RATIONAL HEGELIANISM

THE REFUTATION OF HEGEL

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2018)

Interpretations of Hegel which are the products of today are the productions of our world in the American Age, and therefore are the result of the evolution of two centuries of Hegelianism in universal history: They are the productions of the world of today, and therefore the Hegelianism of our interpretations, our interpretations themselves, requires justification from our world, justifications which are themselves inseparable from Hegelianism, the result of Hegel’s influence in the arena of world politics and economics, — in the universal historical strife between Kantians and Hegelians. All this is from the genuine Hegel of the Pure Hegelian philosophy: We read Hegel systematically, and in the light of Americanism as the rise of universal American Liberty from the ashes of the Civil War, which is the fountainhead of Globalism in the 21st century world of today. Interpreters who do not justify their interpretations in this way remain within the realm of standpoints, perspectives and outlooks, the field of 20th century Kantio–Hegelianism and modern European unreason: Their interpretations are therefore susceptible to the defects of impure Hegelianism, even if they make no reference to the traditions of the Berlin edition, — in order to mask their Kantio–Hegelian affiliations.¹

The strife between the young and old Hegelians is academic, while the struggle between the left and right Hegelians is academic as well as political and economic: The nature of the warfare between both sides is different in their respective forums, but is always the same antagonism between genuine and pseudo–Hegelianism, namely divergent interpretations involving the question of the relationship between the great works of Hegel published in his lifetime, and the posthumously published Lectures, — which ultimately concerns the nature of the relation between Kant and Hegel, based upon the notion of Dialectics.

The enemies of Hegel, especially his criticist interpreters, attack the Hegelian philosophy from outside of the system, from philological and hermeneutical assumptions lying outside the Hegelian system and irrelevant to genuine Hegelianism. On the nature of sophistical refutation, Hegel makes the following observations in the Science of Logic:

“In connection with the refutation of a philosophical system, I have also remarked quite in general that we must get over the distorted idea that that system has to be represented as if thoroughly false, and as if the true system stood to the false as only opposed to it … Refutation would have to come not from outside, that is, not proceed from assumptions lying outside the system and irrelevant to it. The system need only refuse to recognize those assumptions; the defect is such only for one who starts from such needs and requirements as are based on them … The nerve, therefore, of any external refutation consists solely in obstinately clinging to the opposite categories of these assumptions, for example, to the absolute self–subsistence of the thinking individual as against the form of thought which in the absolute substance is posited as identical with extension. Effective refutation must infiltrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground; there is no point in attacking him outside his territory and claiming jurisdiction where he is not.”²

Critics of Hegel do not enter into the spirit of Hegelianism when they make judgments that are sophistically opposed to the Hegelian philosophical system: They obstinately cling to opposite categories and assumptions. The question therefore naturally arises, where is the location of the genuine Hegelian system in the collected works of Hegel? The answer to this question is very easy to discover: The Hegelian system of philosophy is found in the Great Works of Hegel, the originalausgabe published during his lifetime: The Phenomenology of the Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and the Philosophy of Right.

Michael Rosen explains the refutation of Hegel:

“The true system develops and vindicates itself by including these lower standpoints within itself. But it must not, Hegel says, do that ‘externally’ … it must establish common ground with them, and this means participating in their assumptions. Only then can criticism have force.”³

In other words, the refutation of Hegel must contain the philosophical system of Hegelianism as a lower standpoint: The refutation of Hegel is therefore a sublation of Hegelianism, from out of which it arises dialectically in the manner of the Hegelian philosophical system itself. Therefore, the refutation of Hegel must contain an element of Hegelianism, reconciled with its opposite in a higher dialectical unity which cancels out the earlier logical defects as a vanishing phase of world history: The genuine Hegelian refutation of Kantio–Hegelianism accomplishes this feat.

The new dialectical unity cancels out the logical defects and resolves the contradiction as a vanishing phase of world history, and for good reason: The refutation of Hegelianism requires that the genuine conception of the Hegelian philosophical system, which is sublated into the higher unity, is itself obtained dialectically. The resultant Idea of philosophy and science is the sublation and refutation of Kantio–Hegelianism, as the genuine speculative logical and dialectical system of the Pure Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism. In not so many words, the world historical refutation of Kantio–Hegelianism results in the Idea of the superior dialectical rationality of philosophical science.

The world historical refutation of Kantio–Hegelianism results in the Idea of the superior dialectical rationality of philosophical science?

Without the genuine philosophical science of absolute idealism, which is the fountainhead of the rational conception of exact historiography and world history (as universal history), all psychology and biography collapse into imaginative literature: The world historical roots of Hegel’s Science of Logic and the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, are discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. The Pure Hegelian conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic in the exact historiography of world history as the genuine philosophical science of absolute idealism is the aim of exact philology and hermeneutics: The exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, first requires the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism.

From whence comes the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism? The rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism is the result of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and the Philosophy of Right. The exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, results from the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and the Philosophy of Right. Therefore, the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, results from the the phenomenological, scientific, and encyclopaedic sublation of the genuine Hegel of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Philosophy of Right. Therefore, the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, is the result of the Pure Hegelianism of the Philosophy of Right. Pure Hegelianism is therefore the fountainhead of the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism. The sublation of Kant and Hegel is precisely the phenomenological, scientific, and encyclopaedic sublation which results in the Pure Hegelianism of the Philosophy of Right.

Hegel’s Weltgeist as the rational and spiritual dialectic of world history is the crowning achievement of the genuine Hegelian philosophical science of Pure Hegelianism, — the conception of reason and spirit, as found in the Phenomenology, Logic and Encyclopaedia, is world historically sublated in the Philosophy of Right as the Idea of the Weltgeist. Exact interpretations of the rational and spiritual evolution of the genuine dialectical system of Hegelianism in world history must therefore read the works of the originalausgabe as the moving upwards (aufhebung) of the Hegelian conception of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the philosophical science of absolute idealism, in the rational and spiritual culmination of Hegel’s absolute idealism as the Weltgeist.

In 1821, the birth of the rational and spiritual conception of Hegel’s Weltgeist in Berlin constitutes the beginning of a powerful new struggle in the universal history of European civilization and Western humanity, and therefore constitutes a vast period of historical reorganization, in the collapse of modernity and rise of Globalism as the supremacy of American Liberty in the world.

Without the Pure Hegelian conception of the exact philological and hermeneutical notion of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, all interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy are doomed to extinction on the dunghill of the world, as a vanishing phase of universal history: This at least is the verdict of American Idealism in the world of today.

ENDNOTES

1. See: “My claim is that the Logic is to be read as still in line with Kant’s Transcendental Logic, though without being ‘transcendental’ in Kant’s sense … Hegel still seems to think of dialectic in a negative, basically still Kantian sense, as a movement that irrupts from within finite thought revealing the contradictory nature of its determinations when these are held absolutely apart … Logic thus loses whatever vestige of a role it might still have had as an introduction to the system, and regains instead, if one just ignores the ‘thing–in–itself’ of Kant, a function not unlike that of the latter’s Transcendental Logic … On the face of it, Hegel’s Logic has all the markings of a classical, pre–critical metaphysics. But this is a false impression, and our first task is to understand in what sense it in fact still falls within the compass of Kant’s critical project. For this, we must further elaborate on themes already adumbrated … As Hegel takes us systematically across the content of his Logic, he tacitly assumes and makes use of a psychological model which he borrows from Kant and Fichte and which these had borrowed in turn from a long–standing scholastic tradition … In a way, Hegel’s point is still a Kantian one. It is only ideally that full intelligibility is attained, the kind of intelligibility, to put it in more phenomenological terms, that would satisfy reason … I have also interpreted Hegel’s Logic in a transcendental spirit. But one must remember that, for one thing, Hegel presents the Logic as itself a form of life, the perfect instance of self–becoming in which nature finds intelligent completion; and, for another, that there is no question of applying the categories to a material external to them, as is the case for Kant’s categories … the Logic is absolute science only in the sense that it is capable of recognizing itself (and thus containing its limitation even as logic) as an analog of rationality as such — a rationality of which there can be other analogs, all of them capable of communicating across cultures and across times precisely because they are the analogs of one rationality — but at a distance as it were, with something always being lost in translation. I would like to take the claim in this sense, but it is not at all clear that this was Hegel’s intent.”

George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, “Introduction,” The Science of Logic, G.W.F. Hegel; Michael Baur, General editor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, xi–lxii; xi–xx–xxii–xxvii–xxxvi–xlix–lxii.

See also: “It must be acknowledged that phenomenology [subjective idealism] is, nevertheless, well represented in Canada, and that there is a present and energetic level of activity, organization, and research … [phenomenology] shows no signs of fading away and continues to thrive, albeit somewhat quietly … there are currently a number of centers, institutes, and societies with a focus on phenomenology, or Continental thought in the wider scope … given the current levels of activity, and the promise of continued interest and involvement on the part of students and younger academics, a solid future for phenomenology in Canada is assured.”

Linda Fisher, “Canada,” Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Lester Embree, et alia, editors, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, 91–94, 91–91–91–94.

See finally: “[Kant’s] phenomenology was clearly nothing but what he called ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ … Nevertheless, such a critique of human knowledge has by itself little if any affinity with today’s full–fledged phenomenology [sic] … Husserl found himself increasingly in sympathy and agreement precisely with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, apparently without being aware of the fact that there was even a terminological bridge for his latter–day rapprochement to Kant’s critical philosophy.”

Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, vol. 1, Dordrecht, Springer, 1960, 12.

Remark: “[Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason] has by itself little if any affinity with today’s full–fledged phenomenology” : Herbert Spiegelberg’s statement of course does not apply to the Critical Philosophy in toto and its Kantio–Hegelian relationship to phenomenology in the 20th century world, especially with regards to Kant’s Anthropologie.

2. Hegel, “The Science of Subjective Logic or The Doctrine of the Concept: Of the Concept in General,” The Science of Logic, George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, introduction, Michael Baur, General editor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 507–753; 508–527; 511–512–512.

See: “Hegel’s works on the science of logic are not in any sense treatises on formal logic. This is true despite the fact that Hegel first turned to write his Science of Logic after the publication of his Phenomenology of Spirit, upon receiving a request from the Royal Bavarian Ministry of Education to write a formal logic text for use in the kingdom’s secondary schools. To be sure, his science of logic treats the concepts of judgments, syllogisms, definition, and proof in its third and last part on the self–concept, but [viii] this does not make the Science or Lectures a logic textbook. The Lectures are far more a treatise in rational theology in which the author abandons himself to the life and internal self–development of the divine logos at work since the true Parmenidean onset of the history of philosophy. And this is so even though Hegel understood that the science of logic could be used non–theologically as a study of the universal and necessary thought determinations or categories of thinking.”

Clark Butler, “Translator’s Introduction,” Lectures on Logic: Berlin 1831, G.W.F. Hegel and Karl Hegel, transcription; Clark Butler, translator; John Sallis, series editor, Bloomington, Indiana, Indiana University Press, 2008, vii–xxiii; vii–viii. [2001]

Remark: Hegel’s Greater and Lesser Logic and Lectures on Logic (his works on the science of logic), according to the modern sophist Clark Butler, are not in any sense “treatises on formal logic” or logic textbooks, but are far more treatises in “rational theology in which the author abandons himself to the life and internal self–development of the divine logos.” Alas, in Clark Butler’s introduction to Hegel’s Lectures on Logic, wherein these words appear, we discover no concept whatsoever of rational, as opposed to irrational theology, a cardinal distinction in any argument, the conclusion being that “‘Hegel’s works on the science of logic are not in any sense treatises on formal logic,’ but treatises in rational theology.” Clark Butler advances no rational proof that “Hegel understood that the science of logic could be used non–theologically as a study of the universal and necessary thought determinations or categories of thinking.” Before one perseverates upon the psychic activity that allegedly went on in Hegel’s head in Berlin (as well as the difference between rational theology and non–theological logic), an answer is first demanded from the question that naturally arises, What exactly is theology in the first place, and more importantly, why?

See: Hegel, Hegel’s Doctrine of Formal Logic, Being a Translation of the First Section of the Subjective Logic With Introduction and Notes, Henry Stewart Macran, editor and translator, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912.

3. Michael Rosen, Hegel’s Dialectic and its Criticism, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, 30. [1982]

See: “The Jena System, 1804–1805: Logic and Metaphysics is an essential text in the study of the development of Hegel’s thought. It is the climax of Hegel’s efforts to construct a neutral theory of the categories of finite cognition (“logic”) as the necessary bridge to the theory of infinite, or philosophical, cognition (“metaphysics”). As he worked on the Jena system, Hegel’s understanding of the nature of logic and its connection with metaphysics underwent changes crucial to his later system. As a result, logic acquired a new and expanded significance for him. This text is thus the key to an understanding of the works of Hegel’s maturity, and to their relation to the major works of Schelling and Fichte that preceded them ... This book has been published with … a grant from the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, using funds provided by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.”

Hegel, “Frontispiece,” The Jena System, 1804–1805: Logic and Metaphysics, John W. Burbidge, Lorraine Code, William Carruthers, André Dekker, Martin Donogho, Henry Silton Harris, Helga Hunter, George Di Giovanni, Kem Luther, Lee Manchester, Jeff Mitscherling, David Pfohl, Peter Preuss, Kenneth Schmitz and Donald Stewart, editors and translators; Hans Ehrenberg, Rolf–Peter Horstmann, Georg Lasson, Herbert Link and Johann Heinrich Trede, German editors, Kingston/Montréal, McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1986. [1915–1923–1971]

Remarks: Government academics expound upon the “development of Hegel’s thought,” but from whence comes their so–called “development” in the works of Hegelianism, and what exactly do they mean by “thought,” let alone “Hegel’s thought”? Hegel’s understanding of the nature of logic and its connection with metaphysics underwent changes crucial to his later system, logic acquired a new and expanded significance for him. With regards to the so–called “development of Hegel’s thought,” according to government intellectuals, what exactly do they mean by Hegel’s understanding underwent crucial changes, — do they mean by “change” what the genuine Hegel names dialectic, and where do they find their “rational conception” of sublation in the works of Hegel? Burbidge, Harris, and Giovanni hold that the juvenilia is “key to an understanding of the works of Hegel’s maturity,” but where exactly do they find their “conception” of understanding in the system of genuine Hegelianism?

Effective refutation must infiltrate the opponent’s stronghold and meet him on his own ground; there is no point in attacking him outside his territory and claiming jurisdiction where he is not, — Hegel.

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