HEGELIANISM AND EUROPEAN MODERNITY
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2018)
It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.¹
Modern sophists, especially at government controlled schools under the thumbs of nationalistic educational authorities, purposefully publish translations of Hegel in very stilted English (notably very key passages of his doctrine), and they thereby teach the falsehood that Hegelianism is very hard to understand (which makes many of their pupils dislike Hegel, while making genuine Hegelianism very difficult to learn, and requiring far more effort, causing students to find their Hegel in the school textbooks, commentaries, encyclopedias and dictionaries): “[Hegel] is cloaked in a dense and obscure language that is virtually impenetrable to the uninitiated.”² Meanwhile the selfsame irrationalists purposely translate Kant, their master, into an easier English idiom, which distorts his sophistry, and makes their sophistical interpretation of Kantianism appear rational:
“The theoretical foundations of modern liberal society were completed by Kant, who, separating legality and morality, defined the former as the ‘rules of the game,’ so to speak, law dealt with procedural, not substantive issues. The latter were primary matters of conscience, with which the State could not interfere. This distinction has been at the root of the American democracy.”³
The subjective idealism of Immanuel Kant has been at the root of the American democracy: The transcendentalism of Kant constitutes the theoretical foundations of modern liberal society, — according to the sophisters of European modernity. Certainly the transcendentalism of Kant constitutes the theoretical foundations of modern liberal society, namely Bonapartism, — French socialism: The subjective idealism of Immanuel Kant has not been at the root of the American democracy. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America are mostly the result of the rational theologies of advanced Christianity: The Judaeo–Christian conception of right from which evolved the Magna Carta, as the rational and spiritual liberation of humanity. Evolution here signifies the logical and dialectical development of the rational world, as evidenced in the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism, — as the spiritualization of the spirituality of the spiritual universe.
In order to avoid the charge of sophistical philology, the modern sophists corrupt exact historiography:
“G.W.F. Hegel was one of the most influential philosophers ever; his ideas and concepts have so thoroughly permeated our views of reason, right, freedom, and many other ideas that are all a bit Hegelian. But he is one of the more difficult philosophers to fathom, partly because of his language (and the translation thereof) and partly because of his thought. This helps explain why so many different interpretations have been given by so many successors — and sometimes in opposing groups such as the Right Hegelians and the Left Hegelians, and sometimes by just borrowing what interested them, as did Karl Marx. There are compelling motives for compiling this dictionary: The difficulty in grasping the language and thought, Hegel’s widespread and continuing influence, and most important, the intrinsic value of the ideas of Hegel and his successors.”⁴
What exactly is the intrinsic value of the ideas of Hegel and his successors? Certainly they are not the intrinsic value of the ideas of the genuine Hegelian philosophy: Hegel’s ideas and concepts have so thoroughly permeated our views of reason, right, and freedom? Not at all. The genuine Hegel’s ideas and notions are in no way combined with views, perspectives, and outlooks, — in a word, opinion and ideology: The modern sophists make the genuine philosophical science of Hegel into opinion and ideology because they follow the sophistical creed of impure Hegelianism, — the sophists cling to their outdated Kantio–Hegelianism:
“After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the “system” that [they?] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”⁵
The demise of the fake Hegel of Kantio–Hegelianism therefore entails the downfall of the sophistical historiography of European modernity from its academic pedestal, — which in turn entails the world historical restructuring of the political economy of today. The collapse of the Soviet Empire follows upon the heels of the first scholarly publications of the transcriptions of the Lectures of Hegel, — which entails both the genuine Hegelian notion of the Pure Hegel, and the death of Karl Marx. Surprise of all surprises, at this very same moment comes the profound universal historical concretization of the World Mind.
The methodologies through which Hegel’s students and followers assembled the transcriptions of his Lectures into standalone monographs, with the aid of his own manuscripts for his lectures, are dubious at best:
“The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”⁶
It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt (and not everyone does) that Hegel’s classroom lectures are actually reproduced authentically in the published Berlin edition, — that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years:
“Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”⁷
The editors of the Berlin edition of Hegel’s Works sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered his classes: The modern sophists either ignore and neglect the rational conception of world history, otherwise they denature exact historiography, — in order to corrupt and pervert, in the name of modern unreason, the genuine Hegelian notion of Global rational political and economic order.
“Immanuel Kant is indisputably one of the most significant philosophers of the modern age … Does it matter that, even in his own time, his works were interpreted differently by his supporters, and strongly criticized by his opponents, for very different reasons, or that Kantians and Neokantians often disagree sharply with one another? That is hard to say. It depends upon whether one expects philosophy to incorporate the ultimate truth once expounded or to grow and adapt. If the latter, Kant remains impressively significant … there may actually be no ‘correct’ translation [of Kant].”⁸
The modern sophists maintain that within the realm of what may be, namely within theory, there may actually be no “correct” translation of Kant’s writings. Of course it follows, consequently, that there may actually be no “incorrect” translation either: This does not mean that there is actually no correct translation in the world of today, but merely that modern sophists draw no rational distinction between exact and inexact interpretation. Whereas Hegel is very influential, and his ideas and those of his successors (Karl Marx) have intrinsic value, we discover that Kant is “impressively significant,” even “one of the most significant philosophers of the modern age.” Alas, sophists fail to mention any distinction between philosophy and sophistry. Do they name the theoreticians of Soviet communism, such as Bakunin, as sophists or philosophers? Do they also name the theoreticians of Nazi Germany as philosophers or sophists? Here the sophists will draw the distinction between science and ideology: Sophists will place the “significant” Kant on the side of science and philosophy, and the “influential” Hegel on the side of ideology and sophistry (but not the “intrinsic value” of “Hegel and his successors,” namely, the views of 19th and 20th century Kantio–Hegelianism). The Hegel which modern sophistry does not condemn is the pseudo–Hegel of the Kantian tradition: Modern sophists therefore turn a blind Kantio–Hegelian eye to their own tradition of Kantianism and racism. For this reason modern sophistry corrupts and perverts exact historiography and world history, especially that of the United States of America. In the eyes of modern sophistry, the influence of the bad (anti–Kantian) Hegel involves the “ultimate truth once expounded” (metaphysics), whereas the influence of the good (Kantian) Hegel involves growth and adaptation (epistemology):
“Hegel was too much of a critical philosopher to want to undo Kant’s Copernican Revolution … the speculative theologians have never grasped the crucial significance of Kant in Hegel’s development.”⁹
Indeed, the speculative theologians have never grasped the “crucial significance” of Kant:
“Kant’s doctrines are destructively opposed to Catholicism. His teaching has been condemned by Popes Leo XIII and Pius X. His great work, ‘The Critique of Pure Reason’ was placed on the Index, 11th June, 1827. Inconsistent with Catholic teaching are (1) Kant’s Metaphysical Agnosticism, which declares his ignorance of all things as they really are; (2) his Moral Dogmatism which declares the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; (3) his giving to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification; (4) diametrically opposed to scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind is Kant’s theory of knowledge which makes mind and thought the measure of reality rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought. Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The reversal of the order of thought and reality, Kant calls his ‘Copernican Revolution’ in his theory of knowledge.”¹⁰
Rational theologians, “speculative” or otherwise, have never grasped the crucial significance of Kant’s “Critical Philosophy” : Kant’s metaphysical agnosticism declares his ignorance of all things as they really are; his moral dogmatism declares the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; his giving to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification; and diametrically opposed to scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind is Kant’s theory of knowledge which makes mind (facts) and thought (opinions) the measure of reality (the rational world) rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought (fact and opinion). Kant maintains that things are so because we must think them so, not that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The reversal of the order of thought (mere belief and opinion) and reality, Kant calls his Copernican revolution in his theory of knowledge. The Kantian “philosophy” is therefore sophistry, and thus is diametrically opposed to the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism.
The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism, unlike Kant and Kantianism, does not declare his ignorance of all things as they really are; he does not declare the supremacy of will over reason, thereby making blind will without the guidance of reason the rule of action; he does not give to religious dogma merely a symbolic signification. The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism, unlike Kant and Kantianism, does not diametrically oppose scholastic teaching and the common sense of mankind, and make mind and thought the measure of reality rather than making reality the measure of mind and thought. The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism, unlike Kant and Kantianism, does not maintain that things are so because we must think them so, but rather teaches that we must think them so because they are really so independently of our thinking them. The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism, unlike Kant and Kantianism, does not reverse the order of thought and reality: This at least is the rational verdict of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism.
The modern sophists do not accept the verdict of world history:
“Hegel has abandoned the traditional conventions of arguments where we start from accepted premises and move on to justified conclusions. His narrative shifts from one concept to another, and the transitions are described so abstractly that it is hard to decipher what he actually has in mind … How can we appreciate how a concept is being applied, when we have not clearly understood it in the first place?”¹¹
Hegel, in the Kantio–Hegelian eyes of John Burbidge, is “cloaked in a dense and obscure language that is virtually impenetrable to the uninitiated” : Burbidge cannot appreciate how Hegelian concepts are applied, because he has not “clearly understood” Hegel in the first place. Burbidge complains that Hegel has “abandoned the traditional conventions of arguments,” and his “transitions are described so abstractly” that it is hard to “decipher what he actually has in mind.” The cause of Burbidge’s mental troubles is not hard to find:
“I shall suggest … Hegel arrived at his conception of speculative logic from the first edition of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and from Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s proposal to complete Kant’s project.”¹²
Because John Burbidge has press–ganged Hegel into the Burbidgean project of Canadian Kantio–Hegelianism, — inherited from Québec régimers such as Charles Margrave Taylor and ✝Henry Silton Harris — he has therefore forced Hegel’s Logic into the Procrustean bed of modern unreason, and therefore he has completely misunderstood the genuine Hegelian conception of philosophical science: Instead of suggesting that Hegel arrived at his conception of speculative logic from the first edition of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Burbidge should prove this Kantio–Hegelian affiliation, — especially in a Commentary of Logic. Instead of implying that Hegel is a Kantian, Burbidge should instead advance a rational argument. Unfortunately for modern sophists, before one advances a scientific argument, one first must understand the basis of logic, namely, possess the conception of reason.
Sophists blame Hegel, and then distort his teaching, because their “sophistical logic” is defective, and incapable of the elaboration of rational proof in the sphere of science, philosophy and history, as well as religion, literature and art. Instead of putting Hegel into the Procrustean bed of so–called scientific philosophy, Burbidge should have seriously studied the genuine Hegelian notion of philosophical science. This means first abandoning the sophistical distinction between modern liberalism and conservatism …
Wherefore? The modern sophists follow Kant in their hatred of Plato:
“Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, ventured upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He [Plato] did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress … Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences … In his view, they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence — which is called philosophy — the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression … I cannot follow him [Plato] in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them … What I have termed an ideal was in Plato’s philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences … Aristotle may be regarded as head of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists.”¹³
Which Platonic “ideas” are these, drawn from the Plato of Aldus Pius Manutius and Μάρκος Μουσοῦρος, Marsilius Ficinus, Henricus Stephanus and Joannes Serranus or perhaps even from Daniel Albert Wyttenbach? Kant: “I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher [Plato] attached to this expression [idea].” The Kantian distinction between noologism and empiricism in the Kantian history of philosophy is therefore unfounded, otherwise mired in modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism. The separation of Plato from Aristotle by the followers of Kant, in the name of the sophistical distinction between empiricism and rationalism, whereby the latter is made to appear as the ancient adversary of classical Platonic Idealism, is an error:
“It is a mistake to regard his [Hegel’s] philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.”¹⁴
The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked: The essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required:
“Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike. Diogenes Laertius says of Plato that, just as Thales was the founder of natural philosophy, so Plato was the founder of the third science pertaining to philosophy, namely, dialectic — a service which the ancient world esteemed his highest, but which often remains quite overlooked by those who have most to say about him. Dialectic has often been regarded as an art, as though it rested on a subjective talent and did not belong to the objectivity of the notion … It must be regarded as a step of infinite importance that dialectic is once more recognized as necessary to reason, although the result to be drawn from it must be the opposite of that arrived at by Kant.”¹⁵
By separating Plato and Aristotle in the manner of Kant, the modern sophists block the rational conception of Hegelianism. The attack against Plato by modern European unreason is inscribed within the struggle between ruling classes, and is born in the warfare between monarchism and republicanism, in the universal historical struggle between the Industrial and French revolutions, in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism as the supremacy of American Liberty in the world.
That G.W.F. Hegel was one of the most influential philosophers ever, does not therefore entail in the eyes of modern sophistry, that the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism is the greatest philosopher of Western civilization. Ultimate truth, expounded as the cognitive power of reason in the world, grows and adapts: Rationality is actuality and actuality is rationality, — Hegel.
ENDNOTES
1. Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005, 977. [Italics added]
See: Charles W. Mills, “Kant’s Untermenschen,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 169–193.
See: “When the wars and civil wars of the twentieth century had destroyed the old Europe and removed it from the center of the world, the question remained as to what contribution Hegel had made to consideration of the new direction taken by history since 1800. Was Hegel the philosopher who had recognized the emancipatory tendencies of civil society but, faced with the contradictions of development, had sought refuge in once more affirming the positive role of the state? Or had he appealed to the regulatory function of the state in a conservative or rather pro–governmental frame of mind? With his recourse to metaphysical solutions had he helped to pave the way for the most diverse varieties of totalitarianism? Or could not on the contrary the young Hegel at least be ranged on the side of those protesting against the senselessness of the present–day world, or at all events calling for a new experience of history and historicity?”
Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, G.W.F. Hegel & Peter Wannenmann; J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators; Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, 1–43; 4. [1983 & 1995]
See finally: “It is the twentieth century that has at last shaken the [Kantio] Hegelian concept of the historical process whereby ‘everything real is rational.’ It was this concept, violently debated for decades, that Russian thinkers of the past century finally accepted. But now, at the height of the state’s triumph over individual freedom, Russian thinkers wearing padded camp jackets have dethroned and cast down the old Hegelian law.”
Vasily Grossman in Stéphane Courtois, editor & contributor, “Why?” The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Karel Bartošek, Sylvain Boulouque, Pascal Fontaine, Rémi Kauffer, Martin Malia, Jean–Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Jean–Louis Panné, Pierre Rigoulot, Yves Santamaria & Nicolas Werth, contributors; Jonathan Murphy & Mark Kramer, translators; Mark Kramer, consulting editor, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 756–757. [Italics added]
Remark: Thinkers wearing padded camp jackets have dethroned and cast down their sophistical interpretation of the old Hegelian law, but not in the name of young Hegelianism, — rather for the sake of American Liberty.
2. John W. Burbidge, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic: An Introduction, Peterborough, Ontario, Broadview Press, 2006, 12.
Remark: Philosophers maintain thought of phenomena and noumena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. Sophists maintain thought of phenomena is real, matter, physical even if based on illusion and incomplete perception. German Idealism elevates the Western conception of mind and matter, nature and spirit made popular since the time of Descartes: Obviously since the birth of Hegelianism what the philosophers name as thought based upon illusion and incomplete perception is very different from the German Idealism of the sophists. The same remark holds good of phenomena and noumena.
3. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology: On the Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties, New York, The Free Press, 1962, 122. [Italics added]
See: “The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks one of the two key events after which we may take nineteenth–century philosophy to begin. The other event is the French Revolution, of which many people saw Kant’s philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, as the theoretical correlate. ‘Nineteenth–century’ philosophy as an intellectual rather than strictly chronological phenomenon thus actually begins in the later 1780s and the 1790s, in response to Kant’s Critical philosophy and the French Revolution.”
Alison Stone, editor, “Philosophy in the Nineteenth–Century,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Howard Caygill & David Webb, general editors, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1–12; 1.
4. Jon Woronoff, series editor, “Forward,” Historical Dictionary of Hegelian Philosophy, John W. Burbidge, 2nd edition, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2008, xi–xii; xi. [Italics added]
Remark: Karl Marx borrowed from Hegel what interested him all right, but the young Marx was greatly inspired by the French Enlightenment, and the contagion of German Idealism, notably from his future father–in–law. At the German Universities during the period of the effervescence of the Hegelian School, Marx was very affected by the intense rivalry between the Hegelian Left and Right, especially at the Club of Doktors, which is evidenced in his manuscripts on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Marx’s critique of Hegel’s political philosophy shows the heady Kantio–Hegelian influence of Eduard Gans and the Berlin edition of the Rechtsphilosophie (1833).
On the sophistical distinction between exact and inexact historiography and interpretation:
Irene Lawrence, Linguistics and Theology: The Significance of Noam Chomsky for Theological Construction, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 1980.
Debra J. Allen, Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy From the Revolution to Succession, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2012.
Kennth J. Blume, Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy From the Civil War to World War I, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2005.
Martin Folly, Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy During the Cold War, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2014.
Martin Folly and Naill Palmer, Historical Dictionary of U.S. Diplomacy From World War I Through World War II, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2010.
Jacques Fomerand, Historical Dictionary of Human Rights, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2014.
Jacques Fomerand, Historical Dictionary of the United Nations, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2007.
See: “Clinton’s acquittal was aided as much by approval ratings that reached 69 [sic] percent when the impeachment trial began.”
Richard S. Conley, Historical Dictionary of the Clinton Era, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2012, 11.
5. Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4. [Italics added]
6. Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.
Remark: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies” : We have seen no rational philological and hermeneutical proof, the conclusion being therefore the transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies. We therefore maintain that some of the transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies. Of those transcripts which are designated as consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies, we hold that the designation only applies to some of their content: Who has yet proved that most of the transcripts of the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies?
See: “What these texts and transcripts suggest is that Hegel was always rethinking, reworking, and revising his system. It was not a closed package with a single fixed form. Indeed, some have argued that the Hegelian method itself, which he said was the only true method, is a dynamic process.”
John W. Burbidge, “Introduction,” Historical Dictionary of Hegelian Philosophy, 2nd edition, Jon Woronoff, series editor, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2008,1–20; 10.
Remark: “Hegel was always rethinking, reworking, and revising his system” : Where exactly is this system that Hegel was always rethinking, reworking, and revising? Hegel was rethinking, reworking and revising something, according to sophists like John Burbidge, — for Hegel was not working on nothing: Alas, we are hard pressed to find any Burbidgean mention of the exact nature of the Hegelian system that Hegel was always rethinking, reworking, and revising, while its precise location in Hegel’s texts remains a mystery. What these texts and transcripts prove is that as a writer of philosophy Hegel was always rethinking, reworking, and revising his ideas, some of which he afterwards incorporated into the system of genuine Hegelianism, as found in his Great Works. The exact nature of Pure Hegelianism we have outlined in The Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, which is a chapter published from The Stronghold of Hegel.
See: “Simply to preposit unconditioned existence could be the end of all philosophy. For reason has accepted it as that which is absolutely other than all conceptual possibility. As such, there is nothing inherent in this prepositing that opens the way to intellectual development, nor to any explanation of the ambiguities and perversities of the world.”
John W. Burbidge, Hegel On Logic and Religion: The Reasonableness of Christianity, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 1992, 64–65.
Remarks: Reason has accepted it [unconditioned existence or philosophy?] as that which is absolutely other than all conceptual possibility: Therefore simply to preposit unconditioned existence could be the end of all philosophy? What a pity for Burbidge’s legacy that he draws no rational distinction between philosophy and sophistry: In this he follows the footsteps of the Kantio–Hegelian school of ✝Henry Silton Harris. Certainly the mortally corrupt eastern establishment uses the outdated 20th century political and economic distinction between liberalism (republicanism) and conservatism (monarchism) to greatly enrich themselves and their families, as well as their friends. The American Idealistic distinction between superior and inferior ruling classes does not work in Canada for the Québécocracy.
George Di Giovanni in his introduction to Hegel’s Science of Logic has extracted Hegelianism from the arena of world history in order to give his Kantio–Hegelian interpretation the appearance of plausibility, — following in the sophistical footsteps of Charles Margrave Taylor, Henry Silton Harris and John W. Burbidge. The Logic of Hegel is not a literary work in the sense of Chaucer’s poetry, but a work of philosophical science: Di Giovanni, by separating Hegelianism from world history and modern European philosophy, avoids raising political and economic questions that cast suspicion or doubt upon his sophistical interpretation of Hegel. Thus Di Giovanni’s interpretation goes beyond the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine philosophical science of absolute idealism; the professor judges the rational system of genuine Hegelianism from the standpoint, perspective and outlook of Kantianism which is surpassed by genuine Hegelianism. For this reason he remains in the realm of literature, which is disingenuous because he remains beyond the field of world history, — he seeks to immunize himself from interrogation of his “conception” of exact historiography: His sophistical interpretation of the genesis of German Idealism and Hegel’s Logic flounders upon the standpoints, perspectives and outlooks of inexact historiography. What are these standpoints, perspectives and outlooks of Kantian historical development, within which Di Giovanni inscribes his tendentious hermeneutical analyses, but the bankrupt delusions of subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, — are the not the the very opposite of world history and philosophical science?
Without the genuine philosophical science of absolute idealism, which is the fountainhead of the rational conception of exact historiography and world history, psychology and biography collapse into imaginative literature: The world historical roots of Hegel’s Science of Logic and the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, are discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit. The Pure Hegelian conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic in the exact historiography of world history as the genuine philosophical science of absolute idealism is the aim of exact philology and hermeneutics: The exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, first requires the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism.
From whence comes the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism? The rational notion of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism is the result of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and the Philosophy of Right. The exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, results from the rational notion of the genuine Hegel of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Phenomenology of the Spirit, the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline and the Philosophy of Right. Therefore, the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, results from the the phenomenological, scientific, and Encyclopaedic sublation of the genuine Hegel of the speculative logical and dialectical system of the Pure Hegelian philosophical science of absolute idealism, as discovered in the Philosophy of Right. Therefore, the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, is the result of the Pure Hegelianism of the Philosophy of Right. Pure Hegelianism is therefore the fountainhead of the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism. The sublation of Kant and Hegel is precisely the phenomenological, scientific, and Encyclopaedic sublation which results in Pure Hegelianism.
Without the Pure Hegelian conception of the exact philological and hermeneutical conception of the rational development of the Science of Logic from the Phenomenology of the Spirit, in the exact historiography of world history as the authentic philosophical science of absolute idealism, all interpretations of Hegel’s philosophy are doomed to extinction on the dunghill of the world, as a vanishing phase of world history. This at least is the verdict of American Idealism in the world of today.
Di Giovanni, by keeping the discussion of Hegel’s Logic on the purely literary plane, avoids the political and economic question of the rôle of Kantianism in the contagion of modern European irrationalism an the collapse of European modernity, — which is essential to the rational interpretation of genuine Hegelianism in the world of today: There is no question therefore of whether or not Kant is a sophist, whether or not Kantianism is sophistry. Di Giovanni therefore entirely misses the world historical dimensions of Hegel’s Logic, which is the backbone of the Hegelian system, especially the Rechtsphilosophie, which means that his Kantian interpretation is incapable of correctly inscribing Hegelianism within the universal history of European modernity. The cause of this monstrous error of 20th century sophistical Hegel philology, is easy to find: George Di Giovanni suffers profoundly from mental flabbiness, the sophistical disease of modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, — therefore he is in good company with the careerists and opportunists of the Québécocracy. “The Logic is absolute science … with something always being lost in translation,” (Di Giovanni, 2010, lxii). For this reason Di Giovanni’s translation of Hegel’s Science of Logic is suspect, and will undoubtedly be applied to the arena of politics and economics, and be used as an ideological weapon against Americanism by the last remnants of modern unreason, especially in Canada and the United States of America, but also in the European Union and the Commonwealth.
Di Giovanni labors in the tradition of the New York intellectuals, to rehabilitate and salvage Kantio–Hegelianism, and to uphold the modern European divisions between conservatism and liberalism in the arena of politics and economics, inherited from the French Revolution and Napoléon. Wherefore? Modern sophists rehabilitate Kantio–Hegelianism, and fail miserably, in order to pervert and debase the rational distinction between superior and inferior ruling classes, — in order to protect the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of their masters, the Bonapartists.
7. Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.
See: Michael H. Hoffheimer, “Race and Law in Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2005, 194–216.
8. Jon Woronoff, series editor, “Forward,” The A to Z of Kant and Kantianism, Helmut Holzhey & Vilem Mudroch, Lanham, Maryland, The Scarecrow Press, 2010, vii–viii; vii. [Italics added]
9. Henry Silton Harris, “The Hegel Renaissance in the Anglo–Saxon World Since 1945,” The Owl of Minerva, 15.1(Fall, 1983): 77–106; 78–84.
10. Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 166.
11. John W. Burbidge, The Logic of Hegel’s Logic: An Introduction, Peterborough, Ontario, Broadview Press, 2006, 12.
12. Burbidge, Ibidem,15.
13. Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, vol. 42, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960, 16–113–113–114–173–249.
14. Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, Heath Cranton, Ltd., 1927, 10. [Italics added]
15. Hegel, “The Absolute Idea,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller (1899–1991), translator & John Niemeyer Findlay, Foreward, New York, The Humanities Press, 1976, 824–844; 831. [1969]
Remark: “The result to be drawn from it” : Here the word “it” signifies “a step of infinite importance,” while the statement that “dialectic is once more recognized as necessary to reason” refers to the genuine philosophical science of Hegelianism, and not the philosophical sophistry of Kant.
See: “To have called attention to this uncritical procedure has been the infinite merit of the Kantian philosophy, and in so doing to have [12.244] given the impetus to the restoration of logic and dialectic understood as the examination of thought determinations in and for themselves.”
Hegel, “The Absolute Idea,” The Science of Logic, George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, Introduction; Michael Baur, General editor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 735–753; 743.
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