AMERICAN IDEALISM
THE AMERICAN IDEALISM OF JOSEPH ALDEN
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2019)
It is the mind alone that knows … The mind knows, and the mind is the object of knowledge. Francis Wayland¹
In the world historical rise of Americanism, the nineteenth–century American Idealist philosophy of Joseph Alden teaches that “there is no such thing as a general infinite.”² Does the philosophical notion of the general infinite, according to American Idealism following the Civil War, entail that in nineteenth–century American philosophy there is no such thing as the World Spirit, as expounded by the genuine Hegel of rational (pure) Hegelianism?³ We think not. American Idealism follows in the footsteps of Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel, while modern European irrationalism follows behind Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant: Western rationalism in America is the philosophical tradition of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, and is mortally opposed to modern European unreason, — especially that which portrays Socrates, Plato and Aristotle as embryonic Copernican revolutionaries of the ancient “French revolution” of the Peloponnesian war, or as diabolical monarchists and Catholics (dogmatists, metaphysicians and absolutists). Popular twentieth–century European scholarship is profoundly ignorant of nineteenth–century American thought, especially because many works of Americanism were hidden–away in the rare book departments of public universities, controlled by mortally corrupt politicians, their friends and families, — whose electoral success depends upon our collective ignorance, in the form of inert ideas, outdated and surpassed conceptions.
The American Idealism of Joseph Alden teaches that “we cognize infinite objects, and can thus form an abstract idea of infinity … the idea [of the infinite] is not definable.”⁴ That the idea of the infinite is not definable means that cognized ideas (conceptions), such as an abstract idea of infinity, or the conceptualization that we cognize infinite objects, are not themselves definable as dictionary definitions, but rather transcend the fields of lexicography, and englobe philosophy as both epistemology and ontology, conceptions which in the above passages are applied to the notion of rational theology.⁵ Joseph Alden does not therefore teach that the conceptualization of the idea of infinity is the conceptualization of the dictionary meaning of infinity found in lexicography.
“There has been a great deal written about the absolute and infinite which conveys no meaning to such as have not the faculty of understanding the unintelligible.”⁶ Joseph Alden attacks as sophistry the Kantian tradition, whose schools classify the idea of infinity as unintelligible, because amongst them “there has been a great deal written about the absolute and infinite which conveys no meaning”:
“Many assertions have been made for which there is no proof. For example, Mansel says: ‘That which is conceived as absolute and infinite, must be conceived of as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being.’”⁷
The conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of conceptions, ideas and notions of infinity is not itself definable as a dictionary definition, but rather transcends the field of lexicography, and englobes philosophy as both epistemology and ontology: We mean that conceptions, ideas and notions of infinity are not themselves conceptualized as mere dictionary definitions are conceived, because lexicographical cognition is inseparable from the rational conceptualization of the notion of the epistemological and ontological distinction between exact and inexact lexicography. When lexicographical cognition cognizes the science of lexicography, based upon the rational distinction between scientific and pseudo–scientific lexicography, the conceptual rationality of the cognition is not itself conceptualized in rational conceptualization as the mere definition of lexicography is cognized, found in such and such a dictionary, but rather transcends the field of lexicography per se. Of course, the modern European sophists of the Kantian tradition reject such conceptual rationality as unreason, but the political and economic irrationalism of European modernity is transcended and therefore refuted in the conceptual rationality of Americanism, as the supremacy of American Liberty in the world of today.
§1/ Let us examine this question in more detail, in light of our conception of the world: For what is more truly ours, than our conceptions, especially our conception of the world? For we conceive of the world, whatever name our preferences attribute to our conceptualization. Indeed, our conception of the world, as we conceive ourselves and the world, is our conception of ourselves and the world, but in the sense that we ourselves conceive of the world. We need not avoid the first person plural, for in the singular the same ideas hold sway. I conceive of the world, which is the conception of my world: The conception of my world as my conceptualization of the world. Yet the conception of my world is also the conceptualization of the world. For my world is the conceptualization of the world that is mine: My conceptualization of the world is conceptual. Our conception of the world, as we conceive ourselves and the world, is our conception of ourselves and the world, but in the sense that we ourselves conceive of the world. We therefore conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world. We may replace the word conception with any other term that we might prefer, perhaps the noun thought, whichever terminology is more congenial, but our conclusion remains the same: The world as our conception, our conceptualization of the conception of the world, is our conception of the universe.
Remarks: The ancient, mediaeval and modern skeptics doubt or deny the existence of the world, otherwise they doubt or deny the reality of knowledge of the world’s existence: They reject the conception of the world, For whatever is the existence of the world, but our conceptualization of the conception of the world? Skepticism does not here mean one’s skeptical nature, the skepticism of a skeptical nature. Skeptics that doubt the reality of the world, they do not doubt the reality of their doubt, and therefore they do not doubt the non–existence of the world: Their doubt is really legitimate, so they maintain. When philosophical skeptics doubt the reality of the world, therefore, they do not doubt or deny the reality of the rational world, upon which their doubt is founded, rather they reject a certain philosophical version of the universe: The philosophical skeptics give reasons for their doubt. Philosophical skepticism, so–called, is therefore the method and doctrine of the skeptical philosophy, which propounds the epistemology and ontology of skepticism. Skepticism affirms the non–existence of the world, and the non–existence of the conceptualization of the conception of the world: The skeptics are not skeptical of their skepticism. The skeptical “philosophy,” by which the skeptical methodology of doubt is used to attack their opponents the idealists, in order to reject the idealistic version of truth and reality, opposes the version of the rational world according to the school of Western Idealism: The method of skepticism therefore goes hand in hand with the doctrines of the skeptics.
Skeptics who affirm that they do not know, that they are devoid of knowledge, that they know that they do not know, that they know nothing, borrow from Kantianism, nay, they are themselves Kantians dressed in the garb of skepticism, in order to inculcate Kantianism in the guise of skepticism. That these skeptics know nothing therefore really means that in their eyes, the unknowable of Kant exists, while the “knowledge” that they know they do not know, is verbiage whereby they endeavor to advance the sophistical conceptions of their critical philosophy: Kantian skeptics use the methods of skepticism to advance the sophistry of Immanuel Kant. Skepticism draws the skeptical distinction between knowledge and ignorance, and feigns ignorance, to attack the version of knowledge of its philosophical adversaries, the school of anti–skepticism: Skepticism thereby conceives of what it allegedly doubts, — the conceptualization of the conception of the world. In their ignorance they doubt or deny the existence of the world, but in their doubt, they conceive of the rational world in order to affirm their ignorance, — they conceive of their doubt concerning the existence of the world. The doubt of the existence of the world is itself an existential conception, since the conceptualization of doubt is itself an affirmation of the power of reason, and the existence of the rational world. The suspension of judgement is itself an affirmation of judgement’s sovereign power of arbitration, — as the birth–pangs of a greater conceptualization of conceptual rationality.
Skepticism’s conception of the doubt of the existence of the world, as the skeptical difference between knowledge and ignorance, is the skeptical conception of the world as non–existent, the sophistical conception of the world as unknowable: Skepticism affirms the sophistical doctrine of the unknowable. Skepticism as a “philosophy” flounders upon the absurdity that the rational world is unintelligible and that something unknowable exists: Skepticism ruthlessly pursued as an end in itself, is self–destructive of rationality. Skeptics who doubt everything must also doubt the veracity of their own doubts, lest they betray themselves and their philosophy, — a project which ultimately ends in the bottomless pit of sophistry. The doubt of the existence of the world is itself an existential conception: Skepticism was never a “philosophy” but always a purgative, in the service of something greater, a more all–encompassing, conception of the world. Skepticism is the corrosion that clears the conceptual ground, and therefore is an attack against a world that is passing–away, a world in decomposition and disintegration, — in the rise of a far–greater conception of rationality. Skepticism is therefore found in the world historical strife between the Platonism and Aristotelianism of Rome and the Middle Ages, in the warfare between Christianity and paganism, as much as within the ancient struggles between Athens and Sparta, and the birth of Hellenism, from out of the Macedonian Empire, as the strife between Socrates and the materialists, — in Plato’s attacks against the Sophists. For this reason, healthy skepticism as rational doubt is really the seedbed of conceptual rationality, as the rejection of an earlier phase of cognition, as the fertilizer for newer, higher and ever–greater conceptions, — the ante–chamber of philosophical Science. The conception of skepticism, the skeptical doubt about knowledge of the world, is itself a conception of philosophy: The rational conceptualization of the conception of the history of Western philosophy, the philosophical history of the different schools of skepticism, conceives the conceptualization of the historical conception of skepticism. The conception of skepticism is conceptualized as the philosophical conceptualization of the world of philosophy: The conceptual realm of philosophy is a conception, is itself conceptually conceptualized, alongside the sciences, history, religion, literature and art, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world of conceptual rationality.
§2/ Our conceptions are conceptions of ours, as our conceptualizations: As conceptualization, our conception of the world is conceptualized as a rational conception, for we really and truly conceive the world, — namely our world. The conceptual rationality of our conceptualization of the world, as rational conception, is our conceptual rationalization of our world. The denial of this doctrine refutes itself, is self–contradictory, but we need not debate the veracity of our conception of the world in favor of our conceptions of the world, for the result is the same. The conceptual rationality of our conceptualization of the world, as universal conceptions, is rationally conceptualized. Our conception of the world, as the conceptual rationality of the conceptual rationalization of our world, as our conception of the universe, is our rational conception: Our conceptual rationality is rational in the sense of our conceptualization of the conception of the world, the conceptual universe as the universality of conceptuality as the conceptualization of our conceptions:
Cartesius: “Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo … ea enim est natura nostrae mentis, ut generales propositiones ex particularium cognitione efformet.”⁸
Following the footsteps of Cartesius, the conceptualization of the rational conception of selfhood, is also the conceptualization of conceptual rationality: “Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo.” We conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world: Our conceptions of the world are the same. The form and content of our conceptualization of the rational conception of the world, is the universality of conceptual rationality. Again, we may qualify the phrase “conceptual rationality” as we fancy, but as the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world, these qualities themselves remain qualified by the category of universality. This is not so? The conception of our world is not our conception of the world? Indeed, whatever is or is not the case with regards to the world, is always so predicated and therefore conceived, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of the world.
§3/ A point of order: Our conceptions are conceptions of ours, as our conceptualizations. Our conceptualization of rational conceptions as forms of rationality, are conceptualizations of conceptions of rationality: Conceptions as forms of rationality are otherwise conceptualizations of conceptions, as the conceptualizations of rational worlds, they are conceptualizations. Forms of rationality, conceptualizations of rational worlds, are conceptualizations of conceptual rationality: Forms of reason are conceptualized rationally, are conceptions of the rational world. Rational worlds as forms of rationality, are conceptualizations of the conceptual rationality of the rational universe. We need not labour this point, for whether we replace the term reason with some other word, we are dealing with conceptualizations, as sensations, feelings, pleasures, satisfactions, even perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints, but always in the name of intelligibility, as the rational conceptions of the conceptualization of conceptual rationality, in the genuine Hegelian sense of rational (pure) Hegelianism, — in the conceptualization of conceptualization as causa sui.
§4/ What is the exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility? The exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility is precisely conceptual, as the rational conceptualization of the conception of conceptual rationality: When we conceive of the exact difference between intelligibility and unintelligibility, we conceptualize the rational conceptualization of conceptual rationality, as the conceptualization of the difference between the intelligible and unintelligible worlds, as the conceptual rationality of the rational universe. The conception of unintelligibility, when opposed to intelligibility, is always rationally conceptualized: The conception of unintelligibility is not itself an unintelligible conception. When we charge our adversaries of sophistical argumentation, we accuse them of being unintelligible, their demonstration is defective, because we know what unintelligibility is, — we conceive that our conception of unintelligibility is conceptualized. We do not accuse our adversaries of unintelligibility when we do not know that they are in error, as though we conceive of a non–conception:Their conceptions are lesser, while ours are greater, — a conceptual distinction which is rationally conceptualized as the rational conceptualization of form and content.
§5/ The conceptual form and content of rational conceptualization, the formal and material conceptualization of universality, as the conceptual universality of conceptual rationality, is universally conceptualized as our conception of the world: The rational conceptualization of the world as the conceptual universality of conceptual rationality, is therefore the conceptualization of conceptualization. The conceptualization of the conception of rational theology, is an instructive instance: Our conceptualization of the conception of philosophical theology as well as the conception of philosophical physics is the same, in the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world. The conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world, conceives theological conceptions formally and materially: The conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality as the conceptualization of the conception of theology is universally conceived, formally and materially, as the rational conceptualization of churches, parishes, Sunday schools and so forth: As the conceptual complexifications of rational conceptualizations between priests and parishioners, and so forth. Rational conceptions of the priesthood are conceptualized in the cannons of ecclesiastical doctrine. Conceptions of theology are conceptually inscribed, universally conceived, as the conceptual complexifications rationally exemplified as the conception of organized religion. Is this not the same for all conceptual knowledge, including the conceptualizations of the sciences? The same remark holds good of pedagogy, jurisprudence, criminology, psychology, and so on, even the field of military science. The conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality, formally and materially, as the conceptualization of the rational conception of world, is the world of universal and particular conceptualizations: Our formal and material conceptions of the universal and particular world, rationally conceptualized, are themselves theoretical and practical conceptions, are themselves worldly conceptualizations. Whether or not entirely permissible, at this stage of the conceptual argument, our rational conceptualization, we pose the following question, which is not rhetorical: Where is theology ever found in the rational world, conceptualized rationally, without both priest and parishioner, or jurisprudence without both judge and accused? Even the scientists have their laboratories and conduct experiments upon their subjects.
§6/ We conceive of ourselves as rational conceptualizations: We conceive of ourselves and the world as we ourselves conceive of ourselves conceiving ourselves and the world. Therefore our conceptualizations of our rational conceptions of ourselves are themselves conceived conceptually as the conceptual rationality of universal conceptuality. As such is the case, our conceptions of ourselves are themselves conceived as rational conceptualizations: They themselves are conceived conceptually. The manifold agencies of conceptual rationality conceive the conception of personhood: The rationality of the selfhood of personality is the universality of conceptuality. The universality of conceptual rationality, as the conceptual universe of truth and reality, is the rationality of the selfhood of personality as the universality of conceptuality, as formal and material self–conceptualization. We need not therefore refer to ourselves in the conceptual rationalization of rational conceptualization, as somehow “unconceived,” as apart from the world of rational conceptions: As conceptions of ourselves, the conceptual rationality of universal conceptuality conceives of the rational conception of our conceptual world as rationally conceptualized, as our conceptualization of ourselves and the world. Self–conceptualization conceives of the rational world as the conceptual rationality of the universality of conceptuality: The conceptual universe as causa sui.
§7/ Conceptualization of Americanism, in the rational Hegelian sense, is therefore the form and content of the conceptual rationality of the American world, as the struggle between subjective and objective freedom in world history, from out of the clash between Kant and Hegel, from which arises the absolute freedom of American Liberty. The substantial form, the concrete universality of American conceptual rationality, its developmental unification and coaxial integration, as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is found within the clash of ruling classes: From out of the womb of history, arise universal historical determinations, the amniotic complexifications of which constitute the embryonic development of the world. The worldhood of the American world, the realm of its universality as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is the conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism.
§8/ The conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism, conceives that the political and economic worldhood of the American world englobes North America, the United States, Canada and Mexico, not merely in the notional form and content of the political and economic geography of continentalism, but also as the central and innermost sphere of Americanism. Make no mistake, the conceptual relationship between the innermost essence of Americanism and its outermost conceptualization, englobes the entire Western world. The innermost and basic dynamism of Americanism, the essence of American conceptual rationality as causa sui, self–determination in the genuine Hegelian sense, namely the myriad relationships between the White House, Washington and Wall Street, englobes North America within the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.
§9/ Conceptualization, since rational conceptions possess a life and freedom of their own (self–determination as causa sui), therefore conceives of the political and economic worldhood of the American world as the rationalization between core and periphery, which conceptually arises from the very conceptual substrata of Americanism itself, — within concrete universality as the universal form of the immanence of the self–determination of American conceptual rationality. What is the rationality of personality, but the evolution of conceptuality? We must draw attention to the essential conceptual complexifications between the political economies of the West coast of the United States of America with Mexico, as well as between the East coast with Canada: This political and economic dynamism is always found within the rational calculations of the American political economy of the White House, Washington and Wall Street, as the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, — as America’s rational conception of itself.
§10/ For readers accustomed to the sophistical verbiage of twentieth–century Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, especially in the twenty–first century, how very foreign our language must sound, devoid of reverberations of American perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints of the world (standpunkt, perspektive, weltanschauung). Make no further mistake: The application of outdated and surpassed conceptions, as rational solutions to today’s political and economic challenges, is irrationalism: Modern European unreason in the Global world is undone in the rise of Americanism, having self–destructively cleared away from Western civilization’s universal historical ground, the political and economic delusions and phantasms of modernity, as the inescapable lesson of history, in the strife of ruling classes under the floodtide of American rationality.
ENDNOTES
1. Francis Wayland (1796–1865), “Introduction: Definition of the Intellectual Powers,” The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, New York, Sheldon & Company, 1865, 9–14; 9. [1854]
2. Joseph Alden (1807–1885), Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1866, 290.
3. See: “Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”
Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 561–591; 575–586.
4. Joseph Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, Ibidem.
5. Remarks: In the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of theology, philosophical conceptions applied to theology are no more theological conceptions, in the modern European pejorative sense, than the application of philosophical conceptions to physics, in the conceptualization of the rational conception of the science of physics, are themselves conceptions of physics, in the modern European non–pejorative sense: Our conceptualization of the conception of philosophical theology as well as the conception of philosophical physics is the same, in the conceptual rationality of the conceptualization of the conception of the rational world.
Philosophers maintain that thought of phenomena and noumena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. Sophists maintain thought of phenomena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. German Idealism elevates the Western conception of mind and matter, nature and spirit made popular since the time of Descartes: Since the birth of genuine Hegelianism, what philosophers name as thought based upon illusion and incomplete perception is very different from the German Idealism of the sophists. The same remark holds good of phenomena and noumena.
6. Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, 291.
7. Alden, Ibidem.
8. Renatus Cartesius, “Secundæ Responsiones,” Œuvres de Descartes: Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, vol. 7, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, éditeurs, Paris, Léopold Cerf, 1904, 128–159; 140–141. [1641]
Remark: How very clear and distinct are the ideas of Cartesius, coming from his very own hand, although his best translators are also clear and distinct, but less clear and less distinct than the very words of Cartesius himself, as found in his very greatest works, since his Latin is now a dead language, while his modern interpreters fail to elucidate the rational foundations of their sophistical critiques.
Some interpretations of Descartes are very ingenious: “A decisive impetus to the interpretation I offer is imparted by Kant. While Kant’s concerns aren’t those of a professional historian of philosophy (although he has claims to have established the discipline), his backwards–directed perception is, I am convinced, far acuter than that of latter–day analysts. As I shall show towards the end, Kant’s writings contain the categorial polarity so central to my reading. Since I take my cue from Kant, the discussion of Descartes therefore has a slightly unusual historical cast: It is drawn forward by the Kantian terminus ad quem rather than pushed ahead from the scholastic terminus a quo … it is both mildly paradoxical and highly flattering to Kant that the lesson that might otherwise have been learned from him is completely missed, owing to his magnificent success in converting the field to his way of thinking. The dominant [12] metaphilosophy of our age has a Kantian provenance. Post–Kantian orthodoxy places philosophy in a characteristically oblique relation to science, divesting it of the dictatorial functions attributable to a foundational discipline. But Kant didn’t fail to say of his metaphilosophical revolution that it has substantive implications, which he puts by denying to man the possibility of knowledge of ‘things in themselves’; nearly enough, knowledge of the only kind that Descartes regards as worthy of the title … Descartes’ criticism of experience and knowledge as we know it — of the probable — isn’t immanently justified. If at all, it is justified only relative to a view of the world — a certain view — transcendent of our mundane patterns of cognition … Kant’s position is a development of the negative side of Descartes’ overall theory.”
Mark Glouberman, Descartes: The Probable and the Certain, Amsterdam, Rodopi, 1986, 11–11–12–346–346.
Remark: The rational distinction between Descartes, Spinoza, Berkeley and Hegel on the one side, as opposed to Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant on the other, is conceptualized world historically, — following in the footsteps of rational Hegelianism, — at once positively and negatively, which means dialectically: The universal notion of Western civilization, as opposed to European modernity in the strife between philosophy and sophistry (science and ideology), as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, is therefore dialectically cognized as the conceptual rationality of universal freedom in the world of today.
Therefore, the idea of the Cartesian distinction between certainty and probability, as outlined above, is not the essence of the conceptual rationality of the history of Western philosophy and European modernity, which instead resides within the epistemological and ontological clash between reason and unreason, which is the world historical marrow of the former opposition, as the notion of universal freedom, — in rational Hegelian contradistinction to modern European right.
JOSEPH ALDEN: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 1866–1886
Joseph Alden (1807–1885), Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1866).
Joseph Alden, Christian Ethics, or the Science of Duty, (New York: Ivison, Phinney, Blakeman & Company, 1866).
Joseph Alden, The Science of Government in Connection With American Institutions, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1866).
Joseph Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1868).
Joseph Alden, Alden’s Introduction to the Use of the English Language, Grammar and Rhetoric Combined, (New York: Potter, Ainsworth & Company, 1875).
Joseph Alden, The Science of Government in Connection With American Institutions, new edition, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1876). [1866]
Joseph Alden, Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1884).
Joseph Alden, The Science of Government in Connection With American Institutions, new edition, (New York/Chicago: Sheldon & Company, 1886). [1876]
Joseph Alden, First Steps in Political Economy, (New York: School Bulletin Publications, nd).
AMERICAN IDEALIST PHILOSOPHERS: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 1848–1887
Elroy McKendree Avery (1844–1935), Elements of Natural Philosophy: A Text–Book for High Schools and Academies, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1881).
Elroy McKendree Avery, First Principles of Natural Philosophy, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1884).
Robert Blakey, “Chapter VII: Metaphysical Writers of the United States of America,” History of the Philosophy of Mind: Embracing the Opinions of All Writers On Mental Science From the Earliest Period to the Present Time, vol. 4, (London: Trelawney Wm. Saunders, 1848), 490–542.
Joseph Haven (1816–1874), Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will, (Boston/New York/Cincinnati: Gould & Lincoln, 1857).
Joseph Haven, Moral Philosophy Including Theoretical and Practical Ethics,(Boston/New York/Cincinnati: Gould & Lincoln, 1859).
Joseph Haven, Studies in Philosophy and Theology, (Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1869).
Joseph Haven, A History of Philosophy: Ancient and Modern, (New York: Butler, Sheldon & Company, 1876).
Mark Hopkins (1802–1887), Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity Before the Lowell Institute, January, 1844, (Boston: T.R. Marvin, 1846).
Mark Hopkins, Miscellaneous Essays and Discourses, (Boston: T.R. Marvin, 1847).
Mark Hopkins, A Discourse Commemorative of Amos Lawrence: Delivered by Request of the Students, in the Chapel of Williams College, February 21, 1853, (Boston: T.R. Marvin, 1853).
Mark Hopkins, Lectures on Moral Science, (New York/Boston: Sheldon & Company, 1862).
Mark Hopkins, The Law of Love, and Love as a Law, or Moral Science, Theoretical and Practical, (New York: Charles Scribner, 1869).
Mark Hopkins, The Law of Love and Love as a Law, or Christian Ethics, (1870).
Mark Hopkins, An Outline Study of Man, or, the Body and Mind in One System with Illustrative Diagrams, and a Method for Blackboard Teaching, (New York: Charles Scribner, 1873),
Mark Hopkins, Strength and Beauty: Discussions for Young men, (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1874).
Mark Hopkins, The Scriptural Idea of Man: Six Lectures Given Before the Theological Students at Princeton on the L.P. Stone Foundation, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1883).
Mark Hopkins, Teachings and Counsels, Twenty Baccalaureate Sermons, with a Discourse on President Garfield, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1884).
Mark Hopkins, Evidences of Christianity: Lectures Before the Lowell institute, Revised as a Text Book, with a Supplementary Chapter Considering Some Attacks on the Critical School, the Corroborative Evidence of Recently Discovered Manuscripts, etc., and the Testimony of Jesus on His Trial, revised edition, (Boston: T.R. Marvin & Son, 1887). [1846]
James McCosh (1811–1894), The Scottish Philosophy, Biographical, Expository, Critical: From Hutcheson to Hamilton, (New York: Robert Carter & Brothers, 1875).
Francis Wayland (1796–1865), The Elements of Intellectual Philosophy, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1865). [1854]
Francis Wayland, The Elements of Moral Science, revised and improved edition, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1877). [1865]
Francis Wayland, The Elements of Political Economy, revised edition, (New York: Sheldon & Company, 1875). [1873]
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