HEGEL’S TERMINOLOGY: WILLIAM WALLACE

AMERICAN IDEALISM
Sep 1, 2018 · 12 min read

William Wallace (1874)

Partly in order to afford materials of comparison to those who know German, and partly to bring together some points noticed in these introductory outlines, there are here subjoined [clxxvi] short explications of the principal terms which Hegel uses in peculiar, and what the grammarians call pregnant senses.

Abstrakt and Concret. — By abstrakt (abstract) is meant that a term, thought, or object is withdrawn from its context, and regarded apart from the elements which enter into its composition, or from, the relations which connect it with other things. Words and notions, when severed from their solidarity with things and facts, are abstract. The fewer attributes, or relations to other things, are distinctly grasped by our notions, the more abstract they are. To be abstract is to be one–sided, to emphasise half–truths, to stick to partial views, and to lay undue stress upon names.

An object or thought is concret (concrete) when it is seen and known to be the confluence of several elements, to be a process or becoming in its own nature, and not a mere stationary point of being. A concrete notion keeps in view the various inter–connexion and inter–dependence of things: And states that each object, in its truth and totality, must be regarded as equal to itself in the abstract, multiplied into all other things.

An sich: Für sich: An und für sich. That is an sich (implicit: natural: in, at, or by self) which is given in germ, but undeveloped: Which is for others to see, feel, and recognise. It is what is native and spontaneous as opposed to what is imported: Latent as opposed to what is developed and realised: Potential as opposed to what is actual: Natural as opposed to artificial: Abstract as opposed to concrete.

That is für sich (explicit: actual: for self) which is actual, whether it be native or not: — The result of an sich when developed, looked at apart from the process: — What has been acquired and made our own, as opposed to what is merely given. A human being has a capacity for reason: He is an sich rational: But it is incumbent upon him to realise that rationality, and become rational für sich. What is an sich is taken pure and in the abstract: What is für sich is taken entire and in its actuality. [clxxvii]

Hence an und für sich (in and for self: absolute: pure and entire) is applied to denote what is spontaneous and independent: When a thing is taken in the entirety of its development, and that development is due to the evolution of its own native forces. The thing is in the fruition of its nature: It has become everything which it was destined to be. We may compare an sich to the mere generality or possibility of a thing (such is the well–known Dingansich): Für sich to the particularising, determining, differentiating, or realising of that possibility: And an und für sich to completed individuality. When the knowledge of a thing presents it as it is an und für sich, it presents it as a process or development in itself by itself for its own sake: And in such wise it is Absolute.

Anschauung (perception or intuition) is the direct contemplation of an object or quality in externality under the conditions of space and time. The object is individualised in an image of sensuous kind. The works of art are such individualised forms; in which, for example, the object of religious worship is presented to the bodily eye. In Vorstellung (see that word) the background is an idealised time and space, and the eye to which the object is presented is the mental eye. They both have an external object: But the externality of Vorstellung is in the mind, that of Anschauung is in the matter of sense. Hence in Vorstellung the object is to a certain extent generalised:

Aufheben and Setzen. To explain setzen (posit, statute, lay down, set forth explicitly, state) we must recur to an sich. When the presence of an element in a thing is recognised as necessary, when its existence is postulated in order to complete a notion, it is said to be gesetzt. In these circumstances it is imposed from without, but yet the external imposition presupposes an internal response and willingness. Thus in the second sphere of logic we can see that a grasp (or notion) is required to bind the two elements of relativity in one: But as merely required and postulated the notion appears as necessity, and is not yet freely active für sich. Thus the an sich, which [clxxviii] exists in germ undiscerned, is realised as existing: And when thus seen to be self–existing is für sich. Setzen, then, is the process of raising an sich to für sich.

Aufheben (suspend, set aside, absorb, put in abeyance, abrogate) has a double meaning. It denotes (1) that something, having been deprived of its independent existence, is for practical purposes lost and gone. But (2) what has thus disappeared is retained as an element or factor in the result to which it has led. Thus the seed is aufgehoben in the plant which grows from it: It has perished and disappeared as a seed: But it is transfigured and retained in the existence of the plant. Thus setzen expounds the differences which lie involved in an abstraction or germ of truth, and leads them out into reality: While aufheben concentrates these differences into unity and ideality. (See Idealität and Realität.)

Begriff and Vorstellung. Begriff (notion, comprehension: Literally, grasp or grip) is the name of that thought which grasps its object, — which, while it allows all freedom to the several members, at the same time unifies them. The object, or anything, when regarded as a Begriff, is taken in the entirety of its nature, as what has come into being, — as the result of a process, and not intelligible otherwise than in that process. Thus the notion has three functions: Or the same thing presents itself under three aspects: — Universal, particular, and individual. There is the beginning, or mere fact of being, the germ, or thing in itself, the undeveloped universal. There is the movement of advance, the division into parts, the process from essence to appearance, the particularising. And there is the end, or grasp of this particularity and difference in the unity of its innate germ: The individual or actual object into which the vague universal has been developed and specified. Thus to get the Begriff e.g., of a plant, we must comprehend it as a process with these three terms: (a) the seed, — the mere possibility, germ, or universal of the plant: (b) the division into roots, stem, branches, leaves, fruit, &c., where we have the particulars of the fact, its differences: (c)the union of these [clxxix] in the plant, — the individual totality by its living movements reducing these parts to their functional and organic position in the whole. Thus to understand one part rightly we must understand the whole: And vice versa.

Vorstellung (conception, figurate conception: material or picture thought: literally, presentation, from vorstellen, to present or introduce a person) instead of dissolving an object into its process, as the Begriff does, takes it as stationary, and reduces it to a point at rest. It is the generalised picture of an object, without the definite outlines of Anschauung. The Anschauung of a triangle e.g., is some definite triangle before our eyes at this moment: The Vorstellung is a “general idea” which dare not take the definite shape of one triangle, and is really unrealisable as such. It must pass either into Anschauung, or into thought. The dispute about “general ideas” among nominalists, conceptualists, and realists, was partly due to a confusion of Vorstellung with Begriff. Compare the distinction in Spinoza between imaginatio and intellectus. A Vorstellung is a contrivance for sparing thought by means of a word, with which we have otherwise become familiar. Nominal definitions are of this class: They satisfy the desire to have something before us upon which we may fix our mind’s eye.

Bestimmung and Bestimmtheit. A Bestimmung (category: characteristic or term of thought: vocation: typical form: feature: article: specification: determination, — from bestimmen, to define, literally to be–speak) is a statement or article formulating a thing. It gives the dimensions of an object. It is a determination (of thought) into a specific or typical form. The Denksbestimmungen are the several articles or formulae which describe the nature and action of thought. They are the moulds into which thought has shaped itself, and by which we take the dimensions of the world.

A Bestimmtheit (determinateness or character) is that which renders a thing cognisable, — its quality or character in virtue of which it can be described. The terms of this description are Bestimmungen. Bestimmtheit is definiteness: Bestimmung is [clxxx] definition. The Bestimmtkeit is the specific character, the contents or subject–matter which forms the basis of a description.

Daseyn and Existenz. Daseyn (Being–there–and–then; determinate being) is real and definite as opposed to mere or abstract being. To bring a thing into Daseyn is to give it definite being; whereas Seyn is only a tendency to become, the bare possibility of being. By calling it there–and–then no reference is meant to time and place; only to the limitations of reality. Existenz (existence) implies a source of being, a ground or essence, from which the determinate and apparent being has sprung. Existence is always the consequence of some ground. A thing existirt when it proceeds from its essential being into actuality: It has Daseyn (is there and then) when it is in definite being.

Dialektik and Spekulation. Dialektik (dialectic) is the principle of compensation, which shows the other side or negative of things, and thus relieves us from the one–sided view of the world, given by understanding. It is a negative and destructive action, a swing round in the reverse direction, which betrays the inadequacy of any given definite form. The primary aspect of each form of things presents it as an affirmative reality: The second inspection shows that there is contradiction in what we saw, and that it is neither complete nor absolute. The revelation of this undiscerned feature leads to a synthesis, which is an act of Spekulation (speculation), by which negative and positive are assimilated into each other. Thus, while the usual aspect of species shows us the several bonae species (or genuine kinds) distinct from each other and from varieties, the dialectic of nature presents these species as in a greater or less process of transition from one to another. This dialectic is the natural selection, caused by the struggle for existence. The speculative biologist applies this law to discover the order and connexion of the several kinds. Hence speculation means grasping truth in its wholeness, and not merely one element discoverable by analysis. It is the comprehension of rational truth, holding [clxxxi] together those points which we are naturally inclined to let fall asunder into the isolation of their details.

Formell (formal) means that regard is had merely to the form or to external considerations, and not to the real nature or essence of the object in question. What is formell stands in no vital inter–connexion with the thing to which it is applied. Thus formal mechanism (p. 290) means that the mechanical relation is at this stage in a wholly outside connexion with its objects. A party–cry which covers a variety of sentiments in its different criers, and a phrase which suits any content equally well, is formally applied. So we speak of the formalism of grounds and reasons; and mean that they can be employed to explain or excuse anything, one as well as another.

Idee (idea) is the thorough adequacy of thought to itself, the solution of the contradictions which attach to thought, and hence, in the last resort, the coincidence or equilibrium of subjective notion and objectivity, which are the ultimate expression of that fundamental antithesis in thought. Such a coincidence is only attained by a process or development, — a triplicity, in which each step advances upon the preceding, by mastering, i.e., comprehending its limitations. When thought is fully equal to itself and true to its own laws, it is neither objective merely nor subjective merely. Hence the Idee represents thought in its totality as an organisation or system or universe of reason, a process of development or self–construction. The several grades of that self–construction are the categories or terms treated of in Logic.

Idealität: Realität: Moment. By Realität (reality) is meant the self-subsistence and independence of an object: By Idealität (ideality) is meant the deprivation of this definite being, and its reduction into an element or factor, depending upon other parts and upon the whole for its subsistence. Thus a piece of coal is a reality when it is looked upon as one sort of thing distinguished from others, and existing with this quality or character. But when it is put into the fire, and burned, it is seen to make one element in the process: It [clxxxii] loses its self–subsistence, and is as coal dissipated and lost. But it is ideally present so long as its efficiency is felt. Similarly in the case of living beings the albumen, &c., of which they consist are present ideally as constituent elements which can be discovered by analysis: I.e., by reducing the ideëll force of life to abeyance. So, again, in the perfect (ideal) state the several imperfect realities of monarchy, oligarchy, and democracy are present in an ideal way; they no longer subsist in their unimpaired reality, but in their truth as constituent and subordinate elements of the political constitution. Reëll is to Ideëll as differentiation is to integration. When the existent and external world enters the mind it is deprived of its reality: But in its effect upon the mind and character it continues to be ideally present. Such a constituent element, or factor, which has lost all reality of its own except in combination (i.e., in ideality), is a Moment. The reality of a body is its separate qualitativeness as an isolated object; its ideality begins when its reality is abolished (aufgehoben) and it has become a Moment or dynamic element in a larger unity.

Reflexion (reflection) Whenever, instead of burying our contemplation exclusively in the object which is directly before us, and studying the object in its own self, we proceed to trace its bearings upon other things and the consequences which follow from it in the light of our other knowledge, — when we view one thing in the light which it casts upon another, or which another thing casts upon it, we use Reflexion. We connect two things which, as it appears, exist independently by themselves, and we institute a relation between them. Thus by means of our own action we imitate or reproduce that connexion of distinct or different things, which the logical idea accomplishes inherently by the force of its own dialectic. Thus a Reflexions–Philosophie is one which tries to bring together and unify the two fundamental opposites, — thought and objectivity, — which are assumed to be primarily distinct. Thus it is by an act of Reflexion (really flowing from the Begriff) that [clxxxiii] we connect and systematise the several stages in the transitions of being (Seyn), We ask (reflectively), what follows from this? How does this comport itself with other known facts? What would this lead to in such a case?

Raisonnement (ratiocination, inference) is partly connected with reflection, and, as opposed to dialectic, is the name given to such argument as believes its starting–point to be fixed and stable, and is unaware that all process in thought is not a mere stepping from one point forward to the next, but the abrogation or absorption of an inferior term in a higher or more comprehensive. It forgets the negation implied in every process of thought, by which the immediate datum is annihilated to produce something better; by which truth is only attained by means of untruth, and error is a component ideally entering into the production of true knowledge. Dialectical proof shows its conclusion as the truth of its premisses, i.e., the necessary result in which their full significance first becomes apparent: The premisses are aufgehoben in the conclusion. Raisonnement, on the contrary, leaves its premisses behind as they were at first, and when it has piled on argument to argument and term to term, it gets to its conclusion. The French word suggests that it is the vice of French doctrinaires.

Vernunft and Verstand. Vernunft (reason) is the concrete or speculative exercise of thought, which gives due expression to the process–nature in things, as a unity of differences and contrasts. Hence it discovers the limitations or qualifications in each term of thought short of the whole, and prevents us from resting in inadequate descriptions and half truths. Verstand (understanding) is the abstract exercise of thought which distinguishes and defines, instead of comprehending and grasping, its object. Such distinguishing and fixing of differences is a necessary preliminary to comprehension. Verstand analyses and states the several elements in an object; it accepts each object as an ultimate datum, however much it may be connected with other objects, or resolved into its elements. Vernunft, on the other hand, keeps the understanding from [clxxxiv] sticking to these isolated elements as the whole truth, and holds them suspended (idealised) in the unity of the notion.

Ummittelbar and Vermittelt. Unmittelbar (immediate; without intermediation or derivation) is applied to denote what comes before us nakedly and baldly, as a mere fact, unaccounted for, and face to face. That is unmittelbar which comes obviously and solely on its own evidence. The immediate state is the state of nature, — that which is given as a birthright from which we have to rise to the state of culture, or intermediated state. That is vermittelt (mediated; derivative; with intermediation) which comes as the result of a process (or of an argument); which is not founded upon its own evidence, but is got indirectly and by means, — not at a mere momentary act, but by labour and instrumentality. If the beginning as given be taken apart, it is immediate; if the conclusion be taken by itself, it is mediate: But the total object, which is a process or movement in itself, is both immediate and mediated; i.e., it is the process of inter–mediation by itself, or the process of self–realisation (which is the Idea). Immediate knowledge is that which comes without the intervention of means; which is direct, and needs no confirmation by reasoning.¹

ENDNOTES

1. William Wallace, “Prolegomena (Chapter 23): Vocabulary,” The Logic of Hegel, Translated From the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences With Prolegomena, Hegel; William Wallace, translator, preface, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1874), xiii–clvvviv; clxxv–clxxxiv.