideas of his time and how he influenced his successors, — where we can place him in the context of European attitudes toward the Eastern world, and in the evolution of these opinions … The concept of ‘oriental despotism’ coined by the West served above all to justify the military, and especially commercial, interventions of Europeans in Asia.” [Italics added]

Rachida El Diwani, L’Orient des Lettres Persanes, Morrisville, North Carolina, Lulu Press, Inc., 2009, 1–11: “Nous sommes intéressée à savoir jusqu’où Montesquieu était tributaire des idées de son temps, comment il a influencé ses successeurs et où peut–on le placer dans le courant des attitudes européennes envers l’Orient, et dans le courant des changements et de la continuité de ces attitudes … Le concept du ‘despotisme asiatique’ forgé par l’Occident servait surtout à justifier les interventions guerrières et surtout commerciales des Européens en Asie.”

Remarks: Indeed, the Kantian traditions have used the concept of “oriental despotism” (despotisme asiatique) to justify the military, and especially commercial, interventions of Europeans in Asia. The subjective, relativistic and irrational identification of European modernity with Western civilization basedupon attitudes and opinions (perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints), is used by the selfsame outdated and surpassed Kantian traditions to disguise the political and economic irrationalism of modern Europe, in order to debase and corrupt the rational conception of Western civilization, usually as White Supremacy, White Nationalism or some such sophistry, which in the Berliner hands (Business Insider) of the Bonapartists of the European Union, — the Dieselgate aristocracy of Eurocentric Eurocracy, — is used as a modern cudgel against the big American Idealists of the White House, Washington and Wall Street, i.e., American superpower that rejects all or most European political and economic irrationalism in the realm of American finance, commerce and industry. Apart from the degenerate trans–Atlantic influence, in general, of the European Bonapartists upon their misguided puppets in the United States (thankfully very few in number, e.g., Volkswagon), the modern European truncheon of political and economic irrationalism is often used, albeit unsuccessfully, by corrupt state legislators in America to usurp federal powers, — an activity which is deeply influenced by the Bonapartism of Canada and Mexico (lesser and greater Banana Republics), especially via states along the US borders.

The Québécocrats, many of whom hide out in America, and thereby avoid retribution at the hands of their many Canadian victims (especially in Alberta), never classify their Québécocentrisme (politique fonctionnelle as Québécocentric asymmetrical federalism) as French Gaullist Bonapartism, and therefore categorically reject any historical identification of the Québec regime in Ottawa 1968–2006 (the empire of Paul Desmarais) with Bananaism.

See: Alain Grosrichard, Structure du sérail: La fiction du despotisme asiatique dans l’Occident classique, Paris, Seuil, 1979.

7. Arnold Toynbee (1852–1883), “The Chief Features of the Revolution,” Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England, Popular Addresses, Notes, and Other Fragments, London, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1920, 64–73; 64. [1884]

8. Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor, New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 2–13.

9. Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4.

See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”

Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4. [Italics added]

See also: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”
Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.

See also: “Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See also: “[The] more sympathetic tradition in Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as accounts of Hegel’s attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state.”

Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel; Hugh Barr Nisbet, translator, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, vii–xxxii; ix. [1991]

See also: “[In The Philosophy of Right] the state so described is unlike any existing state in Hegel’s day. It is a form of limited monarchy, with parliamentary government, trial by jury and toleration for Jews and dissenters. In all these respects it differed from the contemporary Prussia. It has often been said by Hegel’s detractors that his book was written on the ‘dunghill of servility’ and that his ideal state is identified with the monarchy of Friedrich William III. Little historical knowledge and little study of Hegel is required to see that this is nonsense.”

Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, William Benton, 1967, 298–303; 302.

See also: “The problem as to whether or not and to what extent Hegel succeeded in overcoming Kant’s ‘thing–in–itself’ is a separate question. At any rate, this was his aim. In a metaphysics of the Absolute Spirit, realities beyond the realm of knowledge, in so far as the ‘thing–in–itself’ represents such realities, cannot exist.”

Richard Hoenigswald, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, New York, Philosophical Library, 1947, 267–291; 270.

See also: “It is a mistake to regard his [Hegel’s] philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.”
Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, Heath Cranton, Ltd., 1927, 10.

See finally: “It is the Transcendental Deduction that has played the most important part in the arguments of the English Kantio–Hegelians.”
Andrew Seth Pringle–Pattison in Hiralal Haldar, Essays in Philosophy, Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1920, 6.

10. Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 561–591; 575–586.

See: “[153] [Hegel’s] system was hailed in Germany as the highest effort of human wisdom; and, even at this hour, it constitutes the philosophical creed of more than one half of all the speculative literati in that country … [155] For a more detailed account of Hegel’s ‘Logik,’ see his Cyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences, vol. 6 … [157] As a mere piece of speculative philosophy, the system of Hegel is absurd and untenable … These views have, as might naturally be expected, from the celebrity of their author, been prolific of the most wild and outrageous theological doctrines in Germany; doctrines so entirely denuded of every particle of scriptural authority and common sense, that we stand aghast in amazement at the audacity and folly which gave utterance to them. There are, however, distinctive signs that this fever of [159] speculative folly is now rapidly abating; and that there are good grounds for hoping that German philosophy will once more come within the pale of reason and common sense.”

Robert Blakey, “Chapter II: Metaphysical Writers of Germany, From the Year 1800 Until the Present Day: George Wm. Fred. Hegel,” History of the Philosophy of Mind: Embracing the Opinions of All Writers On Mental Science From the Earliest Period to the Present Time, vol. 4, London, Trelawney Wm. Saunders, 1848, 149–159; 155–157–158–159. [Italics added]

The American Idealism of Joseph Alden

1. Joseph Alden (1807–1885), Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1866, 290.

See: “[29] No writer has carried personification of the faculties to a greater length than has Kant. ‘Pure reason,’ he says, ‘leaves every thing to the understanding which refers immediately to the objects of the intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination.’ Here the mind disappears altogether, and certain imaginary entities take its place … [102] Consciousness does not affirm that the mind creates space: It affirms that the mind cognizes it. It is not, then, a creation of the mind, a subjective state, as is held by Kant … [107] we know that duration is. Like space, it is neither a material nor a spiritual existence. It is not a creation of the mind or form of our cognitions, as is asserted by Kant and others — whatever that phrase may mean … [219] The absolute perfection of God is revealed to us.”

Joseph Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1866, 29–102–107–219.

See also: “That which belongs to time and space on the one hand, is (according to Kant) bare phenomenon or appearance, behind which the real thing hides itself; neither, on the other hand, have the ideas of the pure reason anything but a negative import; and so this philosophy, both in its lower and higher movement, remains entirely empty of all reality; it is a theory wisely founded indeed, and admirable in its original plan, but on account of one error (that respecting time and space) in the outset, and the logical consequences of it in the execution, it sinks at last into an enormous deficit, and ends in a palpable contradiction.”

Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796–1879) in John Daniel Morell, Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century,2nd edition, 1 volume edition, New York, Robert Carter, 1848, 175. [1846–1847]

See also: “The weightiest objection against the doctrines of Kant we conceive to be the fact, that he makes reason, with all its conclusions, purely subjective and personal. The categories with him are simply subjective laws, while the supersensual ideas or noumena, which the reason forms, are nought but regulative principles, and can point us to no real existence, inasmuch as we have no right to transport them out of ourselves, and make them signs of objective reality. Truth may, therefore, ever be truth, so long as our minds remain as they are; but as we can never get beyond the bounds of our own subjectivity, we are not at liberty to affirm that any conclusion of our reason is ‘per se’ eternally true, or that to us there is such a thing as truth at all, outside the limits of our own direct consciousness. The ground of this delusion (for as such we assuredly regard it) appears to lie in the purely abstract view which Kant endeavored to take of the a priori element in human knowledge. Anxious to separate this element from any admixture of empiricism, he views it solely in its connection with the human mind. Phenomenon and essence, matter and form, are regarded as entirely distinct from each other, and the effort of Kantism is to establish the reality of each element in its isolation [176] Essential existence, however, never reveals itself per se: We cannot realize in a direct consciousness the bare essence either of the soul or the world, and consequently Kant is obliged to view them on his principles, simply as subjective forms or laws of our own reason. Had he traced up the actual character of our ideas to their primitive state or origin, it would have become at once apparent, that nothing is given to us originally in the abstract, but always in the concrete; that essential existence reveals itself to us, first in connection with phenomena, and that it is only by degrees that we view it abstractedly, as the substratum by which all phenomena are supported. In Kant’s entire separation of the pure and abstract element of our knowledge from the empirical, we recognize the germ of a principle which tends inevitably to a subjective idealism. The idea of nature, it is true, is not destroyed, but it is contracted to the narrowest possible limits; — the idea of God, or the absolute, is banished altogether from the region of strict philosophy, and made to rest only upon a lower kind of belief; the reason, that emanation from heaven, that portion of eternal truth that is granted by the infinite mind to the finite, is turned into a personal and regulative law, while, on the other hand, the subjective ME, if it does not actually create matter, yet gives it all its attributes, includes as part of itself all the categories from which the laws of nature, as perceived by us, originate, and possesses the idea of God, in such a manner as simply to imply an inward principle, not at all as indicating an outward fact. The grand error is the want of faith in reason as the revealer of eternal verities. Admit the non–personality of reason; place it on the same footing as consciousness; mould the Kantian doctrine to this idea, and it would evolve a mass of abstract truth which no scepticism could shake. As it stands, however, it has given occasion to the re–separation of the empirical and a priori elements, which it strove to unite into an indissoluble synthesis. In this separation the whole of the modern German idealism has its commencement … To search into the monuments [550] of antiquity, is, indeed, a labor for which the German mind is admirably qualified; but when all the authority of these records is discovered, its independence prompts further questions of this nature: — What is the authority of this authority? What means had men of yore to discover truth more than I have myself? Or, if the authority be Divine, the question still comes, What is the testimony on which it rests? What the process by which it reaches my own mind? What the ideas it involves? The German thinker is too subjective in his views and tendencies to be satisfied with any merely objective evidence. He wants to know what must necessarily be true to himself individually; what confidence is to be placed even in the dictates of his own reason and his own consciousness; in other words, he wants a fundamental philosophy as a substratum, before he can allow to authority the command, which it claims over the human mind.

The only scepticism, then, of which Germany is in danger, is that of the philosophical or absolute kind; for, should the reflections and the investigations of her metaphysicians in any instances so clash with one another, that no definite results can be arrived at, such a scepticism, of course, must follow. The only instance, perhaps, in the whole philosophical history of Germany, in which a shallow scepticism came into vogue, is to be found during the reign of the Leibnitzian–Wolfian metaphysics. At that time the influx of French writers, on the one hand, disseminated a low, worthless sensationalism; while, on the other, the pedantry and formalism of the idealistic school brought the deeper method of philosophizing into universal contempt. The result was what we just remarked; a low, shallow, and railing scepticism, un–German in its real character, but rendered sufficiently influential by circumstances to produce a baneful effect, both upon literature and morals. It was this, in fact, that roused up the mighty spirit of Kant to an intellectual effort, which swept away all the minor actors from the stage, and commenced a new scene in the wondrous drama of the world’s philosophy.

Whilst Kant, however, opposed so successfully the shallow scepticism of the age in which he lived, his philosophy contained many germs of another species of scepticism far more deep and philosophical. Determined to silence forever the quibbles and sophistries, in which so many were indulging, respecting the fundamental questions of ontology, of morals, of religion, he conceived the idea of removing them into a region altogether inaccessible to the reach [551] of ordinary logic, and there to let them repose in solemn majesty. The general idea of the Kantian metaphysics is, we trust, sufficiently remembered by the attentive reader to render repetition needless; but still, to prevent the obscurity, which a too great brevity might cause, we shall re–enumerate one or two of the principal conclusions. Of the three great faculties of the human mind, sensation, understanding, and reason, the first alone is capable of furnishing the material of our knowledge, the two latter are merely formal. Sensation gives us the simple fact of objective existence; understanding gives form to whatever notions we may have of it. Sensation, accordingly, in making known to us the reality of an objective world, does not tell us of what it consists, whether it be of a spiritual or of any other essence; it simply assures us of objective phenomena; and to these phenomena, accordingly, our real knowledge of the world without must be confined. Again: Since the understanding gives to our notions all their peculiar forms and aspects, defining their quantity, quality, relation, and mode of existence, this part of our knowledge must be purely subjective, and its truth, consequently, depend upon the validity of our faculties. But further; not only is the understanding merely formal in its nature, but reason is so likewise. Reason strives to bring the notions of the understanding to a systematic unity, and in doing so it personifies its own laws, and regards them as having a real objective existence; the three personifications being the soul, the universe, and the Deity. Any logical reasoning upon these three ideas, upon their existence, or their nature, Kant shows to be entirely fallacious, giving rise in each instance to endless paralogisms. They are, in fact, as ideas, the spontaneous productions of our own reason, and to argue upon them as being either realities or non–realities, is allowing the understanding to intrude upon a province (that, namely, of the supersensual or spiritual) with which it has nothing whatever to do.

In this way, Kant removed the chief points around which scepticism delighted to linger entirely out of the reach of all argumentation. If any one disputed respecting the material world, his reply was, ‘Of what value is discussion about an existence, of which we can never know aught beyond mere phenomena?’ Should any one contest or propound any theories respecting the nature of the soul, the origin of the world, or the existence of God, the same withering repulse was given, ‘Why reason of that which lies beyond all reasoning?’ ‘Your notions of the soul, of the universe [552] of God,’ he would continue, ‘are but subjective ideas; they are personifications of your own mental processes; I can give you strong reasons of a moral nature to believe in the soul and in God; but, as for theoretical science, it is incapable of saying anything whatever, whether it be for or against.’

But now it becomes a question to us, whether Kant, in cutting off the plea of the sceptic of his day, did not prove too much and whether he does not give occasion to another kind of scepticism, more deeply laid than that which he destroyed. Let us see the results, to which his principles gave origin.”

John Daniel Morell, Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1 volume edition, New York, Robert Carter, 1848, 175–549. [1846+1847]

2. See: “Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”

Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 561–591; 575–586.

3. Joseph Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, Ibidem.

4. Remarks: In the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of theology, philosophical conceptions applied to theology are no more theological conceptions, in the modern European pejorative sense, than the application of philosophical conceptions to physics, in the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of physics, are themselves conceptions of physics, in the modern European non–pejorative sense: Our conceptualization of the conception of philosophical theology as well as the conception of philosophical physics is the same, in the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world.

After the Kantian Copernican revolution, philosophers maintain that thought of phenomena and noumena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. Sophists maintain thought of phenomena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. German Idealism elevates the Western conception of mind and matter, nature and spirit made popular since the time of Descartes: Since the birth of genuine Hegelianism, what philosophers name as thought based upon illusion and incomplete perception is very different from the German Idealism of the sophists. The same remark holds good of phenomena and noumena.

5. Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 291.

6. Alden, Ibidem.

7. Renatus Cartesius, “Secundæ Responsiones,” Œuvres de Descartes: Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, vol. 7, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, éditeurs, Paris, Léopold Cerf, 1904, 128–159; 140–141. [1641]

Remark: How very clear and distinct are the ideas of Cartesius, coming from his very own hand, although his best translators are also clear and distinct, but less clear and less distinct than the very words of Cartesius himself, as found in his very greatest works, since his Latin is now a dead language, while his modern interpreters fail to elucidate the rational foundations of their sophistical critiques.

Some interpretations of Descartes are very ingenious: “A decisive impetus to the interpretation I offer is imparted by Kant. While Kant’s concerns aren’t those of a professional historian of philosophy (although he has claims to have established the discipline), his backwards–directed perception is, I am convinced, far acuter than that of latter–day analysts. As I shall show towards the end, Kant’s writings contain the categorial polarity so central to my reading. Since I take my cue from Kant, the discussion of Descartes therefore has a slightly unusual historical cast: It is drawn forward by the Kantian terminus ad quem rather than pushed ahead from the scholastic terminus a quo … it is both mildly paradoxical and highly flattering to Kant that the lesson that might otherwise have been learned from him is completely missed, owing to his magnificent success in converting the field to his way of thinking. The dominant [12] metaphilosophy of our age has a Kantian provenance. Post–Kantian orthodoxy places philosophy in a characteristically oblique relation to science, divesting it of the dictatorial functions attributable to a foundational discipline. But Kant didn’t fail to say of his metaphilosophical revolution that it has substantive implications, which he puts by denying to man the possibility of knowledge of ‘things in themselves’; nearly enough, knowledge of the only kind that Descartes regards as worthy of the title … Descartes’ criticism of experience and knowledge as we know it — of the probable — isn’t immanently justified. If at all, it is justified only relative to a view of the world — a certain view — transcendent of our mundane patterns of cognition … Kant’s position is a development of the negative side of Descartes’ overall theory.”

Mark Glouberman, Descartes: The Probable and the Certain, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1986, 11–11–12–346–346.

Remark: The rational distinction between Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel on the one side, as opposed to Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant on the other, is conceptualized world historically, — following in the footsteps of rational Hegelianism, — at once positively and negatively, which means dialectically: The universal notion of Western civilization, as opposed to European modernity in the strife between philosophy and sophistry (science and ideology), as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, is therefore dialectically cognized as the conceptual rationality of universal freedom in the world of today.

Therefore, the idea of the Cartesian distinction between certainty and probability, as outlined above, is not the essence of the conceptual rationality of the history of Western philosophy and European modernity, which instead resides within the epistemological and ontological clash between reason and unreason, which is the world historical marrow of the former opposition, as the notion of universal freedom, — in rational Hegelian contradistinction to modern European right.

MODERN EUROPEAN UNREASON: LOCKE, LEIBNIZ, HUME & KANT

1/ David Hume and the Master Race

1. David Hume (1777) in Christopher J. Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982, 108. [Italics added]

2. David Hume, “Part I, Essay XXI: Of National Characters,” The Philosophical Works of David Hume, Including all the Essays, and Exhibiting the More Important Alterations and Corrections in the Successive Editions Published by the Author: Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary, vol. 3, Edinburgh/Boston, 1854, 217–236; 228–229. [1752]

See: “I am apt to suspect the negroes and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufacturer amongst them, no arts, no sciences. On the other hand, the most rude and barbarous of the whites, such as the ancient GERMANS, the present TARTARS, still have something eminent about them, in their valour, form of government, or some other particular. Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men.”

David Hume (1752) in Richard H. Popkin, “The Philosophical Basis of Eighteenth–Century Racism,” Racism in the Eighteenth–Century, Harold E. Pagliaro, editor, Cleveland/London, Case Western Reserve University Press, 1973, 245–262; 245.

See: David Hume, “Of National Characters,” Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects, London, T. Cadell, 1777, 208.

See also: “In the Political Discourses, Hume described the slavery of antiquity in horrific detail; he questioned the simile of arbitrary power as being like slavery; he added a homily to the equity of modern times (‘a bad servant finds not easily a good master, nor a bad master a good servant; and the checks are mutual, suitably to the inviolable and eternal laws of reason and equity’). But in a later passage — a footnote which he added in 1754 to his essay ‘Of National Characters’ — he expressed a view [92] of the natural inferiority of Africans which became one of the founding texts, even within his own lifetime, of the defense of slavery. Hume’s footnote was very far from being insouciant, or unintended. ‘I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all the other species of men (for there are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites,’ he wrote in 1754; in a version of the essay prepared not long before his death, and published in 1777, the capricious assertion of white superiority was reduced to the assertion of black inferiority. ‘I am apt to suspect the Negroes to be naturally inferior to the Whites’ Hume wrote in 1776; he likened the ‘one negroe’ in Jamaica (Francis Williams, the Latin poet) who was supposed to be ‘a man of parts and learning,’ to ‘a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.’ Hume’s sentiments in respect of African slavery have been considered, rightly, as one of the most disturbing evils of enlightenment thought, and they are difficult to understand. Even in his own lifetime, the footnote was the subject of intense interest, of which he must to at least some extent have been aware. He was undoubtedly aware of the devastating criticism of his views by James Beattie in his Essay on Truth of 1777.”

Emma Rothschild, “David Hume and the Seagods of the Atlantic,” The Atlantic Enlightenment, Susan Manning & Francis D. Cogliano, editors, Burlington, Vermont, Ashgate Publishing Company, 2008, 81–96; 91–92.

See also: “Hume’s footnote, as Henry Louis Gates has shown, inspired Kant to assert that ‘the Negroes in Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling,’ and Hegel to abandon the supposed universality of Enlightenment: ‘the peculiarly African character is difficult to comprehend, for the very reason that in reference to it, we must quite give up the principle which naturally accompanies all our ideas — the category of Universality.’ Hume is not to be blamed for Hegel.”

Emma Rothschild, “The Atlantic Worlds of David Hume,” Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500–1830, Bernard Bailyn & Patricia L. Denault, editors, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2009, 405–448; 423.

See also: “Hume’s rejection of ethical relativism is an important indicator of the tenor of his thought, because it shows the definite limits to his acceptance (and appreciation) of the significance of social differences. In this regard, Duncan Forbes drives too substantial a wedge between Hume’s sociological relativism and his (admitted) abjuration of ethical relativism. In terms of Hume’s intellectual situation the abjuration signals the attenuated character of his sociological relativism. Though Hume’s position (as interpreted by Forbes) is of course defensible, it requires a sophistication in distinguishing the ethical from the social for which Hume himself had no need. As noted above, Hume is able to treat the whole issue of understanding an alien culture as unproblematical for, as this study is aiming to show, it is post–Humean development of a contextualist [Kantio–Hegelian] theory of human nature that makes this issue contentious by rejecting the uniformitarianism that made all human activity explicable (comprehensible) on the same non–societally specific principles.”
Christopher J. Berry, Hume, Hegel and Human Nature, The Hague, 1982, 107.

3. Andrew Valls, editor, “‘A Lousy Empirical Scientist’: Reconsidering Hume’s Racism,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Ithaca/London, 2005, 129–149; 144.

See: “The ‘I am apt to suspect’ phrasing is used elsewhere by Hume, in his Essay Concerning the Principles of Morals, for endorsing views that he reckons are ‘solid and satisfactory.’ The first version of the footnote was commented on by contemporaries and by modern writers including Richard Popkin.”

Gabrielle D.V. White, Jane Austen in the Context of Abolition: “A Fling at the Slave Trade,” New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, 110.

4. Bernard R. Boxill, “Black Liberation — Yes!” The Liberation Debate: Rights at Issue, Michael Leahy & Dan Cohn–Sherbok, New York/London, Routledge, 1996, 51–64; 62.

*See: “Europe’s Machiavellian relativism and selfishness,” Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 820.

5. Duncan Forbes (1922–1994), “Introductory Preface,” Hume’s Philosophical Politics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, vii–xii; vii. [1975][Italics added]

6. Duncan Forbes, editor, “Introduction,” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in World History, G.W.F. Hegel & Karl Hegel; Hans Reiss (assistant) & Hugh Barr Nisbet, editor and translator; Johannes Hoffmeister, German editor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, vii–xxxv; xiii–xiv–xiv. [1840–1955–1975]

7. Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4.

See: Christian Neugebauer, “The Racism of Kant and Hegel,” Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy, H. Odera Oruka, editor, New York, Brill, 1990, 259–272; Michael H. Hoffheimer, “Race and Law in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 194–216.

8. Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See: “The German philosopher Hegel argued that human beings are ‘human’ in part because they have memory. History is written or collective memory. Written history is reliable, repeatable memory, and confers value. Without such texts, civilization cannot exist. ‘At this point we leave Africa,’ he pontificated, ‘not to mention it again. For it is no historical part of the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit.’”

Henry Louis Gates Jr., “Opinion: Henry Louis Gates Jr.: Restoring Black History,” New York Times, 23 September 2016.

See also: “Hegel, echoing Hume and Kant, claimed that Africans had no history, because they had developed no systems of writing and had not mastered the art of writing in European languages.”

Henry Louis Gates Jr., Henry Louis Gates, Jr. Reader, Abby Wolf, editor, New York, Basic Civitas Books, 2012.

See finally: Henry Louis Gates Jr., Figures in Black: Words, Signs, and the “Racial” Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987, 19–25.

9. Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.

See: “The year 1992 poses a critical moral and cultural challenge for the more privileged sectors of the world–dominant societies. The challenge is heightened by the fact that within these societies, notably the first European colony liberated from imperial rule, popular struggle over many centuries has achieved a large measure of freedom, opening many opportunities for independent thought and committed action. How this challenge is addressed in the years to come will have fateful consequences. October 11, 1992 brings to an end the 500th year of the Old World Order, sometimes called the Colombian era of world history, or the Vasco da Gama era, depending on which adventurers bent on plunder got there first. Or ‘the 500–year Reich,’ to borrow the title of a commemorative volume that compares the methods and ideology of the Nazis with those of the European invaders who subjugated most of the world. The major theme of this Old World Order was a confrontation between the conquerors and the conquered on a global scale. It has taken various forms, and been given different names: Imperialism, neocolonialism, the North–South conflict, core versus periphery, G–7 (the 7 leading state capitalist industrial societies) and their satellites versus the rest. Or, more simply, Europe’s conquest of the world … ‘Hegel discoursed authoritatively on the same topics in his lectures on philosophy of history, brimming with confidence as we approach the final ‘phase of World–History,’ when Spirit reaches ‘its full maturity and strength’ in ‘the German world.’ Speaking from that lofty peak, he relates that native America was ‘physically and psychically powerless,’ its culture so limited that it ‘must expire as soon as Spirit approached it.’ Hence ‘the aborigines …gradually vanished at the breath of European activity.’ ‘A mild and passionless disposition, want of spirit, and a crouching submissiveness … are the chief characteristics of the native Americans,’ so ‘slothful’ that, under the kind ‘authority of the Friars,’ ‘at midnight a bell had to remind them even of their matrimonial duties.’ They were inferior even to the Negro, ‘the natural man in his completely wild and untamed state,’ who is beyond any ‘thought of reverence and morality — all that we call feeling’; there is ‘nothing harmonious with humanity … in this type of character.’ ‘Among the Negroes moral sentiments are quite weak, or more strictly speaking non–existent.’ ‘Parents sell their children, and conversely children their parents, as either has the opportunity,’ and ‘The polygamy of the Negroes has frequently for its object the having many children, to be sold, every one of them, into slavery.’ Creatures at the level of ‘a mere Thing — an object of no value,’ they treat ‘as enemies’ those who seek to abolish slavery, which has ‘been the occasion of the increase of human feeling among the Negroes,’ enabling them to become ‘participant in a higher morality and the culture connected with it’ … Hegel, Philosophy, 108–9, 81–2, 93–6; ‘the German world’ presumably takes in Northwest Europe … Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich. The Philosophy of History (Dover, 1956; Lectures of 1830–31).”

Noam Chomsky, Year 501: The Conquest Continues, Montréal/New York, Black Rose Books, 1993, 3–4–5–291–313.

10. Neville Chamberlain, The Struggle For Peace, Toronto, Allen, 1939, 33. [Italics added]

Remark: In this instance, Chamberlain does not face every situation that arises, — he faces Hitlerite Germany: Neville Chamberlain “reconciles” his ideology with European events, and the result is subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism in the arena of modern British world politics and economics. Neville Chamberlain therefore fails to rationally reconcile the Industrial and French Revolutions in his domestic and foreign political and economic policy precisely because he is the fateful prisoner of 19th century British Kantio–Hegelian nationalism and imperialism.

11. Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, 2nd edition, London, Macmillan, 1962, 20–21–21. [1939]

See: “By my definition, a theory of international politics would be a set of generally valid and logically consistent propositions that explain the outcomes of interactions between and among political actors. As such, the theory would contain three kinds of statements: (1) those which identify or take inventory of components and properties of international systems and events, (2) those which identity and describe relationships among the components and properties of the international systems and events, and (3) those which explain or otherwise account for such relationships.”
Donald James Puchala, International Politics Today, New York, Dodd, Mead, 1971, 358.

12. Anonymous, “Obituary: Duncan Forbes, 1922–1994,” Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain, (1994): 112–113; 112.

13. Duncan Forbes, editor, “Introduction,” Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Introduction: Reason in World History, G.W.F. Hegel & Karl Hegel; Hans Reiss (assistant) & Hugh Barr Nisbet, editor and translator; Johannes Hoffmeister, German editor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, vii–xxxv; xxxv. [1840–1955–1975]

14. Johann Eduard Erdmann, A History of Philosophy: German Philosophy Since Hegel, 4th German edition, vol. 3, Williston S. Hough, translator, London, Swann Sonnenschein, 1899, 66–81.

15. Karl Marx in Bertrand Russell, German Social Democracy: Six Lectures, With an Appendix on Social Democracy and the Woman Question in Germany by Alys Russell, London and New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1896, 4–5. [Italics added]

16. William Wallace (1844–1897), “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1911, 200–207; 205.

17. Friedrich Michelet (1842) in John Daniel Morell (1816–1891), “Hegel and German Hegelianism,” An Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1 volume edition, New York, Robert Carter, 1848, 456–481; 480. [1846+1847]

2/ Kantianism and the Master Race

1. Immanuel Kant in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 148.

See: “The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no motivating force, for it lacks affect and passion. They are not in love, thus they are also not afraid. They hardly speak, do not caress each other, care about nothing and are lazy.” (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, translation)

Immanuel Kant in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “Chapter Four: The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology: Kant’s Idea of ‘Race’: The Taxonomy,” Ka Osi Sọ Onye: African Philosophy in the Postmodern Era, Jonathan O. Chimakonam & Edwin Etieyibo, editors; Olatunji A. Oyeshile, introduction & Ifeanyi Menkiti, forward; Adeshina L. Afolayan, Ada Agada, Olajamoke Akiode, Oladele A. Balogun, Jonathan O. Chimakonam, Edwin Etieyibo, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Michael Onyebuchi Eze, Bruce B. Janz, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Victor C.A. Nweke, Uchenna L. Ogbonnaya, Olatunji A. Oyeshile, Leonhard Praeg, Mogobe B. Ramose, Uduma O. Uduma, contributors, Wilmington, Delaware, Vernon Press, 2018, 85–124; 97–106; 97–102; 99. See: Immanuel Kant, “Von der Charakteristik des Menschen,” Immanuel Kant’s Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie: Nach handschriftlichen Vorlesungen, Friedrich Christian Starke (Johann Adam Bergk), hrsg., Leipzig, Die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831, 337–358; 353: “Das Volk der Amerikaner nimmt keine bildung an. Es hat keine Triebfedern, denn es fehlen ihm Affekt und Leidenschaft. Sie sind nicht verliebt, daher sind auch nicht furchtbar. Sie sprechen fast nichts, liebkosen einander nicht, sorgen auch fur nichts, und sind faul.”

See also: “The race of Negroes, one could say, is completely the opposite of the Americans; they are full of affect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They can be educated but only as servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained. They have many motivating forces, are also sensitive, are afraid of blows and do much out of a sense of honor.” (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, translation)

Immanuel Kant in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Ibidem. See: Immanuel Kant, Ibidem, 353: “Die race der Neger, konnte man sagan, ist ganz das Gegenteil von den Amerikanern; sie sind voll Affekt und Leidenshaft, sehr Lebhaft, schwatzhaft und eitel, sie nehmen Bildung an, aber nur eine Bildung der Knechte, d.h. sie lassen sich abrichten. Sie haben viele Triebfedern, sind auch empfindlich, furchten sich vor Schlagen und thun auch viel aus Ehre.”

See also: “The Kant most remembered in North American academic communities is the Kant of the Critiques. It is forgotten that the philosopher developed courses in anthropology and/or geography and taught them regularly for forty years from 1756 until the year before his retirement in 1797 … It was Kant, in fact, who introduced anthropology as a branch of study to the German universities when he first started his lectures in the winter semester of 1772–3 (Cassirer, 1963, 25). He was also the first to introduce the study of geography, which he considered inseparable from anthropology, to Konigsberg [86] University, beginning from the summer semester of 1756 (May, 1970, 4). Throughout his career at the university, Kant offered 72 courses in ‘Anthropology’ and/or ‘Physical Geography,’ more than in logic (54 times), metaphysics (49 times), moral philosophy (28), and theoretical physics (20 times), (May, 1970, 4). Although the volume Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View was the last book edited by Kant and was published towards the end of his life, the material actually chronologically predates the Critiques. Further, it is known that material from Kant’s courses in ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Physical Geography’ found their way into his lectures in ethics and metaphysics.”

Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Ibidem, 85–86.

See finally: “In my occupation with pure philosophy, which was originally undertaken of my own accord, but which later belonged to my teaching duties, I have for some thirty years delivered lectures twice a year on ‘knowledge of the world,’ namely on Anthropology and Physical Geography. They were popular lectures attended by people from the general public. The present manual contains my lectures on anthropology. As to Physical Geography, however, it will not be possible, considering my age, to produce a manual from my manuscript, which is hardly legible to anyone but myself.”

Immanuel Kant in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Ibidem, 85.

2. Isaiah Berlin in Bernasconi, Ibidem, 145. [Italics added]

3. Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Translator’s Introduction: Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–1794), Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810), Eberhardt August Wilhelm von Zimmerman (1743–1815), New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 40. [Italics added]

See: “[Kant] is best understood not as a ‘system builder,’ but as a systematic philosopher — that is, as a thinker who was ever reexamining the conclusions he had come to within each component part of the critical project both with respect to the conclusions he had previously established for the other component parts of the project as well as to his most favored ‘core’ beliefs. He was, in other words, not the sort of philosopher who never revised his views on the many topics that interested him, and he clearly endeavored to keep himself informed of developments in every imaginable field of investigation of his time. Consequently, to consider any narrowly [2] defined topic within the scope of the critical philosophy, such as Kant’s race theory or his philosophy of biology, could lead to a reconsideration of every other part of the critical project. We should then hardly find it surprising that significant interest in the texts by Kant included in this volume has, in the years since the volume was originally conceived, also increased among scholars concerned primarily with Kant’s political philosophy — or, more specifically, with his role in the formative development of a view that is difficult to define but commonly referred to as liberal internationalism. Thus it would be no exaggeration to suggest that what is at stake in these discussions is not simply Kant’s views on specific topics but a complete reassessment of his contribution to the ‘project of modernity,’ inasmuch as Kant’s contribution to the construction of liberal internationalism is viewed as a core element of that project as famously sketched by Jürgen Habermas in his 1980 Adorno Prize lecture, ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’… Kant did indeed write numerous texts concerned with issues of race which had otherwise been almost universally ignored by English–language Kant scholarship in the past two centuries … [3] Who — half a century, or even a couple of decades ago — would ever have thought of Kant as a major contributor to the formative development of either race theory or the philosophy of biology? For the Kant we knew then was typically presented as a figure who had contributed so much to the development of modern liberal internationalism that it was inconceivable that he could ever have written or uttered comments that could be construed as racist or have even concerned himself with any of the problems of race theory — except, perhaps, in ways that directly contributed to the construction of modern concepts of human rights. Now, however, with new knowledge of the texts by Kant included in this volume and a reexamination of related texts and other source materials, there can be no doubt about the fact that Kant was not only deeply concerned with the analysis of the concept of race but that he gave expression to views both in print but in his private notebooks that are clearly racist not only in tone but also in spirit, if not, necessarily, in ideological intent … [5] [Earl W. Count] chided scholars for forgetting ‘that Immanuel Kant produced the most raciological [racist] thought of the eighteenth century’ … [10] ‘in spite of Kant’s avowed cosmopolitanism … evident in such essays as his ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,’ one also finds within his philosophy expressions of a virulent and theoretically based racism, at a time when scientific racism was still in its infancy’ … [13] Whatever definition of race is ultimately attributed to Kant — whether or not Bernasconi can make good on his claim that Kant was, in some sense or other, the inventor of the concept — it is clear from the references provided in the final section of the second of these articles that Kant was indeed generally ‘opposed to the mixing of races’ and that his views on this matter are recorded in texts dating from the 1760s through the late 1790s.”

Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Translator’s Introduction: Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–1794), Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810), Eberhardt August Wilhelm von Zimmerman (1743–1815), New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 1–2–3–5–10–13.

4. Earl W. Count (1950) in Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Translator’s Introduction: Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–1794), Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810), Eberhardt August Wilhelm von Zimmerman (1743–1815), New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 5. [Italics added]

See: Earl W. Count, editor, “Introduction,” This is Race: An Anthology Selected From the International Literature on the Races of Man, New York, Schuman, 1950, xiii–xxviii.

5. Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005, 975–977; 977.

6. Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism,” Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Critical Perspectives, Katrin Flikschuh & Lea Ypi, editors; Martin Ajei, Katrin Flikschuh, Pauline Kleingeld, Sankar Muthu, Peter Niesen, Anthony Pagden, Arthur Ripstein, Anna Stilz, Liesbet Vanhaute & Lea Ypi, contributors, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 2014, 43–67; 53 ff.

7. Pauline Kleingeld, Ibidem, 45.

8. Kleingeld, Ibidem, 46.

9. Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Translator’s Introduction: Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–1794), Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810), Eberhardt August Wilhelm von Zimmerman (1743–1815), New York: State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 1.

10. Immanuel Kant in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 148.

11. Michael Lackey, “The Fictional Truth of the Biographical Novel: The Case of Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The American Biographical Novel, New York, Bloomsbury, 2016, 35–82; 44–45–46–49.

See: “We can say that Kant, via Chamberlain, was certainly one of the most important influences on National Socialism.”

Michael Lackey, The Modernist God State: A Literary Study of the Nazis’ Christian Reich, New York, Continuum International Publishing Group Inc., 2012, 278.

See: “We can interpret Chamberlain’s work as he wanted it to be understood: as a strong bridge between Kant and Hitler.”

Paul Gilroy, Against Race: Imagining Political Culture Beyond the Color Line, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 2001, 63.

See: “The contention that there is to be found in Kant, or, more broadly, in the Enlightenment, certain conceptual or ideological origins of the Nazi genocide may appear initially either as tautological or as absurd. On the one hand, insofar as ideas are at all admitted as historical causes, the position of the Enlightenment at a crossroads of modern European social and intellectual history would assure it a role in the subsequent events of that history: to this extent, the tautology. On the other hand, to narrow this very general claim sufficiently to allege a direct connection or implication — to claim that specific motifs of the Enlightenment serve historically as an evocation of the events of the Nazi genocide — seems to strain the evidence to a breaking point. The span of 150 years which must be elided, the numerous factors (economic, geopolitical psychological — in addition to other ideological elements) that have been otherwise established, the compelling moral and social ideals of the Enlightenment to which we are indebted for the very phrase the ‘rights of man’: to find beyond these a contributory rule in the Enlightenment for an event as opaque in its rationale and as morally inhuman and notoriously ‘un–enlightened’ as the Nazi war against the Jews seems more than any assembly of evidence that was not simply tendentious could support. What will be outlined here, however, is a position that stands between the two alternatives, with the suggestion first, in the form of an analogy, that certain ideas prominent in the Enlightenment are recognizable in the conceptual framework embodied in the Nazi genocide; and, secondly, that if the relation between those two historical moments is not one of direct cause and effect (the one, that is, does not entail the other), the Enlightenment establishes a ground of historical possibility.”

Berel Lang, “Genocide and Kant’s Enlightenment,” Act and Idea in the Nazi Genocide, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 2003, 165–206; 168.

12. Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf: Zwei Bände in einem Band Ungekürzte Ausgabe, 851–855 Auflage, München, Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Verlag Franz Eher Nachf., G.m.b.H., 1943, 328: “Reinster Idealismus deckt sich unbewußt mit tiefster Erkenntnis.”

13. Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer (Herman Jan de Vleeschauwer, 1899–1977/1986?), “Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica: Macropædia, 15th edition, vol. 22, Chicago, The University Press, 1991, 495–499; 495.

14. See: “Vleeschauwer, a Nazi collaborator during World War II, was tried for war crimes in 1945 and condemned to death in abstentia as he was in hiding.”

Elaine Harger, Which Side Are You On? Seven Social Responsibility Debates in American Librarianship 1990–2015, Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland & Company, Inc., 2015, 60.

See: “The work of the ERR was to confiscate archives, libraries, and works of art from the ideological enemies of Nazism. It was the most productive unit of plunder in Belgium and was directed by archivists, librarians, and museum curators. De Vleeschauwer was close to senior ERR officials like Adolf Vogel, Karlheinz Esser, and Hans Muchow who targeted private libraries in Jewish homes in Belgium. He had attended German book exhibitions regularly, and wrote several articles on politics and culture for the German–language Nationalsocialist, advocating Nazism.”

Archie L. Dick, The Hidden History of South Africa’s Book and Reading Cultures, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2012.

15. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 44–44–101–105.

See: Napoléon Bonaparte (1769–1821) & Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

16. Ernst Cassirer, “Neo–Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 16, Chicago, The University Press, 1945, 215–216; 215.

See: “Neo–Kantianism is a term used in a rather arbitrary way to cover a wide variety of philosophical movements that not only show the influence of Kant’s thought but also explicitly claim to go back to Kant, to free his system from inconsistencies and other errors, or to develop it further in the light of new mathematical and scientific discoveries.”

Stephan Körner (1913–2000), “Neo–Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 16, Chicago, William Benton, 1967, 213–214; 213. See: Stephan Körner, Kant, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1960. [1955]

17. Albert Rivaud (1876–1956), «La diffusion du Kantisme», Histoire de la philosophie: La philosophie allemande de 1700 à 1850: De l’Aufklärung à Schelling, première partie, tome 5, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, 273–276; 274. [1967]: «Il est remarquable que le Kantisme se vulgarise surtout après 1871 … le Kantisme devient–il, vers 1880, le symbole d’une pensée morale et politique profonde, aux yeux de ceux qui sont animés d’une foi républicaine. La philosophie de Kant doit fournir, à une pensée qui se veut affranchie de la «superstition», les moyens de répandre dans la jeunesse une moralité sévère, le civisme, le désintéressement, le patriotisme, toutes ces disciplines apportant un substitut républicain à l’ancienne formation religieuse, en somme l’armature d’une religion laïque».

See: “The hope was always the same: To trace the origins and perhaps the explanation of what made France an exceptional case [10] among all the great Western democracies: A nation–state that had exported her constitutions around the world, but a country whose own institutions were still questioned by a large part of the population. By studying these early years, and by trying to restore to the succession of events or accidents their dimension of uncertainty, which by recurring, had created a custom, perhaps it would be possible, if not to understand the ‘wherefore,’ at least to follow the birth and growth of our unwritten law which, as everyone knows, is ultimately more binding than any law ever written down. But is it really necessary to remember? Since May 10, 1981 something quite new has happened in the bowels of French universal suffrage: For the first time since 1871, a national election allowed the opposition to invest the head of the executive power. And invest it directly and in the clearest way. Does this mean that politics in France have become trivialized, and that we are now ripe for a British–style system of successive and peaceful alternations of opposing forces? This is not the place for such a discussion. The one thing to understand is that this radical form of electoral alternation had never existed before … [verso] The years from 1870–1889 chart the republican conquest of the Republic, and the victory of parliamentary Republicanism over different forms of constitutional revisionism … The analysis of the elections of 1881, 1885 and 1889, the systematic use of original documents, even unpublished archives, allow us to give a far more realistic version of the Republican adventure in a country still largely dominated by the monarchist parties and the Church’s Syllabus. To fight against the partisans of absolutism, the parliamentary Republic did not hesitate to distance itself from the liberalism which was its glory and its justification: Hence our title of absolute Republic (République absolue) for this Republic which, in the victory of its many combats, at the same time prepared the future conditions of its fall.” [Italics added]

Odile Rudelle, «Note Liminaire», La république absolue: Aux origines de l’instabilité constitutionnelle de la France républicaine 1870–1889, ré–édition, Paris, Publications de la Sorbonne, 1986, 9–10; 9–10–verso: «L’espoir était toujours le même: traquer les origines et peut–être l’explication de ce qui faisait de la France un cas exceptionnel [10] parmi toutes les grandes démocraties occidentales: un pays qui avait exporté des constitutions dans le monde entier, mais un pays dont les propres institutions étaient toujours contestées par une importante partie de la population. En étudiant les premières années, en essayant de restituer avec leur marge d’incertitude la succession des événements ou des accidents qui, en se reproduisant, avait créé une coutume, peut–être serait–il possible sinon de comprendre le pourquoi mais au moins de suivre la naissance et la croissance de cette loi non écrite qui, chacun le sait, est finalement plus contraignante que toutes les lois écrites. Mais est–il besoin de le rappeler? Depuis le 10 mai 1981 quelque chose de tout a fait nouveau s’est passé dans la France profonde du suffrage universel: pour la première fois depuis 1871, une élection nationale a permis à l’opposition d’investir la tête du pouvoir exécutif. Et de l’investir directement et de la façon la plus claire. Est–ce à dire que la France politique s’est banalisée et qu’elle est maintenant mûre pour un régime à l’anglaise fait d’alternances successives et pacifiques de forces opposées? Ce n’est pas ici le lieu d’en discuter. La seule chose importante est de savoir que sous cette forme radicale l’alternance électorale n’avait jamais existé auparavant … [verso] Les années 1870–1889 sont celles de la conquête de la République par les républicains et de la victoire de la République parlementaire contre les différents révisionnismes constitutionnels … L’analyse des élections de 1881, 1885 et 1889, le recours systématique aux documents originaux, voire aux archives inédites, permettre de donner une vision plus réaliste de ce qui fut l’aventure républicaine dans un pays encore largement dominé par les partis monarchistes et l’ Église du Syllabus. Pour lutter contre les partisans de l’absolutisme la République parlementaire n’hésita pas à prendre quelques distances vis–à–vis du libéralisme qui était sa gloire et son justificatif: d’où le titre de République absolue pour cette République qui, en gagnant de nombreux combats, creusait en même temps les conditions futures de sa chute».

See also: Frédéric Mourlon (1811–1866), Répétitions écrites sur le code civil contenant l’exposé des principes généreux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 11e édition, revue et mise au courant par Charles Démangeât, Tome premier, Paris, Garniers Frères, Libraires–Éditeurs, 1880, [1846]; Frédéric Mourlon, Répétitions écrites sur le deuxième examen du code Napoléon contenant l’exposé des principes généreux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 2e édition revue et corrigée, 3 vols., Paris, A. Marescq, Libraire–Éditeur, 1852, [1846].

See also: “France does not know it, but we are at war against America. Yes, an eternal war, a vital war, an economic war, a war without deaths … apparently. Yes, they are very predatory, the Americans, they are voracious, and they want to rule the world … Our war against America is a secret war, an eternal war, a war apparently without deaths, and yet a war unto death!”

François Mitterrand (1995) in Georges–Marc Benamou, Le dernier Mitterrand, Paris, Plon, 1996, 50–52: «La France ne le sait pas, mais nous sommes en guerre avec l’Amérique. Oui, une guerre permanente, une guerre vitale, une guerre économique, une guerre sans morts … apparemment. Oui, ils sont très durs, les américains, ils sont voraces, ils veulent un pouvoir sans partage sur le monde … C’est une guerre inconnue, une guerre permanente, sans morts apparemment, et pourtant, une guerre à mort!»

See finally: François Mitterrand in Alain de Benoist, Dernière année: Notes pour conclure le siècle, Lausanne, Suisse, Éditions L’Age d’Homme, 2001, 187; François Mitterrand in Henri de Grossouvre, «Guerre économique Europe/États–Unis», Paris–Berlin–Moscou: La voie de l’indépendance et de la paix, Pierre Marie Gallois, préface, Lausanne, Suisse, Éditions L’Age d’Homme, 2002, 38–40; 38.

18. Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought: The English, Irish and Scotch Schools, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 158–159–160.

See: “Kant’s doctrines are destructively opposed to Catholicism. His teaching has been condemned by Popes Leo XIII and Pius X. His great work, ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ was placed on the Index, 11th June, 1827. Inconsistent with Catholic teaching are (1) Kant’s Metaphysical Agnosticism, which declares his ignorance of all things as they really are; (2) his Moral Dogmatism which declares the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; (3) his giving to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification; (4) diametrically opposed to scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind is Kant’s theory of knowledge which makes mind and thought the measure of reality rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought. Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The reversal of the order of thought and reality, Kant calls his ‘Copernican Revolution’ in his theory of knowledge.”

Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought: The English, Irish and Scotch Schools, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 166.

Remarks: Defenders of the Kantian traditions attack Catholicism based upon the evils of Gallicanism, but in their assaults upon Gallican theology, especially in the realm of practice, their refutations fall flat with regards to Ultramontanism: The Popes, in the name of Scholasticism, have vigorously rejected the evils of modernism.

Defenders of the Kantian traditions who attack Catholicism based upon the evils of Gallican theologians, and thereby assault Gallican theology, especially in the realm of practice, really only refute the satanic connexions between Gallicanism and modern European political and economic irrationalism, — and thus entirely miss their alleged target, namely the Catholic Church and Vatican.

American Idealism vigorously defends the Western traditions of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

19. Michael Joseph Mahony, Essentials of Formal Logic, New York, The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1918, 8–9.

See: “In spite of some sympathy shown in recent years for a vaguely Kantian sort of idealism or, better, anti–realism, which argues for the dependence of our conception of reality on our concepts and/or linguistic practices, Kant’s transcendental idealism proper, with its distinction between appearance and things in themselves, remains highly unpopular … many interpreters continue to attribute to Kant the traditional “two–object” or “two–world” or some close facsimile thereof, and in most (though not all) cases this reading is combined with a summary dismissal of transcendental idealism as a viable philosophical position. In fact, the manifest untenability of transcendental idealism, as they understand it, has led some critics to attempt to save Kant from himself, by separating what they take to be a legitimate core of Kantian argument (usually of an anti–skeptical nature) from the excess baggage of transcendental idealism, with which they believe it to be encumbered … there is an important asymmetry here. The reason for this is that in considering objects as they appear or as appearances, one is actually considering them as subject to intellectual as well as sensible conditions (the schematized categories and the Principles), whereas in considering them as they are in themselves the converse does not hold.”

Henry E. Allison, “Part I: The Nature of Transcendental Idealism: Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Problem,” Kant’s Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense, 2nd edition, New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 2004, 1–74; 3–19; 3–453. [1983]

Remarks: In the world historical struggle between Kant and Hegel, as the collapse of European modernity and rise of Americanism, especially in twentieth century Europe, the strife between Kantian anti–Hegelianism (e.g.,Schopenhauer) and Kantio–Hegelianism (e.g., Marx) in the arena of modern politics and economics, as the strife between monarchism and republicanism, is the clash between the Left and Right, while the warfare between the good and bad Kant is the struggle for political and economic centrism: “The manifest untenability of transcendental idealism, as they understand it, has led some critics to attempt to save Kant from himself.” Henry Allison’s rejuvenation of Kantianism in the name of “Kant’s Transcendental Idealism,” is effectuated via the beliefs (claims) of the historical personage of Immanuel Kant, his opinions: “The separability of Kant’s fundamental claims in the Critique from transcendental idealism will be categorically denied (4).” Statements such as “What Kant actually says is that one might name this illusion the subreption of hypostatized consciousness (499)” are in need of a philosophical conception of actuality, especially in the fields of exact hermeneutics and exact historiographical biography. For this reason Allison’s rejection of Kantian anti–realism, “a vaguely Kantian sort of idealism or, better, anti–realism, which argues for the dependence of our conception of reality on our concepts and/or linguistic practices,” requires texts translated by Kantian hermeneuticists like Paul Guyer, and leans at crucial junctures mainly upon writings outside the Critical works proper: “[Transcendental Idealism’s] intimate connection with virtually every aspect of the Critique (4).” [Italics added] In other words, Henry Allison endeavors merely to establish the division between Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism in terms of the good versus bad Kant, as the Kantian distinction between true and falseKantianism, but his differentiation is no way a proof of the philosophical veracity of subjective idealism: “[The] main goal is to provide an overall interpretation and, where possible, a defense of transcendental idealism. The defense will not amount to an attempt to demonstrate the truth of transcendental idealism; that being much too ambitious a project. It will, however, argue that this idealism remains a viable philosophical option, still worthy of serious philosophical consideration (4).” [Italics added] Henry Allison is no way advances any proof of the philosophical veracity of transcendental idealism, but only establishes his own distinction between its good and bad versions at the hands of Kantian interpreters, and “defends” his interpretation as a “a viable philosophical option … worthy of serious philosophical consideration.” In other words, Henry Allison merely assumesthat transcendental idealism is philosophy, rather than sophistry: “The defense will not amount to an attempt to demonstrate the truth of transcendental idealism; that being much too ambitious a project … this idealism remains a viable philosophical option.” Allison leans upon Kantian translators and their translations (contaminated with their Kant “philology”), in order to establish that the idealism (“this idealism”) of his defense of Kant’s transcendental idealism is philosophical, rather than sophistical. The reader should not be blind to the fact that Henry Allison’s “philosophical defense” of Kant’s subjective idealism is itself advanced as Kantian transcendental idealism. Since Allison advances no proof of the philosophical veracity of Kant’s transcendental idealism, and therefore his own idealistic “interpretation,” he does not possess the philosophical wherewithal to draw exact hermeneutical and philological distinctions between the texts of Kant’s so–called philosophical system of transcendental idealism of the Critiques, as opposed to texts whose interpretive bearings upon Kant’s idealism are objectionable or disputable upon strict (anti–Kantian) hermeneutical and philological grounds: “I have occasionally modified these translations. Where there is no reference to an English translation either the translation, is my own or the text is referred to but not cited (ix).” What Henry Allison names as philosophy is therefore in no wise fundamentally different from what is usually named as sophistry.

20. Hegel, “Part Three: Ethical Life,” The Philosophy of Right, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, Sections 358–360.

See: Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821; Hegel, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Band 124, Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911; Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, Vierte Auflage, Band 124a, Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag 1967. [1955]

21. See: Anonymous, “Brexit Could Cost UK Research Sector Billions, Says Oxford Boss,” The Guardian, 10 May 2018; Raphaela Henze & Gernot Wolfram, editors, Exporting Culture: Which Rôle for Europe in a Global World?Wiesbaden, Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden G.m.b.H., 2014; Anonymous (Goethe–Institut/Invent/Institut für Kulturkonzepte), Hrsgs., Report on the Cultural Management Africa Advanced Training Programme, München,Goethe–Institut, 2011; Anonymous (Goethe–Institut), Hrsg., Kompetenzzentrum Kulturmanager in Osteuropa und Zentralasien: Kultur und Entwicklung Dokumentation, München, Goethe–Institut, 2011; Raka Shome, “Internationalizing Critical Race Communication Studies,” The Handbook of Critical Intercultural Communication, Thomas K. Nakayama & Rona Tamiko Halualani, editors, Oxford, John Wiley and Sons, 2011, 149–170; Corina Suteu, Academic Training in Cultural Management in Europe: Making It Work, Amsterdam, Boekmanstudies, 2003; Corina Suteu, Another Brick in the Wall: A Critical Review of Cultural Management Education in Europe, Amsterdam, Boekmanstudies, 2006; Anonymous (UNESCO), editors, “Shaping Cultural Diversity,” Unesco Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: White Paper (German Commission for UNESCO), Bonn, Eigenpubli., 2005; Klaus Siebenhaar, Marga Pröhl & Charlotta Pawlowsky–Flodell, hrsgs., “Hrsg., im Auftrag der Bertelsmann Stiftung,” Kulturmanagement: Wirkungsvolle Strukturen im kommunalen Kulturbereich, Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 1993.

See also: “The conference brought together researchers as well as practitioners from different fields and fifteen different nations. They all set a momentum for putting international as well as intercultural relations into focus and for promoting greater critical discourses on the rôle of arts and cultural management and institutions within the context of internationalization, globalization and the increasing global migration of people.” [Italics added]

Raphaela Henze, “Guest Editorial: Cultural Management Without Borders,” Zeitschrift für Kulturmanagement: Kunst, Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft/Journal of Cultural Management: Arts, Economics, Policy, Steffen Höhne & Martin Tröndle, editors–in–chief, 2.1(2016): 11–14; 11.

Remarks: The main business of Bonapartism in the Western world of today, is the preservation of the last remnants of modern European political and economic irrationalism (Eurocentrisme as multipolarity or polycentrisme), under the floodtide of American Liberty, — in the name of the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of Großdeutschland, as der Merkel Apparat. The rôle of Federica Mogherini, Cecilia Malmström and Margrethe Vestager in Europe’s attacks upon Americanism is well known. The success of the European Bonapartist project of Eurocentrisme (the political and economic retardation of Americanism in Europe), requires the assistance of American intellectuals and academics, in the name of the Copernican revolution as Liberal Internationalism, — especially in the ranks of the Republican and Democratic political parties, whether as Kantian anti–Hegelians or Kantio–Hegelians.

See also: “The twenty–first century multipolar world presents a new context for international relations. The evolving shift of power in global governance — ‘from the West to the rest’ and from state to non–state actors — has witnessed the emergence of a new array of competing players … Shaping the EU Global Strategy: Partners and Perceptions considers the EU’s response to these fundamental global shifts in power and multiple internal challenges; it critically examines the global influence of the EU’s identity and values in the face of competing normative paradigms each with their own distinct policies and identities.”

Natalia Chaban & Martin Holland, editors, “Introduction: Partners and Perceptions,” Shaping the EU Global Strategy: Partners and Perceptions (The European Union in International Affairs), Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019, 1–26; 1. [Italics added]

Remarks: What passes for “Global Strategy” among the Kantian traditions of the European Union is a mask, a useful propaganda tool, especially among intellectuals and academics, the intelligentsia, designed to hide the overwhelming influence of Berlin’s hand in the determination of foreign policy, which is always crafted with the aim of uplifting Großdeutschland as the prius of European political and economic power, — at least under the regime of der Merkel Apparat. The “multipolar world” is therefore a modern European delusion, which hides the inhumanity of political and economic irrationalism, the dumping of the sick and elderly into the boneyards as “cost savings,” so that European nations are not bankrupted by their inferior ruling classes as they pillage public wealth, — in the name of their backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts: Puppets of the Dieselgate Aristocracy of Eurocentric Eurocracy (the Airbus ruling class), in their dirty works, thereby sooth their flabby minds, those of whom are not utterly depraved, with delightful phantasms of humanitarianism (Global Strategy in the multipolar world), as opposed to “authoritarianism,” i.e., so–called American unipolarity as Yankee imperialism. The Global Strategy of the European Union aims at uplifting the inferior ruling classes of the earth, in return for lucrative contracts and purchases from the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of European Bonapartism, at the expense of the superior ruling classes, whose leaders around the world are often debased and even sidelined. The main political and economic victim of this modern European irrationalism is American finance, commerce and industry in Europe and around the world, — victimization that undermines the health of the American superpower, and which thereby endangers the Western democracies.

“Does all this ‘Global Strategy’ really matter, after everything is said and done, since Americanism is on the rise?” Indeed, our words are merely the rational justification of American Idealism, in the destruction of modern European political and economic irrationalism, — in the rise of Global rational political and economic order as the supremacy of American Liberty in the world.

See finally: “With the British referendum, the need for a common strategy was even greater than before. We needed — and we still need — to look beyond this self–induced crisis of European integration and to focus on what binds us together: the shared interests and the values driving our common foreign policy; our unparalleled strength, as the First–World economy, the largest global [viii] investor in humanitarian aid and development cooperation, a global security provider with a truly global diplomatic network. We need to focus on the immense untapped potential of a more joined–up European Union. We need to move from a shared vision to common action … The twenty–eight Heads of State and Government have approved my proposals for implementing the Strategy in the field of security and defence. It is a major leap forward for European cooperation — and eventually, integration — on defence matters. The process leading to the Global Strategy has helped build consensus on a set of concrete measures and on their rationale. Instead of getting stuck into never–ending ideological debates or exhausting negotiations on revising the Treaties, we moved pretty steadily from principles to practice — to finally get things done, where it really matters. The implementation of the Strategy is now under way in all sectors, from fostering resilience to public diplomacy, from a more joined–up development cooperation to a rethinking of global governance. The European Union of security and defense can be a major building block to relaunch the process of European integration, but it cannot be the only one. Europe can deliver to our citizens’ and our partners’ needs only when it acts as a true Union, at national and European levels, with our hard and soft power, in our external and internal policies alike. Europe delivers only when it is united.”

Federica Mogherini, “Foreward,” Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World (Palgrave Studies in European Union Politics), Nathalie Tocci; Michelle Egan, Neill Nugent & William E. Paterson, series editors, Cham, Switzerland, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, vii–ix; vii–viii.

Remarks: The European Union’s “Global Strategy” of Federica Mogherini, as Eurocentrism, i.e., multipolarity (“a shared vision to common action … [Europe’s] hard and soft power”), is opposed to the unipolarity of American superpower, and is the twenty–first century mask of European anti–Americanism, which preserves the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of Großdeutschland at the expense of American finance, commerce and industry in Europe (especially the United States military–industrial complex), based upon the modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of the Copernican revolution as Cosmopolitanism and Liberal Internationalism, — mortally opposed to the Western traditions of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

22. See: “The present inquiry analyzes the patterns of class in a society whose leaders are the holders of despotic state power and not private owners and entrepreneurs. This procedure, in addition to modifying the notion of what constitutes a ruling class, leads to a new evaluation of such phenomena as landlordism, capitalism, gentry, and guild. It explains why, in hydraulic society, there exists a bureaucratic landlordism, a bureaucratic capitalism, and a bureaucratic gentry. It explains why in such a society the professional organizations, although sharing certain features with the guilds of Medieval Europe, were socially quite unlike them. It also explains why in such a society supreme autocratic leadership is the rule. While the law of diminishing administrative returns determines the lower limit of the bureaucratic pyramid, the cumulative tendency of unchecked power determines the character of its top … I have started my inquiry with the societal order of which agromanagerial despotsim is a part; and I have stressed the peculiarity of this order by calling it ‘hydraulic society.’ But I have no hesitancy in employing the traditional designations ‘Oriental society’ and ‘Asiatic society’ as synonyms for ‘hydraulic society’ and ‘agromanagerial society’; and while using the terms ‘hydraulic,’ ‘agrobureaucratic,’ and ‘Oriental despotism’ interchangeably, I have given preference to the older formulation, ‘Oriental despotism’ in my title, partly to emphasize the historical depth of my central concept and partly because the majority of all great hydraulic civilizations existed in what is customarily called the Orient.” [Italics added]

Karl August Wittfogel, Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 1967, 4–8. [1957]

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Select Merkel Bibliography

Robin Alexander, Die Getriebenen: Merkel und die Flüchtlingspolitik: Report aus dem Inneren der Macht, (Schwaig bei Nürnberg, Bayern: John Verlag, 2017).

Florence Autret, Angela Merkel: Une Allemande (presque) comme les autres, (Paris: Tallandier, collection «Biographie», 2013).

Odile Benyahia–Kouider, L’Allemagne paiera: Voyage au pays d’Angela, (Paris: Fayard, collection «Documents», 2013).

Baudouin Bollaert, Angela Merkel: Portrait, (Monaco: Éditions du Rocher, collection «Documents», 2006).

Jacqueline Boysen, Angela Merkel: Eine deutsch–deutsche Biographie, (Berlin: Ullstein Verlag, Taschenbuch, 2001).

Guy Chazan & Mehreen Khan, “Merkel’s Party Drops Insistence on IMF Staying in Greek Bailout: CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group Shifts Stance Over Fund’s Call for Debt Relief for Athens,” Financial Times, 31 May 2018.

Alan Crawford & Tony Czuczka, Angela Merkel: A Chancellorship Forged in Crisis, (Chichester, West Sussex: John Wiley & Sons, 2013).

Frank Decker, “Follow–up to the Grand Coalition: The German Party System Before and After the 2013 Federal Election,” The Merkel Republic: An Appraisal, Eric Langenbacher, editor; Jeffrey Anderson, Louise K. Davidson–Schmich, Frank Decker, Wade Jacoby, Jackson Janes, Melanie Kintz, Eric Langenbacher, Charles Lees, Jonathan Olsen, David F. Patton, Lars Rensmann, Hermann Schmitt, Steven Weldon & Andreas M. Wüst, contributors, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 26–47.

Fredrik Erixon “Angela’s Ashes: Merkel’s Grand Project is Crumbling,” The Spectator, 28 June 2018.

Thorsten Faas, Jürgen Maier & Michaela Maier, Merkel gegen Steinbrück: Analysen zum TV–Duell vor der Bundestagswahl 2013, (Springer–Verlag, 2017).

Mehdi Hasan, “Europe’s Most Dangerous Leader,” New Statesman, 20 June 2012.

Wade Jacoby, “The Politics of the Eurozone Crisis: Two Puzzles Behind the German Consensus,” The Merkel Republic: An Appraisal, Eric Langenbacher, editor; Jeffrey Anderson, Louise K. Davidson–Schmich, Frank Decker, Wade Jacoby, Jackson Janes, Melanie Kintz, Eric Langenbacher, Charles Lees, Jonathan Olsen, David F. Patton, Lars Rensmann, Hermann Schmitt, Steven Weldon & Andreas M. Wüst, contributors, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 177–191.

Matthew Karnitschnig, “How Merkel Broke the EU,” Politico, 28 June 2018.

Jadwiga Kiwerska, Obama and Merkel–Building a Partnership: German–American Relations (2009–2016). A Polish View, (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, Institute for Western Affairs, 2017).

Ferdinand Knauß, Merkel am Ende: Warum die Methode Angela Merkels nicht mehr in unsere Zeit passt, (München: FinanzBuch Verlag, Münchner Verlagsgruppe GmbH, 2018).

Stefan Kornelius, Angela Merkel: Die Kanzlerin und ihre Welt, (Hambourg: Hoffmann und Campe, 2013).

Stefan Kornelius, Angela Merkel: The Chancellor and Her World, Anthea Bell & Christopher Moncrieff, translators, (Richmond, Surrey: Alma Books, 2014).

Eva Krick, “Ensuring Social Acceptance of the Energy Transition: The German Government’s ‘Consensus Management’ Strategy,” Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning, 20.1(5 May 2017): 64–80.

Eric Langenbacher, editor, The Merkel Republic: An Appraisal, Jeffrey Anderson, Louise K. Davidson–Schmich, Frank Decker, Wade Jacoby, Jackson Janes, Melanie Kintz, Eric Langenbacher, Charles Lees, Jonathan Olsen, David F. Patton, Lars Rensmann, Hermann Schmitt, Steven Weldon & Andreas M. Wüst, contributors, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).

Eric Langenbacher, editor, “Introduction: Merkel’s Nachsommermärchen?” The Merkel Republic: An Appraisal, Jeffrey Anderson, Louise K. Davidson–Schmich, Frank Decker, Wade Jacoby, Jackson Janes, Melanie Kintz, Eric Langenbacher, Charles Lees, Jonathan Olsen, David F. Patton, Lars Rensmann, Hermann Schmitt, Steven Weldon & Andreas M. Wüst, contributors, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 1–25.

Charles S. Maier, “In Merkel’s Crisis, Echoes of Weimar,” NYR Daily: New York Review of Books, 4 December 2017.

Marcus Maurer, Carsten Reinemann, Jürgen Maier & Michaela Maier, Schröder gegen Merkel: Wahrnehmung und Wirkung des TV–Duells 2005 im Ost–West–Vergleich, (Springer–Verlag, 2008).

Angela Merkel & Hugo Müller–Vogg, Mein Weg, (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 2004).

Angela Merkel & Hugo Müller–Vogg, À ma façon: Entretiens avec Hugo Müller–Vogg, Véronique Médard, traduction, (Paris: Archipel, 2006).

Hugo Müller–Vogg & Uwe–Karsten Heye, Steinbrück oder Merkel? Deutschland hat die Wahl, (Berlin/Köln: Quadriga Verlag/Bastei Lübbe AG, 2013).

George Packer, “The Quiet German: How Angela Merkel Rose to Power,” The New Yorker, 1 December 2014.

Jean–Paul Picaper, Angela Merkel, une chancelière à Berlin: La première femme à gouverner l’Allemagne, (Paris: J.–C. Gawsewitch éditeur, 2005).

Jean–Paul Picaper, Angela Merkel: La femme la plus puissante du monde, (Paris: J.–C. Gawsewitch éditeur, collection «Coup de gueule», 2010).

Philip Plickert, Merkel: Eine kritische Bilanz, (München: FinanzBuch Verlag, Münchner Verlagsgruppe GmbH, 2017).

Volker Resing, Angela Merkel. Die Protestantin. Ein Porträt, (Leipzig: Benno, 2009).

Volker Resing, Hrsg., Angela Merkel: Daran glaube ich. Christliche Standpunkte, (Leipzig: Benno, 2013).

Volker Resing, Angela Merkel: Une femme de conviction, Antoine Doriath, traduction, (Paris: Empreinte temps présent, 2010).

Volker Resing, Die Kanzlermaschine. Wie die CDU funktioniert, (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder GmbH, 2013).

Volker Resing, Angela Merkel–Die Protestantin: Ihr Aufstieg, ihre Krisen–und jetzt? (Freiburg im Breisgau: Verlag Herder GmbH, 2017).

Andreas Rinke, Das Merkel–Lexikon: Die Kanzlerin von A–Z, (Springe: zu Klampen Verlag GbR, 2016).

Evelyn Roll, Die Kanzlerin: Angela Merkels Weg zur Macht, (Taschenbuch, 2009).

Arkadiusz Stempin, Angela Merkel: Cesarzowa Europy, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Agora SA, 2014).

Arkadiusz Stempin, Sojusznicy: Od Fryderyka i Katarzyny Wielkiej do Merkel i Putina, (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Agora SA, 2016).

Wolfgang Stock, Angela Merkel: Eine politische Biografie, (Gebundene Ausgabe, 2005).

Marion Van Renterghem, Angela Merkel: L’Ovni politique, Alastair Campbell, préface, (Paris: Éditions Les Arènes–Le Monde, 2017).

Eurocentrism, Multipolarity, Liberal Internationalism & Cosmopolitanism: Select Bibliography

Anonymous (UNESCO), editors, “Shaping Cultural Diversity,” Unesco Convention on the Diversity of Cultural Expressions: White Paper (German Commission for UNESCO), (Bonn: Eigenpubli., 2005).

Anonymous (Goethe–Institut/Invent/Institut für Kulturkonzepte), Hrsgs., Report on the Cultural Management Africa Advanced Training Programme, (München: Goethe–Institut, 2011).

Anonymous (Goethe–Institut), Hrsg., Kompetenzzentrum Kulturmanager in Osteuropa und Zentralasien: Kultur und Entwicklung Dokumentation, (München: Goethe–Institut, 2011).

Anonymous, “Brexit Could Cost UK Research Sector Billions, Says Oxford Boss,” The Guardian, 10 May 2018.

Jens Bartelson, “The Trial of Judgement: A Note on Kant and the Paradox of Internationalism,” International Studies Quarterly, 39.2(1995): 255–279.

Isaiah Berlin, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Nationalism (Original lecture, 1972),” The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History, Henry Hardy, editor, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1996), 232–248.

Isaiah Berlin, “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Nationalism (Original lecture, 1972),” The Sense of Reality: Studies in Ideas and Their History, Henry Hardy, editor, (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1997), 232–248.

Garrett Wallace Brown, Grounding Cosmopolitanism: From Kant to the Idea of a Cosmopolitan Constitution, (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2009).

Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1998).

Charles Covell, Kant, Liberalism and the Pursuit of Justice in the International Order (Studies in the History of International Relations), (Münster/Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1994).

Charles Covell, Kant and the Law of Peace: A Study in the Philosophy of International Law and International Relations, (London: Macmillan, 1998).

Natalia Chaban & Martin Holland, editors, “Introduction: Partners and Perceptions,” Shaping the EU Global Strategy: Partners and Perceptions (The European Union in International Affairs), (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 1–26.

Paul D’Anieri, International Politics: Power and Purpose in Global Affairs, (Nelson Education, 2016).

Howard Dick, The Politics of Critique, (Minneapolis, Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

Thomas Diez & Nathalie Tocci, editors, The EU, Promoting Regional Integration, and Conflict Resolution, (Springer International Publishing, 2017).

Jason Dittmer & Fiona McConnell, editors, Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives (Routledge New Diplomacy Studies), (New York: Routledge, 2015).

Jason Dittmer & Fiona McConnell, editors, “Introduction: Reconceptualizing Diplomatic Cultures,” Diplomatic Cultures and International Politics: Translations, Spaces and Alternatives (Routledge New Diplomacy Studies), (New York: Routledge, 2015), 1–20.

Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 1,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12.3(Summer, 1983): 205–235.

Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, Part 2,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12.4(Fall, 1983): 323–353.

Michael W. Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” International Relations: Critical Concepts in Political Science: Section V, the Liberal Peace, vol. 3, Andrew Linklater, editor, (London/New York: Routledge, 2000), 870–895.

Eric S. Easley, The War Over Perpetual Peace: An Exploration into the History of a Foundational International Relations Text (Palgrave Macmillan History of International Thought Series), (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

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Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

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