THE KANTIAN PHILOSOPHY
Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1905–1908)
The philosophy [die Weltanschauung] of Immanuel Kant arises out of the keenest dissection of the human intellect, and of its relation to surrounding nature: Is it possible to place a clear conception of it before a lay public not previously prepared for its reception?¹ Can a critical theory of recognition [kritische Erkenntnistheorie] be set out in such a way as to be generally intelligible? I hardly think so. And yet the wish not to leave a man of Kant s importance to be the monopoly of a caste of the learned, but to make him a most precious possession of all cultured people, is so well justified, that it is beginning to spring up in many directions: Already a number of good men and true have, each according to his own manner, kept this aim before them and done much valuable work. Kant had said that he was born too soon, and that a century must pass before his morning should arise. That day is now dawning. It is no mere coincidence that the first complete and accurate edition of the various writings and letters of Kant should have begun to appear in the year 1900; the new century needs the protection of this strong intellect, that was able to say of its own philosophy [Weltanschauung] that it wrought a revolution in the method of thought analogous to that of Copernicus in physics. Today there are some few who know, and many who suspect, that this philosophy [Weltanschauung] is destined to form a main pillar of the culture of the future. Kant’s method of thinking is a shield against the two opposite dangers the dogmatism of priestcraft and the superstition [4] of science; at the same time it braces us for the self–sacrificing fulfilment of the duties of life.
… I undertook to investigate Kant’s matter as a question of style; so far as theoretical reason is concerned I think that this purpose has been adequately fulfilled: By means of positive analyses of its contents, supplemented by negative delimitations, we have arrived at a more and more precise characterisation of the domain of transcendental philosophy.² The domain of transcendental philosophy has characterised itself more and more precisely. For this we have to thank Kant’s personality. One last task remains before us; the endeavour to extend the investigation to practical reason, that is to say, to seek for an answer to the question: How does Kant fashion [293] his matter so as to arrive at final scientific results as to freedom, moral law, God and religion?
That it was practice and not theory which from the outset formed Kant’s aim just as it had been Plato’s, you already know: That by itself suffices to distinguish him from almost all philosophers: But you also know that it was precisely this passionate impulse to render practical service to humanity, which compelled him to devote the greater part of his life to the theoretical and systematic critique of recognition. This law which compelled Kant, equally binds me in these lectures. Kant desired to be a teacher for the people: In his peaceful self–controlled nature there lay unnoticed, I dare not say hidden, — for all dissimulation lay far from him — a bold revolutionary spirit; when he attacked his critical work, he summed up his philosophical aims into these words:
“The special intention is the abolition of all pedantry in things which touch the nature of the soul, the future, and the origin of all things.”³
The abolition of pedantry, the striking off of the fetters from consciously free, reasonable, practical thought! that is what he desired. And now precisely in the interests of this release he had to plunge into this deep critique of human reason, he had to watch with such “pedantic” exactitude that no loophole should be left open for the evil spirit of our race, ever in ambush insidiously whispering dogmas into our ears, and in that way he himself fell a victim to the Pedants and hair–splitters — the whole guild of them — and that means to misunderstanding, to distortion, to caricature, whilst the living men whom he had in view throughout his life s work only gathered that he was the most difficult, the most inaccessible, the most inconsistent of all thinkers, whom no two professional men explained alike. These are things which begin to give a higher meaning to the word fate. To be wrecked not upon the rock of insufficiency, but on the best that can [294] be achieved by man: That is the secret of the tragedy of this noble life. For the feeble echo which reached the ears of us laymen — the formula of the categorical imperative, and in some measure also the dark idea that Kant had in his latter days undertaken an official vindication of God, freedom, and immortality, is partly mere phrase, partly the disgusting endeavour to cast contempt upon great life–thoughts. It is and must remain to all eternity impossible to understand a single word of Kant’s moral teaching, of his critique of practical reason, unless we have assimilated the fundamental thoughts of his transcendental philosophy, and that can only be attained by the study of the critique of theoretical reason. We may confidently assert that the majority of mankind see nothing more in Kant s categorical imperative than a sort of drill sergeant’s lesson, — obey without budging. That was what made the popularity of Schopenhauer’s shallow joke, so full of misunderstanding, about “wooden iron,” “wooden leg,” and the like. Thus it is that we are cut off, separated from Kant. We hold centenaries in his honour, but of his personality, of his philosophy we know little or nothing. It was in order to break this ban that I have felt myself bound to lay all stress upon his theory and the critique of nature; for it is here that the key to understanding lies: Had I only kept the personality in view I should have followed another and an easier road: But the knowledge of the personality should serve as introduction to the work. If the Copernican transformation has taken place, if you have really grasped the thought of the transcendental, then it will be child’s play for you to understand Kant’s doctrine of freedom, morals, religion, and God, and he himself will be a better guide than any one else could be. What I propose now to bring forward, therefore, as the final conclusion of our labours, will be a mere bird’s–eye view. Speaking for myself personally, Kant’s school has meant the greatest [295] influence in my life. Renunciation, which is no lack of courage; religion finally purified from superstition; science, the prerogatives of which are indestructibly established, but which is modestly conscious of its own limits: That is the high school of inmost freedom: Here the scales of omnipresent superstition fall from our eyes, — the superstition of history, of the churches, of the philosophies, of the puffed–up vulgar natural history: Here we have room to breathe and rest for thought; we learn to be our own masters, we learn not to fear: At last a philosopher is born to us who does not impose upon us with some non ens, who wishes to prove nothing that is incapable of proof, and does not hold the marsh of empiricism to be the free open sea; here is natural system, conscious art of comprehension, and therewith a philosophy rounded off and perfected on all sides: It is good to live here! “Everything, even that which is the loftiest,” says Kant,⁴ “grows smaller under the hands of men”: But he has achieved that which is most rare, he has made nothing smaller, neither science, nor religion, nor art, neither law nor commandment, neither nature nor freedom. If he everywhere set up boundaries, he at the same time everywhere pulled down barriers; a boundary guards us against the night of confusion: The removal of barriers opens up a free view into what lies beyond: In this way everything grew and was fashioned under his hand. But these are matters which cannot be communicated, they must be worked up, conquered, experienced; only so far, only so far as the outer threshold, can the helping hand give support.
And now, before starting upon any discussion of practical reason and freedom, we must give some attention to a critical buffer–land. As you saw by our last scheme,⁵ looked at from the objective standpoint, which is the standpoint which every simple person first adopts, [296] the Thing and the Ego are opposed to one another. It is true that we have seen in detail that each of these stands in correlation to the other, that is to say, that they are interchangeable. But transcendental philosophy teaches us that we never can take in everything at one glance; we must be one–sided, otherwise we are at a standstill; exact science is the most glorious example of successful one–sidedness; but the man who is worldlywise must, in distinction to all others, be conscious of his one–sidedness, he must be lord over himself. To this end it will be indispensable that we should ask ourselves how Kant looked upon the Thing and the Ego. Here again it is not my purpose to attempt any technical exposition, but only to indicate the style of this order of thought; whoever stands face to face with style without understanding it, no matter how learned and clever he may be, will never succeed in grasping Kant s thoughts at this critical juncture, whereas the man who is familiar with the style, will find everything in Kant comprehensible in itself.
This excursus forms an indispensable link between the two parts of the lecture. It certainly touches an abstract consideration, because we have Kant alone in view, still, it must be my endeavour to force as clear an expression as possible out of the remotest and most unfamiliar thought of the great philosopher, and I hope that it may be a perspicuous, easily grasped scheme, worthy of being remembered and of further consideration. Here too we at the same time obtain as a contribution to our study of the personality the valuable addition of a deep insight into its workshop.
Among Kant s technical terms it is unquestionably the Ding an sich, the Thing in itself, that has achieved the greatest popularity — it is not rare to find it in the comic papers: At the same time we hardly ever find any understanding of what Kant means by it; indeed, it is [297] impossible to understand it without having previously mastered the conception of the transcendental.⁶
ENDNOTES
1. Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), “Immanuel Kant: Introductory,” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 1, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 1–9; 3–4. [1905 & 1908]
See: “Kant had said that he was born too soon, and that a century must pass before his morning should arise. That day is now dawning.”
Chamberlain, Ibidem, 3.
See: “[Kant’s] philosophy makes for a revolution, against which all previous merely political revolutions shrink into insignificant episodes … in the work of this man lies the greatest revolutionary power of the world’s history … that would at last bring about, not merely an outward political revolution, but a total transformation from within to without.”
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Kant: Science and Religion, With an Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 167–414; 182–338–379. [1905]
See: „Die Weltanschauung Immanuel Kant’s entspringt der scharfsinnigsten Zergliederung des Menschengeistes und seines Verhältnisses zur umgebenden Natur; ist es möglich, einem unvorbereiteten Laienpublikum eine klare Vorstellung von ihr beizubringen? Kann kritische Erkenntnistheorie gemeinverständlich dargestellt werden? Ich glaube es nicht. Und doch ist der Wunsch, einen Mann von der Bedeutung Kant’s nicht einer Gelehrtenkaste zum Alleinbesitz zu überlassen, sondern ihn allen Gebildeten zu einem kostbarsten Eigentum zu machen, so berechtigt, dass er sich vielerorten zu regen beginnt; auch hat bereits eine Anzahl tüchtiger Männer, jeder in seiner Art, dies Ziel ins Auge gefasst und manches Gute zustande gebracht. Kant hatte gesagt, er sei zu früh gekommen, sein Morgen werde erst nach einem Jahrhundert aufgehen. Jetzt dämmert dieser Morgen. Nicht Zufall ist es, wenn die erste vollständige und diplomatisch genaue Ausgabe der sämtlichen Schriften und Briefe Kant’s im Jahre 1900 zu erscheinen begann; das neue Jahrhundert bedarf dieses starken Schutzgeistes, der von seiner Weltanschauung urteilen durfte, sie bewirke „eine der Copernikanischen analoge Umänderung der Denkart“. Heute wissen es Einige und ahnen es Viele, dass diese Weltanschauung einen Grundpfeiler der Kultur der Zukunft bilden muss. Kant’s Denken bewahrt vor den beiden entgegengesetzten Gefahren: priesterlichem Dogmatismus und wissenschaftlichem Aberglauben; zugleich stärkt es zur hingehenden Erfüllung der Lebenspflichten.“
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Vorrede,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, München, F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921, 1–8; 3. [1905 & 1908 & 1916]
See: „Kant hatte gesagt, er sei zu früh gekommen, sein Morgen werde erst nach einem Jahrhundert aufgehen. Jetzt dämmert dieser Morgen.“
Chamberlain, Ibidem, 3.
Remarks: We must be wary when reading Redesdale’s English translation of Chamberlain’s Kant, and (1) distinguish meanings attributed to Chamberlain’s words in the English text, from their original German significance found in the first and second editions, which are quite alien to his German Neo–Kantianism (the different British Anglo–Saxon meanings of “philosophy” as opposed to Weltanschauung), the significance of which is otherwise imported from the British Kantio–Hegelianism of Bradley, Bosanquet, McTaggart and so forth, albeit via the prism of popular culture , (2) and also be equally wary of the importation into our twenty–first century interpretation of these English meanings, our hermeneutical baggage inherited from the twentieth century Anglo–American tradition, which in various ways, differs significantly from late nineteenth century Anglo–Saxon philosophy, — in particular, various “epistemological conceptions” which are often deployed to distinguish the latter tradition from the alleged “irrationalism” of the former’s sophistry, i.e., as analytical philosophers like Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein draw oppositions to British Neo–Hegelianism, at the turn of the last century, which are later distinguished, opposed and reconstructed by Russell, Quine, Kripke, Putnam, Goodman, Rorty and so on, and dependent upon the different “meanings” that are given to language and logic. In other words, our interpretation of Chamberlain’s Kant must historically navigate the “logical” fields of semantics, linguistics and semiology, which are themselves historically inscribed within the modern European conception of the transcendent (Transzendentale Logik). The political and economic struggles in central Europe which explode in the Great War are not strictu sensu world historical determinations, but are rather themselves complexifications from greater shocks, — the collapse of European modernity in the fratricidal strife between the Industrial and French revolutions, as the rise of Globalism within the supremacy of American Liberty, the beacon of Western civilization. In the world of today, the Kantian traditions are overcome in the supremacy of Americanism, as the genuine Hegelianism of the rational Hegelian philosophy.
2. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Kant: Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 167–414; 292–339; 293–297. [1905 & 1908]
See: Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, erste Auflage, München, Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1905, 551–767; 660–692.
3. References, II, 6.
4. Rel., xii.
5. See p. 258.
6. See: “[254] Kant’s philosophy is understood by most people as rationalism, and therefore as a pure doctrine of reason, and it is only this view which explains how it is that people are still bold enough to give out Fichte, Schelling, Hegel (the whole development in the direction of Panlogism, of the doctrine of reason as the only truth) — as a direct continuation and amplification of Kant. This is false from top to bottom … [314] We then speak of intellectual perception, and ever since Aristotle’s time there have been plenty of fairy tales to tell of it: Hegel in especial has had much to say about ‘supersensual perception’ … [321] we may also assert, and that is just what Hegel does, that there is a non–sensual form of perception, that is to say, that there is a form of understanding which is so constituted that without any intermediary of receptivity it perceives things by mere thought, by mere [322] spontaneity … [453] The sublime conception of the breath of life as the creative agent of the universe gradually dissolved even the world by interpreting the naïve mythological equation of ‘Thought’ with ‘Being,’ which exists exclusively in thought alone. Hegel made very great efforts to impose a similar system of philosophy during the last century.” Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 254–314–321–322–453. [1905]
See: “[253] Kant reveals, and systematically investigates, reason in nature and nature in reason. With this it is proved that the transcendental method really lies entirely beyond this current distinction into subjective and objective, indeed so utterly beyond it that every continuous one–sided insistence, on one or the other standpoint, falsifies the peculiar fashion of this philosophy so as to make it unrecognisable … [254] When he [Kant] is minded critically to investigate the organisation of reason, he turns to nature: this is at once in itself the simplest and most beautiful example of the transcendental method … [257] We should rather say that Kant’s transcendental method, his conception of the domain of scientific philosophy, is neither subjective nor objective, neither reason nor nature; it is on the hither side of both; it sees the object only in the subject and the subject only in the object. But it is essentially impossible for us men to remain permanently upon the same point in the balance: In order to come to [258] an understanding we must hold either to a subjective or to an objective mode of expression, and that is why Kant’s system may be understood objectively (empirically) as well as subjectively (rationalistically) … [282] For the comprehension of Kant’s transcendental method in its specific nature a comparison with Newton may render good service. It will be remembered with what a stroke of genius Newton understood how to extract from a phenomenon what made it capable of being grasped and elaborated by means of theoretical science … [360] Transcendental philosophy has, however, shown you with detailed exactitude why such arguments do not hold good: Psychologically, freedom is of course completely incomprehensible, and to designate it as something belonging to the nature of the soul is a mere phrase; on the other hand, the fact of freedom finds its place in transcendental method and architectonics, it finds its connection with the other phenomena of reason, and so far also its comprehensibility: It is neither more nor less sure and comprehensible than the law of gravitation in theoretical science.” Chamberlain, Ibidem, 253–254–257–258–282–360. [Italics added]
See: “Transcendental philosophy is the general conception by critical observation in conjunction with hypothetical architectonics of the complicated system of the combinations which reciprocally condition one another. It does not touch special men and special things; it is not biological: It is not historical: It differs entirely from logic (cf. R.V. 61); neither is it speculative and dogmatic; least of all is it psychological. It only establishes scientifically and firmly those objective conditions without which there could be no world and no reason, and consequently also no recognition. And in doing this it erects everywhere the true defining landmarks and tears down those that are false and conventional.”
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Kant: Science and Religion, With an Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, London/New York/Toronto, John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914, 167–414; 292. [1905 & 1908]: “Transscendentalphilosophie ist die durch kritische Beobachtung, gepaart mit hypothetischer Architektonik, gewonnene Gesamtvorstellung des ganzen verwickelten Systems dieser sich gegenseitig bedingenden Verknüpfungen. Sie betrifft nicht besondere Menschen und besondere Dinge; sie ist nicht biologisch; sie ist nicht historisch; sie ist etwas ganz Anderes als Logik (vgl. namentlich r. V. 61 unten); ebensowenig ist sie spekulativ und dogmatisch; am allerwenigsten ist sie psychologisch. Sondern sie stellt lediglich die objektiven Bedingungen wissenschaftlich fest, ohne welche es keine Welt und keine Vernunft und folglich auch kein Erkennen geben würde. Und indem sie das tut, richtet sie überall die rechten Grenzpfeiler auf und reisst die falschen, hergekommenen nieder.” Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Kant (Wissenschaft und Religion) mit einem Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, erste Auflage, München, Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1905, 551–767; 660. [Italics added] — Editor
HOUSTON STEWARD CHAMBERLAIN: SELECT KANT BIBLIOGRAPHY
First Edition: erste Ausgabr
Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927), Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, erste Auflage, (München: Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1905).
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Kant (Wissenschaft und Religion) mit einem Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, erste Auflage, (München: Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1905), 551–767.
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, erste Auflage, (München: Verlagsanstalt F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1905), 551–767; 660–692.
Second Edition: zweite Ausgabe
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, zweite Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1908). [1905]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Vorwort zur neuen Ausgabe,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, zweite Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1908), xi. [1905]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Vorrede zur ersten Auflage,” Immanuel Kant:Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, zweite Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1908), 1–10. [1905]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Kant (Wissenschaft und Religion) mit einem Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, zweite Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1908), 551–879. [1905]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, zweite Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1908). [1905]
Third Edition: dritte Ausgabe
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, dritte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1916). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, dritte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1916). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Kant (Wissenschaft und Religion) mit einem Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, dritte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1916). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, dritte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1916). [1905 & 1908]
Fourth Edition: vierte Ausgabe
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921). [1905 & 1908 & 1916]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Vorwort zur vierten Auflage,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921), xi. [1905 & 1908 & 1916]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Kant (Wissenschaft und Religion) mit einem Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921), 569–788. [1905 & 1908 & 1916]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Sechster Vortrag: Exkurs über das Ding an sich,” Immanuel Kant: Die Persönlichkeit als Einführung in das Werk, vierte Auflage, (München: F. Bruckmann, A.–G., 1921), 680–712. [1905 & 1908 & 1916]
English Edition
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, 2 vols., John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 1, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Immanuel Kant: Introductory,” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 1, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914), 1–9. [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914). [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Kant: Science and Religion, With an Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914), 167–414. [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Kant: Excursus on the ‘Thing in Itself,’” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914), 167–414; 292–339. [1905 & 1908]
Houston Stewart Chamberlain, “Notes: Notes to Kant,” Immanuel Kant: A Study and a Comparison with Goethe, Leonardo da Vinci, Bruno, Plato and Descartes, vol. 2, John Lees, translator & Algernon Bertram Freeman–Mitford (1st Baron Redesdale/Lord Redesdale, 1837–1916), introduction, (London/New York/Toronto: John Lane/The Bodley Head, 1914), 415–510; 493–510. [1905 & 1908]
