Der reine Hegelianismus: Die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit

STRONGHOLD OF HEGEL

MODERN ENEMIES OF PLATO AND HEGEL

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2013–2019)

Why don’t the moderate liberals state that, if the Government continues their socialism and arbitrary ways, they cannot support them?
Edward VII, 1910¹

Now the Kantian traditions have gained power once more.
Ernst Mach, Vienna, 1912²

The [Russian] Revolution is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August 1914 … this war is at bottom a struggle for popular Government as well as for liberty.
David Lloyd George³

Plato is a noologist: “[Plato] has expressed for all time the perfect exemplar of the rationalistic temper.”⁴ What exactly does modern sophistry, especially in the 20th century, mean by “noologism” and the “rationalistic temper” of Plato with regards to the philosophy of Hegel? “Hegel’s metaphysical doctrine of the State bears a resemblance, which is not accidental, to the Platonic metaphysics of nature.”⁵ In other words, according to the modern sophists, Hegel is a Platonist: “[Hegel’s] doctrine that the State is the product of a timeless process, of which the stages stand to one another in a relation of logical consequence, is a relic of Platonism in his metaphysics.”⁶ According to the modern sophists, the metaphysics of Hegel is a relic of Platonism. What is the crime of Plato and Platonism in the scatology of modern irrationalism?

“The failure of Greek ethics to achieve a notion of will was a necessary consequence of Greek metaphysics. The essence of this metaphysics was the distinction within the universe of an intelligible nature from a sensible nature, the former being the ground, or ratio essendi, of the latter … [Hegel] makes the distinction between the ‘idea’ and its historical manifestation precisely analogous to the Platonic distinction between the intelligible and the sensible within the world of physical nature.”⁷

Hegel, according to the sophists, is guilty of the charge of Platonism, which is the philosophical crime of dogmatic metaphysics: “The Hegelian doctrine that it [the state] is to be understood only as the product of a logical development appears, and is, uncompromisingly Platonic.”⁸ The evidence of Hegel’s guilt of the crime of Platonic metaphysics is his Platonic logic: “[Hegel] gives to the state as it exists in the world a status in the scale of being which Plato was bound in consistency to reserve for the idea ‘laid up in heaven.’”⁹ The logic of Hegel and Plato are the same: “For Hegel the earthly realization of the state involves no admixture of the idea with an alien element, but is no less than the development of the idea itself, the earthly state possesses undiminished the status of being which Plato assigned to the idea.”¹⁰

What exactly is, according to the modern sophists, the criminal nature of the logic of Hegel and Plato in the arena of politics and economics? “The institutions of parliamentary democracy, of which it is the proper function to be organs (not the enforcement, but) of the creation of the law, can find no place in Hegel’s State.”¹¹ Modern sophists thus accuse Hegel of anti–democracy: “The franchise of the citizen of a parliamentary democracy does not confer a right either to rule or to participate in the activity of ruling; it confers the right to take part in the quite different activity, proper not to the ruler but to a sovereign, of commanding the laws which the ruler has to enforce. This freedom is totally lacking in Hegel’s State.”¹²

The Hegel of the modern sophists is not alone in his political and economic barbarism: “Since indeed he [Hegel] lacks the conception of will as creative, he is bound, like Plato, to regard any exercise of will upon the law as perversive of its nature.”¹³ Thus, according to the modern sophists, Hegel and Plato are the forefathers of 20th century totalitarianism: Sophists, we must conclude, are therefore the progenitors of modern political and economic rationality, while philosophers are the promoters of political and economic unreason. In other words, the philosophers are sophists, while the sophists are philosophers!

Thus, the crime of Hegel, according to the modern sophists, is nothing more than the Hegelian rejection and opposition to modern European raison d’État: “When Hegel elucidates his conception of the State by contrast with Kant or the political theories of modern Empiricism, he refers to the Greek Polis, of which he takes Plato’s Republic to be the ideal representation, as that of all forms of society in which the nature of the State is most closely anticipated.”¹⁴ The modern sophists are indeed correct, the Pure Hegel is the avowed enemy of modern political and economic irrationalism, but they are absolutely incorrect in the identification of Pure Hegelism with sophistry: “Hegel perverts the truth which he purports to be ‘translating into the concept.’”¹⁵ Hegel is therefore guilty of sophistry?

“[Hegel] can conceive of no virtue in practical activity except in so far as it is governed by a concept, so he can conceive no process to be intelligible which is not teleological. If human history is a teleological process, then it is to be rendered intelligible by a conception of its end distinct from the empirical description of the events which are means to its achievement. Thus Hegel is led inevitably to his vicious distinction of Philosophy of History from the empirical science of history, the former having as its object the end, the latter the means of the historical process.”¹⁶

Hegel is led inevitably to his vicious distinction of Philosophy of History from the empirical science of history? Hegel, according to the modern sophists, suffers from the vice of vicious distinction. The empirical science of history is viciously opposed to Hegel’s Philosophy of History, which involves the end and not the means of the historical process:

“The vice of this distinction is now so universally recognized that further exposure of it may be spared. I am indebted specially to Croce’s forceful criticisms of the doctrine. I need hardly add that Hegel’s own practice often enough belies his theory and that there is much great History in what he [Hegel] calls his Philosophy of History.”¹⁷

Pray tell, what exactly does the Pure Hegel call his Philosophy of History? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History written and published by Eduard Gans? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the History of Philosophy written and published by Carl Ludwig Michelet? Is there much great History in the Lectures on the Philosophy of History written and published by Karl Ritter von Hegel? Is there much great History in Hegel’s philosophy of history found in the originalausgabe? Without the rational argument in favor of the exact distinctions between the empirical and non–empirical science of history found in the works of Hegel, as well as between scientific and pseudo–scientific historiography, the modern sophistical attack against the Pure Hegel falls flat: In other words, Hegel is a sophist, according to British Empiricists like Michael Beresford Foster, because according to Benedetto Croce, Hegel is a sophist!

What exactly does Signor Croce have to say about Hegel? “No one but Hegel has understood Kant … in the History of Philosophy also, Hegel attained to heights never reached previously to him and rarely since … [Hegel] sought to adapt to his dialectic universal history as it appears in the books of the historians; and he deluded himself that he had found in the individual a point of departure which should have the precision of the first term of the dialectic triad … The triadic expedient, and the term Logos, to which Hegel has recourse, show that he is always entangled in dualism; that he struggles valiantly against it, but does not escape from it. This dualism not overcome, in which Hegel’s absolute idealism becomes entangled, owing to the grave logical error he has committed.”¹⁸ Hegel suffered from delusions and committed a grave logical error (Hegel was truly a Kantian), according to Benedetto Croce, the father of Italian Hegelianism, after Augusto Véra.

But which Hegel is this, the Hegel of Benedetto Croce, Michael Beresford Foster and British Empiricism? Why, it is the Hegel of the pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians: “The State as it is in the present is the product of a teleological process, of which the end was not conceived by any of the human agents whose acts were the means of its achievement.”¹⁹ Wherefore?

“This process is the process of World–history as it has unfolded itself up to the present time. It is a development, in that it is directed towards an end, and it is a natural development, in that the end is that of the ‘Weltgeist’ or World Spirit, which uses the human agents of history as unconscious tools to its achievement, and which thus stands to them in somewhat the same relation as the divine Demiurge to processes of growth in nature. To be used thus by the World Spirit as a means to its end is what constitutes the historical importance of a people or of an event and the greatness of an individual.”²⁰

Where, pray tell, is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the State as it is in the present is the product of a teleological process, of which the end was not conceived by any of the human agents whose acts are and were the means of its achievement, namely, where is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the process of world history as it unfolds and has unfolded itself up to the present time, is a development, directed towards an end, a natural development, in that the end is that of the “Weltgeist” or World Spirit, which uses all the human agents of history as unconscious tools to its achievement? The basis of the so–called Hegelian vice of vicious distinction, by which Hegel is classified as a sophist by the modern irrationalists, is extracted from the works of impure Hegelianism:

“This is the famous doctrine of ‘Die List der Vernunft.’ See §298 Zusätze for an illustration of how the selfish and ambitious acts of historical personages are turned to an end of which they had no conception. In §344 the ‘states, peoples, and individuals’ who do the business of the World Spirit are called ‘bewußtlose Werkzeuge,’ and in §348 it is explicitly declared that the work which they do ‘is concealed from them and is not their object or purpose.’”²¹

Hegel is rejected as a sophist by Benedetto Croce and British Empiricists like Michael Beresford Foster in virtue of material culled from the works of impure Hegelianism: Modern irrationalists ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegel of impure Hegelianism on the other. Is it really and truly the case that the selfish and ambitious acts of all historical personages are turned to an end of which they have and had no conception, namely, does the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism teach or “explicitly declare” that the work which all states, nations, and individuals do “is concealed from them and is not their object or purpose”?

“States, nations, and individuals [die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes] arise animated by their particular determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition. While their consciousness is limited to these and they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind at work within them. The shapes which they take pass–away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage.”²²

The Pure Hegel: States, nations, and individuals (die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes), namely, civilizations, arise animated by their particular, determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition. While the consciousness of civilizations is limited to these, and while they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: The shapes which they take pass–away, while the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage.

What does this mean according to the Pure Hegel? While the consciousness of civilizations is limited to these, namely, the particular, determinate principle which has its interpretation and actuality in their constitutions and in the whole range of their life and condition, and while they are not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. Thus, some of the shapes which the consciousness of civilizations takes, do not pass–away, and the absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage. What is in question here is the nature of the Dialectic of Hegel:

“The history of a single world–historical nation contains (a) the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history; and (b) the period of its decline and fall, since it is its decline and fall that signalizes the emergence in it of a higher principle as the pure negative of its own. When this happens, mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another nation for world–historical significance.”²³

The absolute mind prepares and works out its transition to its next higher stage, namely, decline and fall signifies the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative: While the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. While the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: The history of a single world historical civilization contains the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history. What does this mean?

“All actions, including world–historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, they are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed though it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.”²⁴

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.

All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object.

World historical individuals and actions, therefore, are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are therefore directly at one with that deed, and it is not therefore concealed from some of them, and it is their aim and object. Wherefore? The historical development of the principle of Western civilization blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed, and it is not concealed from them as their aim and object, — as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history.

The deed of the world mind is the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: The dialectic of universal history is therefore the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, namely, world civilization. World historical individuals and actions are therefore the living instruments of the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life as world civilization: World historical individuals are the living instruments of the dialectic of world history. The historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the mind of the world.

The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism says of those individuals who are directly at one with the deed of the world mind although it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object:

“For the deeds of the world mind, therefore, they receive no honour or thanks either from their contemporaries or from public opinion in later ages. All that is vouchsafed to them by such opinion is undying fame in respect of the subjective form of their acts.”²⁵

World historical actions culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial in respect of the subjective form of their acts as inferior ruling classes, namely, the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative. For this very reason the deed of the world mind is concealed from them, and is not their aim and object. The morphology of the text proves that §348 continues the thought at the end of both §347 and §347A, which means that Hegel is referring in §348 to the topic directly above, namely, to the distinction between the rise and fall of civilizations in both §347 and §347A, “in the advance of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind,” but in the negative dimension, namely, “in contrast with this its absolute right of being the vehicle of this present stage in the world mind’s development.” According to the Pure Hegel:

“World–history, however, is above the point of view [Gesichtspunkten] from which these things matter. Each of its stages is the presence of a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and that moment attains its absolute right in that stage.”²⁶

All the stages present the necessary moments in the idea of the world mind, and all the moments attain their absolute right in all the stages of world history: “The nation whose life embodies this moment secures its good fortune and fame, and its deeds are brought to fruition.”²⁷ The life of world civilization thus embodies all the moments, and is the deed of all, brought to fruition:

“The mind which has thus reverted to the substantiality with which it began is the mind which has returned out of the infinite opposition, and which consequently engenders and knows this its truth as thought and as a world of actual laws.”²⁸

Therefore, out of the dialectic of finitude of Pure Hegelism arises the universal mind of the world, and therefore the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind. They are therefore the superior ruling classes.

Thus, the Pure Hegel is the modern philosophical progenitor of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes. What is the nature of superior ruling classes? All actions, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, when the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object:

“The history of a single world–historical nation [eines welthistorischen Volks] contains (a) the development of its principle from its latent embryonic stage until it blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life and presses in upon world history.”²⁹

The historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms. They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind: They are the superior ruling classes. What is the world historical nature of these superior ruling classes of rising civilization (eines welthistorischen Volks)?

“Each of its stages is the presence of a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and that moment attains its absolute right in that stage. The nation whose life embodies this moment secures its good fortune and fame, and its deeds are brought to fruition.”³⁰

The superior ruling class is a necessary moment in the Idea of the world mind, and attains its absolute right at that stage in the advancement of Western civilization in universal history:

“The nation to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it in the advance of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind. The nation is dominant in world history [das Herrschende] during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike.”³¹

The civilization to which is ascribed a moment of the Idea in the form of a natural principle is entrusted with giving complete effect to it, and is dominant in world history during this one epoch, and it is only once that it can make its hour strike: The advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind is the work of the superior ruling classes of Western civilization. The dialectic of world history, which is the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, according to the Pure Hegel, is the advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind as the superior ruling class of Western civilization:

“The history of mind is its own act. Mind is only what it does, and its act is to make itself the object of its own consciousness. In history its act is to gain consciousness of itself as mind, to apprehend itself in its interpretation of itself to itself. This apprehension is its being and its principle, and the completion of apprehension at one stage is at the same time the rejection of that stage and its transition to a higher. To use abstract phraseology, the mind apprehending this apprehension anew, or in other words returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension, is the mind of the stage higher than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension.”³²

Why do the superior ruling classes affect the work of mind, “returning to itself again out of its rejection of this lower stage of apprehension”? Why do the superior ruling classes affect the work of mind on the “stage higher than that on which it stood in its earlier apprehension”? The work of the superior ruling classes is “mind apprehending this apprehension anew,” as the mortal enemy of all inferior ruling classes:

“But to those who reject this doctrine, mind has remained an empty word, and history a superficial play of casual, so–called ‘merely human,’ strivings and passions. Even in connexion with history, they speak of Providence and the plan of Providence, and express a faith in a higher power, their ideas remain empty because they expressly declare that for them the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible.”³³

The superior ruling classes are mortally opposed to the inferior ruling classes because these latter expressly declare that “the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible,” namely because their own “ideas remain empty,” — for the inferior ruling classes, “mind has remained an empty word, and history a superficial play of casual, so–called ‘merely human,’ strivings and passions.” Wherefore?

“These principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … [Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion … [Rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated … It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance … Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”³⁴

Why are the superior ruling classes mortally opposed to inferior ruling classes in world history? The superior ruling classes do not expressly declare that “the plan of Providence is inscrutable and incomprehensible,” namely, because their own ideas do not remain empty, — for the superior ruling classes, on the other hand, mind is not an empty word, and history is not a superficial play of casual, so–called “merely human,” strivings and passions. Wherefore? World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them, as their aim and object, — as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: The superior ruling classes, in contradistinction to the inferior ruling classes, are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, and are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the world mind.

What therefore is the world historical nature of the inferior ruling classes, according to the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism? All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object. The decline and fall of civilizations signalizes the emergence of a higher principle as the pure negative of its own. When this happens, mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another civilization for world historical significance.

The historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: While they are absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind. They are the inferior ruling classes. Mind passes over into the new principle and so marks out another civilization for world historical significance:

“The declining nation has lost the interest of the absolute; it may indeed absorb the higher principle positively and begin building its life on it, but the principle is only like an adopted child, not like a relative to whom its ties are immanently vital and vigorous. Perhaps it loses its autonomy, or it may still exist, or drag out its existence, as a particular state or a group of states and involve itself without rhyme or reason in manifold enterprises at home and battles abroad.”³⁵

What is the world historical nature of the inferior ruling classes of declining civilizations? They are “without rights, and they, along with those whose hour has struck already, count no longer in world history.”³⁶ There is no longer any interest between the inferior ruling classes and the absolute in world history, because the collapse of civilization means the loss of “interest” between the absolute and the inferior ruling classes:

“If it is asked why then, since 1850 at any rate, his [Hegel’s] writings have been a good deal neglected, the answer is not difficult to give. It is only by the multitude that they have been laid aside. The principle has penetrated in this country into the attitude and methods of some of the later thinkers who have been amongst us, men like Green, Caird, Bradley and Bosanquet. These have indeed hardly been Hegelians. It was not probable that a system which was given to the world a century since should serve the world sufficiently today. But its broad principle has profoundly moved the English thinkers to whom I have referred, and I might add instances of the same kind from the United States and from other countries, as well as from Germany … We need not be deterred by the feeling that we are no longer interested in the doctrine of the Absolute which engrossed attention in the early part of the last century.”³⁷

The Pure Hegel is therefore the modern Western philosophical progenitor of the life and death struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes in world history:

“If states disagree and their particular wills cannot be harmonized, the matter can only be settled by war … It is as particular entities that states enter into relations with one another. Hence their relations are on the largest scale a maelstrom of external contingency and the inner particularity of passions, private interests and selfish ends, abilities and virtues, vices, force, and wrong.”³⁸

While the struggle between ruling classes is the arena of external contingency, wherein is found, “the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind,” and although, “the principles of the national minds are wholly restricted on account of their particularity, for it is in this particularity that, as existent individuals, they have their objective actuality and their self–consciousness,” nevertheless:

“Their deeds and destinies in their reciprocal relations to one another are the dialectic of the finitude [die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit] of these minds, and out of it arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its right — and its right is the highest right of all — over these finite minds in the ‘history of the world which is the world’s court of judgement.’”³⁹

From out of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, namely the dialectic of finitude, arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction: The dialectic of world history, as the dialectic of finitude, is the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, and is the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, and therefore according to the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism, the advancement of the self–developing self–consciousness of the world mind in the aggrandizement of Western civilization: Globalism is therefore the supremacy of the superior ruling class (das Herrschende).

As the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism has foretold, the grandeur and decadence of Western civilization is the result of the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, as the dialectic of finitude: The aggrandizement of Western civilization is the work of superior ruling classes, while the decline of civilization is the work of inferior ruling classes. The rise of Western civilization in world history is therefore the result of superior ruling classes, whether aristocratic, monarchical or democratic.

Thus, the struggle between ruling classes and the birth of world civilization (Herrlichkeit) is the dialectic of world history in the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism. But which Hegel is the Hegel of the modern sophists?

“The will of the great man performs the essential function of the sovereign will: It brings into being the law which determines the activity of every power within the State, not only that of the government, but that of the legislature and that of the monarch himself. But it is not a sovereign will precisely because it lies outside the State which it constitutes. The task of the great men is ended when the State which they wrought unconsciously to achieve is completely realized. Hegel’s State itself fails to be sovereign in the full and proper sense by lacking an organ to give expression to this will.”⁴⁰

Pray tell, where exactly is it in the Pure Hegel that the will of the great rulers who perform the essential function of the sovereign will, “is ended when the State they wrought unconsciously to achieve is completely realized”? Where is it exactly in the Pure Hegel that the “State itself fails to be sovereign in the full and proper sense by lacking an organ to give expression to this will”? From whence comes the pseudo–Hegel of modern irrationalism? The answer is readily available: In the writings and publications of Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Christoph Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Ritter von Hegel, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Carl Ludwig Michelet, Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz and Johannes Karl Hartwig Schulze (Schultze), namely, from the works of impure Hegelianism is found the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of modern irrationalism:

“It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”⁴¹

In other words, Hegel is rejected as a sophist and anti–democrat by modern irrationalists in virtue of material drawn from the works of impure Hegelianism. Modern sophists ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel and Pure Hegelism of the originalausgabe on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of their own impure Hegelianism on the other hand:

“Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”⁴²

Thus, modern irrationalism and impure Hegelianism, namely, pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, ignores and neglects the dialectic of finitude (die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit) as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, and the rise of world civilization as the supremacy of Global rational political and economic order in universal history:

“The concrete Ideas, the minds of the nations, have their truth and their destiny in the concrete Idea which is absolute universality, i.e., in the world mind. Around its throne they stand as the executors of its actualization and as signs and ornaments of its grandeur [Herrlichkeit]. As mind, it is nothing but its active movement towards absolute knowledge of itself and therefore towards freeing its consciousness from the form of natural immediacy and so coming to itself.”⁴³

Modern irrationalism is therefore the weapon of the inferior ruling class, namely, modern European raison d’État: “The outlook of Kant’s philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”⁴⁴ The irrationalists therefore mean by the “noologism” and the “rationalistic temper” of Plato and Hegel (namely, the opposition of Western Idealism to modern sophistry), that reason is the weapon of the superior ruling class, albeit rechristened by the sophists as “unreason,” which they wrongly foist upon Western philosophy. In the eyes of modern irrationalism, Western philosophy is sophistry. Hegel is thus sophistically identified with Plato, and both are then made into anti–democrats (totalitarians), as the congenital enemies of what the modern sophists name rational political and economic order.

What exactly the sophists mean by modern democracy or rational political and economic order (so–called liberalism, republicanism, nationalism, socialism and communism) is spelled out in the world of today as criticism, empiricism and even science in the backwards, outdated and corrupt political economy of modernity (in contradistinction to their pejorative usage of such terms as dogmatism, idealism and metaphysics).⁴⁵ Their sophistical political economy is therefore culled from the modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of Locke,⁴⁶ Leibniz, Hume and Kant: As the Machiavellism of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, which is not the rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta and the Constitution of the United States of America.⁴⁷

The political and economic doctrine of Locke’s version of so–called constitutional, as opposed to absolute, monarchy is forged in the modern European warfare between Gallicanism and Ultramontanism (unleashed by Luther and the revolt of Protestantism), and especially the revolutionary struggle between William of Orange and King James II: This struggle also involves the late mediaeval theological distinction between Catholicism and Protestantism in the political and economic clash between the old and new world historical forms of Christendom, — as the moment of the modern self–determination of the self–comprehending pure notion, namely, as the rise of Globalism:

“Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”⁴⁸

In the first editions of the great works of Hegel’s lifetime, the Owl of Minerva is successively released from the coils of modern irrationalism: Pure Hegelianism is the sublation of modernity that ends the mental struggle between reason and unreason in world history. Pure Hegelianism reconciles the strife between Descartes, Spinoza and Berkeley on the one side, and Locke, Leibniz and Hume on the other, in the struggle between Kant and Hegel in 20th century world history: Americanism is therefore the concrete sublation of Pure Hegelianism.⁴⁹

World civilization is therefore Globalism, the rational foundation of which is therefore the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.

ENDNOTES

1. Edward VII in Giles St. Aubyn, Edward VII: Prince and King, New York, 1979, 431.

See: “Churchill was never a rational man … in moments of crisis he [Churchill] sought guidance not by reasoning but by intuition.” William Manchester, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Alone, 1932–1940, Boston, 1988, 664.

2. Ernst Mach, “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition,” The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, Supplement to the Third English Edition Containing the Author’s Additions to the Seventh German Edition, Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain, translator and annotator, Chicago and London, 1915, xi. [1912]

See: “With regard to the monstrous conceptions of absolute space and absolute time … Newton indeed spoke much about these things, but throughout made no serious application of them.” Ernst Mach, Ibidem, 1915, xii. See: Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Enwickelung: Historisch–Kritisch Dargestellt, Siebente verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, Leipzig, 1912.

3. David Lloyd George in Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, 1967, 459.

See: “Nicholas, his arm still around Alexis, began to rise from his chair to protect his wife and son. He had just time to say ‘What … ?’ before Yurovsky pointed his revolver directly at the Tsar’s head and fired. Nicholas died instantly. At this signal, the entire squad of executioners began to shoot. Alexandra had time only to raise her hand and make the sign of the cross before she too was killed by a single bullet. Olga, Tatiana and Marie, standing behind her mother, were hit and died quickly. Botkin, Kharitonnov and Trupp also fell in the hail of bullets. Demidora, the maid, survived the first volley, and rather than reload, the executioners took rifles from the next room and pursued her, stabbing with bayonets. Screaming, running back and forth along the wall like a trapped animal, she tried to fend them off with a cushion. At last she fell, pierced by bayonets more than thirty times. Jimmy the spaniel was killed when his head was crushed by a rifle butt. The room, filled with the smoke and stench of gunpowder, became suddenly quiet. Blood was running in streams from the bodies on the floor. Then there was a movement and a slow groan. Alexis, lying on the floor still in the arms of the Tsar, feebly moved his hand to clutch his father’s coat. Savagely, one of the executioners kicked the Tsarevich in the head with his heavy boot. Yurovsky stepped up and fired two shots into the boy’s ear. Just at that moment, Anastasia, who had only fainted, regained consciousness and screamed. With bayonets and rifle butts, the entire band turned on her. In a moment, she too lay still.” Robert Kinloch Massie, Nicholas and Alexandra, New York, 1967, 517.

See also: “The renovation of Parliamentary government, the transformation of the conditions of the ownership and occupation of land, the relations between the Governments at home and our adventures abroad in contact with inferior races, the limitations on free contract, and the rights of majorities to restrict the private acts of minorities, these are only some of the questions that time and circumstance are pressing upon us.” John Morley (Lord Blackburn) in William Hastie, editor & translator, “Introduction,” Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, Emmanuel Kant, Edinburgh, 1891, xxxviii–xxxix.

See also: “Machiavelli represents certain living forces in our actual world … Science, with its survival of the fittest, unconsciously lends him illegitimate aid.” John Morley (Lord Blackburn), Machiavelli: The Romanes Lecture Delivered in the Sheldonian Theatre, June 2nd, 1897, London, England, Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1897, 49.

See also: “The Republican Constitution is, thus, the only one which arises out of the idea of the Original Compact upon which all the rightful legislation of a people is founded … the Republican Constitution is the only one which perfectly corresponds to the Rights of Man.”
Immanuel Kant in Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, William Hastie, editor & translator, Edinburgh, 1891, 89–116. [Kant, Zum ewigen Frieden, 1795]

See also: “The Republican Constitution is not to be confounded with the Democratic Constitution … of the three forms of the State, a Democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is necessarily a despotism; because it establishes an Executive power in which All resolve about, and, it may be, also against, any One who is not in accord with it; and consequently the All who thus resolve are really not all; which is a contradiction of the Universal Will with itself and with liberty.” Immanuel Kant, Ibidem, 91–92.

See also: “The conception of a noumenon is problematical … the conception of a noumenon is therefore not the conception of an object, but merely a problematical conception … my existence cannot be considered as an inference from the proposition, ‘I think,’ as Descartes maintained.”
Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, 106–106–127.

See finally: “The concept of the noumenon is problematical … the concept of the noumenon is not therefore the concept of an object, but only a problem … the so–called syllogism of Cartesius, cogito, ergo sum, is in reality tautological.” Immanuel Kant, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, vol. 2, Friedrich Maximillian Müller, translator, London, 1881, 249–250–308.

4. Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Plato or Protagoras? Being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the Theaetetus with Some Remarks Upon Error, Oxford, 1908, 29.

See: “Has not the time come when Kant’s ‘Copernican change of standpoint’ might at last be put into practice seriously, and when Truth, instead of being offered up to idols and sacrificed to ‘ideals,’ might at length be depicted in her human beauty and simplicity?” Ferdinand Canning Scott Schiller, Studies in Humanism, London, 1907, 178.

See also: “Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, ventured upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He [Plato] did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress … Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences … In his view, they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence — which is called philosophy — the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression … I cannot follow him [Plato] in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them … What I have termed an ideal was in Plato’s philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences … Aristotle may be regarded as head of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists.” Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, 16–113–113–114–173–249.

Remarks: But which Platonic “ideas” are these, drawn from the Plato of Aldus Pius Manutius and Μάρκος Μουσοῦρος, Marsilius Ficinus, Henricus Stephanus and Joannes Serranus or perhaps even from Daniel Albert Wyttenbach? Kant: “I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher [Plato] attached to this expression [idea].” The Kantian distinction between noologism and empiricism in the Kantian history of philosophy is therefore unfounded, otherwise mired in modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism. What a pity, indeed …

See: “The White race contains all impulses and talents within itself … The Negro … undoubtedly holds the lowest of all remaining levels by which we designate the different races.” Immanuel Kant in Robert Bernasconi, “Kant As An Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” Philosophers on Race: Critical Essays, Julie K. Ward & Tommy L. Lott, editors, Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell, 2002, 145–166; 148.

See also: “The race of the American cannot be educated. It has no motivating force, for it lacks affect and passion. They are not in love, thus they are also not afraid. They hardly speak, do not caress each other, care about nothing and are lazy.” (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, translation) Immanuel Kant in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, “Chapter Four: The Color of Reason: The Idea of ‘Race’ in Kant’s Anthropology: Kant’s Idea of ‘Race’: The Taxonomy,” Ka Osi Sọ Onye: African Philosophy in the Postmodern Era, Jonathan O. Chimakonam & Edwin Etieyibo, editors; Olatunji A. Oyeshile, introduction & Ifeanyi Menkiti, forward; Adeshina L. Afolayan, Ada Agada, Olajamoke Akiode, Oladele A. Balogun, Jonathan O. Chimakonam, Edwin Etieyibo, Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Michael Onyebuchi Eze, Bruce B. Janz, Ifeanyi Menkiti, Victor C.A. Nweke, Uchenna L. Ogbonnaya, Olatunji A. Oyeshile, Leonhard Praeg, Mogobe B. Ramose, Uduma O. Uduma, contributors, Wilmington, Delaware, Vernon Press, 2018, 85–124; 97–106; 97–102; 99. See: Immanuel Kant, “Kant’s philosophische Anthropologie: Von der Charakteristik des Menschen,” Immanuel Kant’s Menschenkunde oder philosophische Anthropologie: Nach handschriftlichen Vorlesungen, Friedrich Christian Starke (Johann Adam Bergk), hrsg., Leipzig, Die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, 1831, 337–358; 353: “Das Volk der Amerikaner nimmt keine bildung an. Es hat keine Triebfedern, denn es fehlen ihm Affekt und Leidenschaft. Sie sind nicht verliebt, daher sind auch nicht furchtbar. Sie sprechen fast nichts, liebkosen einander nicht, sorgen auch fur nichts, und sind faul.”

See also: “The race of Negroes, one could say, is completely the opposite of the Americans; they are full of affect and passion, very lively, talkative and vain. They can be educated but only as servants (slaves), that is they allow themselves to be trained. They have many motivating forces, are also sensitive, are afraid of blows and do much out of a sense of honor.” (Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, translation) Immanuel Kant in Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze, Ibidem. See: Immanuel Kant, Ibidem, 353: “Die race der Neger, konnte man sagan, ist ganz das Gegenteil von den Amerikanern; sie sind voll Affekt und Leidenshaft, sehr Lebhaft, schwatzhaft und eitel, sie nehmen Bildung an, aber nur eine Bildung der Knechte, d.h. sie lassen sich abrichten. Sie haben viele Triebfedern, sind auch empfindlich, furchten sich vor Schlagen und thun auch viel aus Ehre.”

See also: “Immanuel Kant produced the most raciological [racialist and racist] thought of the eighteenth century.” Earl Wendel Count (1950) in Jon Mark Mikkelsen, “Translator’s Introduction: Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon Mark Mikkelsen, translator and editor; Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Johann Georg Adam Forster (1754–1794), Christoph Girtanner (1760–1800), Christoph Meiners (1747–1810), Eberhardt August Wilhelm von Zimmerman (1743–1815), New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 5. Earl Wendel Count (1899–1996), editor, “Introduction,” This is Race: An Anthology Selected From the International Literature on the Races of Man, New York, Henry Schuman, 1950, xiii–xxviii.

See also: “It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.”

Yitzhak Yohanan Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005, 975–977; 977.

See also: “[Kant’s] philosophy makes for a revolution, against which all previous merely political revolutions shrink into insignificant episodes … in the work of this man lies the greatest revolutionary power of the world’s history … that would at last bring about, not merely an outward political revolution, but a total transformation from within to without.” Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), “Kant: Science and Religion, With an Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 167–414; 182–338–379. [1905+1908]

See also: „Die Weltanschauung Immanuel Kant’s entspringt der scharfsinnigsten Zergliederung des Menschengeistes und seines Verhältnisses zur umgebenden Natur; ist es möglich, einem unvorbereiteten Laienpublikum eine klare Vorstellung von ihr beizubringen? Kann kritische Erkenntnistheorie gemeinverständlich dargestellt werden? Ich glaube es nicht. Und doch ist der Wunsch, einen Mann von der Bedeutung Kant’s nicht einer Gelehrtenkaste zum Alleinbesitz zu überlassen, sondern ihn allen Gebildeten zu einem kostbarsten Eigentum zu machen, so berechtigt, dass er sich vielerorten zu regen beginnt; auch hat bereits eine Anzahl tüchtiger Männer, jeder in seiner Art, dies Ziel ins Auge gefasst und manches Gute zustande gebracht. Kant hatte gesagt, er sei zu früh gekommen, sein Morgen werde erst nach einem Jahrhundert aufgehen. Jetzt dämmert dieser Morgen. Nicht Zufall ist es, wenn die erste vollständige und diplomatisch genaue Ausgabe der sämtlichen Schriften und Briefe Kant’s im Jahre 1900 zu erscheinen begann; das neue Jahrhundert bedarf dieses starken Schutzgeistes, der von seiner Weltanschauung urteilen durfte, sie bewirke „eine der Copernikanischen analoge Umänderung der Denkart.“ Heute wissen es Einige und ahnen es Viele, dass diese Weltanschauung einen Grundpfeiler der Kultur der Zukunft bilden muss. Kant’s Denken bewahrt vor den beiden entgegengesetzten Gefahren: priesterlichem Dogmatismus und wissenschaftlichem Aberglauben; zugleich stärkt es zur hingehenden Erfüllung der Lebenspflichten.“ Houston Stewart Chamberlain, „Vorrede,“ Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, München, F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921, 1–8; 3. [1905+1908+1916]

See also: „[49] Ja, die guten Zeiten der Bonzenherrlichkeit [Beifall] (sind vorbei. Ein neues Deutschland steht auf, — ein Deutschland, erzogen in den spartanischen Gesetzen preußischer Pflichterfüllung. Ein Deutschland, das sich nicht fettgefressen, sondern großgehungert hat! Ein Deutschland der Kraft, des Willens und des Idealismus! Ein Deutschland, das dem marxistischen Verrat) und der bürgerlichen Leisetreterei den Fehde(handschuh) vor die Füße geworfen hat! … [50] Wir haben es diesen materialistischen Bonzen gezeigt, daß in Deutschland noch ein Idealismus lebt. Wir haben es ihnen gezeigt, daß man aus Hunger und aus Opfer und Not einem Volk wieder den Weg nach oben zeigen kann … [55] Die deutschen Dome in Ulm und Straßburg und Freiburg, die Bildwerke eines Albrecht Dürer, die geistigen Zeugnisse eines Kant und Schopenhauer, die Lyrik Goethes und Mörikes, das dramatische Genie eines Friedrich von Schiller, die Neunte Symphonie und die letzten Streichquartette Beethovens, die preußische Staatsidee eines Friedrich Wilhelm I. und Friedrich des Einzigen, die Reichsschöpfung eines Bismarck, — sie alle sind die beglückenden Ergebnisse jener schöpferischen Kulturfähigkeit des deutschen Volkes, die auf dem Boden des deutschen Nationalcharakters emporschoß … [134] Wenn ich also heute der ganzen Kriegszielforderung der deutschen Nation eine andere Nuance gebe, wenn ich sage: Es geht jetzt nicht darum, wer die tiefere Philosophie besitzt oder die höhere religiöse Überzeugung — für diesen Kampf um Ideale hat Deutschland in den vergangenen drei Jahrhunderten einen hinreichenden Tribut gezollt — , sondern jetzt wollen wir auch um daskämpfen, um das die anderen dreihundert [135] Jahre in der Vergangenheitgekämpft haben, nämlich um einen vollgedeckten Tisch! … [152] Die brauchen gar nicht Goethe und Schiller zu kennen und brauchen nicht die Kantsche Philosophie studiert zu haben, sondern die brauchen nur zu wissen: Es geht um mein Vaterland und es geht um eine soziale neue Heilslehre und es geht für Hitler und es geht für die Erneuerung meines Landes und meines Volkes — das genügt vollkommen! So ist das auch heute!“ Josef Goebbels, Goebbels Reden: 1932–1945, Helmut Heiber, hrsg., Bindlach, Bavaria, Gondrom, 1991, 49–55–134–135–152.

See finally: „Reinster Idealismus deckt sich unbewußt mit tiefster Erkenntnis.“ Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf: Zwei Bände in einem Band Ungekürzte Ausgabe, 851–855 Auflage, München, Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Verlag Franz Eher Nachf., G.m.b.H., 1943, 328.

5. Michael Beresford Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, New York, 1965, 132. [1935]

See: “When the wars and civil wars of the twentieth century had destroyed the old Europe and removed it from the center of the world, the question remained as to what contribution Hegel had made to consideration of the new direction taken by history since 1800. Was Hegel the philosopher who had recognized the emancipatory tendencies of civil society but, faced with the contradictions of development, had sought refuge in once more affirming the positive role of the state? Or had he appealed to the regulatory function of the state in a conservative or rather pro–governmental frame of mind? With his recourse to metaphysical solutions had he helped to pave the way for the most diverse varieties of totalitarianism? Or could not on the contrary the young Hegel at least be ranged on the side of those protesting against the senselessness of the present–day world, or at all events calling for a new experience of history and historicity?”
Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, translators, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, editors, Oxford, 2012, 4. [1983 & 1995]

The twentieth century had destroyed the old Europe and removed it from the center of the world? Otto Pöggeler does not notice that Continental Europe was never at the “center of the world.” The British Empire was at the center of the world, not as “old Europe” but as the Industrial Revolution, precisely because of its profound integration with the New World. Pöggeler and his friends at the Hegel Archiv (Habermas and company), undoubtedly are blinded by the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, and therefore they fail to notice the profound difference between Bonapartism and the rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta. These are hard words and bound to roil the Eurocentrics in the House of Commons, the present–day relics of David Lloyd George. What do we care? The rational conception of right found in the Magna Carta, the political and economic fountainhead of the Industrial Revolution, is uplifted in the Constitution of the United States of America, as the bastion of world civilization. The American Civil War unchained the political and economic Idea of universal freedom from the modern coils of Bonapartism in the arena of world history. Modern European raison d’état is Bonapartism, which follows in the footsteps of Machiavellism, especially in the philosophical sophistry of Locke, Leibniz, Hume and Kant, and is therefore political and economic irrationalism: “The absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli (les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel).” This at least is the inescapable lesson of 20th century world history.

6. Michael Beresford Foster, Ibidem, 164.

7. Foster, Ibidem, 131–133.

8. Foster, Ibidem, 166.

9. Foster, Ibidem, 123.

10. Foster, Ibidem, 123–124.

11. Foster, Ibidem, 193.

12. Foster, Ibidem, 200.

13. Foster, Ibidem,

14. Foster, Ibidem, 91.

15. Foster, Ibidem, 204.

16. Foster, Ibidem, 203.

17. Foster, Ibidem.

18. Benedetto Croce, What Is Living and What Is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, 3rd edition, Douglas Ainslie, translator, London, 1915, 50–110–182–201. [1906]

See: “Hegel was the culmination of the movement in German philosophy that started from Kant; although he [Hegel] often criticized Kant, his system could never have arisen if Kant’s had not existed … The identification of the real and the rational leads unavoidably to some of the complacency inseparable from the belief that ‘whatever is, is right’… All these quotations are from the introduction to The Philosophy of History … [Hegel’s] is a very superfine brand of freedom. It does not mean that you will be able to keep out of a concentration camp. It does not imply democracy, or a free press, or any of the usual Liberal watchwords, which Hegel rejects with contempt … I doubt whether, in Hegel’s opinion, a man could be a ‘hero’ without being a military conqueror. Hegel’s emphasis on nations, together with his peculiar conception of ‘freedom,’ explains his glorification of the State — a very important aspect of his political philosophy, to which we must now turn our attention. His philosophy of the State is developed both in his Philosophy of History and in his Philosophy of Law … Hegel’s doctrine of the State — [is] a doctrine which, if accepted, justifies every internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be imagined. The strength of his bias appears in the fact that his theory is largely inconsistent with his own metaphysic, and that the inconsistencies are all such as tend to the justification of cruelty and international brigandage. A man may be pardoned if logic compels him regretfully to reach conclusions which he deplores, but not for departing from logic in order to be free to advocate crimes … Hegel thought that, if enough was known about a thing to distinguish it from all other things, then all its properties could be inferred by logic. This was a mistake, and from this mistake arose the whole imposing edifice of his system.”
Bertrand Arthur William Russell, History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, London, 1947, 757–758–763–764–766–768–772.

See also: “What, then, is the difference between Kant and Hegel? … Kant opposes the knowledge of phenomena to the knowledge of things in themselves, the latter being knowledge that only pure rational cognition could offer us … Hegel pushes the critique of representation inaugurated by Immanuel Kant, to its very end. Kant revolutionized philosophy by asserting that thought is not regulated by its object, but rather the opposite is true. Hegel engages in this new path, and affirms that thought is unto itself its very own object. Hegel advances Kant’s Copernican revolution, while at the same time, he smashes it into pieces. What remains, according to Hegel (his greatest discovery) is the tension between the unity of the I think and the unthought multiplicity, or the multiplicity which is not completely unified by thought. Every object (thought) carries within itself this tension, which is why every object carries contradiction within itself, and is contradictory. The rôle of the doctrine of essence, its explosive force within the Hegelian system, is that the philosophy of Hegel reposes upon this tension; the function of which is to unfold its successive forms, without itself ever being surpassed. There is no exact determination of the nature of contradiction in the world, outside of this transition from the nature of being into the nature of essence. This is proved by Hegel’s critique of Heraclitus … ‘truth or universality is not yet expressed: It is the concept of unity as opposition per se, but it is not the concept of unity reflected into itself.’ (Note 7: Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, §18, p. 337) … Hegel tries to prove that unity can be known only on the condition of understanding being as the being of thought; unity is, as being, thought which thinks of being as thought (‘unity reflected in itself’) … Hegel’s distinction between the Hegelian dialectic and the Heraclitean dialectic is essential. It will play a very important rôle in the understanding of the Hegelian logic as a method of thought. Thus, for example, when Karl Marx uses the traditional Hegelian dialectic to combat universal change … Is Hegel left unscathed when the concept is unfolded across the entire Hegelian system? Probably not … For the last book of Hegel’s Logic, I have made my own translations.”
Béatrice Longuenesse, Hegel et la critique de la métaphysique: Étude sur la doctrine de l’essence, Paris, 1981, 10–17–51–52–208–209: “Où est, alors, la différence entre Kant et Hegel? … [Kant] oppose à la connaissance des phénomènes une connaissance des choses en soi que seule une pensée purement rationnelle pourrait nous offrir … Hegel pousse à son terme une critique de la représentation que Kant ne fait que amorcer. Kant a révolutionné la philosophie en affirmant que la pensée ne se règle pas sur son objet, mais l’inverse … Hegel s’engouffre dans la voie ouverte, et affirme que la pensée est à elle–même son propre objet. Il prolonge la révolution copernicienne, en même temps qu’il la fait voler en éclats … Ce qui reste, selon lui [Hegel], une découverte inestimable, est la tension entre l’unité du Je pense et la multiplicité non pensée, ou non complètement unifiée par la pensée. Tout objet (pensé) porte en soi cette tension, c’est pourquoi tout objet porte en soi la contradiction … L’intérêt de la Doctrine de l’essence, sa force explosive à l’intérieure du système hégélien, tiennent à ce qu’elle est tout entier bâtie sur cette tension; son objet est d’en exposer les forms successives, sans que jamais elle soit supprimée … Il n’y a pas de détermination rigoureuse de la nature de la contradiction dans les choses, en dehors de cette transposition du registre de l’être dans celui de l’essence. C’est ce que montre la critique formulée par Hegel à l’encontre d’Héraclite … ‘la vérité, l’universalité n’est pas encore exprimée; c’est le concept de l’unité étant dans l’opposition, non de l’unité réfléchie dans soi’ (Note 7: Hegel, Leçons d’histoire de la philosophie, §18, p. 337) … Hegel veut montrer, au contraire, que l’unité ne peut être saisie qu’à condition de comprendre l’être comme être pensée; l’unité est, dans l’être, la pensée pensant l’être (‘l’unité réfléchie dans soi’) … Ce clivage entre dialectique hégélienne et dialectique héraclitéenne est essentiel. Il jouera un rôle très important dans la compréhension de la logique hégélienne comme méthode de pensée. Ainsi par exemple, lorsque Marx revendique l’héritage de la dialectique hégélienne contre le mobilisme universel … [Hegel] échappe–t–il, en particulier, lorsque le concept se déploie dans le système tout entier? Peut–être pas … Pour ce dernier livre de la Logique, j’ai toujours donné ma propre traduction.”
See: Béatrice Longuenesse, éditrice, “Préface,” Vladimir Lénine: Textes philosophiques, Sylvie Pelta & Françoise Sève, traductrices, Paris, Éditions sociales/Messidor, 1982. [1978]

See finally: “The primary focus of Hegel’s discussion of the state in organic terms is the political constitution of the state. In this context, Hegel talks of the state as an organism not because it is a whole of which its individual citizens are parts, but rather that the elements that make up the constitution of the state depend on one another in the way that the categories that comprise the Concept are dependent on one another: ‘Note 64: While the powers of the state must certainly be distinguished, each must form a whole in itself and contain the other moments within it. When we speak of the distinct activities of these powers, we must not fall into the monumental error of taking this to mean that each power should exist independently and in abstraction; on the contrary, the powers should be distinguished only as moments of the concept,’ (Philosophy of Right, §272 Zusätze). Put very simply, this means that while the monarchy is a manifestation of individuality, the executive is a manifestation of particularity, and the legislature is a manifestation of universality, each also embodies aspects of the other ‘moments’ (so, for example, the monarch acts as an individual, but in his person represents the universal interest, where that interest involves the interest of a state comprising different particular groups). Thus, the conception of the universal that Hegel is using here is concrete in the sense that it cannot be conceived as something separable from the categories of particularity and individuality … Hegel’s position could be said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems (concerning the question of individuation, or the relation between substances and their attributes, for example).”
Robert Stern, “Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15.1(2007): 141–142.

It goes without saying that the statement by Robert Stern to the effect that, “Hegel’s position could be said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems,” does not mean: Hegel’s position is said to have philosophical value in offering a potential solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems. The former statement therefore most certainly does not mean: Hegel’s position has philosophical value in offering a solution to certain familiar metaphysical problems. Wherefore? Modern sophists like Robert Stern ignore and neglect the rational distinction between the genuine Hegel and Pure Hegelism of the originalausgabe on the one hand, and the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of their impure Hegelianism on the other hand.

I am reminded of Vladimir Zeman and his Kant Seminar some 20 years ago in Montréal, when he used to praise Kant to high–heaven as the “father of the contemporary scientific spirit,” and who treated the school of Hegel as the bastion of 20th century totalitarianism: Along with Stanley French and his Clique of French phenomenologists, they gave the admirers of Hegel no quarter, unless by Hegelianism one means marxisme.

See: “It must be acknowledged that phenomenology [subjective idealism] is, nevertheless, well represented in Canada, and that there is a present and energetic level of activity, organization, and research … [phenomenology] shows no signs of fading away and continues to thrive, albeit somewhat quietly … there are currently a number of centers, institutes, and societies with a focus on phenomenology, or Continental thought in the wider scope … given the current levels of activity, and the promise of continued interest and involvement on the part of students and younger academics, a solid future for phenomenology in Canada is assured.”
Linda Fisher, “Canada,” Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Lester Embree, et alia, editors, Dordrecht, 1997, 91–94, 91–91–91–94.

See: “[Phenomenologists] are critical of Hegel’s goal of ‘absolute knowledge,’ the identity of thought and Being, which they regard as spirit’s totalizing comprehension of some first–order truth about what there is. They thus reproach Hegel for what appears to be the organizing principle for his Phänomenologie, viz., his so–called metaphysical monism, because, as phenomenologists, their primary philosophical interest, allegedly unlike Hegel’s, is not the coherence of an intellectual system establishing a supersensible entity (Divine Mind) that both explains and coincides with the sensible or historical world.”
Frank M. Kirkland, “Hegel,” Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, Lester Embree, et alia, editors, Dordrecht, 1997, 292–298, 292–293.

Phenomenologists, according to the Encyclopedia of Phenomenology, attack (criticize and reproach) Hegel because his philosophy does not interest them. Undoubtedly these same phenomenologists uphold subjective idealism because modern irrationalism interests them. The modern sophists, namely the schools of Jean–Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir and so forth, in the public universities, the media and politics, especially in Europe and the United States, have long attacked Washington as totalizing, absolutistic, imperialistic, conservative and totalitarian, especially at Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal. They follow in the footsteps of modern subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism:

“Jean–Paul Sartre and myself have always been perfectly clear on this point: It is not because there is a desire to exist that this desire corresponds to reality as such. This is proved beyond doubt in Kant’s intellectual philosophy: The belief in causation is no basis for the belief in a Supreme Cause. Man desires to exist, which does not mean therefore that he could ever reach existence, or even that existence is a possible notion: Of course, we speak of being and existence as reflection. We refer to the synthesis between being and existence which is impossible. Sartre and I, we have always taught this doctrine, which is the very foundation of our philosophy: Out of timber so crooked as that from which man is made nothing entirely straight can be built.”
Simone de Beauvoir in Madeleine Gobeil, “Entrevue avec Simone de Beauvoir,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16(15).69(août–septembre, 1964): 30–31: “Nous avons toujours dit, Sartre et moi, que ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a désir d’être, que ce désir corresponde à une réalité quelconque. C’est comme Kant le disait, sur le plan intellectuel. Ce n’est pas une raison parce qu’on croit à des causalités pour qu’il y ait une cause suprême. Ce n’est pas parce qu’il y a chez l’homme un désir d’être pour qu’il puisse jamais atteindre l’être, ou même que l’être soit une notion possible, l’être en tout cas qui soit réflexion et en même temps existence. II y a une synthèse existence et être qui est impossible. Nous l’avons répété toute notre vie, Sartre et moi, et c’est le fond de notre pensée, il y a un creux dans l’homme et même ses réalisations ont ce creux en elles.”

Modern sophists have thereby greatly enriched themselves and their backers over the years, the inferior ruling classes. Meanwhile, the defenders of America and the Western democracies in the struggle against world communism are abused as war–mongers and baby–killers.

Phenomenology is about the the re–definition of words such as being, existence, love, jealousy, emotion and so forth, according to what is named the “phenomenological method,” which is modern sophistry. Since the realm of exact historiography and world history is not subjective idealism, phenomenologists create sophistical historical distinctions in order to separate phenomenology from modern unreason:

“[Kant’s] phenomenology was clearly nothing but what he called ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ … Nevertheless, such a critique of human knowledge has by itself little if any affinity with today’s full–fledged phenomenology … Husserl found himself increasingly in sympathy and agreement precisely with Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, apparently without being aware of the fact that there was even a terminological bridge for his latter–day rapprochement to Kant’s critical philosophy.”
Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, vol. 1, Dordrecht, 1960, 12.

Kant’s critical philosophy is not sophistry? Phenomenologists are not outside of world history and the arena of politics and economics: Phenomenologists thus re–define words for their backers, the inferior ruling classes. Phenomenologists who maintain the contrary, namely that they re–define words for the superior ruling classes, have not learned the inescapable lesson of exact historiography and world history: Subjective idealism in 20th century politics and economics is not absolute idealism. In other words, absolute idealism is not impure Hegelianism, among other things: Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion.

See finally: “[Hegel] accepted Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness in … [his] own thought but, in contrast to Kant … [Hegel] evaluated it positively … [Hegel] recognized in it Reason’s special capacity to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding …. with his Logic Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, 1976, 5–5–5–5–76. [1971]

The genuine Hegel recognized (1) in Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, otherwise Hegel recognized (2) in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, otherwise, Hegel recognized (3) in both Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness and in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding. Therefore, Hegel positively evaluated (1) Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, otherwise Hegel positively evaluated (2) the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, otherwise, Hegel positively evaluated (3) both Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness and the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason. Therefore Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion with the Hegelian Logic? Of course, this is not the place for a rigorous exposition of the Pure Hegelian refutation of the hermeneutical dialectics of Gadamer, which is contained in the Stronghold of Hegel, in the chapter which is entitled “Contre Gadamer,” 436 ff.

If Hegel recognized in Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, and if he recognized in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, namely, if Hegel positively evaluated Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness as the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason, then Hegel seeks to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion with the Hegelian Logic? Therefore it is not the case that the genuine Hegel greatly recognized in the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason (beyond the so–called demonstration of Kant), the special capacity of Reason to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding, if Hegel positively evaluated Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness as the necessary self–contradictoriness of reason.

Gadamer’s “necessary contradictoriness of reason” is beyond the genuine Hegelian dialectic because Reason possesses a “special capacity to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding.” Hegel did not therefore recognize in Kant’s demonstration of reason’s necessary self–contradictoriness, Reason’s special capacity to transcend the limits of a kind of thought which fails to rise above the limits of the understanding: The necessary contradictoriness of reason of the Kantian dialectic is therefore not the same necessary contradictoriness of Reason of the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism. The Pure Hegelian dialectical necessity is not the Kantian dialectical necessity: The Pure Hegelian dialectical necessity is absolute, while the Kantian dialectical necessity is subjective. The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism did not therefore recognize the necessary self–contradictoriness of absolute dialectical rationality in the subjective dialectical necessity of Kantian irrationalism: In his Logic Hegel does not seek to bring the transcendental philosophy initiated by Kant to its conclusion. The rational distinction between Kant and Hegel is found in the Pure Hegelian philosophy.

It is a mistake to regard Hegel’s philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system: “The essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle … all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required,” (Hiralal Haldar, 1927, 10).

See: “The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked … it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.”
Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, 1927, 10.

Considering Hans–Georg Gadamer’s place in the Cold War struggle and his place in the strife between Western and Soviet Marxism in East and West Germany, his submission to Hitler and then Stalin, and considering his relations to Heidegger and modern European political and economic irrationalism, his dialectical hermeneutics therefore constitutes part of the beginning of the movement away from modern 20th century German unreason, in the world historical rise of Americanism:

“From the standpoint of the philosophy of finitude, it’s possible for us to acquire historical consciousness again without falling prey to historical relativism, exactly to the extent that we recognize the limits of all knowledge, which is bounded precisely by its own historical situation. This recognition gives us back the possibility of seeing the past from our historical perspective, a possibility that I called the ‘fusion of horizons.’ Yet the meaning of our finitude doesn’t exhaust itself in this alone. What I had already tried to show Heidegger in Marburg and later developed further in the Lisbon lecture and in other essays was, as I have already said, that the genuine meaning of our finitude or our ‘thrownness’ consists in the fact that we become aware, not only of our being historically conditioned, but especially of our being conditioned by the other. Precisely in our ethical relation to the other, it becomes clear to us how difficult it is to do justice to the demands of the other or even simply to become aware of them. The only way not to succumb to our finitude is to open ourselves to the other, to listen to the ‘thou’ who stands before us.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer in Riccardo Dottori, A Century of Philosophy: Hans–Georg Gadamer in Conversation With Riccardo Dottori, Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, translators, New York, Continuum, 2006, 29. [2000]

From the standpoint of the philosophy of finitude? “Hegel brought to its completion the development of traditional logic into a transcendental ‘logic of objectivity’ — a development which began with Fichte’s ‘Doctrine of Science.’ But the language–ness of all thought continues to demand that thought, moving in the opposite direction, convert the concept back into the valid word. The more radically objectifying thought reflects upon itself and unfolds the experience of dialectic, the more clearly it points to what it is not. Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer, Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, translated with an introduction by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven, 1976, 99. [1971]

Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics because the more radically objectifying thought reflects upon itself and unfolds the experience of dialectic, the more clearly it points to what it is not? Perhaps dialectic retrieves itself in hermeneutics, otherwise perhaps not. Wherefore? Dialectic must retrieve itself in hermeneutics, otherwise not.

The hermeneutical and dialectical conception of rationality is therefore not the fountainhead of Globalism in the world of today: Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion.

See: Richard Wolin, “Nazism and the Complicities of Hans–Georg Gadamer: Untruth and Method,” The New Republic, 15 May 2000, 36–45.

See finally: “[Heidegger] rebuked me for traveling to America instead of writing my book on Plato. He later realized that he wasn’t entitled to rebuke me for this, because it was through me that he saw that he had been wrong to think of Plato’s relationship to Aristotle as he did … That was then the meaning of our [Heidegger’s and Gadamer’s] encounter with Hegel. This is where the essays in Hegel’s Dialectic come from. All of this came out of the time I was holding lectures in Leipzig. I was reading a great deal about Kant and Fichte and Schelling and Heidegger and, most of all, Hegel. All of it emerged during this period, after I had developed my idea about Plato’s dialectic being an ethical thesis.”
Hans–Georg Gadamer in Riccardo Dottori, A Century of Philosophy: Hans–Georg Gadamer in Conversation With Riccardo Dottori, Rod Coltman and Sigrid Koepke, translators, New York, 2006, 29. [2000]

19. Michael Beresford Foster, Ibidem, 195–196.

20. Foster, Ibidem, 196.

21. Foster, Ibidem.

22. Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, “The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, §344, 111.
See: “Die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes stehen in ihrem besonderen bestimmten Prinzipe auf, das an ihrer Verfassung und der ganzen Breite ihres Zustandes seine Auslegung und Wirklichkeit hat, deren sie sich bewußt und in deren Interesse vertieft, sie zugleich bewußtlose Werkzeuge und Glieder jenes inneren Geschäfts sind, worin diese Gestalten vergehen, der Geist an und für sich aber sich den Übergang in seine nächste höhere Stufe vorbereitet und erarbeitet.”
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, §344, 345–346.
See also: Hegel, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu herausgegeben von Georg Lasson, Band 124, Leipzig, 1911, §344, 272.
See finally: “Die Staaten, Völker und Individuen in diesem Geschäfte des Weltgeistes stehen in ihrem besonderen bestimmten Prinzipe auf, das an ihrer Verfassung und der ganzen Breite ihres Zustandes seine Auslegung und Wirklichkeit hat, deren sie sich bewußt und in deren Interesse vertieft, sie zugleich bewußtlose Werkzeuge und Glieder jenes inneren Geschäfts sind, worin diese Gestalten vergehen, der Geist an und für sich aber sich den Übergang in seine nächste höhere Stufe vorbereitet und erarbeitet.”
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, Vierte Auflage, Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Hamburg, 1967, §344, 290. [1955]

23. Thomas Malcolm Knox, Ibidem, §347 Anmerkung, 111.
See: “Die spezielle Geschichte eines welthistorischen Volks enthält teils die Entwickelung seines Prinzips von seinem kindlichen eingehüllten Zustande aus bis zu seiner Blüte, wo es zum freien sittlichen Selbstbewußtsein gekommen, nun in die allgemeine Geschichte eingreift, — teils auch die Periode des Verfalls und Verderbens; — denn so bezeichnet sich an ihm das Hervorgehen eines höheren Prinzips als nur des Negativen seines eigenen. Damit wird der Übergang des Geistes in jenes Prinzip und so der Weltgeschichte an ein anderes Volk angedeutet …”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347 Anmerkung, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347 Anmerkung, 273.

24. Knox, Ibidem, §348, 111.
See: “An der Spitze aller Handlungen, somit auch der welthistorischen, stehen Individuen als die das Substantielle verwirklichenden Subjektivitäten. Als diesen Lebendigkeiten der substantiellen Tat des Weltgeistes, und so unmittelbar identisch mit derselben, ist sie ihnen selbst verborgen und nicht Objekt und Zweck.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §348, 347–348. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §348, 274.

25. Knox, Ibidem, §348, 111.
See: “Als diesen Lebendigkeiten der substantiellen Tat des Weltgeistes und so unmittelbar identisch mit derselben, ist sie ihnen selbst verborgen und nicht Objekt und Zweck; sie haben auch die Ehre derselben und Dank nicht bei ihrer Mitwelt (ebendas.), noch bei der öffentlichen Meinung der Nachwelt, sondern als formelle Subjektivitäten nur bei dieser Meinung ihren Teil als unsterblichen Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §348, 348. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911.

26. Knox, Ibidem, §345, 111.
See: “Die Weltgeschichte fällt außer diesen Gesichtspunkten; in ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

27. Knox, Ibidem.
See: “In ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

28. Knox, Ibidem, §353, 112.
See: “Das Prinzip der vierten Gestaltung ist das Umschlagen dieses Gegensatzes des Geistes, in seiner Innerlichkeit seine Wahrheit und konkretes Wesen zu empfangen und in der Objektivität einheimisch und versöhnt zu sein, und weil dieser zur ersten Substantialität zurückgekommene Geist der aus dem unendlichen Gegensatze zurückgekehrte ist, diese seine Wahrheit als Gedanke und als Welt gesetzlicher Wirklichkeit zu erzeugen und zu wissen.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §353, 350. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §353, 275–276.

29. Knox, Ibidem, §347A 111.
See: “Die spezielle Geschichte eines welthistorischen Volks enthält teils die Entwickelung seines Prinzips von seinem kindlichen eingehüllten Zustande aus bis zu seiner Blüte, wo es zum freien sittlichen Selbstbewußtsein gekommen, nun in die allgemeine Geschichte eingreift.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347A, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347A, 273.

30. Knox, Ibidem, §345, 111.
See: “In ihr erhält dasjenige notwendige Moment der Idee des Weltgeistes, welches gegenwärtig seine Stufe ist, sein absolutes Recht, und das darin lebende Volk und dessen Taten erhalten ihre Vollführung, und Glück und Ruhm.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §345, 346. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §345, 272–273.

31. Knox, Ibidem, §347, 111.
See: “Dem Volke, dem solches Moment als natürliches Prinzip zukommt, ist die Vollstreckung desselben in dem Fortgange des sich entwickelnden Selbstbewußtseins des Weltgeistes übertragen. Dieses Volk ist in der Weltgeschichte, für diese Epoche, — und es kann in ihr nur einmal Epoche machen, — das Herrschende.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347, 346–347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347, 273.

32. Knox, Ibidem, §343, 110.
See: “Die Geschichte des Geistes ist seine Tat, denn er ist nur, was er tut, und seine Tat ist, sich und zwar hier als Geist sich zum Gegenstande seines Bewußtseins zu machen, sich für sich selbst auslegend zu erfassen. Dies Erfassen ist sein Sein und Prinzip, und die Vollendung eines Erfassens ist zugleich seine Entäußerung und sein Übergang. Der, formell ausgedrückt, von neuem dies Erfassen erfassende, und was dasselbe ist, aus der Entäußerung in sich gehende Geist, ist der Geist der höheren Stufe gegen sich, wie er in jenem ersteren Erfassen stand.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §343, 344–345. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §343, 271–272.

33. Knox, Ibidem, §343A, 111.
See: “Aber denen, welche diesen Gedanken verwerfen, ist der Geist ein leeres Wort geblieben, sowie die Geschichte ein oberflächliches Spiel zufälliger, sogenannter nur menschlicher Bestrebungen und Leidenschaften. Wenn sie dabei auch in den Ausdrücken von Vorsehung und Plan der Vorsehung den Glauben eines höheren Waltens aussprechen, so bleiben dies unerfüllte Vorstellungen, indem sie auch ausdrücklich den Plan der Vorsehung für ein ihnen Unerkennbares und Unbegreifliches ausgeben.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §343A, 345. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §343A, 272.

34. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, 1921, 44–71–71–99–100–101–102–105.

35. Knox, Ibidem, §347A, 111.
See: “Eine Periode, von welcher aus jenes Volk das absolute Interesse verloren hat, das höhere Prinzip zwar dann auch positiv in sich aufnimmt und sich hineinbildet, aber darin als in einem Empfangenen nicht mit immanenter Lebendigkeit und Frische sich verhält, — vielleicht seine Selbständigkeit verliert, vielleicht auch sich als besonderer Staat oder ein Kreis von Staaten fortsetzt oder fortschleppt und in mannigfaltigen inneren Versuchen und äußeren Kämpfen nach Zufall herumschlägt.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347A, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347A, 273.

36. Knox, Ibidem, §347, 111.
See: “Gegen dies sein absolutes Recht, Träger der gegenwärtigen Entwickelungsstufe des Weltgeistes zu sein, sind die Geister der anderen Völker rechtlos, und sie, wie die, deren Epoche vorbei ist, zählen nicht mehr in der Weltgeschichte.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §347, 347. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §347, 273.

37. Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane, “Introductory Preface,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, vol. 1, By Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Walter Henry Johnston & Leslie Graham Struthers, translators, London, 1929, 7–9.

See: “Hegel writes as though he were divided from Kant by a mighty gulf …The Absolute as Absolute stands revealed, but not as an object perceived.”
Richard Burdon, Viscount Haldane, “Hegel,” The Contemporary Review, 67(February, 1895): 237–242.

See also: “L’humanité a jusqu’ici vécu sur la réponse à priori qu’elle a dû se faire dans son enfance, alors que manquaient les éléments d’une solution à posteriori.”
George Clemenceau, “Appendice,” Notions d’anatomie et de physiologie: De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, Charles Robin, Introduction, Paris, 1867, 279. See: George Clemenceau, “Appendice,” De la Génération des Éléments anatomiques, Paris, 1865, 221.

See: “Nous avions livré au Napoléon, après le coup d’État, tout ce qui faisait la force morale de la France dans le monde, ses traditions historiques de pensée, et, avec toutes nos garanties de contrôle, les principes vivants de notre Révolution, du droit, de justice et de liberté … Fermons les Codes, Français, plus de lois, plus de justice, suivons, les yeux bandés, le chef inepte, au flair d’artilleur, vers les recommencements de Sedan et de Metz!”
Georges Clemenceau, Vers la réparation, Paris, 1899, 94–503.

See also: “L’homme parlant, il est vrai, fait résonner le mot droit, formule magique d’un idéal d’équité dont rien ne fournit le spectacle sur la terre.”
Georges Clemenceau, La France devant l’Allemagne, Paris, 1918, 11.

See also: “I have always regarded Immanuel Kant not only as a very powerful thinker, but as the metaphysical father of the philosophy of positivism … undoubtedly the greatest and most positive advance that I have made since Kant is the discovery of the evolution of human ideas according to the law of three stages, namely the theological, metaphysical and scientific phases: The Kantian philosophy in my opinion is the very basis of the three stages of positivism.” (xxi)

[ J’avais toujours regardé Kant non–seulement comme une très–forte tête, mais comme le métaphysicien le plus rapproché de la philosophie positive … le pas le plus positif et le plus distinct que j’ai fait après lui, me semble seulement d’avoir découverte la loi du passage des idées humaines par les trois états théologique, métaphysique, et scientifique, loi qui me semble être la base dont Kant à conseillé l’exécution ]

Auguste Comte (10 December 1824) in Maximillian Friedrich Müller, “Translator’s Preface,” Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, vol. 1, London, 1881, v–lxii; xxi: “‘J’ai lu et relu avec un plaisir infini le petit traité de Kant (Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht, 1784); il est prodigieux pour I’époque, et même, si je I’avais connu six ou sept ans plus tot, il m’aurait épargné de la peine. Je suis charmé que vous I’ayez traduit, il peut très–efficacement contribuer à préparer les esprits à la philosophie positive. La conception générale ou au moins la méthode y est encore métaphysique, mais les détails montrent à chaque instant I’esprit positif. J’avais toujours regardé Kant non–seulement comme une très–forte tête, mais comme le métaphysicien le plus rapproché de la philosophie positive … Pour moi, je ne me trouve jusqu’à present, après cette lecture, d’autre valeur que celle d’avoir systématisé et arrêté la conception ébauchée par Kant à mon insu, ce que je dois surtout à I’éducation scientifique; et même le pas le plus positif et le plus distinct que j’ai fait après lui, me semble seulement d’avoir découverte la loi du passage des idées humaines par les trois états théologique, métaphysique, et scientifique, loi qui me semble être la base dont Kant à conseillé l’exécution. Je rends grâce aujourd’hui à mon défaut d’érudition; car si mon travail, tel qu’il est maintenant, avait été précédé chez moi par I’étude du traité de Kant, il aurait, à mes propres yeux, beaucoup perdu de sa valeur.’ See Auguste Comte, par É. Littré, Paris, 1864, p. 154; Lettre de Comte à M. d’Eichthal, 10 Déc. 1824.”

See also: “The positivist philosophy was a reaction to the speculative phase that developed in philosophy after Kant.”
Dagobert David Runes, Vergilius Ferm, Kurt Friedrich Leidecker & John White, editors, “Auguste Comte: Positive Philosophy,” Treasury of Philosophy, New York, 1955, 260–267, 261. [Italics added]

See also: “The absolute [of Hegel] became a stumbling–block to Ludwig Andreas Feuerbach and other members of the ‘Left.’ They rejected as an illegitimate interpolation the eternal subject of development, and, instead of one continuing God as the subject of all the predicates by which in the logic the absolute is defined, assumed only a series of ideas, products of philosophic activity. They denied the theological value of the logical forms — the development of these forms being in their opinion due to the human thinker, not to a self–revealing absolute. Thus they made man the creator of the absolute. But with this modification on the system another necessarily followed; a mere logical series could not create nature. And thus the material universe became the real starting–point. Thought became only the result of organic conditions — subjective and human.”
William Wallace 1844–1897, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, 1911, 205.

See also: “[Those] theistic Hegelians who maintain the personality of God in a world beyond our sphere, must, for consistency’s sake, deny that God is cognizable. But how then can they remain in the (Hegelian) school?”
Karl Ludwig Michelet in Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 585.

See also: “[Hegel] was a thoroughly anti–critical, anti–revolutionary philosopher … Hegel’s teaching had been taken up by the Left in a one–sided and abstract way; and the great majority of people always prefer what one can become fanatical about, and this is never anything but what is abstract.”
Johann Eduard Erdmann 1805–1892, A History of Philosophy: German Philosophy Since Hegel, 4th German edition, vol. 3, London, 1899, 66–81.

See also: It is the twentieth century that has at last shaken the [Kantio–] Hegelian concept of the historical process whereby [757] ‘everything real is rational.’ It was this concept, violently debated for decades, that Russian thinkers of the past century finally accepted. But now, at the height of the state’s triumph over individual freedom, Russian thinkers wearing padded camp jackets have dethroned and cast down the old Hegelian law.”
Vasily Grossman in Stéphane Courtois, editor & contributor, “Why?” The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Karel Bartošek, Sylvain Boulouque, Pascal Fontaine, Rémi Kauffer, Martin Malia, Jean–Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Jean–Louis Panné, Pierre Rigoulot, Yves Santamaria & Nicolas Werth, contributors, Jonathan Murphy & Mark Kramer (consulting editor), translators, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 756–757. [Italics added]

See also: “It has been written that ‘history is the science of human misfortune.’ Our bloodstained century of violence amply confirms this statement … The United States remains heavily influenced by a culture of violence deeply rooted in two major historical tragedies — the enslavement of black Africans and the extermination of Native Americans.”
Stéphane Courtois, editor & contributor, “The Crimes of Communism,” The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Karel Bartošek, Sylvain Boulouque, Pascal Fontaine, Rémi Kauffer, Martin Malia, Jean–Louis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Jean–Louis Panné, Pierre Rigoulot, Yves Santamaria & Nicolas Werth, contributors, Jonathan Murphy & Mark Kramer (consulting editor), translators, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1999, 1.

See also: “The unfolded totality of the Hegelian school may be pictured in a brief compend. With the pseudo–Hegelians (Fichte, jun., Weisse, Brandis &c.,) perception under the form of faith or experience, is the sole source of positive religious truth. On the extreme right of the Hegelian school, perception, (as with Hinrichs) is the absolute criterion of the results found by means of logical thinking; while Göschel gives it still a decisive voice in all religious affairs. Schaller, Erdmann, and Gabler, who form the pure right side, allow to religious perception a consultative vote, which however, like a good ruler with his subjects, they never leave unrespected. Rosenkranz, who ushers in the centre, proceeds for the most part in accordance with the voice of perception, but in some cases rejects it. In Marheineke, the perception is the witness, who can only speak respecting the fact, while the question of law or right can only be decided by speculative thinking. On the left of the centre, (that taken by Vatke, Snellmann and Michelet) the perception is a true–hearted servant, who must subject herself obediently to reason as mistress. Strauss, on the left side, makes her a slave, while with Feuerbach and Bauer she appears verily as a paria.”
Karl Ludwig Michelet (1842) in John Daniel Morell, Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1 volume edition, New York, 1848, 481. [1846]

See finally: “It is asserted by some, that the three branches above mentioned (usually termed the right hand, the centre, and the left), exhibit the threefold movement of the dialectic process.”
John Daniel Morell, Ibidem, 480–481.

38. Knox, Ibidem, §§334–340, 109–110.
See: “Der Streit der Staaten kann deswegen, insofern die besonderen Willen keine Übereinkunft finden, nur durch Krieg entschieden werden … In das Verhältnis der Staaten gegeneinander, weil sie darin als besondere sind, fällt das höchst bewegte Spiel der inneren Besonderheit der Leidenschaften, Interessen, Zwecke, der Talente und Tugenden, der Gewalt, des Unrechts und der Laster, wie der äußeren Zufälligkeit, in den größten Dimensionen der Erscheinung.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §§334–340, 339–342. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §§334–340, 268–270.

39. Knox, Ibidem, §340, 110.
See: “Die Prinzipien der Volksgeister sind um ihrer Besonderheit willen, in der sie als existierende Individuen ihre objektive Wirklichkeit und ihr Selbstbewußtsein haben, überhaupt beschränkte, und ihre Schicksale und Taten in ihrem Verhältnisse zueinander sind die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit dieser Geister, aus welcher der allgemeine Geist, der Geist der Welt, als unbeschränkt ebenso sich hervorbringt, als er es ist, der sein Recht, — und sein Recht ist das allerhöchste, — an ihnen in der Weltgeschichte, als dem Weltgerichte, ausübt.”
Hegel, Ibidem, 1821, §340, 342–343. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §340, 270–271.

40. Michael Beresford Foster, The Political Philosophies of Plato and Hegel, New York, 1965, 196–197.

See: “Reference 2: §298, quoted p. 193, note 3, supra, and Reference 3: §280, Zusätze, quoted p. 191, note 1, supra.”
Foster, Ibidem, 196.

See finally: “[In The Philosophy of Right] the state so described is unlike any existing state in Hegel’s day. It is a form of limited monarchy, with parliamentary government, trial by jury and toleration for Jews and dissenters. In all these respects it differed from the contemporary Prussia. It has often been said by Hegel’s detractors that his book was written on the ‘dunghill of servility’ and that his ideal state is identified with the monarchy of Friedrich William III. Little historical knowledge and little study of Hegel is required to see that this is nonsense.”
Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, 1967, 302.

41. Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.

See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the “system” that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”
Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “Introduction: What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4.

See also: “The form in which this book [Philosophy of Right] presents itself has given it an air of dogmatism beyond what can properly be laid to the charge of its author. The Philosophy of Right contains the substance of lectures delivered by Hegel as professor. After its publication it served as a compendium on which Hegel lectured in succeeding years. And he thus made many oral additions, notes of which were taken by his pupils, and these notes were, after his death, thrown into the shape of paragraphs, annexed to the sections of the original work. The work, therefore, as we now have it, contains both the paragraphs written by the author, and also those embodying, as nearly as possible in the author’s words, what he said by way of illustration or explanation. This has given it a fragmentary and incomplete character, which is detrimental to its effect and has made many portions wear an appearance of inconclusiveness and precipitate assumption.”
Thomas Collett Sandars, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Oxford Essays, Contributed by Members of the University, London, 1855, 216.

See finally: “Hegel’s works on politics and history merely elaborate part of his system — that part in which human mind objectifies itself in its endeavor to find an object identical with itself — and are unintelligible in isolation, they deserve separate treatment because they have become so famous, if not notorious.”
Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, 1967, 302–303.

42. Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See: “That Hegel does not conceive of spirit, soul, or God as separate entities is clear to anyone who has read his Philosophy of Religion … Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they [Zusatze] be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought. On issues where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise (as is the case for large parts of the Aesthetics, the History of Philosophy, and the Philosophy of World History) we must, of course, use the surviving course notes as the only possible access to Hegel’s thought; but here, too, the ultimate criteria for their authenticity lie in the principles of his authorized work … ‘es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt daß der Staat ist.’ Literally: ‘It is the course of God in the world that the state is’ … ‘God’ is used by Hegel as a more popular name for the universal and absolute spirit. His system presents the universe as one great movement or course (Gang) in which the spirit (or ‘God’) unfolds all of its possibilities (that is, logical, natural, spiritual, aesthetic, religious, and theoretical) … ‘It is the course of God [that causes or necessitates the fact] that nature or art or religion or the state exist’ … a journey with Hegel is certainly rewarding, but it does not quite reach the desired goal. The Good demands a higher ascent and a deeper descent because it exceeds and precedes the noëtic cosmos of ideas.”
Adriaan Peperzak, Ibidem, 12–29 ff.

Genuine Hegelianism, the true Gospel of Hegel which greatly influenced America over the years, especially during the Civil War, unlike impure Hegelianism, suspends judgement on matters where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise, because the speculative logical and dialectical system of the pure Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism comes only from the originalausgabe.

On issues where Hegel left us without any authorized treatise we must use the surviving course notes as the only possible access to Hegel’s thought, while the ultimate criteria for their authenticity lie in the principles of his authorized work (Ad Peperzak): Refutations of Hegel’s philosophy which contain as premises statements from the non–authorized work are not inferentially equivalent with arguments which contain as premises statements from Hegel’s authorized work because the former involve only the “possible access” to Hegel’s thought. The authenticity and “possible access” of such statements as premises lies in their reconciliation to the principles of the originalausgabe. But the interpretative determination, the hermeneutical judgement that entails the semantic reconciliation, that makes these non–authorized statements “authentic,” and therefore acceptable as premises in arguments against Hegel, does not thereby make them inferentially equivalent to the statements from the originalausgabe: They involve only the possible access to Hegel’s thought, whereas the latter involve the actual access to Hegel’s thought. In other words, the difference here between interpretative possibility and actuality entails the distinction between weaker and stronger levels of inference in the demonstrability of the refutation: A strong refutation of Hegel’s philosophy therefore contains only premises from the originalausgabe, whereas a weak refutation of Hegel’s philosophy contains premises from the originalausgabe and from the non–authorized work, while a sophistical refutation contains no premise from the originalausgabe. Refutation of the Hegelian philosophy is inseparable from Hegel philology: Therefore, dialectical inference is inseparable from dialectical hermeneutics, as the notion of dialectical scientivity, — as the speculative logical and dialectical system of the pure Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, in the realm of world history, in the collapse of European modernity and the rise of Global American civilization.

Of course, we perceive very clearly and distinctly, we lovers of the superior ruling class, that the genuine philosophy of Hegel does not divide Christians into schisms and sects, and thereby empower contemporary Machiavellism, as the Napoléonic and French Revolutionary delusion of right, especially in Brussels and Italy, but rather unites and uplifts world Christianity in the rise of Global civilization.

See: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1840, v–viii.

See also: Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Berlin, 1843, v–viii.

See finally: “Michelet very clearly proves the Straussianism of Hegel, by citations from his lectures.”
Anonymous, “Johann Karl Friedrich Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 585.

43. Knox, Ibidem, §352, 112.
See: “Die konkreten Ideen, die Völkergeister, haben ihre Wahrheit und Bestimmung in der konkreten Idee, wie sie die absolute Allgemeinheit ist, — dem Weltgeist, um dessen Thron sie als die Vollbringer seiner Verwirklichung, und als Zeugen und Zieraten seiner Herrlichkeit stehen. Indem er als Geist nur die Bewegung seiner Tätigkeit ist, sich absolut zu wissen, hiermit sein Bewußtsein von der Form der natürlichen Unmittelbarkeit zu befreien und zu sich selbst zu kommen, so sind die Prinzipien der Gestaltungen dieses Selbstbewußtseins in dem Gange seiner Befreiung.”
Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, §352, 349–350. See finally: Hegel, Ibidem, 1911, §352, 275.

That I have laid out some of the philosophical reasons for this doctrine in the third edition of another writing of mine, an outline of sorts, named Americanism, is of slight importance: That the teaching therein involves the sciences of economics and politics is of some interest, however, and therefore has a bearing upon the subject at hand, namely, as the developmental unification and coaxial integration of the American world. In that work I flatter myself as the first Hegelian philosopher ever to apply the Dialectic of Hegel to the Hegelian Dialectic: “Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe … Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism … In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?”
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, 3rd edition, San Francisco, California, The Internet Archive, 2016, 6–9.

44. Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, Addition 86 = §135,129–Addition 152 = §258, 141.

See: Eduard Gans, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Leipzig, 1911, Zusätze 86 = §135, 318–Zusätze 152 = §258, 349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben … Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

45. The following list of satanic ideas in which modern unreason, especially in 20th century world history, is served up on a new platter by inferior ruling classes is not exhaustive: Darwinism, phenomenology, positivism, phenomenalism, pragmatism, behaviorism, dialectical materialism, existentialism, analysis, physicalism, materialism, naturalism, realism, psycho–analysis and so forth, oftentimes set in stark contradistinction to Western philosophy pejoratively comprehended as Platonism, metaphysics, idealism, noologism, rationalism, spiritualism, dialectics, ideology, historicism, essentialism, theology, absolutism and so on …

46. See: “All things that exist being particulars … every man’s reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind.”
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New Edition, 2 vols., New York, 1824, 381/I–203/II.

Thus, the world does not exist, according to John Locke, while the universe is appearance and delusion.

See finally: “Locke was heavily involved in the slave trade, both through his investments and through his administrative supervision of England’s burgeoning colonial activities … The attempt to reconcile Locke’s involvement in the slave trade with his reputation as a philosopher of liberal freedom has a long history, beginning shortly after the abolition of the slave trade … Locke’s readers are faced with the problem of how he could have been so intimately involved in promoting an activity that he apparently knew to be unjustified … We are disturbed by the ease with which some commentators excuse Locke of racism or minimize its significance … to advocate, administer, and profit from a specifically racialized form of slavery is clear evidence of [Locke’s] racism, if the word is to have any meaning at all.”
Robert Bernasconi and Anika Maaza Mann, “The Contradictions of Racism: Locke, Slavery, and the Two Treatises,” Race and Racism in Modern Philosophy, Andrew Valls, editor, Ithaca/London, 2005, 89–89–90–91–91.

See finally Cartesius: “Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo … ea enim est natura nostrae mentis, ut generales propostiones ex particularium cognitione efformet.”
Cartesius, “Secundæ Responsiones,” Œuvres de Descartes: Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, vol. 7, Charles Adam & Paul Tannery, éditeurs, Paris, 1904, 140–141.

How very clear and distinct are the ideas of Cartesius, coming from his very own hand, although his best translators are also clear and distinct, but less clear and less distinct than the very words of Cartesius himself, as found in his very greatest works, since his Latin is now a dead language, while his modern interpreters fail to elucidate the rational foundations of their sophistical critiques.

47. See: “Such were the leading principles of the Roman law as to the effect of sale in passing title, and such was the law of the continent of Europe wherever based on the civil law, till the adoption and spread of the Code Napoléon, first among the Latin races, and more recently among the nations of central and northern Europe. The French Code says in a few emphatic words, ‘La vente de la chose d’autrui est nulle,’ Art. 1599, and would thus seem to have swept away at once the entire doctrine dependent upon the Roman system, which was based on a principle exactly the reverse.”
Judah Philip Benjamin, A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law, London, 1868, 299.

See: “Napoléon Bonaparte, who uplifted himself, by which means no one has ever determined, to the heights of conceptual power in his knowledge of the greatest problems of jurisprudence and legislation, often participated in the deliberations of the Judicial Council. Napoléon’s great genius, his profound method and penetrating insight, always astonished the members of the judiciary.”
Frédéric Mourlon, Répétitions écrites sur le code civil contenant l’exposé des principes généraux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 11e édition, revue et mise au courant par Charles Demangeat, Tome premier, Paris, 1880, 24. [1846]: “Napoléon, qui s’est élevé, on ne sait comment, jusqu’à l’intelligence des problèmes les plus ardus du droit et de la législation, pris souvent part aux discussions du Conseil. Il y déploya toujours une clarté, une méthode, et quelquefois une profondeur de vues, qui furent pour tout le monde un sujet d’étonnement.”

See also: “It is the soldier who founds a republic and it is the soldier who maintains it.”
Napoléon Bonaparte in Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, 1908, 21. See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … This is not the place for a detailed examination of the principles of Napoléonic law. It is well, however, to notice that the civil code alone was drawn up during the Consulate, that it is nearer both in time and spirit to the revolutionary law than are the codes which were compiled in a more perfunctory manner under the darker shadows of imperial despotism … in the codes, in the common system of administration, the foundations of a modern Italy were laid. And here the memory of Napoléon was not easily forgotten … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality.”
Fisher, Ibidem, 7–22–39–55–87–120.

See also: “We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from all of them … the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli … Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State … those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood [sang des hommes répandu] as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine … The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress … Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.”
Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352: “Nous nous proposons un rapprochement, une comparaison, entre la doctrine de Machiavel, telle qu’elle ressort du Prince, et la doctrine de l’absolutisme, que nous essayerons de dégager, non pas de tel ou tel des théoriciens qui en furent les champions; mais de l’ensemble de ces théoriciens … les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel … Machiavélisme et absolutisme sont issus de situations historiques analogues. C’est là un premier point essentiel de notre parallèle. Cette situation inspire à Machiavel l’idée de la légitimité de tous les moyens destinés à atteindre un but d’intérêt public et à réaliser le salut de l’État … Tous ceux qui ont pu étudier Napoléon l de près, nous disent qu’il y avait en lui le Napoléon homme d’État, qui voyait dans le sang des hommes répandu un des grands remèdes de la médecine politique … Le Prince de Machiavel et les doctrines de l’absolutisme sont nés d’un même sentiment profond de patriotisme, à des époques et dans des pays où un souverain puissant était nécessaire pour faire cesser, sous sa domination, les désordres et la désunion, causes de la détresse nationale … Machiavel nous apparaît comme un patriote sans scrupule lorsqu’il s’agit de sauver l’État. Dans sa conception du gouvernement il se révèle à nous comme un politique soucieux du bonheur du peuple et respectueux de sa liberté.”

See finally: Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, Machiavel commenté par Non Buonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans le carrosse de Buonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 18 juin 1815, Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), éditeur & Napoléon Bonaparte, traduction et commentaire, Paris, H. Nicolle, à la Librairie Stéréotype, 1816.

48. Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 575–586.

See: “[Hegel’s] legacy was quickly dispersed into … the service of orthodox Protestant theology.” George Di Giovanni, “The New Spinozism,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Alison Stone, editor and Howard Caygill and David Webb, general editors, Edinburgh, 2011, 27.

See also: “What Luther initiated as faith in feeling and in the witness of the spirit, is precisely what spirit, since become more mature, has striven to apprehend in the concept in order to free and so to find itself in the world as it exists today … Mind is here pressed back upon itself in the extreme of its absolute negativity. This is the absolute turning point; mind rises out of this situation and grasps the infinite positivity of this its inward character, i.e., it grasps the principle of the unity of the divine nature and the human, the reconciliation of objective truth and freedom as the truth and freedom appearing within self–consciousness and subjectivity, a reconciliation with the fulfilment of which the principle of the north, the principle of the Germanic peoples, has been entrusted.” Hegel, Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Chicago, 1960, Preface–§358, 7–113.

See also: “Was Luther als Glauben im Gefühl und im Zeugnis des Geistes begonnen, es ist dasselbe, was der weiterhin gereifte Geist im Begriffe zu fassen, und so in der Gegenwart sich zu befreien, und dadurch in ihr sich zu finden bestrebt ist … erfaßt der in sich zurückgedrängte Geist in dem Extreme seiner absoluten Negativität, dem an und für sich seienden Wendepunkt, die unendliche Positivität dieses seines Innern, das Prinzip der Einheit der göttlichen und menschlichen Natur, die Versöhnung als der innerhalb des Selbstbewußtseins und der Subjektivität erschienenen objektiven Wahrheit und Freiheit, welche dem nordischen Prinzip der germanischen Völker zu vollführen übertragen wird.” Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, Vorrede–§358, xxiii–353. See finally: Hegel, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Band 124, Leipzig, 1911, Vorrede–§358, 16–278.

See finally: “The persistence of the idealist tradition in Germany long after Hegel’s death … was continued not only by minor figures in very obscure places, but by major figures in very prominent ones … the idealistic tradition in Germany came to an end not with cholera in 1832 but with a cold in 1881 …[German Idealism] went back to Leibniz and Kant, and … was carried forward by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel … with further research and reflection the classification could be refined in all kinds of ways … one of the least appealing aspects of the idealist tradition from Kant down to Hegel is its notorious obscurity, which derives not least from its esoteric vocabulary and technical jargon. To understand idealist texts, it seems, one needs to be gifted with intellectual intuitions, or one has to cultivate a special technique of reasoning (the dialectic).” Frederick C. Beiser, The Late German Idealism: Trendelenburg & Lotze, Oxford, 2014, 1–4. [2013]

Remarks: Modern irrationalists in Britain like Frederick Beiser place Kant and Hegel together as German Idealists in their so–called histories of philosophy without drawing the rational distinction between sophistical and philosophical idealism, — which is also the division between the rise of Globalism and decline of modernity in world history:

“The Kantian philosophy thus serves as a cushion for intellectual indolence which soothes itself with the conviction that everything is already proved and settled.”
Hegel, “Introduction: General Division of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, New York, 1976, 62. [1969] See: Hegel, “Einleitung: Allgemeine Eintheilung der Logik,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1832, 30. [1812] See also: Hegel, “Einleitung,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Nürnberg, 1812, i–xxvii.

Modern sophists are corrupt (impure) Hegelians and their historiography is therefore defective. As such they aim to downplay the rise of world civilization and the collapse of European modernity, and thereby create political and economic resistance to Globalism among the British intelligentsia, as a breathing space for the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of their masters, the inferior ruling classes. Sophists like Frederick Beiser will deny that they are the same old pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians of yesterday precisely because they are not what they name “idealists.” Modern sophists thus use what they term the “idealist tradition” as a mask, to hide their own irrationalism, especially in the arena of politics and economics: What is this but the modern technique of the imbecile ruling classes and their flabby minds? They follow in the footsteps of the Great Sophist himself:

“The United States … imposes intolerable regimes on Asian, Latin American, and Middle East countries, and economically exploits the great majority of mankind who live at below–subsistence level to support American profit … The American government pursues a policy of genocide.” Bertrand Russell (1963) in Harvey Arthur DeWeerd, Lord Russell’s War Crimes Tribunal, Santa Monica, 1967, 4.

These same sophists wish (or pretend to wish) to bring back Eurocentricism and make the European Union into the 21st century bastion of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right. Philosophers of today, whose minds are liberated by the rise of Global freedom of thought, will notice that while our present day pseudo–Hegelians and anti–Hegelians are not “idealists” (according to their own esoteric terminology) they are nevertheless modern irrationalists all the same: Their subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism comes from the same old delusion of Kant albeit served up on a new platter. For this reason the phantasms of the modern sophists evaporate before the corrosive onslaught of Americanism: The superior ruling classes of Europe have been profoundly influenced by Washington and American political and economic rationality in the world of today.

See: “[Frederick Beiser] claims that, beginning with Schelling and Hegel, German philosophy reverted to the sort of ‘speculative metaphysics’ that Kant’s Critical Philosophy had attempted to put aside once and for all.” David A. Duquette, editor, Hegel’s History of Philosophy: New Interpretations, Albany, State University of New York Press, 2003, 212.

See: “One of the most striking and characteristic features of Hegel’s thought is that it historicizes [relativizes] philosophy … [Hegel] accepts Kant’s critical teaching that metaphysics is not possible as speculation about a realm of transcendent entities, and that it is possible only if it does not transcend the limits of possible experience … [Hegel] explains the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history … [the] self–critical dimension of Hegel’s historicism was his completion of Kant’s project for a critique of pure reason. Like Kant, Hegel believed that philosophy should become self–critical … Hegel’s historicism is perhaps most explicit in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy.” Frederick C. Beiser, editor, “Hegel’s Historicism,” The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, Cambridge, 1993, 270–271–271–272–273.

Hegel explains the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history? But which Hegel is this, the genuine Hegel of the Pure Hegelianism of the Originalausgabe or the Hegel of impure Hegelianism, the bastion of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism? The rational conception of the necessity and realization of the end of existence in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism is mortally opposed to the Kantio–Hegelian phantasms of Frederick Beiser and the modern irrationalists:

“Reflective understanding took possession of philosophy … this turn taken by cognition, which appears as a loss and retrograde step, is based on something more profound on which rests the elevation of reason into the loftier spirit of modern philosophy. The basis of that universally held conception is, namely, to be sought in the insight into the necessary conflict of the determinations of the understanding with themselves. The reflection already referred to is this, to transcend the concrete immediate object and to determine it and separate it. But equally it must transcend these its separating determinations and straightway connect them. It is at the stage of this connecting of the determinations that their conflict emerges. This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason and the rising above those determinations which attains to an insight into their conflict is the great negative step towards the true Notion of reason. But the insight, when not thorough–going, commits the mistake of thinking that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself; it does not recognize that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them. Cognition, instead of taking from this stage the final step into the heights, has fled from the unsatisfactoriness of the categories of the understanding to sensuous existence, imagining that in this it possesses what is solid and self–consistent. But on the other hand, since this knowledge is self–confessedly knowledge only of appearances, the unsatisfactoriness of the latter is admitted, but at the same time presupposed: As much as to say that admittedly, we have no proper knowledge of things–in–themselves but we do have a proper knowledge of them within the sphere of appearances, as if, so to speak, only the kind of objects were different, and one kind, namely things–in–themselves, did not fall within the scope of our knowledge but the other kind did, phenomena did.” Hegel, “Introduction: General Notion of Logic,” Hegel’s Science of Logic, Arnold Vincent Miller, translator & Forward by John Niemeyer Findlay, New York, 1976, 46–46. [1969] See: Hegel, “Einleitung,” Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Nürnberg, 1812, v–vii.

As the general notion of logic, cognition transcends the concrete immediate object and determines and separates it, and equally transcends its separating determinations and straightway connects them. At the stage of this connecting of the determinations conflict emerges. This connecting activity of reflection belongs in itself to reason, while the rising above those determinations is the insight into their conflict, which is the great negative step towards the true Notion of reason. The insight when not thorough–going commits the mistake of thinking that it is reason which is in contradiction with itself; it does not recognize that the contradiction is precisely the rising of reason above the limitations of the understanding and the resolving of them. Because of his Kantio–Hegelianism, Frederick Beiser does not therefore understand that the genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelianism does not explain the existence of evil by showing it to be necessary for the realization of the end of history. Reason, in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism, rises above the limitations of the understanding and resolves them as the true Notion, within the general conception of logic. Shall we therefore hold that the realm of philosophy and world history is beyond the self–determination of reason and the general conception of logic in the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of absolute idealism? We most certainly shall not espouse the lost cause of Kantio–Hegelianism: We shall meticulously avoid the camp of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, which is condemned to rot upon the dunghill of history.

See: “Perhaps some commentators think that the non– or anti– or a–metaphysical character of Hegel’s ‘absolute idealism’ (as he himself calls it) can be proven by consistently translating it into twentieth–century language that they deem free from metaphysical assumptions. If such a transposition succeeded without losing essential elements of Hegel’s texts, their account would perhaps corroborate their thesis. If, on the contrary, Hegel’s thought cannot be captured in this transposition, their commentaries are obviously partial or unilateral. Hegel himself would call them untrue. If a partial reading is presented as equivalent to the whole, it is even false. But if the logic, as the heart of Hegel’s thinking, is metaphysical, why are certain commentators so attracted to it that they spend considerable energy reshaping it into their own image?” Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, 2001, 1–52, 6.

The mortal opposition of Pure Hegelianism to modern irrationalism is found in the American Idealism of Washington and the rise of Global political and economic rationality in the world of today.

49. In the last decade of his life, the old Hegel published nothing really new, apart from increasing the size of the Encyclopedia, and he made no departure from the system of Pure Hegelianism. Hegel’s intellectual powers waned in the political and theological strife of Berlin:

“The writer must content himself with what he has been allowed to achieve under the pressure of circumstances, the unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time, and the haunting doubt whether, amid the loud clamor of the day and the deafening babble of opinion … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought.” Hegel (1831) in Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, “Biographical Note: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1770–1831,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, vol. 46, Chicago, 1960, v–vi.

Old Hegel complains that “he must content himself with what he has been allowed to achieve under the pressure of circumstances, the unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time,” and he is haunted by the “doubt whether, amid the loud clamor of the day and the deafening babble of opinion … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought.”

The “deafening babble of opinion” is the work of the sophists, the Kantian school at Berlin, the followers of Fichte. The “loud clamor of the day” is the religious and political strife resultant from the French revolution and Napoléon. The “pressure of circumstances” is Hegel’s political and administrative work at the university, while the “unavoidable waste caused by the extent and many–sidedness of the interests of the time” is Hegel’s neglect of intense intellectual work under the burdens of academic lectures. The “haunting doubt whether … there is left any room for sympathy with the passionless stillness of a science of pure thought,” are the words of an intellectual leader whose school is beginning to exhibit the first symptoms of the coming upheaval.

These words of the old Hegel at the height of his academic and political power, exhausted and haunted by doubt in the twilight of his intellectual life, are lifted from the 1831 preface to the second edition of the Great Logic (Zweite Ausgabe, Stuttgart & Tübingen, Cotta, 1832), which was published in the very influential Berlin editions of 1833 and 1841, after the death of Hegel, so that the true significance of their meaning is obscured by the many modifications, additions and notes of Hegel’s students and editors: The genuine Hegelian philosophy of the Originalausgabe contains the diamond purity of Hegelianism, — the rational germ of Hegel’s “freshness and power.”

See: “One man has understood me, and even he has not.” Hegel in William Wallace, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, New York, 1911, 200–207, 204.

See: “It is a mistake to regard his [Hegel’s] philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.”
Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, 1927, 10.

See also: “It is the Transcendental Deduction that has played the most important part in the arguments of the English Kantio–Hegelians.” Andrew Seth Pringle–Pattison in Hiralal Haldar, Essays in Philosophy, Calcutta, 1920, 6.

See also: “The problem as to whether or not and to what extent Hegel succeeded in overcoming Kant’s ‘thing–in–itself’ is a separate question. At any rate, this was his aim. In a metaphysics of the Absolute Spirit, realities beyond the realm of knowledge, in so far as the ‘thing–in–itself’ represents such realities, cannot exist.” Richard Hoenigswald, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, New York, 1947, 267–291, 270.

See finally: “Hegel’s presence in twentieth–century philosophy is overwhelming … Was Hegel too complicated, or too much of a Janus, to be understood in a non–unilateral, dialectical, rational way?” Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, 2001, 1–49.

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Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem Handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, Vierte Auflage, Band 124a, Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag 1967). [1955]

Henning, Leopold Dorotheus von, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1840), v–viii.

Henning, Leopold Dorotheus von, Hrsg., “Vorwort des Herausgebers,” Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1843), v–viii.

Hoenigswald, Richard, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, (New York: Philosophical Library, 1947), 267–291.

Kant, Immanuel, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960), vii–250.

Kant, Immanuel, Kant’s Principles of Politics Including His Essay on Perpetual Peace: A Contribution to Political Science, William Hastie, translator & editor, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1891).

Kant, Immanuel, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: A Commemoration of the Centenary of Its First Publication, 2 vols., Friedrich Max Müller, translator, (London: Macmillan, 1881).

Knox, Thomas Malcolm, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, (Chicago: William Benton, 1967), 298–303.

Locke, John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, New Edition, 2 vols., (New York: Valentine Seaman, 1824). [1690]

Longuenesse, Béatrice, Hegel et la critique de la métaphysique: Étude sur la doctrine de l’essence, (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1981).

Mach, Ernst, “Author’s Preface to the Seventh German Edition,” The Science of Mechanics: A Critical and Historical Account of Its Development, Supplement to the Third English Edition Containing the Author’s Additions to the Seventh German Edition, Philip Edward Bertrand Jourdain, translator and annotator, (Chicago and London: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1915), ix–xii. [1912]

Mach, Ernst, Die Mechanik in ihrer Enwickelung: Historisch–Kritisch Dargestellt, Siebente verbesserte und vermehrte Auflage, (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1912).

Machiavelli, Niccolò di Bernardo dei, Machiavel commenté par Non Buonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans le carrosse de Buonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 18 juin 1815, Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), éditeur & Napoléon Bonaparte, traduction et commentaire, (Paris: H. Nicolle, à la Librairie Stéréotype, 1816).

Machiavelli, Niccolò di Bernardo dei, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, (Oxford: Humphrey Milford, 1921).

Manchester, William, The Last Lion: Winston Spencer Churchill: Alone, 1932–1940, vol. 2, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1988).

Massie, Robert Kinloch, Nicholas and Alexandra, (New York: Atheneum, 1967).

McGrath, Sean J. & Joseph Carew, “Introduction: What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 1–19.

Morell, John Daniel, Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century, 2nd edition, 1 volume edition, (New York: Robert Carter, 1848). [1846]

Mourlon, Frédéric, Répétitions écrites sur le code civil contenant l’exposé des principes généraux leurs motifs et la solution des questions théoriques, 11e édition, revue et mise au courant par Charles Demangeat, Tome premier, (Paris: Garniers Frères, Libraires–Éditeurs, 1880). [1846]

Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor Basilius, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001).

Peperzak, Adriaan Theodoor Basilius, “Introduction,” Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001), 1–52.

Otto Pöggeler, “Editorial Introduction,” Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right, Heidelberg 1817–1818, With Additions From the Lectures of 1818–1819, G.W.F. Hegel & Peter Wannenmann, J. Michael Stewart & Peter C. Hodgson, editors and translators, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Friedrich Hogemann, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme, Hans Christian Lucas, Kurt Rainer Meist & Hans Josef Schneider, Staff of the Hegel Archives editors, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–43. [1983 & 1995]

Russell, Bertrand Arthur William, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” History of Western Philosophy and its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1947), 757–773. [1946]

Sandars, Thomas Collett, “Hegel’s Philosophy of Right,” Oxford Essays, Contributed by Members of the University, (London: John W. Parker and Son, 1855), 213–250.

Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, Plato or Protagoras? Being a Critical Examination of the Protagoras Speech in the Theaetetus with Some Remarks Upon Error, (Oxford: Basil H. Blackwell, 1908).

Schiller, Ferdinand Canning Scott, Studies in Humanism, (London: Macmillan, 1907).

Spiegelberg, Herbert, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2 vols., (Dordrecht: Springer, 1960).

St. Aubyn, Giles, Edward VII: Prince and King, (New York: Atheneum, 1979).

Stern, Robert, “Hegel, British Idealism, and the Curious Case of the Concrete Universal,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 15.1(2007): 115–153.

Wallace, William, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopædia Britannica, 11th edition, vol. 13, (New York: Encyclopædia Britannica Inc., 1911), 200–207.

Wallace, William, Kant, (Edinburgh: William Blackwood & Sons, 1911).

HEGEL’S ORIGINALAUSGABE 1807–1821

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, System der Wissenschaft: Phänomenologie des Geistes, Erster Theil, (Bamberg und Würzburg: Joseph Anton Goebhardt, 1807).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1812).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik — Die Lehre vom Wesen, Erster Band, Zweites Buch, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1813).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die subjektive Logik — oder Lehre vom Begriff, Zweiter Band, (Nürnberg: Johann Leonhard Schrag, 1816).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, (Heidelberg: August Osswald’s Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1817).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, zum Gebrauch fur seine Vorlesungen, (Berlin: Nicolaischen Buchhandlung, 1821).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: ORIGINALAUSGABE 1827–1832 (ZWEITE & DRITTE AUSGABE)

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Zweite Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Druck und Verlag von August Osswald, 1827). [1817]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, zum Gebrauch seiner Vorlesungen, Dritte Ausgabe, (Heidelberg: Verwaltung des Oswald’schen Verlags (C.F. Winter), 1830). [1817 & 1827]

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Wissenschaft der Logik: Die objektive Logik, Erster Band, Zweite Ausgabe, (Stuttgart und Tübingen: J.F. Cotta’schen Buchhandlung, 1832). [1812]

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1832–1845 BERLIN WERKE (ERSTE AUFLAGE)

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Philosophische Abhandlungen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Erster (1) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Zweiter (2) Band, Johann Schulze, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik — Die objektive Logik — Die Lehre vom Seyn: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Dritter (3) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik — Die objektive Logik — Die Lehre vom Wesen: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, Erste Auflage, Vierter (4) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Wissenschaft der Logik — Die subjektive Logik — Die Lehre vom Begriff: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Fünfter (5) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Logik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erster Theil, Erste Auflage, Sechster (6) Band, Leopold Dorotheus von Henning, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1840).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Vorlesungen über die Naturphilosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1842).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Encyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse — Die Philosophie des Geistes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Erste Auflage, Siebenter (7) Band, Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1845).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Achter (8) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Auflage, Neunter (9) Band, Eduard Gans, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1837).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Erste Theil, Erste Abtheilung, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Zweiter Theil, Zweite Abtheilung, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Aesthetik: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, Dritter Theil, Dritte Abtheilung, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Zehnter (10) Band, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1838).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Elfter (11) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, nebst einer Schrift uber die Beweise vom Daseyn Gottes: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Zwolfter (12) Band, Philipp Konrad Marheinecke, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1832).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Driezehnter (13) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Vierzehnter (14) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1833).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Dritter Band), Erste Auflage, Fünfzehnter (15) Band, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1836).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Erster Band), Erste Auflage, Sechzehnter (16) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1834).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Vermischte Schriften: Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Werke, Vollständige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten: D. Ph. Marheineke, D. J. Schulze, D. Ed. Gans, D. Lp. v. Henning, D. H. Hotho, D. K. Michelet, D. F. Förster, (Zweiter Band), Erste Auflage, Siebenzehnter (17) Band, Friedrich Förster & Ludwig Boumann, Hrsg., (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker & Humblot, 1835).

HEGEL BIBLIOGRAPHY: VORLESUNGEN AUSGEWÄHLTE NACHSCHRIFTEN UND MANUSKRIPTE 1983–2007

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (1): Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft Heidelberg 1817–1818, Mit Nachträgen aus der Vorlesung 1818–1819, — Nachgeschrieben von P. Wannenmann, Claudia Becker, Wolfgang Bonsiepen, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Kurt Rainer Meist, Friedrich Hogemann, Hans Josef Schneider, Walter Jaeschke, Christoph Jamme & Hans Christian Lucas, Herausgegeben, Mit einer Einleitung von Otto Pöggeler, Band 1, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (2): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Kunst, Berlin 1823, — Nachgeschrieben von H.G. Hotho, Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, Hrsg., Band 2, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1998).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (3): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 1, Einleitung, Der Begriff der Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 3, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (4): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 2, Die bestimmte Religion, in zwei Bänden: Textband (a), Anhang (b), Mit einem Begriffs– Realien– und Personenverzeichnis zum Gesamtwerk, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 4, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (5): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, Teil 3, Die vollendete Religion, Walter Jaeschke, Hrsg., Band 5, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1984).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (6): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 1, Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie, Orientalische Philosophie, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 6, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (7): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 2, Griechische Philosophie, I, Thales bis Kyniker, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 7, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1989).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (8): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 3, Griechische Philosophie, II, Plato bis Proklos, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 8, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (9): Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, Teil 4, Philosophie des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, Pierre Garniron & Walter Jaeschke, Herausgegeben, Band 9, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1986).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (10): Vorlesungen über die Logik, Berlin 1831, — Nachgeschrieben von Karl Hegel, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Herausgegeben unter Mitarbeit von Hans–Christian Lucas, Band 10, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2001).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (11): Vorlesungen über Logik und Metaphysik, Heidelberg 1817, — Mitgeschrieben von Franz Anton Good, Karen Gloy, Hrsg., Band 11, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1992).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (12): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Berlin 1822–1823, — Nachschriften von Karl Gustav Julius von Griesheim, Heinrich Gustav Hotho & Friedrich Carl Hermann Victor von Kehler, Karl Brehmer, Karl–Heinz Ilting & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 12, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (13): Vorlesung über die Philosophie des Geistes, Berlin 1827–1828, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Eduard Erdmann & Ferdinand Walter, Franz Hespe & Burkhard Tuschling, Herausgegeben, Band 13, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1994).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (14): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie des Rechts, Berlin 1819–1820, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Emil Angehrn, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 14, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2000).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (15): Vorlesungen über philosophische Enzyklopädie, Nürnberg 1812–1813, — Nachschriften von Christian Samuel Meinel & Julius Friedrich Heinrich Abegg, Udo Rameil, Hrsg., Band 15, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (16): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1819–1820, — Nachgeschrieben von Johann Rudolf Ringier, Martin Bondeli & Hoo Nam Seelmann, Herausgegeben, Band 16, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2002).

Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Vorlesungen, Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (17): Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Natur, Berlin 1825–1826, — Nachgeschrieben von Heinrich Wilhelm Dove, Karol Bal, Gilles Marmasse, Thomas Posch & Klaus Vieweg, Herausgegeben, Band 17, (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2007).

HEGEL’S RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY 1821–2013

1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, [=Originalausgabe] (Berlin: Nicolaische Buchhandlung, 1821).

2. Eduard Gans, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, Hrsg., von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Werke, Vollstandige Ausgabe durch einem Verein von Freunden des Verewigten, Band 8], (Berlin: Verlag von Duncker und Humblot, 1833). [Zweite Auflage, Berlin 1840; Dritte Auflage, Berlin 1854]

3. Gerardus Johannes Petrus Josephus Bolland, Herausgegeber, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts mit einer Einleitung, (Leiden: A.H. Adriani, 1902).

4. Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911). [Zweite Auflage, Leipzig 1921; Dritte Auflage, Leipzig 1930]

5. Alfred Baeumler, Herausgegeber, Hegels Schriften zur Gesellschaftsphilosophie: Teil I, Philosophie des Geists und Rechtsphilosophie, [=Die Herdflamme, Sammlung der gesellschaftswissenschaftlichen Grundwerke aller Zeiten und Volker, Band 11], (Jena: Verlag von Gustav Fischer, 1927).

6. Hermann Glockner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschat im Grundrisse, Mit einem Vorwort von Eduard Gans, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Jubiläumsausgabe in zwanzig Bänden, Auf Grund des von Ludwig Boumann, Friedrich Förster, Eduard Gans, Karl Hegel, Leopold von Henning, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, Philipp Marheineke, Karl Ludwig Michelet, Karl Rosenkranz und Johannes Karl Hartwig Schultze besorgten Originaldruckes im Faksimileverfahren, Siebenter Band], (Stuttgart–Bad Cannstatt: Fromann, 1928).

7. Johannes Hoffmeister, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Randbemerkungen in seinem handexemplar der Rechtsphilosophie, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Sämtliche Werke, Neu kritische Ausgabe, Band XII], (Hamburg: Verlag Felix Meiner, 1955).

8. Karl Löwith & Manfred Riedel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Studienausgabe in 3 Bänden, Ausgewählt und eingeleitet von Karl Löwith und Manfred Riedel, Band 2] (Frankfurt und Hamburg: Fischer Verlag, 1968).

9. Berhard Lakebrink, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit einer Einleitung, Hrsg., von Berhard Lakebrink, (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1970).

10. Eva Moldenhauer & Karl Markus Michel, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen und den mündlichen Zusätzen, [=G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden, Band 7], (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

11. Helmut Reichelt, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, mit Hegels eigenhändigen Notizen in seinem Handexemplar und den Mündlichen Zusätzen, (Frankfurt–Berlin–Wien: Ullstein, 1972).

12. Karl–Heinz Ilting, Herausgegeber, Die “Rechtsphilosophie” von 1820 mit Hegels Vorlesungnotizen 1821–1825, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Vorlesungen uber Rechtsphilosophie, 1818–1831: Edition und Kommentar in sechs Banden von Karl–Heinz Ilting, Zweiter Band], (Stuttgard–Bad Cannstatt: Frommann–Holzboog, 1974).

13. Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeber, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts oder Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse, nach der Ausgabe von Eduard Gans herausgegeben und mit einer Einleitung versehen von Hermann Klenner, (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1981).

14. Klaus Grotsch, Elisabeth Weisser–Lohmann & Hermann Klenner, Herausgegeben, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Verfasser des Anhangs Hermann Klenner, [=Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Gesammelte Werke, Band 14, 1–3], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2009–2011).

15. Horst D. Brandt, Herausgegeber, Philosophische Bibliothek: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Band 638, [Auf der Grundlage der Edition des Textes in den Gesammelten Werken, Band 14], (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 2013).

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