With Kant in one pocket and Hegel in the other, I walk towards the sun

CHARLES MARGRAVE TAYLOR’S SCHOOL

Canadian Academia Under the Québec Regime in Ottawa

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2019)

The philosophy of Globalism is the doctrine that there is a center of gravity in the world … the error of philosophical Globalism is its social conception of the human condition (la condition humaine sociale), its view of the evolution of social phenomena is defective, and thereby constantly leads Globalism to reduce everything to a specious unity, which, since false and without structure, is Hegel’s night wherein all cows are black … this philosophy only pretended that the world is rational … twentieth–century totalitarianism, in other words, sublates everything into an ultimate end. Charles Margrave Taylor, 1964¹

The wars of the French Revolution marked the transition to the nation–state defined by common language and culture … [The United States] have never been nation–states in the European sense. America has succeeded in forming a distinct culture from a polyglot national composition. Henry Kissinger, 1994²

France does not know it, but we are at war against America. Yes, an eternal war, a vital war, an economic war, a war without deaths … apparently. Yes, they are very predatory, the Americans, they are voracious, and they want to rule the world … Our war against America is a secret war, an eternal war, a war apparently without deaths, and yet a war unto death! François Mitterrand, 1995³

What really was Mitterrand’s policy with regards to the emancipation of Eastern Europe, German unification, the disintegration of the USSR, and the redefinition of the European order after the Cold War? Was French diplomacy guided by the ambition, constantly proclaimed from de Gaulle to Mitterrand, to move beyond “Yalta”? … To what extent did France attain its objectives at Cold War’s end, whether in the resolution of the German question, in its relations with Eastern Europe and with the USSR, in the relaunching of European construction, in the redefinition of transatlantic relations or in the establishment of a new pan–European architecture? Frédéric Bozo, 2009⁴

INTRODUCTION

Under the Québec Regime in Ottawa 1968–2006, when Canada is ruled by Québécocrats for nearly a half–century except for one year under Kim Campbell, Joe Clark and John Turner, the Provincial Legislative Assemblies of Canada are subjected to the political and economic interference and domination of the Québécocracy, i.e., Québécification, namely, the political parties in every province are slowly and covertly infiltrated by Québécocrats from the already Québécified federal political parties, especially the Liberal Party of Canada under Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his entourage, but also the Conservative Party of Canada under Brian Mulroney, and the New Democratic Party of Canada under David Lewis: This movement of Québécification is continuous and totalizing, finally engulfing every provincial government across Canada, except Alberta.

Once completed, this political and economic interference and domination leads directly to the Québécocentralization (centralisation) of Canada, especially through the Québécocentrification of the provincial public educational systems, in schools, universities and institutions of higher learning (in the private sector, there is the Québécocentrification of our media): These organizations are ruthlessly and systematically infiltrated by puppets of the Québécocracy, especially at their senior–most administrative levels, — academic bureaucrats, all of whom are exorbitantly remunerated for their services, swallowing entire academic budgets. From out of the clash of ruling classes, arises a generation of idéologues, “academic scholars,” whose main function is to replace the narrative of the old British Imperialist ruling class (imperial federalism) with another narrative, the Québécocentric “conception” of Canada, based upon the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, politically and economically implanted in francophone Canada by the followers of Louis–Joseph Papineau and Louis Riel, later juridically and academically institutionalized by Pierre–Basile Mignault, and then inherited by the Québec regime from Wilfrid Laurier and Louis St. Laurent, through the agencies of Jean Lesage, — updated and implemented across Canada by Trudeau, Mulroney, Chrétien and Martin, in the political and economic version established and propagated by Charles Margrave Taylor and his school, resultant in Canadian regionalism comprehended as multiculturalisme (Québécocentric pluralism), in stark contradistinction to a “distinct culture from a polyglot national composition” (Henry Kissinger).

In the Québécification of Canada, the Québécocrats are assisted by the degenerate ruling classes of Great Britain which brought the British Empire to its knees, the intellectual offspring of David Lloyd George and Neville Chamberlain, especially at the Home Office and Whitehall, reorganized under Clement Attlee, and re–energized under Harold Wilson: The British “anti–imperialist” ruling classes will be greatly remunerated for their services, notably with the construction of British rail infrastructure by the Bombardier Corporation and Air Canada purchases of Airbus planes (manufactured in France and the United Kingdom), as well as Canadian pension fund and public sector investments, not to mention lucrative federal military contracts for ships and submarines, and a myriad of other mortally corrupt schemes, — subsidized by the generous taxpayers of South central Ontario, under the thumb of Québécocrats in Ottawa and Queen’s Park.

The Gaullist ruling classes of France, whether as left–wing (Mitterrand), centrist or right–wing, liberal or conservative, are the main backers of the Québécocracy:

“[4] Careful investigation leads to the discovery of more and more French diplomats, politicians, and state officials active in the cause of Québec separatism during the past thirty–five years … [5] By 1967, when de Gaulle made his notorious fourth visit to Québec on 23–26 July, he had already worked out a general plan of attack … Having launched a cold war campaign in Québec, de Gaulle then turned his attention to the smaller French–speaking community of Acadians in the Maritime provinces … there was no mistaking his [General de Gaulle’s] hostility to the Canadian confederation … [6] the two world wars of this century had the strongest influence [7] on the Gaullist mind. But behind their impact lies the imperial tradition established by Napoléon, and followed by his nephew, Napoléon III who ruled the Second Empire … [11] Political movements for the independence, or sovereignty, of Québec can be traced back into the 1950s, but the first with any permanence and influence was the Rassemblement pour l’Indépendence Nationale (RIN), established in September 1960. Its founders were Raymond Barbeau, who in 1957 had launched a similar but short–lived movement called the Alliance Laurentienne … they worked to spread the idea that Québec ought to become an independent republic, ‘free, French and democratic’ … [13] By 1960, when de Gaulle made his visit to Canada, the Lesage liberals, the RIN, and other nationalists were forming a neo–nationalist movement … [14] The neo–nationalist were typical of what has become known as the Quiet Revolution … in its narrowest meaning the term applies to a series of reforms carried out by the Lesage government … when Duplessis died, Québec was seized with an outburst of liberal and national sentiments that led to changes so profound that they may justly be described as revolutionary. Educated Frenchmen, such as Charles de Gaulle and his staff, were immediately at home amid the liberal and national aspirations of the Quiet Revolution in Québec. Every French republic, even the Fifth, is founded on liberal and nationalist ideas that are an ideological legacy of the French Revolution … [18] De Gaulle’s regime in France and Jean Lesage’s neo–nationalist government in Québec had a common desire to use the social revolution of their time to transform their societies … both were investing or planning — or hoping — to invest in regional development, new factories, electrical and nuclear power plants, airports and seaports, aircraft industries, railway and telephone systems, highways, mass housing projects … De Gaulle for his part saw collaboration as a means for promoting the power and influence of his country and expanding French civilization in the world … the ruling élites in France and Québec found it easy to collaborate in economic development because they were both prepared to act via powerful government leadership.”⁵

The Québécocentrification of Canadian academic circles stumbles over Alberta, and in general is incapable of infiltrating religious institutions and organizations with deep foreign connexions, notably to the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States of America, and especially the Vatican (Ultramontanismo) and Jewish organizations (Zionism).⁶ The political and economic assistance from the French Gaullists and British “anti–imperialists” (Eurocentrisme) comes into varying degrees of conflict over the years with Uncle Sam on the stage of world history, in the Cold War struggle between capitalism and communism.

The beacons of the Québécocentralization of erstwhile English and French Canada are at McGill University and the University of Toronto: The academic circles which gravitate around Charles Margrave Taylor, the Kantio–Hegelian father of Canadian asymmetrical federalism as Québécocentrisme, — “modern Canada.” In Montréal during the 1960s Charles Taylor and Pierre Trudeau first produced their sophistical philosophy at Cité Libre: Nouvelle série (published by the Desmarais Inc.) as the justification of Québécocentrisme for their English and French Canadian audiences. The impure Hegelian roots of the pseudo–Hegelian and anti–Hegelian sophistry of the Kantio–Hegelianism (dialectique de l’action) of Charles Taylor and Pierre Trudeau are found in the Marxist–Leninist tradition of French Existentialism forged in the 1930s and 1940s by the Parisian followers of Joseph Stalin and the Parti communiste français (PCF).⁷ Later in the 1970s, both Trudeau and Taylor will deny these erstwhile affiliations, — as the Eurocommunism of the New Left, Western Marxism and so forth, — but only once they are firmly established in positions of political and academic power.

Charles Taylor’s relationship with Pierre Trudeau at Cité Libre ensured that the political and economic complexifications which brought the latter to power, also uplifted Taylor and his school to the heights of academic supremacy. Charles Margrave Taylor, as an editor (rédacteur) of Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, sat on the editorial board (Comité de rédaction) of the magazine from August 1964 until February 1966 (some 18 months), alongside Maurice Blain and Jacques Tremblay, under the directorship of Jean Pellerin: Charles Taylor was therefore an influential figure at Cité Libre: Nouvelle série during the rise of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the birth of the Québécocracy, especially in Ottawa. Charles Taylor’s influence does not cover merely 18 months, but begins at least in May 1962 and lasts until February 1966, a grand total of nearly 50 months (some 46), which spans roughly 4 years of intellectual activity (Charles Taylor’s direct influence at Cité Libre probably lasts at least five years, if not longer): During Charles Taylor’s time at Cité Libre, Pierre Trudeau’s 1950s version of politique fonctionnelle is upgraded in two important articles “Pour une politique fonctionnelle” and “Pour une politique fonctionnelle: L’agriculture au Québec,” published in May 1964 and July 1965: The first article is published by Albert Breton, Raymond Breton, Claude Bruneau, Yvon Gauthier, Marc Lalonde, Maurice Pinard and Pierre Elliott Trudeau. The second article is published by Albert Breton, Claude Bruneau, Marc Lalonde, Maurice Pinard and Pierre Elliott Trudeau. Since Charles Taylor, as an editor (rédacteur) of Cité Libre, sat on the editorial board (Comité de rédaction) of the magazine from August 1964 until February 1966, and was a regular contributor from May 1962 until November 1965, there is no doubt that he was part of the very important editorial decisions that resulted in the publication of the updated version of politique fonctionnelle: Charles Taylor’s influence upon the evolution of politique fonctionnelle is therefore both direct and indirect. Charles Taylor possessed something the others lacked, namely his experience and knowledge of the rising wave of 1960s European social democracy, valuable expertise for the seduction of younger Québec intellectuals: Especially as exemplified in France during the transition from Sartre to Merleau–Ponty, as the transition from French communism to socialism and the rise of Mitterrand’s Gaullism. But unlike the others at Cité Libre, Charles Taylor not only published his articles, he shared editorial power along with Blain, Tremblay and Pellerin. At Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, Charles Margrave Taylor, as a Québécois intellectual élite very experienced in European social democracy, and possessed of editorial power, along with Maurice Blain, Albert Breton, Raymond Breton, Claude Bruneau, Yvon Gauthier, Marc Lalonde, Jean Pellerin, Maurice Pinard, Jacques Tremblay as well as Pierre Trudeau himself, updated Trudeau’s politique fonctionnelle from the 1950s, in light of the tumultuous events of the 1960s, as the justification of the Quiet revolution and Jean Lesage’s neo–nationalist movement, especially with a fresh infusion of European “anti–imperialism and anti–Americanism,” indirectly borrowed from British and French Stalinism as well as later Soviet communism: This is the early basis of Taylor’s left–wing Gaullism (late twentieth–century French Bonapartism) as polycentrisme: Welfare, allegedly for the lowest class, rather than the highest class, but always in function of the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right (Bonapartism and Machiavellism), as the power of the people (Québécocrats) and tyranny of the masses (Québécocracy) as the dictatorship of the proletariat (Social Democracy, i.e., socialism as politique fonctionnelle). The Kantio–Hegelian dialectique de l’action, elaborated in the version of politique fonctionnelle which is the basis of Québécocentrisme as asymmetrical federalism, the political and economic “philosophy” of the Québec regime in Ottawa, while modified in the 1990s to accommodate Americanism, is essentially the brainchild of Pierre Trudeau and Charles Margrave Taylor.

Charles Taylor’s polycentrisme⁸ is thus inscribed within the world historical struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, as the imaginary Gaullist “Third Way,” as delusionally opposed to the bipolar clash of the Cold War: In twentieth–century world history, Gaullism is degeneratively inscribed within the clash between reason and unreason, in the struggle between capitalism and communism, — in the strife between Americanism and anti–Americanism. French Bonapartism in the twentieth–century is the selfsame anti–Americanism as the Russian Bonapartism of Soviet imperialism and communism.⁹ The so–called polycentrisme of the Francosphère (francophonie and Communauté) is anti–Americanism in the twentieth–century strife of ruling classes, as the world historical clash between Kant and Hegel, — in the struggle between subjective and objective freedom unchained by the Industrial and French revolutions, in the collapse of European modernity, and rise of world civilization as rational political and economic order, in the supremacy of absolute freedom as American Liberty.

Beginning with the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE) in Ottawa under Jean Marchand, during the first Québec regime of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the Québécocracy will also advance socialism as politique fonctionnelle, but mainly as corporate welfare:

“Now we know, after the last Budget Speech, this year (1968) Québec will get $362,740,000.00 in various federal equalization payments, compared to the $66 million in 1962. Québec has therefore won the taxation war in Ottawa.”¹⁰

Soon afterwards a very powerful and self–destructive academic movement is established at various Canadian universities, lavishly funded by multiple federal and provincial institutions across the country, devoted to proving that Trudeauisme (politique fonctionnelle, i.e., le modèle québécois) is in fact the basis of rational political and economic order in Canada: This taxpayer cash is no doubt better spent on Healthcare in the age of the Digital Revolution and rise of Americanism.

Once in positions of power, the Québécocrats abandoned their erstwhile mask of démocratie for dirigisme in politics and academia: They smashed against the wall of Americanism, and their power formation advanced no more. They embraced the mask of Gaullisme and Eurocentrisme (polycentrisme) during the Cold War, as the justification of their Québécocentrisme, but their backers nevertheless bowed down to the American superpower, as the Hydro–Québec energized the New York Subway system and the Eastern seaboard of the United States, — subsidized by the generous taxpayers of South central Ontario, under the thumb of Québécocrats in Ottawa and Queen’s Park. Today, their sophistical political and economic philosophy of Québécocentrisme is exposed once and for all, as modern European unreason, the mask by which they justified their mortal corruption, — in the name of the power of the people and tyranny of the masses, as the dictatorship of the proletariat: In the world of today, the Cold War is over, and the raison d’être of the Québécocracy on the stage of universal history exists no more. One last world historical task awaits them: As the inferior ruling classes vanish into oblivion, in the whispered name of “cost–savings” they drag down their erstwhile soixante–huitard comrades with them, into the boneyard of the world.

The long harbored delusions of the Québécocracy are merely the death rattle of a dying order: Even as their political and economic flesh and blood withers–away, falling from their financial, commercial and industrial bones, their imprisoned eyes are still entranced by their demonic master, the satanic gaze of Machiavelli: “Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force.”¹¹

1/ ANTI–COPERNICAN REVOLUTION VERSUS UNIVERSITY QUÉBÉCOCENTRISME

An extremely powerful academic movement once existed at various Canadian universities, especially in Central and Eastern Canada, which were lavishly funded over the years by multiple federal and provincial institutions across the country, and were devoted to proving that Trudeauisme (politique fonctionnelle, i.e., le modèle québécois) is in fact the basis of rational political and economic order in Canada: This movement was mainly concentrated in the schools of law, but was also found in the fields of politics and history, as well as the departments of philosophy in Ontario and Québec. Today our academia’s influence is inexorably marginalized by the powerful political and economic movement of Americanism, unchained by the Digital Revolution, and the new computational and technological conjuncture: Québécocentrisme cannot escape from the corrosive forces of rational political and economic order, in the rise of Global civilization, as the supremacy of American Liberty.

The Digital Revolution unchained, in the first decade of the twenty–first century, a worldwide intellectual upheaval: The most closely guarded secrets of our government run schools and universities were quickly uncovered before the eyes of the world, the most groundbreaking being the secret of Kant and Hegel. The great academic upheaval in philosophy that shook our twentieth–century academic temples to the ground, was first unleashed by the twenty–first century Digital Revolution, and begins with both Kant and Hegel:

“What is at stake in these discussions is not simply Kant’s views on specific topics but a complete reassessment of his contribution to the ‘project of modernity,’ inasmuch as Kant’s contribution to the construction of liberal internationalism is viewed as a core element of that project … Kant was indeed generally ‘opposed to the mixing of races’ and that his views on this matter are recorded in texts dating from the 1760s through the late 1790s.”¹

At the very same time that two hundred years of traditional Kant scholarship around the world was upended and rendered obsolete, — the outdated and surpassed project of modernity as “Liberal Internationalism,” the Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, — the same situation occurred, in the opposite direction, with regards to Hegel:

“[Hegel’s] many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”²

While this knowledge of the bad Kant and good Hegel was a very closely guarded secret in the hands of a select few academic specialists and government bureaucrats during the twentieth–century, the information was disseminated around the world in the blink of an eye, thanks to the powerful technological and computational conjuncture unchained by the Digital Revolution: The result of the reassessment and reorientation of Kant and Hegel in academic philosophy during the past decade, is a complete upheaval of academia, within the sciences, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art, — the anti–Copernican Revolution. In the world of today, the main weapon of anti–Americanism of the past hundred years is finally undone, — the modern European mask of Americanism collapsed under the hammer blows of the Digital Revolution. The modern European sophistical distinction between the good Kant and bad Hegel is no more, at least in the minds of knowledgeable scholars and intellectuals: The veil of Maya is lifted, and the genuine visage of Americanism is made visible before the eyes of humanity, as the rational conception of the American world, — the age of American Idealism is at hand, as the planetization of rational political and economic order, in the rise of Americanism as the Global supremacy of American Liberty.

American Idealism is the fountainhead of Global civilization. The teaching of the concept is the inescapable lesson of history: As the historical unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom, Americanism is rising upwards in the world of today. The rational conception of Canada is therefore the Canadian conceptualization of Americanism, — the conceptual rationality of the American world, — in the genuine Hegelian meaning of reason, in the rational Hegelianism of the pure Hegel:

“Admirers of Hegel are accustomed to refer to the first edition [Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline], as having most of the author’s freshness and power … in America, no one can look back a few years, without observing that the whole tone of our public men has changed, and that the phrases, ‘progress,’ ‘necessary development,’ and ‘God in history,’ occur with marked frequency.”³

In the genuine Hegelian meaning of reason, in the rational Hegelianism of the pure Hegel, the rational conception of Canada as the Canadian conceptualization of Americanism, — the conceptual rationality of the American world, — Ottawa is the first sphere of the American world, of which the White House, Washington and Wall Street constitute the central power (le noyau rationnel). The rational conceptualization of the Québécocracy and its organisational dynamism under the Québec regime in Ottawa 1968–2006, the Empire of Paul Desmarais (DAY–maw–ray), is inscribed within the rise of Globalism in the twentieth–century, and collapse of European modernity in world history. Conceptualization of Americanism, in the rational Hegelian sense, is therefore the form and content of the conceptual rationality of the American world, as the struggle between subjective and objective freedom in world history, from out of the clash between Kant and Hegel, from which arises the absolute freedom of American Liberty. The substantial form, the concrete universality of American conceptual rationality, and its developmental unification and coaxial integration, as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is found within the clash of ruling classes: From out of the womb of history, arise universal historical determinations, the amniotic complexifications of which constitute the embryonic development of the world. The worldhood of the American world, the realm of its universality as the Noetic scientivity of the Noosphere, is the conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism.

The conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of Americanism, conceives that the political and economic worldhood of the American world englobes North America, the United States, Canada and Mexico, not merely in the notional form and content of the political and economic geography of continentalism, but also as the central and innermost sphere of Americanism. Make no mistake, the conceptual relationship between the innermost essence of Americanism and its outermost conceptualization, englobes the entire Western world. The innermost and basic dynamism of Americanism, the essence of American conceptual rationality as causa sui, self–determination in the genuine Hegelian sense, namely the myriad relationships between the White House, Washington and Wall Street, englobes North America within the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world.

Conceptualization, since rational conceptions possess a life and freedom of their own (self–determination as causa sui), therefore conceives of the political and economic worldhood of the American world as the rationalization between core and periphery, which conceptually arises from the very conceptual substrata of Americanism itself, — within concrete universality as the universal form of the immanence of the self–determination of American conceptual rationality. What is the rationality of personality, but the evolution of conceptuality? We must draw attention to the essential conceptual complexifications between the political economies of the West coast of the United States of America with Mexico, as well as between the East coast with Canada: This political and economic dynamism is always found within the rational calculations of the American political economy of the White House, Washington and Wall Street, as the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, — as America’s rational conception of itself.

For readers accustomed to the sophistical verbiage of twentieth–century Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, especially in the twenty–first century, how very foreign our language must sound, devoid of reverberations of American perspectives, views, outlooks and standpoints of the world (standpunkt, perspektive, weltanschauung). Make no further mistake: The application of outdated and surpassed conceptions, as rational solutions to today’s political and economic challenges, is irrationalism: Modern European unreason in the Global world is undone in the rise of Americanism, having self–destructively cleared away from Western civilization’s universal historical ground, the political and economic delusions and phantasms of modernity, as the inescapable lesson of history, in the strife of ruling classes under the floodtide of American rationality.

Recapitulation: From out of the womb of history, arise universal historical determinations, the amniotic complexifications of which constitute the embryonic development of the world. Conceptualization of the rational conception of Canada, as the Canadian conceptualization of Americanism, therefore conceives Canadian education, and the national educational authorities, within the strife of ruling classes, as the conceptual clash of political and economic complexifications: The academics and bureaucrats behind the extremely powerful and self–destructive academic movement at various Canadian universities under the Québec Regime in Ottawa 1968–2006, especially in Central and Eastern Canada, lavishly funded over the years by multiple federal and provincial institutions across the country, who devote themselves to proving that politique fonctionnelle is the basis of rational political and economic order as “modern Canada,” are mainly found concentrated in the schools of law, but also in the fields of political science, economics and history.

The Québécocracy is not, and never was, an indigenous Canadian ruling class, but is an offshoot of modern European ruling classes born from the French Revolution: These are the degenerate twentieth–century continental European ruling classes which wrought the collapse of the British Empire in the Great Wars, — in the name of modern European political and economic irrationalism:

“Especially after 1871, the contagion of Kantianism in France is remarkable … Around 1880, Kantianism becomes the powerful beacon of French moral and political thought, in the eyes of those who are followers of France’s republican creed: For republican thinkers who want to be freed from “superstition,” Immanuel Kant’s philosophy must provide the means of indoctrinating France’s young people with strict morality and civics, self–sacrifice and patriotism: Intellectual disciplines which will eliminate ancient French religious traditions via the powerful secular religion of republicanism.”⁴

The inferior ruling classes of European modernity in the twentieth– century, the mortal enemies of Western civilization (Athens, Jerusalem and Rome), are not wiped out after the Second World War, for Uncle Sam is preoccupied with the Soviet Empire and world communism. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, beginning with German reunification and Maastricht,⁵ these antediluvian ruling classes, especially in Eastern Europe and the Warsaw Pact, are unchained once more in the arena of European politics and economics, in the rise of Großeuropa, the reconciliation of western and eastern Europe, especially under the influence of the Franco–German Éntente forged at Maastricht, and the Francosphère:

“[3] France plays a leading rôle in the conduct of Canada’s foreign policy … The constructivist [relativist] model that we develop in the pages that follow downplays the materialist [subjectivist] foundations of this phenomenon by emphasizing the pre–eminence of identity factors [psychologism] … [5] As of yet, theoretically and empirically speaking, no systematic study exists on franco–Canadian international security relationships, let alone on the importance of France in Canada’s international security policy … [6] French efforts led to a new geopolitical (géostratégique) ‘éntente’ between France and Canada … [thanks to] the Quiet Revolution and the French presidency of General Charles de Gaulle … Québec nationalism and the personality of Charles de Gaulle are the origins of France’s newfound interest in Canada, especially as a very useful ally in the Atlantic Alliance … The re–emergence of France in Canada’s strategic culture results from a transformation of Canada’s identity into both an anglophone and [7] francophone atlanticist and bicultural state (État biculturel), namely as the expression of a sense of parentage and identity (sentiment de filiation identitaire) with Great Britain and the United States (the anglosphere) as much as with France (the Francosphère).”⁶

The political and economic forces of Americanism were swamped after German reunification, first in Germany and then in central Europe, especially while Uncle Sam deals with the sudden upswing of Middle Eastern turmoil: With this destabilization of Americanism in Europe during the 1990s, and then the expediency of the Franco–German Éntente during the civil wars in the Balkans, the inferior ruling classes gain a beachhead in Brussels. With the sudden upswing of Middle Eastern turmoil, and the 9/11 terrorist attacks upon America, and the ensuing war on terror, the inferior ruling classes in Europe again receive a much needed breathing space while Uncle Sam is greatly preoccupied around world, and thereby expand their beachhead in Brussels and Strasbourg into a rout of Americanism within the institutions of the European Union: From this twenty–first century contagion of modern European anti–Americanism (especially resultant from Großdeutschland and Ostpolitik), first in Mitteleuropa, and then in Brussels, comes the destabilization of Americanism in the European Union with the BREXIT. Behind these inferior ruling classes lurk their backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts, whose financial, commercial and industrial claws span across the Atlantic with globalization. The Francosphère is the creation of Charles DeGaulle and the Gaullist ruling class, greatly empowered after the Cold War by the Franco–German Éntente, since the 1960s its tentacles reach deep into the Québécocracy, — its very raison d’être as the dominant ruling class in Canada. The very basis of the Québécocracy as a dominant ruling class in Canada, after the end of the Cold War and birth of NAFTA, is Großeuropa and the Franco–German Éntente, forged in the flames of Merkel’s Mitteleuropa, as the rise of Großdeutschland and Ostpolitik. The rise of Merkel’s Mitteleuropa is the implosion of the last remnants of European modernity, unchained by the fall of the Soviet Empire. The dominion of the Québécocracy across Canada is greatly diminished under the rise of Großeuropa, because America prevailed in the War on Terror, which greatly stimulated the Digital Revolution, — greatly empowered by the birth of the Trumpocracy from out of the Trump Revolution: The rise of twenty–first century American Idealism.

The Québécocracy is not, and never was, an indigenous Canadian ruling class, but is an offshoot of modern European ruling classes born from the French Revolution: The academic circles that gravitate around Charles Margrave Taylor, the academics and bureaucrats behind the extremely powerful and self–destructive political and economic movement of Québécocentrisme at various Canadian universities under the Empire of Desmarais, especially at McGill University and the University of Toronto, are mostly found in the departments of law, politics and economics because as élites of inferior ruling classes they are followers of the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, in the tradition of modern European Bonapartism, — they follow in the footsteps of their master, Machiavelli, as Bonapartist creatures of the Francosphère.⁷

2/ THE SCHOOL OF CHARLES MARGRAVE TAYLOR

According to Damien–Claude Bélanger, a University of Toronto Québécocrat, European modernity is superior to Americanism (which is an ideology, an intellectually blurred vision of the American world), since modernism is a very powerful revolutionary force which will destroy the political and economic power of traditional élites, our Industrial revolutionaries, and their greatest defenders, organized religion:

“[Modernism] will invariably corrode the power of traditional élites, particularly that of the clergy … Modernity is a powerful revolutionary force … America has long presented a vision of the future, albeit a blurred one, to the intellectuals of the world.”¹

America has long presented a vision of the future, albeit a blurred one, to the intellectuals of the world? From whence comes this modern European political and economic irrationalism of the University of Toronto, which makes Americanism into an intellectual ideology? Why, it comes from Charles Margrave Taylor and his school,—that’s from where the anti–Americanism of Canadian academia comes.

Charles Margrave Taylor’s school is composed of many followers at McGill University and the University of Toronto, and many other government run universities, — especially located in Ontario, Québec and the Maritimes: In the philosophical organizations and publications lavishly funded over the years by the federal and provincial governments, their rule is supreme (†Stanley George French and †Vladimir Zeman were powerful followers of Charles Taylor at Concordia University in the early years of the twenty–first century).² The members of Charles Taylor’s school reject any affiliation as a group, and resist a collective nomenclature, for they name themselves variously as phenomenologists, existentialists, continental philosophers and so forth, but they are united in their pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, which they inherited from Charles Taylor’s Kantio–Hegelianism, beginning in the 1970s, and especially as found in his Hegel (1975) and Hegel and Modern Society (1979), but also in journal publications such as “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments,” (1978): The Kantio–Hegelianism of Taylor’s school is evidenced in the sophistical political and economic philosophies of his disciples, their Kantio–Hegelian distinction between civilization and barbarism, which they zealously wield in their inexact interpretations of modern European history, as the difference between Americanism and Europeanism. Of course, in their eyes, rightful Americanism is Americanism under the spell of Bonapartisme as Eurocentrisme, which they imagine is the evolution of the US Constitution over the years, following in the modern footsteps of the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right (which they wrongly consider as unsurpassed): This usually leads them to imagine elaborate and convoluted phantasies in which they appear as the natural allies of American democrats. Indeed, in their delusional and imaginary alignment of US Republicans with “totalitarianism” (Globalism as unipolarity, not as multipolarity or polycentrisme: “la pensée globalisante, sous certaines formes, engendre aussi le totalitarisme”) they ignore the fact that as foreign nationals outside the United States, they themselves are not accorded political protections under the US Constitution, which means that the propaganda of their sophistical attacks, directed against the White House, Washington and Wall Street (Republican presidencies), is anti–Americanism, — as conceptualized in the writings of the US Presidents and Secretaries of State, whether republican or democrat. For these reasons, amongst many others, their Kantio–Hegelian version of Americanism is defective.

Canadian jurisprudence is the academic field most influenced by Charles Margrave Taylor’s school during the Québec regime, since students in the faculties of law are destined to wield the executive power, as well as fill the senior ranks of the federal and provincial civil services of the Québécocracy: The central aim of Canadian jurisprudence taught at universities during the hightide of the Québec regime, apart from the rote memorization of our laws and procedures, is to instill the delusion that the 1982 Constitution is a high and mighty product, on the same political and economic plane as the Constitution of the United States of America. In this phantastic endeavour our Québécocentric jurists have recourse to the sophistical philosophy of Kantio–Hegelianism, especially as found in the works of Charles Margrave Taylor:

“[Charles Taylor] subscribes to the same view of Hegel’s theory of contradictions as the logical positivists do, for whom such metaphysical propositions are neither true nor false but ‘literally nonsense,’ an expression of the believer’s convictions but utterly lacking any rational or epistemic validity.”³

The main task of the Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian schools of Canadian jurisprudence is the justification of the Notwithstanding clause, the payment of unconstitutional equalization to the Québécocracy, which has never signed the 1982 Constitution, as well as the Québécification of our two federal civil services. Mostly, our Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian professors of jurisprudence wile away their days in the pleasant phantasizing of (sophistical) rationale for the systematic rejection of any change, any juridical evolution beyond Québécocentrisme. Of course, being mostly the family members and close friends of senior Québécocrats, they do not overly exert themselves in this sophistical endeavor, but rather maintain an easy lifestyle as aristocrats of our new leisure class.

As we shall soon discover, Canadian jurisprudence, political science, economics, history and so forth, in Stalinoid fashion, always follow the footsteps of Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, along the road of modern European unreason: Because they always follow in the footsteps of impure Hegelianism, the latter connect Kant and Hegel in the name of their pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, while the former separate Kant and Hegel in the name of their pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism.⁴ Conceptual rationality conceives of the rational conceptualization of the conceptual difference between pure and impure Hegelianism: As the inescapable lesson of modern history, the conceptual clash of political and economic complexifications, exemplified in the separating and connecting of Kantianism and Hegelianism upon the stage of world history (in successive phase upon the plane of the world historical manifold of historicity, the phasality of which is not merely comprehended as the Egological constitution of the world of scientivity), is the collapse of European modernity and rise of Global civilization, — in the spiritual liberation and planetization of humanity as the conceptual rationality of the rational conceptualization of the conception of American Liberty.⁵

Charles Margrave Taylor’s sophistical philosophy of Kantio–Hegelianism was first applied to Canadian politics and economics in the 1960s at Cité Libre to advance the cause of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and his entourage, by laying the political and economic foundations of politique fonctionnelle in Canada: Once Pierre Trudeau and the Québécocracy are installed in power, Charles Taylor begins in the 1970s to form his school in academia, in the field of political science, and builds his reputation as a Hegel scholar. Beginning in the late 1970s, during the Québec regime’s French imperialistic (Gaullisme and Bonapartisme) sweeping–away of Canada’s British imperial federalism, in the name of politique fonctionnelle as Québécocentrisme, the contagion of Charles Taylor’s sophistical philosophy becomes evermore greater in Canadian academic political science, especially in the justification of the repatriation of the Canadian constitution as imagined by Joseph Jacques–Jean Chrétien and Pierre Trudeau, and thereby moves into the field of jurisprudence, around disputes over sovereignty, — as his students begin to populate academia and the civil services in ever greater numbers, eventually gravitating into the uppermost regions of government, especially in Ottawa. In the 1990s, the Kantio–Hegelian influence of Taylor’s outdated and surpassed conception of Canada reaches its zenith, especially in the federal and provincial bureaucracies: Charles Taylor’s school begins its inexorable decline in the first decade of the twenty–first century, under the floodtide of Americanism, unchained by the Digital revolution.

A. The Four Waves of Taylorism

The contagion of Charles Taylor’s school of Québécocentrisme under the Québec regime in Ottawa 1968–2006 is composed of four distinct waves: The first wave of intellectuals indoctrinated into the philosophical sophistry of Charles Taylor’s Québécocentrisme begins in the late 1960s and continues into the 1970s, under the first Québec regime in Ottawa. The second wave of intellectuals indoctrinated into Charles Taylor’s Québécocentrisme begins in the 1980s, under the second Québec regime in Ottawa. The third wave of intellectuals indoctrinated into Québécocentrisme begins in the 1990s, under the third Québec regime in Ottawa. The fourth and last wave of intellectuals indoctrinated into Québécocentrisme begins in the early 2000s, under the fourth Québec regime in Ottawa. After the fourth wave of Québécocentrisme, comes the administration of Stephen Harper, and the profound academic upheavals caused by the Digital revolution: Taylor–made intellectuals are confronted with the rise of Americanism. In the work of Charles Taylor there arises an intellectual make–shift designed to shield Québécocentrisme from the charge of modern unreason, and which coincides with the decline of his school. Nevertheless, the collapse of Taylor’s school across Canada does not entail its academic demise: Charles Taylor’s version of Québécocentrisme still thrives in Québec, and will continue to hold sway for at least another decade, perhaps longer: Eventually Québécocentrisme will collapse in Québec under the three influences of Americanism, from the United States, from anglophone Canada, and finally from francophone Europe. But the profound exposure of Canadian anglophone intellectuals to Americanism during the Digital revolution means that Québécocentrisme will continue to disintegrate at a much faster rate outside Québec, notably in Western Canada and Ontario: The rise of the Canadosphere will continue unabated in the expansion of Canadocentricism.

As we shall discover in the course of this work, the contagion of the Québécocentrisme of Charles Taylor’s school spreads across Canada at an ever–increasing rate until the NAFTA, and thereafter begins its decline, alongside the Québec “nationalist movement,” starting around the Second Referendum, during the 1995 cuts. We shall discover the rise and fall of Québécocentrisme in the works of prominent Québécocentric intellectuals, especially at McGill University and the University of Toronto, but also other universities in Western and Eastern Canada: The modern European unreason of Charles Taylor’s Québécocentric school, whether anglophone or francophone, englobes the fields of the sciences, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art. The Québécocentric leaders of Charles Taylor’s school in academia are the masterminds of Québécocentrisme, and amongst them is their inner circle, their ringleaders. Many of the most influential disciples of Charles Taylor’s school eventually leave their positions in academia, for work as writers, journalists, civil servants and so forth, while many others, once they graduate, remain outside academia altogether. We shall discover that Québécocentrisme is like a parasite that slowly drains its political and economic host of vital financial, commercial and industrial energies, but does not thereby destroy its victim, especially in the field of jurisprudence, and within the confines of our justice system: The main parasitical beneficiaries of our lifeblood is the Québécocracy and their Bonapartist backers in Europe. The principal victims of Québécocentrisme are always our sick and elderly, but also our children and young people, deprived of potential and prosperity: In Québec alone some four million Canadians live in grinding poverty, thanks to our inferior ruling class.

B. World Historical Characteristics of Charles Margrave Taylor’s School

Charles Taylor’s school exhibits certain world historical characteristics, which transcend the academic field of characterology proper: The application of Taylor–made Québécocentrisme to the sciences, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art, works in the following way: These fields are taught based upon the pseudo–methodology of relativism, subjectivism and irrationalism, which is imagined and phantasized as the scientific logic of Science. Once this Taylor–made “Science” is inculcated in the captive minds of Canadian school children (those youngsters that resist phantasy are systematically excluded from higher studies and academic careers), the “scientific” perspectives, standpoints, outlooks and worldviews function as pseudo–conceptions, as inert ideas in the phantasy of “modern Canada,” i.e., the delusion that depicts the Chrétien–Trudeau Constitution as the foundation of all rational political and economic order in Canada. All Québécocentric academic stories, whether named as politics, economics, sociology, psychology, physics, jurisprudence and so forth, are justified via the outdated and surpassed Transzendentale Logik (transcendental arguments) of Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, as the rationale and essence of modern Canada, — the outdated and surpassed unreason of European modernity is reheated and served upon a platter:

“Kant inaugurated a Copernican revolution in philosophy, which claimed that the subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object; i.e., that knowledge is in part constituted by a priori or transcendental factors (contributed by the mind itself), which the mind imposes upon the data of experience. Far from being a description of an external reality, knowledge is, to Kant, the product of the knowing subject. When the data are those of sense experience, the transcendental (mental) apparatus constitutes man’s experience or his science, or makes it to be such.”¹

“The subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object … [knowledge is] the product of the knowing subject”: The “Copernican revolution in philosophy” (the subject doing the knowing constitutes, to a considerable extent, the object), is not based upon Kant’s philosophical sophistry that knowledge is the product of the knowing subject. The unreason of European modernity thus infects the very foundations of “modern Canada” as the sophistical philosophical justification of the modern European political and economic irrationalism of the Gaullism of the Francosphère, — as Bonapartism and Machiavellianism. For this reason, (the continued application of outdated and surpassed conceptions by our degenerate élites), our technological and computational conjuncture long ago withered away and died, — Nortel is an example of the utter waste of our potential, in the intestinal and fratricidal strife at the very heart of our polity. In other words, the school of Charles Margrave Taylor is in the business of producing the apparatchiki of the ideological apparatus of the Québécocracy: What dirty work these degenerates have accomplished, as the gravediggers of European modernity in Canada! In the world of today the work of Charles Taylor’s school is done, and the world historical ground of the Québécocracy is undone, in the collapse of modern European unreason and rise of Americanism, — in the supremacy of American Liberty as the bastion of Globalism.

While corruption and degeneration destroy the very foundations of our polity, our protectors are not asleep at the switch, not at all, they are very busy enjoying themselves in the pleasant activity of phantasizing complex and sophisticated delusions, — with the assistance of very expensive and powerful machines: They gorge themselves upon the relativism, subjectivism and irrationalism of their Transzendentale Logik. Our youth, our young people, the flower of our civilization, are cast upon the dunghill of welfare and unemployment, many of whom are destroyed in a floodtide of dope, prostitution and criminality: Our inferior ruling classes busy themselves at seminars and conferences, surrounding themselves in a corrupt atmosphere of intellectual superiority, while the kingpins and gangsters, traffickers and pimps, rape and pillage our land. For nearly a half century, the most powerful crime family in Canadian history, destroyed great numbers of our young people, thereby wrecking our potential, while the degenerate élites of our Québécocracy turned a blind eye to this mortal corruption: The erstwhile defenders of Québécocrats are now themselves the victims of the Québécocracy. This is the legacy of Charles Margrave Taylor’s school, during the Québec regime in Ottawa and empire of Paul Desmarais: Critique is not critique at all, but only a big shovel used to satiate their own voracious appetites for pleasures, sensations and feelings. The inferior ruling classes of European modernity, unable to prey upon the American superpower, and thus bankroll their grandiose Napoléonic delusions, turn inwards against themselves, and so prey upon their own kind, — with their backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts, they destroy themselves.

3/ GAULLISM, BONAPARTISM AND EUROPEAN UNITY 1945–1968: THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL OF ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE

Kojève was asked about his own influence in France, he famously said that he was second only to de Gaulle in the decision making process of the French Republic.¹

[Kojève’s] political influence in the government — through his membership in the ministry and in the French legation to GATT and to the United Nations, in which he functioned as a self–taught economist of world class — was perhaps second only to that of General de Gaulle. So Kojève told me; and his self–assessment was confirmed for me by Raymond Aron and André Philip, the latter the head of the French legation to GATT.²

As is appropriate for someone who chose to work behind the scenes as an adviser to princes, as it were, Kojève’s name is virtually absent from the standard literature on the formation of the EU, but for those influential in French policy making, he was acknowledged as a leading figure.³

Kojève’s Marxism and perhaps ironical Stalinism were well known during Kojève’s lifetime, and they seem not to have impeded his ascent to the very highest levels of the French civil service. However, his political leanings were put in a new light in September 1999, when stories appeared in the French press alleging that he had been a Soviet agent for the last thirty years of his life. The stories were based on a dossier that the French secret service (the DST) had apparently received from the KGB.⁴

Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov (Александр Владимирович Кожевников), known in academic circles as Alexandre Kojève (COSH–vuh), and his followers in France and Europe, constitute the degenerate ruling classes, the modern European irrationalists (postmoderns)⁵ of the European Union, — in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism as the supremacy of American Liberty upon the stage of world history: Gaullism and Bonapartism collide in the clash between Kant and Hegel as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes, — as the rational planetization of Americanism in the world of today. Global civilization is the mastery of superior ruling classes in the age of Digital revolution, the notion of American Liberty as universal and absolute freedom, — the fountainhead of Cosmism.

In the twenty–first century Western world of today and the age of BREXIT, we do well to consider the future of the European Union: Europa, whither thou goest, whither thou art? Our endeavour therefore raises the question of the very nature of European unity itself, which in turn relates to the conception of Americanism, one of humanity’s greatest notions. The exact historical origins of the European Union are found within the notion of what exactly the European Union is, namely an appendage of the American world: For without the American superpower, European unity dissolves within the fratricidal strife of ruling classes. Indeed, the rational conceptualization of exact historiography and world history is the work of notions. Of course the conception of the European Union as an appendage of the American world is vigorously rejected by anti–Americans, especially in Europe: The soixantehuitards prefer spending billions of €Euros on the reinvention of the wheel (Airbus), thereby greatly enriching themselves, their friends and family members, who (coincidentally) own the finance, commerce and industry behind Airbus, subsidized by European politicians.⁶ These selfsame inferior ruling classes in the twentieth century, the gravediggers of European modernity, were impotent against the likes of Mussolini, Hitler and Stalin, but during the Cold War were very useful tools of the American world in the struggle between capitalism and communism upon the stage of universal history: Now their time is done.⁷

The mortally corrupt ruling classes of Europe, now their time is done? The reorganization of the American world in the age of twenty–first century American Idealism, unchained by the Digital revolutionaries of the White House, Washington and Wall Street, throws some light upon the question of the European Union’s survival. For those whose minds are warped by the phantasms of the modern European nation state, the reorganization of the American world appears as U.S. nationalism, as populism, rather than as the natural growth of Western civilization upon the plane of a far higher notion of political and economic freedom. Anti–Americans, especially in Europe, do not fathom the world historical significance of Henry Kissinger’s words: “The wars of the French Revolution marked the transition to the nation–state defined by common language and culture … [The United States] have never been nation–states in the European sense. America has succeeded in forming a distinct culture from a polyglot national composition.”⁸ For thinkers like myself, American Idealists raised upon the mountain peaks of Americanism, and exposed to the fresh air of the open ranges, the reorganization of American civilization entails the regeneration of European unity.

(A slight digression is here in order: Our detractors will accuse American Idealism of borrowing from the Kantian traditions and therefore pure Hegelianism, in their eyes, is itself corrupted, i.e., self–contradictory. The Kantian traditions have indeed touched upon some historical facts, but their interpretation of these facts is sophistical. These selfsame detractors will undoubtedly accuse American Idealism of borrowing Kantian “facts” and therefore pure Hegelianism, in their eyes, is corrupted all the same. The Kantian anti–Hegelians completely ignore the facts of universal history,unless their “possible” facts are really and truly historical, while Kantio–Hegelianism gets some of the facts right, but Hegelian anti–Kantianism englobes the factuality of world history: Some of the facts of Kantio–Hegelianism cannot be ignored, and therefore American Idealism does indeed borrow facts from the “Kantian” traditions, but these are not Kantian “facts” stricto sensu. Karl Wittfogel, for instance, is quite correct in his categorization of oriental despotism, whereas his interpretation of its world historical significance is mistaken: Oswald Spengler, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, Pitirim Sorokin and Erich Vögelin are more examples of the same.)

The question of the future of the European Union after the BREXIT, the very notion of twenty–first century European unity itself, is inseparable from the relationship between Americanism and Europeanism, the world historical struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes. These power struggles are found at the very origins of the European Union: We must return to the beginning of the Cold War, the clash between capitalism and communism, in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism. The birth of the new Europe from out of ruin and destruction, the emergence of postwar European unity, results from the strife between Americanism and anti–Americanism. With the defeat of the Axis powers arise the first Global complexifications of universal and absolute freedom as American Liberty. Objective and subjective freedom, and their universal historical clash within the arena of world politics and economics, ends. The spirit of America is victorious upon the stage of world history, and the work of American Idealism really begins in earnest, in the clearing away of the rubble of European modernity, for the power of Americanism is everywhere unrivaled: This clearing away of European modernity is precisely the birth of the new Europe and postwar European unity. The Americanized European as a higher notion of humanity is born from out of the ashes of old Europe as a new form of spiritual identity: The European conception of Americanism is born.

Americanized Europeans are the builders of rational political and economic order in Europe, in the name of American Idealism, and they are first found in embryonic form within the ranks of U.S. finance, commerce and industry in Europe. These are the vanguard of the superior ruling classes of the new Europe, and their struggle against modern European political and economic irrationalism, Bonapartism and Machiavellianism, is the very bedrock of the Cold War: As the struggle against Stalinism and Gaullism, which are really both the very same thing, the death rattle of modern European raison d’état upon the stage of world history, — while their differentiation appears as a result of various climes and seedbeds, the one Asiatic, the other European, i.e., as Eastern and Western.

The strife in Cold War Europe against Gaullism and Stalinism⁹ is political and economic warfare against modern European irrationalism within Europe, itself divided into Western and Eastern powers: From out of the greatest power struggles in the history of the world, comes forth the new European identity, from out of the unification of Europe in the name of Americanism: The very basis of European unity is inscribed (conceptualized) within the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, the fountainhead of Western civilization. The new European identity, forged in the flames of the Cold War, in the clearing away of the rubble of European modernity, is the unity of the superior ruling classes of Americanized Europe, — the birth of the European conception of Americanism. The modern European conception of the world as Eurocentrism is undone.

The birth pangs of the European Union are therefore inscribed within the amniotic determinations of world history, in the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism as the supremacy of American Liberty, i.e., inscribed (conceptualized) within the political and economic complexifications of universal historical determinations, as the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, the twentieth century logic of American superpower, the world historical matrix of the notional dynamism of history’s phasality itself: As the historical self–determination and self–unfolding of the conceptual rationality of the notion of universal freedom, Americanism is rising upwards in the world of today, — in the genuine (pure) Hegelian meaning of reason, as the rational Hegelianism of American Idealism.

The birth pangs of the European Union are therefore inscribed within the amniotic determinations of world history: The first roadblock upon the highway of rational political and economic order within Europe is therefore Stalinism, while the second is Gaullism. The origins of the European Union,from out of the political and economic complexifications from whence emerges the new Europe as the notion of European unity, — itself forged within the identity of superior ruling classes as the European conception of Americanism (NATO), — are themselves uplifted (conceptualized) as solutions (conceptualizations) aimed at the problem of Stalinism and Gaullism, implemented (conceived) by American Idealists.

Recapitulation: Americanism confronts anti–Americanism in the clash between Kant and Hegel upon the stage of world history, and therefore confronts Kantio–Hegelianism in Europe (the followers of Alexandre Kojève and his school) as the struggle between superior and inferior ruling classes resultant in the formation of the European Union.

With the deaths of Alexandre Kojève in 1968 and Charles de Gaulle in 1970, right–wing Gaullism in France and Europe is a spent force, especially as evidenced by Valéry Giscard d’Estaing: Kojève’s school will nevertheless resuscitate Kojèvean anti–Americanism in France and Europe as left–wing Gaullism in their differentiation of socialism and communism, their New Left Eurocommunist distinction between the orthodox Marxism of Soviet imperialism, and the existential Marxism of the Kojèveans. François Mitterrand and the soixantehuitards arrive upon the stage of world history:The end of the Cold War as the expansion of the European Union is at hand, — the last death spasm of European modernity, — the Gaullist and Bonapartist institutionalization of European unity at Maastricht as the Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian struggle between Americanism and anti–Americanism is at hand, — the specter of Der Merkel Apparat, the European Union gravediggers of modernity, looms upon the horizon.

I/ THE HEGELIAN SCHOOL OF KOJÈVE: L’ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES 1933–1939

Already in 1961, some thirty years after the formation of his school, the extent of Kojève’s preponderant influence is well–known: Kojève is the father of French postwar progressivism.

“[vii] Kojève is the unknown Superior whose dogma is revered, often unawares, by that important subdivision of the ‘animal kingdom of the spirit’ in the contemporary world — the progressivist intellectuals. In the years preceding the second world war in France, the transmission was effected by means of oral initiation to a group of persons who in turn took the responsibility of instructing others, and so on. It was only in 1947 that by the efforts of Raymond Queneau, the classes on the Phenomenology of Spirit taught by Alexandre Kojève at the École des Hautes Études from 1933–1939 were published under the title, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel. This teaching was prior to the philosophico–political speculations of J.P. Sartre and M. Merleau–Ponty, to the publication of les Temps modernes and the new orientation of Esprit, reviews which were the most important vehicles for the dissemination of progressivist ideology in France after the liberation. From that time on we have breathed Kojève’s teaching with the air of the times. It is known that intellectual progressivism itself admits of a subdivision, since one ought to consider its two species, Christian (Esprit) and atheist (les Temps modernes); but this distinction, for reasons that the initial doctrine enables one to clarify, does not take on the importance of a schism … M. Kojève is, so far as we know, the first … to have attempted to constitute the intellectual and moral ménage à trois of Hegel, Marx and Heidegger which has since that time been such a great success … Aimé Patri, ‘Dialectique du Maître et de l’Esclave,’ Le Contrat Social, V, № 4 (July–August 1961), 234.”¹

Kojève replaced Alexandre Koyré at l’École des Hautes Études in Paris:

“Koyré proposed Kojève as his replacement, and for the next five and a half years Kojève devoted the seminar to a line–by–line reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit. His audience included Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, Raymond Queneau, André Breton, Georges Bataille, Gaston Fessard and other well–known figures.”²

During the 1930s Kojève initiated many young intellectuals in the dialectical thought of Kantio–Hegelianism at l’École des Hautes Études,including the rising generation of leading thinkers of postwar France and Europe: Hanna Arendt, Raymond Aron, Georges Bataille, André Breton, Georges Callois, Roger Caillois, Gaston Fessard, Georges Gurvitch, Denyse Harari, Jean Hyppolite, Pierre Klossowski, Alexandre Koyré, Jacques Lacan, Robert Marjolin, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, Raymond Queneau, Claude Valéry and Éric Weil, — these were his most influential students and disciples.

“‘Non è soltanto questo o quell’uomo che muore: muore l’Uomo in quanto tale. La fine della Storia è la morte dell’Uomo propriamente detto.’ Questa parole, lucidamente pronunciate in una piccola aula dell’École Pratique, dove ogni lunedì alle 17.30, per cinque anni, si repeté la liturgia del seminario, segnarono per sempre una sparuta manciata di studenti. Tra questi: Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, Alexandre Koyré, Éric Weil, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, André Breton, Raymond Aron, Roger Caillois, Denyse Harari, padre Fessard e Robert Marjolin. Con il metodo tutto parigino dell’agrégation, un’intera generazione intellettuale [17] ruotò attorno all’austero ed eccentrico commento di Kojève. Il suo seminario divenne in pochi anni leggendario, le discussioni che esso suscitava scavalcavano le mura delle aule universitarie per prolungarsi nei circoli letterari, nei laboratori politici e sociologici in cui si incubava un’estrema riflessione sulla crisi del moderno.”³

After the war, Kojève’s influence, moves far beyond his immediate circles at l’École des Hautes Études, with the publication of his Lectures in 1947, and spreads from Paris into French mainstream thought, and beyond into Europe, — undoubtedly even to France’s oversea colonies.

“Kojève’s influence was not limited to those who attended his lectures. Leading figures of postmodernism such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida also pay tribute to him and are deeply indebted to his reading of Hegel.”⁴

Kojève, via his impure Hegelian reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, advances the cause of postwar European pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism in his reconciliation of the Existentialism and Marxism of his time:

“[201] Kojève provides an overly ‘Husserlian’ descriptive interpretation of Hegel’s view of phenomenology since he mistakenly regards Hegel’s phenomenological method as a mere passive contemplation of the real. According to Kojève, thought only reflects a real that is itself dialectical … He goes so far as to identify the conceptions of method in Hegel and in Husserl … [202] There is a direct line running from Kojève’s to Hyppolite’s own existential approach to Hegel. Hyppolite applies Sartre’s definition of human being in Being and Nothingness to Hegel’s conception of man … Kojève strongly influenced Sartre … [205] In fact, Kojève was a Heideggerian and Marxian disciple of Hegel … [206] Roth maintains that Kojève’s concern in his dissertation to elucidate how a religious thinker reconciles his concerns with history with a commitment to the eternal decisively shaped Kojève’s later study of Hegel … This reading of Kojève is explicitly contradicted by Kojève’s own assertion that his reading of the Phenomenology is inspired and derived from Alexandre Koyre’s article on the concept of time in Hegel’s discussion of the philosophy of nature in the Jena writings. See Kojève, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel, p. 367.”⁵

What is the basis of Kojève’s Existentialist–Marxist Hegelianism? Kojève updates nineteenth century European Kantio–Hegelianism, especially as found in France at the turn of the century, itself rendered obsolete by the Great War and Soviet revolution:

“[128] Kant’s philosophy must be accepted as given truth … [142] the first attempt at a dualistic ontology was made by Kant … Hegel merely makes more precise the Kantian theory.”⁶

After the Second World War, Kojève will reintroduce his updated version of Kantio–Hegelianism, — since German “Neo–Kantianism” is bankrupted by the Hitler regime, — within the arena of French and European politics and economics. The mortally corrupt ruling classes of Europe will latch onto Kojève’s teaching in the absence of earlier Kantianism, — itself compromised by raciology during the war, — in order to exploit the advantages of enrichment presented by the Cold War in Europe, as “friends” of the American superpower: New life is thereby breathed into the nineteenth century European cadaver of the left and right, first unchained by the decomposition of the Hegelian school, — these are the same imbecile ruling classes incapable of resisting Hitler’s advances, since they themselves are in cahoots with the very same modern European political and economic irrationalism so demonically deployed by the criminals of the German Reich.

II/ GAULLISM AND EUROPEAN UNITY 1945–1968

Alexandre Kojève — Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov at the heights of Gaullist power?

“I saw Kojève again in 1945, when I was director of External Economic Relations in the Ministry of the National Economy. He came to see me one day and explained that he wanted to get into the civil service. I had him appointed chargé de mission in the ministry, where he was to stay until his death in 1968. Valued counsellor of Olivier Wormser, Bernard Clappier and many others, he enjoyed considerable authority there.”¹

Alexandre Kojève — Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov at the heights of Gaullist power?

“[136] During this time Kojève finally becomes a French national, and after the war Jean Monnet recommends one of Kojève’s students, Robert Marjolin, as director of the Direction des relations économiques extérieures au ministère de l’Économie nationale (‘DREE’). In 1944 Marjolin is appointed to this position by Pierre Mendèz France. Apparently following Kojève’s own request, Marjolin in turn appoints Kojève to the DREE … From 1945 on, Rousselier was Kojève’s new superior. Under him Kojève played an important role as one of the French delagates in the negotiations of the Havana Charter. In 1953 Bernard Clappier was appointed director [137] of the DREE and Olivier Wormser director of economic affairs at the Quai d’Orsay. Those two and Kojève form a powerful alliance in the central government administration until 1966. For the rest of his life Kojève is concerned with international trade, promoting what he called ‘giving colonialism,’ abolition of trade barriers, international economic relations and especially relations between developing and industrial countries. In 1964 Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, then Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, makes him chevalier de la Légion d’honneur. Kojève dies on 4 June 1968 at a meeting of the common market in Brussels.”²

Alexandre Kojève — Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov at the heights of Gaullist power?

“[Alexandre Kojève] died suddenly, on June 4, 1968, while giving a speech in Brussels at a meeting of an organization he had done much to create and foster: the European Common Market … After the war, he was asked by a former student, Robert Marjolin, to join him in the Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures as an ‘adviser.’ From this time on Kojève seems to have played a rôle of considerable importance in the postwar French government, shaping economic policy, promoting the common market, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and support for third world development. Anecdotes abound regarding his influence on French policy making, the 1957 creation of the European Community from the Coal and Steel Treaty, and his unusual position as a feared and enigmatic éminence grise who, together with Bernard Clappier and Olivier Wormser, dominated French economic policy for more than a decade.”³

Alexandre Kojève — Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov at the heights of Gaullist power?

“With the help of Robert Marjolin, Kojève secured a job at the Direction des relations économiques extérieures after World War II, and for the next twenty years, he was instrumental in helping to shape France’s foreign trade and economic policy. According to everyone who worked with him, Kojève was the éminence grise of French foreign economic policy, and he was involved in diplomatic events and treaties whose significance continue to define international affairs. After helping to implement the Marshall Plan, he was involved in promoting the European Economic Community (now the European Union); he was a central participant in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization); and he took a keen interest in encouraging Third World development (what is now routinely referred to as the North–South dialogue and aid). Although Kojève continued to publish occasionally, his longer and more detailed studies in the history of philosophy and political thought were published posthumously. He died in 1968 after giving a speech in Brussels before a meeting of the Common Market.”⁴

Alexandre Kojève — Aleksandr Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov at the heights of Gaullist power?

“At the time of his sudden death, Alexandre ‘Kojevnikoff, dit Kojève Alexandre,’ was serving on the Committee for Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community, the so–called Committee 113, the sancta sanctorum of its external commercial policy. This is how a man almost universally considered one of the most brilliant exegetes of Hegel came to receive his first official mourning from two European civil servants, during a meeting of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the then Council of Ministers, to which the Committee 113 was attached.”⁵

1/ Alexandre Kojève’s Latin Empire: Twentieth Century French Bonapartism

Draped in the Kantio–Hegelian language of his time, Kojève’s Gaullism places France at the center of world power in Europe (une grande puissance moderne) in the name of Bonapartism, autocracy founded upon popular consent, — the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right:

“[93] L’époque est aux Empires, c’est–à–dire aux unités politiques trans–nationales, mais formées par des nations apparentées … Une parenté ainsi conçue existe sans aucun doute entre les nations latines, — française, italienne et espagnole en premier chef. Tout d’abord ces nations sont éminemment catholiques, même si elles sont «anticléricales». En ce qui concerne la France par exemple, l’observateur étranger est frappé en voyant à quel point les «libres penseurs» et même les protestants et les israélites y sont pénétrés de la mentalité catholique plus ou moins laïcisée, dans la mesure tout au moins où ils pensent, agissent ou réagissent en français. En outre, l’étroite parenté des langues rend le contact entre les pays latins particulièrement aisés. En ce qui concerne en particulier la France, l’Italie et l’Espagne, il suffirait dans chaque pays de rendre obligatoire l’étude approfondie (d’ailleurs très facile) d’une seule des deux langues latines étrangères pour supprimer tous les inconvénients que provoque une diversité de langage. D’ailleurs les civilisations latines sont elles–mêmes proches parentes … [94] La parenté latine, fondée sur la parenté de substance et de genèse, est déjà un Empire en puissance qu’il s’agit seulement d’actualiser politiquement dans les conditions historiques concrètes de notre temps, qui sont d’ailleurs propices aux formations impériales … La parenté spirituelle et psychique qui unit les nations latines semble devoir assurer à leurs relations à l’intérieur de l’Empire ce caractère de liberté, d’égalité et de fraternité sans lequel il n’y a pas de Démocratie véritable. Et on pourrait même croire que c’est seulement en instaurant la Démocratie dans l’ensemble du Monde latin qu’on peut lui enlever ce caractère «municipal» qu’elle possède tant qu’elle reste renfermée dans des frontières purement nationales … [95] Enfin, l’organisation de l’Empire latin, qui serait essentiellement autre chose que le Commonwealth anglo–saxon ou l’Union soviétique, poserait à la pensée politique démocratique des problèmes inédits, qui lui permettraient de dépasser enfin son idéologie traditionnelle, adaptée aux seuls cadres nationaux et par conséquent anachronique. C’est peut–être en déterminant les rapports entre les nations au sein d’un Empire (et à la limite, — de l’humanité) que la Démocratie aura de nouveau quelque chose à dire au monde contemporain … [96] L’essentiel est que l’Union latine soit vraiment un Empire, c’est–à–dire une entité politique réelle. Or de toute évidence elle ne peut l’être qu’à condition de former une véritable unité économique.”¹

Kojève attacks French Bonapartism as nationalism, in the name of French Bonapartism as imperialism:

“[92] D’une part, dans le domaine de l’idéologie politique, le pays continue à vivre sur la base des idées qui furent définitivement élaborées au cours de la Révolution. L’idéal politique «officiel» de la France et des Français est aujourd’hui encore celui de l’État–nation, de la «République une et indivisible». D’autre part, dans les profondeurs de son âme, le pays se rend compte de l’insuffisance de cet idéal, de l’anachronisme politique de l’idée strictement «nationale».”²

What is the basis of Kojève’s French Bonapartism as imperialism?

“[94] La parenté spirituelle et psychique qui unit les nations latines semble devoir assurer à leurs relations à l’intérieur de l’Empire ce caractère de liberté, d’égalité et de fraternité sans lequel il n’y a pas de Démocratie véritable.”³

The basis of Kojève’s French Bonapartism as imperialism, the fountainhead of his Latin Empire, is real democracy “la démocratie véritable,” by which of course he means autocracy founded upon popular consent. For this reason Bonapartist France is located at the very center of Kojève’s Latin Empire:

“[95] Cependant, en dépit — ou peut–être en raison même — de l’étroite «parenté» des peuples impériaux et donc du caractère «familial» de la vie de l’Empire, il y aura nécessairement parmi les nations unies une nation qui sera l’«aînée» des autres et la première parmi ses pairs.”⁴

Bonapartism (“volonté de puissance”), the outdated and surpassed the Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right (l’étroite «parenté»), — autocracy founded upon popular consent, — is the very essence of the imperialism (“l’État véritable”) of Kojève’s Latin Empire:

“[La] «volonté de puissance» … cette «indépendance» ou autonomie [89]politique qui caractérise l’essence même de l’État véritable.”⁵

Kojève’s Latin Empire is inscribed within the confines of his Kantio–Hegelianism:

“[89] Le seul État (provisoirement national) qui se révélera à la longue comme politiquement viable, sera celui qui aura pour but suprême et premier d’englober l’humanité tout entière … on ne peut pas sauter de la Nation à l’Humanité sans passer par l’Empire … Avant de s’incarner dans l’Humanité, le Weltgeist hégélien, qui a abandonné les Nations, séjourne dans les Empires.”⁶

According to Kojève, “liberté, égalité et fraternité” is “volonté de puissance” as “indépendance” and “autonomie,” the very essence of his “Démocratie véritable” or “l’État véritable,” which constitutes the fountainhead of his Latin Empire as Bonapartism, and which places General de Gaulle’s France at its very center. Behind Kojève’s “liberté, égalité et fraternité,” the very essence of his Latin imperialism, lurks the outdated and surpassed Napoléonic and French revolutionary category of right as autocracy founded upon popular consent, the power of the people and tyranny of the masses, — at least upon the stage of world history, especially as la Communauté and la Francophonie:

“In and through this battle, the vanguard of humanity has virtually reached the limit and the goal point, that is, the end of Man’s historical evolution. Whatever has occurred since then is but an extension in space of the universal revolutionary power actualized in France through Robespierre–Napoléon.”⁷

2/ Kojève’s Anti–Americanism: The Origins of the European Union

Kojève’s rabid anti–Americanism is downplayed by his Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian interpreters (for they cannot totally disavow him and thereby betray the perspectives of their historical “empiricism”),and their European publishers and media combines, which receive massive subsidies from the European Union (while the sick and elderly taxpayers of Europe, especially the poor and lower middle classes, are massively dumped into the boneyards in the name of cost–savings by their under–funded “healthcare” systems):

“Rejected by the U.S. and other countries, the French proposal would become characteristic of Kojève’s tactic, which consisted in unmasking the hypocrisy hidden under apparently generous offers (most of the times North American) by concocting elaborate counter proposals that reversed the rationale of the original ones.”¹

Since Kantio–Hegelianism (“avant de s’incarner dans l’Humanité, le Weltgeist hégélien, qui a abandonné les Nations, séjourne dans les Empires”) is the basis of his Gaullist and Bonapartist opposition to the American empire (“le bloc politico–économique anglo–américain”), on the stage of world history Kojève’s anti–Americanism leads him to vigorously oppose Britain’s entrance into the embryonic European Union:

“[139] [Kojève] played an active and quite destructive role in Britain’s first application to join the EEC. As mentioned above, Kojève was opposed to British accession to the ECSC and the EEC … [140] From early on in the process of Britain applying to join the EEC, France opposed the application and cabaled against it. Chief protagonists in these machinations were Wormser and Kojève. Both were described by the British embassy in Paris as ‘two virtuosos of intrigue, and renowned for their opposition to British membership.’ Wormser and Kojève tried to strengthen the resistance of the Dominions to UK membership in the EEC by approaching the embassies of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand with the clear message that the Commonwealth could not possibly survive in its present form if Britain joined the EEC. Even though, ultimately, it was not the resistance of the Dominions that killed off the first attempt, Kojève must have been a great nuisance to the British delegation.”²

The modern European irrationalists in the European Union, especially Brussels, downplay Kojève’s anti–Americanism in their effort to disentangle themselves from the charge of modern European raison d’état, — in this context, Gaullism and Bonapartism:

“It would be misleading to define Kojève as a Europeanist, or to say that his influence on the institutional development of European integration was of any practical importance. He didn’t like the idea of the European Coal and Steel Community and originally objected to a continental common market such as that which developed with the European Economic Community. Nor does he seem to have sympathized with one of its core concepts, namely the recovery of the Federal Republic of Germany, as a crucial element of the economic strengthening of Europe. His original [108] enthusiasm for a Latin Empire geared to the civilizational communality between France, Italy, and Spain evoked some of the conservative ideas of Charles Maurras, while his idea of a balancing power seemed to anticipate de Gaulle’s longing for a Troisième Force. Additionally, in a time of national liberation struggles, his plans for a ‘caring capitalism’ could easily be interpreted as an inappropriate revival of White Man’s Burden approach. And yet it is impossible not to acknowledge that some of the ideas developed by Kojève came to be part of the discourse on modernity embodied in the project of European integration.”³

The reason Kojève’s influence upon the origin of European institutions appears to them as incidental results from their tendentious Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian interpretations of Kojèveanism:

“The fact that Brussels has been able to wield its power over European societies and nations, irrespective of any military force, has to do, beyond any doubt, with the central role played in the imaginary associated with [109] it by reciprocal recognition — recognition between individuals (embodied in liberal ideology), between classes (embodied in socialist ideology) and between states (embodied in what we could label integration ideology). Should actual policies fail to abide by this imaginary, the legitimacy of European integration, as conceived in its original form, would be destroyed forever.”⁴

In the same vein as they mask their political and economic connections with the relativism, subjectivism and irrationalism of European modernity (imaginaire, idéologie), the raciological traditions that resulted in the collapse of Europe in world wars and mass exterminations, they neglect and ignore the raciology of Immanuel Kant, precisely to draw their outdated and surpassed distinction between democracy and totalitarianism, in order to attack their opponents as totalitarians and fascists, i.e., to enrich themselves and their backers while Europeans wallow in the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of Der Merkel Apparat.

Yet Kojève was a rabid anti–American, and the anti–Americanism he deployed within the world historical arena of politics and economics is from his Kantio–Hegelianism:

“If Americans can be perceived as rich Sino–Soviets, it is because the Russians and the Chinese are only Americans who are still poor, but they are soon to become rich. This led me to conclude that the American way of life was the type of life specific to the post–historical period, the current presence of the United States in the world heralding the future ‘eternal present’ of humanity as a whole. The return of Man to animality thus no longer appeared as a possibility yet to come, but as an already present certainty.”⁵

Kojève was a notorious enemy of Americanism, evidenced even by his adversaries upon the stage of world history:

“Some of the U.S. delegates to the conference of Havana called him ‘the snake in the lawn’ and, in a similar vein, the German delegation at the GATT negotiation on textiles, where the six EEC countries frequently had to harmonize their positions on the basis of French [Gaullist] proposals, called him Schwarz Peter (Black Peter) — the elf who, in German folklore, accompanies St. Nicholas to punish naughty children with his little whip.”⁶

Our American Idealist interpretation of Kojèveanism as Gaullism and Bonapartism (twentieth century French Machiavellianism) makes use of his early works on Hegel, his doctrine of French raison d’état, as well as his postwar writings and political and economic activities upon the stage of world history: Alexandre Kojève and his followers are conceived within the world historical clash of superior and inferior ruling classes, as the collapse of European modernity and rise of Globalism in the supremacy of American Liberty.

Following in the footsteps of American Idealism, our world historical interpretation of Alexandre Kojève’s Kantio–Hegelian blueprint for the anti–Americanization of the European ruling classes, his Existentialist–Marxist Hegelianism, relies upon our translations of French texts, not merely “interpretations” based upon characteriological outlines from his works, such as the incomplete presentations of Allan Bloom and James H. Nichols (tainted by their self–avowed pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism):

“The present translation includes slightly under one half of the original volume: the passages translated correspond to pp. 9–34, 161–195, 265–267, 271–291, 336–380, 427–443, 447–528, and 576–597 of the French text. The selections for this edition were made with two goals in mind: to present the outlines of Kojève’s interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and to present the most characteristic aspects of his own thought.”⁷

III/ Kojeve’s Kantio–Hegelian Doctrine of the Concept

Alexandre Kojève’s impure Kantio–Hegelian version of the famous Hegelian Doctrine of the Concept, as outlined in his famous work on Hegelianism, clashes with the genuine doctrine, especially as found in the great works published by Hegel during his lifetime (including the 1832 second edition of the Greater Logic, the first chapter of which was revised by himself in 1831, just before his sudden death), because he imports propositions from the Jena Lectures into his hermeneutical argument, which is thereby rendered sophistical: Kojève gives the propositions of impure Hegelianism the same philological and exegetical valuation as propositions culled from the Originalausgabe. Now, there is no reason to reject these former propositions out of hand from the canons of exact hermeneutical analysis, but the attribution of their doctrinal equality by Kojève with the Originalausgabe is mistaken: At most these impure Hegelian propositions have a conditional hermeneutical valuation. In other words, they may or may not be doctrinally equivalent with propositions found in the Originalausgabe. One way or the other, on a case by case basis, the question of the doctrinal equivalency of these impure Hegelian propositions with statements found in the Originalausgabe requires an exact hermeneutical argument. Kojève merely assumes (asserts) their doctrinal equivalence, but nowhere advances any precise hermeneutical evaluation in support his attribution.

Why not merely assume the doctrinal equivalency of such impure Hegelian statements without further ado, and thereby obliterate the exact philological and hermeneutical distinction between pure and impure Hegelianism? The obliteration of the distinction results in the debasement of the concept of orthodoxy, established since the earliest times within the ancient Athenian schools of Western philosophy. The traditions of Western philosophy have always distinguished between the philosophically orthodox and unorthodox, while political and economic schisms are founded upon the notion. The history of Marxism in western Europe abounds with examples of struggles between political and economic orthodoxy; indeed, Existentialist–Hegelians vociferously condemn Stalinism as “orthodox Marxism,” while the entire Eurocommunist socialist project (Cosmopolitanism) of the 1960s New Left is predicated upon the distinction. The philosophical distinction between official and unofficial doctrine is therefore widely established in the world historical arena of politics and economics. Indeed, Kojève advances his own Existential–Hegelian version of Kantio–Hegelianism as the genuine interpretation of Hegelianism, in rabid opposition towards Hegelian anti–Kantianism: Kojève’s Existential–Hegelianism rejects Hegelian anti–Kantianism as falsehood and error, and thereby affirms itself as the interpretative truth and reality of “correct” Hegelian philosophy. Kojève’s Existential–Hegelianism therefore inverts the distinction between pure and impure Hegelianism, i.e., affirms the orthodoxy of Kantio–Hegelianism, versus the unorthodoxy of Hegelian anti–Kantianism. Kojève’s version of interpretative truth and reality wields the historically established (traditional) distinction between correct and incorrect Hegelianism, i.e., philosophical orthodoxy and unorthodoxy, and therefore is itself an inescapable lesson of history. Shall we therefore oppose Kojève’s impure Hegelianism in contradistinction to our own version of the genuine Hegel, within the philological and exegetical arena of exact hermeneutics? Not at all. We will reject Kojève’s philological and exegetical“analysis” as sophistical hermeneutics, based upon his very own statements. In other words, we will apply the sophistical canons of Kojève’s Hegelianism to the interpretation of his very own Existential–Hegelianism: We will thereby discover exactly where the world historical inversion of Kojève’s Existential–Hegelianism ends:

“The real presence of Time in the World, therefore, is called Man. Time is Man, and Man is Time. In the Phenomenology, Hegel does not say this in so many words, because he avoids the word ‘man.’ But in the Lectures delivered at Jena he says: ‘Geist ist Zeit’ (‘Spirit is Time’). Now, ‘Spirit’ in Hegel (and especially in this context) means ‘human Spirit’ or Man, more particularly, collective Man — that is, the People or State, and, finally, Man as a whole or humanity in the totality of its spatial–temporal existence, that is, the totality of universal History.”¹

Kojève affirms, in the name of correct Hegelianism, the totality of universal history as spatial–temporal existence: “‘Spirit’ in Hegel means ‘human Spirit, or Man,” according to Kojève. The arena of world history is therefore the bastion of Kojève’s Kantio–Hegelianism, as spatial–temporal existence. What exactly does Kojève mean by the Hegelian conception of Spirit as spatial–temporal existence, i.e., the totality of universal history, as exemplified in his own version of correct Hegelianism? We shall discover that the Existential–Hegelianism of Kojève’s Kantio–Hegelian version of Spirit follows in the world historical footsteps of nineteenth century Left Hegelianism. Upon world historical grounds (the grounds of Kantio–Hegelian spatial–temporal existence), American Idealism rejects Kojève’s Existential–Hegelian distinction between correct and incorrect Hegelianism. The world historical ground of this rejection constitutes the condemnation of the political and economic monstrosities of pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism: The political and economic satanism of Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini.

There is no world historical question here of war guilt, but only the modern European political and economic irrationalism from which springs the Holocaust.

To Be Continued …

ENDNOTES

Introduction

1. Charles Margrave Taylor, “La révolution futile ou les avatars de la pensée globale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.69(août–septembre, 1964): 10–22; 10–19–20–21: “Ce que j’appelle une pensée globaliste, c’est une pensée qui définit la réalité par rapport à un seul facteur … [19] Le tort de la pensée globalisante réside dans le fait qu’en abordant ce domaine de la condition humaine sociale où ces phénomènes se dessinent, elle est frappée d’une cécité qui l’entraîne constamment à tout réduire à l’unité — unité qui, puisqu’elle est fausse et sans structure est une nuit, semblable à celle dont parlait Hegel et où toutes les vaches sont noires … [20] Cette pensée prétendait rendre raison de tout … [21] Le mouvement totalitaire, en d’autres termes, totalise tout pour faire une somme.” [Italics added]

From April 1962 until August 1966, very important years in the rise of Pierre Elliott Trudeau and the Québécocracy, the magazine Cité Libre: Nouvelle série was published by Pierre Desmarais Inc., of Montréal.

See: “[10] Ce que j’appelle une pensée globaliste, c’est une pensée qui définit la réalité par rapport à un seul facteur, qui groupe non seulement l’ensemble mais une totalité de problèmes, tous les maux dont souffre un peuple, pour y trouver une seule et unique solution … [18] il y a un phénomène appelé ‘culture de masse’ qui commence à se manifester. Cette nouvelle culture dite ‘de masse,’ on l’appelle souvent et à tort, ‘américanisation’… C’est une culture populaire, mais elle n’a pas les mêmes résonnances historiques que la culture traditionnelle proprement dite … ce sont peut–être en effet les penseurs marxistes qui ont analysé ce phénomène le plus en profondeur … [19] Le tort de la pensée globalisante réside dans le fait qu’en abordant ce domaine de la condition humaine sociale où ces phénomènes se dessinent, elle est frappée d’une cécité qui l’entraîne constamment à tout réduire à l’unité — unité qui, puisqu’elle est fausse et sans structure est une nuit, semblable à celle dont parlait Hegel et où toutes les vaches sont noires … [20] Dans les collèges classiques, elle a nourri des générations d’élèves aux sources d’une pensée systématique et étanche. Cette pensée prétendait rendre raison de tout. Elle prétendait ne laisser rien en dehors. Bref, elle prétendait tenir la solution de tous les problèmes et se complaisait en la ‘possession tranquille de la vérité’ … Le système traditionnel a formé des esprits incapables d’accepter une réalité qui ne se laisse pas résumer dans une simple formule, des esprits qui ne sont donc vraiment pas préparés à aborder les problèmes complexes que posent la vie et la réforme démocratique au XXe siècle … La pensée globalisante est un symptôme inquiétant du désespoir, d’un ‘failure of nerve’ devant les problèmes qui nous affrontent … Elle est facilement portée à désespérer de toute action concrète dans le contexte actuel et à se réfugier dans une solution globale … [21] La pensée globalisante, sous certaines formes, engendre aussi le totalitarisme … Un mouvement totalitaire donc, a tendance à tout mobiliser dans le sens de son but privilégié. Il entend briser la résistance interne de tout ce qu’il trouve sur son chemin et la faire servir comme instrument dans la poursuite de ses fins ultimes … Le mouvement totalitaire, en d’autres termes, totalise tout pour faire une somme … quand nous avons affaire à des formes de pensée globalisante qui relèvent, non d’une certaine vision de la structure du pouvoir politique, mais d’une conception de la condition humaine, nous sommes en présence d’une pensée qui est aussi totalitaire, car en ce cas, il s’agit souvent d’une conception qui ne prétend, non seulement que tous les problèmes politiques peuvent se résoudre par un correctif unique, mais que tous les problèmes humains se rassemblent sous un seul … [22] le vice majeur de la pensée québécoise était de vouloir résoudre tous les problèmes par des méthodes théologiques ou autoritaires; et de rechercher par ces méthodes cléricales et autoritaires, des solutions à des problèmes aussi concrets que l’organisation économique, syndicale, etc., … Nous sommes aujourd’hui en présence d’un nouveau dogmatisme systématique … il importe de bâtir dans la rigueur un programme de réformes sociales et économiques qui morde véritablement à la réalité qui nous entoure, et qui puisse véritablement casser les structures qui nous empêchent de vivre pleinement.” Charles Margrave Taylor, “La révolution futile ou les avatars de la pensée globale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.69(août–septembre, 1964): 10–22.

See also: “A spectre haunts Charles Taylor’s conception of the self — the spectre of Marxism ... there has been little written about Taylor’s relationship to Marx ... [Charles Margrave Taylor] was one of the founders of the New Left in Britain, and began the journey of rethinking and re–evaluating Marxism ... From the late 1950s onwards, he wrote a number of articles and chapters, which explicitly engaged with Marxism in one form or another. Over this thirty–year period, he can be seen as adopting a sympathetic and immanent critique of Marx and Marxism.” Ian Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor, Exeter, Imprint Academic, 2007, 1–2.

See also: “Taylor’s reflections on his analysis of ‘transcendental arguments’ may contribute to a clarification of how we accept or validate our position on some fundamental questions. The impetus derives from the thought of Kant, but Taylor’s concern is their applicability to contemporary questions. They typically adjudicate questions about our fundamental assumptions. They work by a regressive argument to some strong conclusion about ourselves or our purchase on the world from some features of our experience … I would argue here that so conceived ‘transcendental arguments’ have a pedigree that goes beyond Kant to several medieval thinkers.” John V. Apczynski, “The Projects of Michael Polanyi and Charles Taylor,” Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Charles W. Lowney II, editor; John V. Apczynski, John Fennell, Charles W. Lowney II, David James Stewart, Charles Margrave Taylor & Diane M. Yeager, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 53–70; 61–67.

See also: “Kant himself seems to have thought that such a ‘transcendental’ argument, from a fact to its necessary condition, was an important discovery of his own; he distinguished it both from the ‘dogmatic’ proofs of his predecessors (who in his view had argued ‘from concepts,’ i.e., by arbitrarily adopting certain notions and working out their implications) and from inductive arguments. Unlike the latter, transcendental arguments were alleged to lead to conclusions which were certain and incorrigible. Unfortunately Kant did not explain how they could achieve such a result; he did not make clear how we could know what was the necessary condition (or set of necessary conditions) of a fact. His failure to deal with this question is part of a wider failure to discuss the nature and conditions of philosophical assertions — a problem which clearly arises in his work but to which he nowhere gave sufficient attention.” William Henry Walsh, “Kant,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 13, Chicago, Illinois, William Benton, 1967, 217–223; 220.

See finally: “According to Kant, we can never know anything but ‘phenomena,’ never a thing that exists independently of the mind. It cannot be but a subjective phenomenon, because the element of experience in it — the ‘impression,’ which is called the ‘matter’ of the object of a sense–intuition, is subjective, and the element of necessity and universality which is called the ‘form’ coming as it does from the mind, is likewise subjective. Hence the object before the mind, composed as it is by subjective elements, is wholly subjective. Yet Kant always calls such an object really objective. Because the term ‘objective’ always means for Kant, whatever contains a necessary and universal element. For such an element is the same for all human minds as they are at present constituted.” Michael Joseph Mahony, History of Modern Thought, New York, Fordham University Press, 1933, 158–159.

Remarks: Charles Margrave Taylor advanced his academic career by promoting the Marxist fad in Britain, thereby helping the British Labour Party into power. Charles Taylor advanced his professional career by promoting the Socialist fad, thereby helping the Québécocracy seize power in Ottawa. Later in life, to protect himself from blowback, he called himself a Christian and fled to Cambridge. The only reason why Charles Taylor is called a philosopher rather than a sophist is because he has friends in very high places. Charles Margrave Taylor’s modern European unreason is Canadian Kantio–Hegelianism:

“Canadian higher education has been significantly influenced by Hegelian notions of progress, which seem to have resulted in a belief that it is the future, not the past, that matters, — to the point that the young in Canada seem not to be able to think in terms of anything other than progress.” John von Heyking in David W. Livingstone, editor, “Introduction,” Liberal Education, Civic Education, and the Canadian Regime: Past Principles and Present Challenges, Kingston/Montreal, McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2015, 3–28; 6.

2. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 806–808. [Italics added]

3. François Mitterrand (1995) in Georges–Marc Benamou, Le dernier Mitterrand, Paris, Plon, 1996, 50–52: “La France ne le sait pas, mais nous sommes en guerre avec l’Amérique. Oui, une guerre permanente, une guerre vitale, une guerre économique, une guerre sans morts … apparemment. Oui, ils sont très durs, les américains, ils sont voraces, ils veulent un pouvoir sans partage sur le monde … C’est une guerre inconnue, une guerre permanente, sans morts apparemment, et pourtant, une guerre à mort!” [Italics added]

See: François Mitterrand in Alain de Benoist, Dernière année: Notes pour conclure le siècle, Lausanne, Suisse, Éditions L’Age d’Homme, 2001, 187; François Mitterrand in Henri de Grossouvre, “Guerre économique Europe/États–Unis,” Paris–Berlin–Moscou: La voie de l’indépendance et de la paix, Pierre Marie Gallois, préface, Lausanne, Suisse, Éditions L’Age d’Homme, 2002, 38–40; 38.

Remarks: European irrationalists who interpret this instance of François Mitterrand’s anti–Americanism as an example of economic warfare between France and the United States of America ignore and neglect that economic warfare is not “une guerre à mort”: Modern European sophisters assume without further ado, i.e., they pretend, imagine and phantasize that the sentence “nous sommes en guerre avec l’Amérique,” and the phrase, “c’est une guerre inconnue,” mean that la France est en guerre avec l’Amérique, instead of meaning that Président François Mitterrand and the Gaullist ruling class are at war with America. Modern delusions, phantasms and imaginings are themselves inscribed within the degeneration of European modernity and rise of world civilization: As the inferior ruling classes are wheeled–off the stage of modern history, as the soixante–huitards are unceremoniously dumped onto the dunghill of the world, they themselves are the greatest cheerleaders of their own self–destruction. Surprise of all surprises, the soixante–huitards wheel themselves into the boneyard: Woe to those who appear as their “saviors” rather than masters.

See: “What de Gaulle had in mind was a Europe organized along the lines of Bismarck’s Germany — that is, unified on the basis of states, one of which (France) would play a dominant role, with the same function that Prussia had had inside Imperial Germany. Everybody would have had some role in de Gaulle’s [Bonapartist] redefinition of the old dream of Richelieu’s pre–eminent France: The Soviet Union would have seen to the division of Germany; the United States to Western Europe’s defense against the Soviet Union; France to diverting German national aspirations into European unity. But, unlike Prussia, France was not the strongest state in Western Europe; it did not have the economic muscle to dominate the others and, finally, it was in no position to dominate an equilibrium containing the two superpowers … cooperation between these two long time friendly adversaries — something like America’s special relationship between Great Britain — has emerged as a key to the equilibrium, just as it should have when, two generations earlier, Wilson had appeared in France to liberate the Old World from its follies and to raise its sights beyond the nation–state.”

Henry Kissinger, “Concepts of Western Unity: Macmillan, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 594–619; 606–619.

See finally: Pierre Péan, Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, 1934–1947, Paris, Fayard, 1994.

4. Frédéric Bozo [BUZZ–saw], “Prologue: France and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal,” Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, Susan Emanuel, translator, New York, Berghahn Books, 2009, xi–xxxiii; xv. [2005] [Italics added]

See also: “[xiii] It is commonly alleged that Paris tried to slow down if not altogether block certain ineluctable evolutions: German unification, against which Mitterrand purportedly attempted to make an alliance with Mikhail Gorbachev’s USSR and Margaret Thatcher’s Great Britain; the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which French diplomacy allegedly sought to avert up until the end; and finally the integration of the former people’s democracies into the European Community, which Paris reputedly tried to postpone indefinitely by means of a European confederation proposed by Mitterrand … the negative image of France’s role at the end of the Cold War and vis–à–vis German unification began to emerge at the time of the events as the result of the misperceptions brought about by French policy, in particular in the domestic and international press, not least the German press. It has also been fueled by the revelations and polemics that accompanied the end of Mitterrand’s presidency (whether on financial scandals or his role during the Vichy years), which had the effect of tarnishing his presidential record, including in foreign policy. But more importantly, it was nourished by the highly controversial publication of the last volume of his former special advisor Jacques Attali’s diary for the years 1988 to 1991, in which many comments and documents — although of dubious authenticity — contribute to dramatizing Mitterrand’s alleged hesitations, if not his anxiety, when faced with German unification and the end of the Cold War. To the extent that a number of later works rely largely on Attali’s toxic Verbatim, it is no exaggeration to state that the negative image of French policy in this period arises to no small extent from an ‘Attali problem’ … [xiv] the 2002 book by German political scientist Tilo Schabert … denounces the ‘legend’ that Mitterrand’s France [xv] tried to ‘stall’ if not ‘block’ German unification. Schabert seeks to radically correct the negative image of French policy that prevailed until then … What really was Mitterrand’s policy with regards to the emancipation of Eastern Europe, German unification, the disintegration of the USSR, and the redefinition of the European order after the Cold War? Was French diplomacy guided by the ambition, constantly proclaimed from de Gaulle to Mitterrand, to move beyond ‘Yalta’? Or on the contrary, once this perspective carried the day, was France conservative and wary of leaving the ‘Cold War niche’ it had comfortably occupied since the 1960s by denouncing the East–West status quo while at the same time benefiting from security against the USSR and from primacy over a divided Germany? To what extent did France attain its objectives at Cold War’s end, whether in the resolution of the German question, in its relations with Eastern Europe and with the USSR, in the relaunching of European construction, in the redefinition of transatlantic relations or in the establishment of a new pan–European architecture? Finally, and as a corollary, did France contribute in a significant way to events of this period, or did it play only a marginal role in the transformations that marked the end of the Cold War? …[xxviii] The perception of France’s reluctance to accept German unification is particularly widespread in Germany.”

Frédéric Bozo, “Prologue: France and the End of the Cold War: A Reappraisal,” Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, Susan Emanuel, translator, New York, Berghahn Books, 2009, xi–xxxiii; xiii–xiv–xv–xxviii. [2005]

See finally: Frédéric Bozo, “French Diplomacy and the New European Architecture (1990–1991),” Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, Susan Emanuel, translator, New York, Berghahn Books, 2009, 310–376, [2005]; François Mitterrand, De l’Allemagne, de la France, Paris, Odile Jacob, 1996; Condoleezza Rice & Philip Zelikow, Germany United and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1995; George H.W. Bush & Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed, New York, Vintage, 1998; James A. Baker III & Thomas M. DeFrank, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992, New York, Putnam, 1995; Samy Cohen, direction, Mitterrand et la sortie de la guerre froide, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1998; Helmut Kohl, Erinnerungen, 1982–1990, Munich, Droemer Verlag, 2005; Stephen F. Szabo, The Diplomacy of German Unification, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1992; John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997; John L. Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History, New York, Penguin Books, 2005; Karl Kaiser, Deutschlands Vereinigung: Die Internationalen Aspekte, Bergisch Gladbach, Gustav Lubbe, 1991; Tilo Schabert, Wie Weltgeschichte gemacht Wird: Frankreich und die deutsche Einheit, Stuttgart, Klett–Cotta, 2002.

5. John Francis Bosher, The Gaullist Attack on Canada: 1967–1997, Montréal/Kingston, McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1999, 4–5–5–5–6–11–13–14–18.

See: David Anderson, Lloyd Axworthy, Ethel Blondin–Andrew, Raymond Chan, Joseph Jacques–Jean Chrétien, David Michael Collenette, Sheila Copps, David Charles Dingwall, Michel Dupuy, Arthur C. Eggleton, Joyce Fairbairn, Sheila Finestone, Alphonso Gagliani, Jon Gerrard, Ralph Edward Goodale, †Herbert Eser Gray, Ron Irwin, Lawrence MacAulay, Roy MacLaren, John Manley, Sergio Marchi, Diane Marleau, Paul Edgar Philippe Martin, Marcel Massé, Anne McLellan, André Ouellet, Fernand Robichaud, Douglas Peters, Allan Rock, Christine Stewart, Brian Tobin & Douglas Young.

6. One day the exact historiography of these institutions will be uncovered, and their world historical role in the uplifting of Americanism in the last half of the 20th century will be revealed: Many years ago I discussed this subject in Montréal with my dear friend Rabbi Joshua Shmidman. I spent many hours alone with the elderly Rabbi, together plunged into deep conversation, downstairs in his narrow basement study, the two walls of which were stacked to the ceiling with his massive tomes of Hebrew books: The Jewish philosophy of Rabbi Shmidman greatly uplifted my conception of Spinozism, and the place of Spinoza in Western thought. I was very saddened by the news of Rabbi Shmidman’s untimely demise. I will always remember our last conversation together, his serene and imperturbable face, his quiet–spoken demeanor, and his unusually piercing eyes: “You are truly the greatest philosopher that I have ever known.” I will never forget the large photograph of the Rabbi in his youth, above his desk, wherein he is seen teaching Hebrew to his students. Even today, I can still see him seated at his desk near the end of the long rectangular study (located farthest from the front entrance), his face beaming with happiness: I cannot help being struck by the profound spiritual genius and erudition of this great Jewish philosopher, in thinking of the influence of his powerful and amazing ideas. Rabbi Shmidman was himself the truly greatest philosopher that I have ever known: There was another many years ago, whose ideas of Descartes and the Cartesian revolution of Western philosophy deeply influenced my conception of Americanism, — inscribed within the powerful tradition of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

7.

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9.

10. Robert Bourassa, “Épilogue: Aspects économiques d’un Québec indépendant,” Cahiers de Cité Libre: Réflexions d’un Citoyen, Robert Bourassa & Jean–Paul Lefebvre, Ottawa/Montréal, Éditions du Jour Inc., 1968, 99–113; 112: “On sait, d’après le dernier discours du budget [1968], que le Québec recevra pendant l’exercice en cours $362,740,000.00 sous divers titres de péréquation, comparativement à 66 millions qu’il touchait en 1962. Sur le plan fiscal, le Québec n’est donc plus perdant.”

See: “Exploitons à fond la Confédération … the confederation pact must not be allowed to continue on its present path, else it will be in danger of compromising its existence.”

Jean Lesage, “Exploitons à fond la Confédération,” The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure? (Le Canada, expérience ratée … ou réussie?) Congress Held 15–18 November 1961, Under the Auspices of the Association générale des étudiants de l’Université de Laval, Mason Wade, editor; Murray G. Ballantyne, Jean–Jacques Bertrand, Marcel Chaput, Douglas Fisher, Eugene Forsey, Edmund Davie Fulton, Maurice Lamontagne, André Laurendeau, Jean Lesage, René Lévesque, James R. Mallory, Michael Oliver, Gérard Pelletier & Mason Wade, contributors, Québec, Presses de l’Université de Laval, 1962, 168–180; 169–180.

See finally: “All that matters to me is that we find, in the very near future, a means which will allow us to combine our forces, in order to crush forever the Duplessis machine.”

Jean Lesage (5 August 1958) in Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “Un manifeste démocratique,” Cité Libre, 22(octobre, 1958): 1–31; 26: “Je désire fermement que nous trouvions, au plus tôt, une formule qui nous permettra de combiner nos forces afin d’écraser à tout jamais la machine duplessiste.”

11. Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 102. [1532]

See: “[44] These principalities, therefore, are secure and happy. But as they are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … [71] [Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion … [Rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated … [99] It is not unknown to me how many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance … [100] Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it; and yet though it is of such a kind, still when it is quiet, men can make provision against it by dams and banks, so that when it rises it will either go into a canal or its rush will not be so wild and dangerous. It happens similarly with fortune, which shows her power where no measures have been taken to resist her, and turns her fury where she knows that no dams or barriers have been made to hold her … [101] if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … [102] fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity … [105] God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.”

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 44–71–71–99–100–101–102–105. [1532]

See also: “[xix] We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from them all … [xxi] the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli … [xxvii] Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State … [136] those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood [sang des hommes répandu] as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine … [149] The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress … [352] Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.”

Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352: “[xix] Nous nous proposons un rapprochement, une comparaison, entre la doctrine de Machiavel, telle qu’elle ressort du Prince, et la doctrine de l’absolutisme, que nous essayerons de dégager, non pas de tel ou tel des théoriciens qui en furent les champions; mais de l’ensemble de ces théoriciens … [xxi] les doctrines absolutistes, dans leur application, conduisent les princes aux mêmes résultats que les doctrines de Machiavel … [xxvii] Machiavélisme et absolutisme sont issus de situations historiques analogues. C’est là un premier point essentiel de notre parallèle. Cette situation inspire à Machiavel l’idée de la légitimité de tous les moyens destinés à atteindre un but d’intérêt public et à réaliser le salut de l’État … [136] Tous ceux qui ont pu étudier Napoléon I de près, nous disent qu’il y avait en lui le Napoléon homme d’État, qui voyait dans le sang des hommes répandu un des grands remèdes de la médecine politique … [149] Le Prince de Machiavel et les doctrines de l’absolutisme sont nés d’un même sentiment profond de patriotisme, à des époques et dans des pays où un souverain puissant était nécessaire pour faire cesser, sous sa domination, les désordres et la désunion, causes de la détresse nationale … [352] Machiavel nous apparaît comme un patriote sans scrupule lorsqu’il s’agit de sauver l’État. Dans sa conception du gouvernement il se révèle à nous comme un politique soucieux du bonheur du peuple et respectueux de sa liberté.”

See also: Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

See finally: David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770–1823, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1975.

1/ Anti–Copernican Revolution Versus University Québécocentrisme

1. Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor, New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 2–13.

2. Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4.

3. Anonymous, “Karl Rosenkranz: The Life of Hegel,” The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, 20.4(October, 1848): 561–591; 575–586.

See: “Such were the leading principles of the Roman law … and such was the law of the continent of Europe wherever based on the civil law, till the adoption and spread of the Code Napoléon, first among the Latin races, and more recently among the nations of central and northern Europe … and would thus seem to have swept away at once the entire doctrine dependent upon the Roman system, which was based on a principle exactly the reverse.”
Judah Philip Benjamin (1811–1884), A Treatise on the Law of Sale of Personal Property: With References to the American Decisions and to the French Code and Civil Law, London, Henry Sweet, 1868, 299.

4. Albert Rivaud (1876–1956), “La diffusion du Kantisme,” Histoire de la philosophie: La philosophie allemande de 1700 à 1850: De l’Aufklärung à Schelling, première partie, tome 5, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, 273–276; 274. [1967]: “Il est remarquable que le Kantisme se vulgarise surtout après 1871 … le Kantisme devient–il, vers 1880, le symbole d’une pensée morale et politique profonde, aux yeux de ceux qui sont animés d’une foi républicaine. La philosophie de Kant doit fournir, à une pensée qui se veut affranchie de la «superstition», les moyens de répandre dans la jeunesse une moralité sévère, le civisme, le désintéressement, le patriotisme, toutes ces disciplines apportant un substitut républicain à l’ancienne formation religieuse, en somme l’armature d’une religion laïque.”

Remarks: French Kantianism is press–ganged into the service of France’s republican governments, and easily adapted as the ideological justification of Bonapartism and revanchisme, a function which is performed with deadly results in the 20th century: The ringleaders are French élites like Clemenceau, Poincaré and the Kantian intellectual luminaries of the IIIᵉ République. De Gaulle and many other Bonapartists in the 20th century will use the same methodology, but they smash against the world historical wall of American Idealism, are crushed under the almighty American superpower: The degenerate ruling classes of modernity are undone, in the supremacy of Americanism.

See: “The awakening of the new age, namely, the ‘kingdom of the realized spirit’ (royaume de l’esprit réalisé), is the age of the Critical Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and the French Revolution. A free will, albeit formal, whose content is created as it touches the real, is the Kantian principle: This principle of the Critical Philosophy, without doubt, is the very basis of the French Revolution (c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française). The Kantian principle brings practical results to the French Revolution. Kantian reason legislates for the collective will as well as for the individual will … The French Revolution made the bold attempt to begin with individual wills, with the atoms of will: The revolutionary philosophy of Kant attacks the collective will of the Ancien Régime for its abusive privileges.”

Charles Philippe Théodore Andler (1866–1933), “Préface: Hegel,” Le pangermanisme philosophique, 1800 à 1914: Textes traduits de l’Allemand par M. Aboucaya [Claude Aboucaya?], G. Bianquis [Geneviève Bianquis, 1886–1972], M. Bloch [Gustave Bloch, 1848–1923], L. Brevet, J. Dessert, M. Dresch [Joseph Dresch, 1871–1958], A. Fabri, A. Giacomelli, B. Lehoc, G. Lenoir, L. Marchand [Louis Marchand, 1875–1948], R. Serreau [René Serreau], A. Thomas [Albert Thomas, 1878–1932], J. Wehrlin, Paris, Louis Conard, Librairie–Éditeur, 1917, xxix–xlv; xliii: “L’ère nouvelle qui s’annonce, c’est–à–dire le ‘royaume de l’esprit réalisé,’ est celle, non seulement de Kant, mais de la Révolution française. Un vouloir libre, tout formel, dont le contenu se crée à mesure qu’il touche au réel, c’est là le principe kantien et c’est, non moins, le principe de la Révolution française. Ce principe donne des résultats pratiques dans la Révolution d’abord. La raison kantienne légifère pour le vouloir collectif comme pour le vouloir individuel … La Révolution fit cette tentative audacieuse de commencer par les vouloirs individuels, par les atomes du vouloir. C’est le vouloir collectif, l’Ancien Régime, que la philosophie révolutionnaire incrimine pour ses privilèges abusifs.”

See also: “The publication of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason marks one of the two key events after which we may take nineteenth–century philosophy to begin. The other event is the French Revolution, of which many people saw Kant’s philosophy, with its emphasis on autonomy, as the theoretical correlate. ‘Nineteenth–century’ philosophy … thus actually begins in the later 1780s and the 1790s, in response to Kant’s Critical philosophy and the French Revolution.”

Alison Stone, editor, “Philosophy in the Nineteenth–Century,” The Edinburgh Critical History of Nineteenth–Century Philosophy, Howard Caygill & David Webb, general editors, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2011, 1–12; 1.

See finally: “The standpoint of Kantian philosophy is a high one … the march of God in the world, that is what the state is.”

Eduard Gans, “Additions to The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, 1960, Addition 1–Addition 194, 115–150; Addition 86 = §135/129–Addition 152 = §258/141. [Lasson, 2nd edition, 1921]

Eduard Gans, “Zusätze aus Hegels Vorlesungen, zusammengestellt,” Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, mit den von Eduard Gans redigierten Zusätzen aus Hegels Vorlesungen, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, neu hrsg., von Georg Lasson, Herausgegeber, [=Hegels sämtliche Werke, Band VI], Leipzig, Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1911, Zusätze 1–Zusätze 194, 281–371; Zusätze 86 = §135, 318–Zusätze 152 = §258, 349: “Den Standpunkt der Kantischen Philosophie hervorhoben … Es ist der Gang Gottes in der Welt, daß der Staat ist.”

5. See: “[312] The Munich Franco–German Summit on 17–18 September [1990] was marked by the German Chancellor’s vigorous pro–European reassurances, and it gave rise to a common declaration reaffirming that ‘the two countries will continue to be the motor of European construction,’ their objective being the establishment of ‘European union as the solid basis for the unity of Europe as a whole.’ The fifteen months that followed confirmed this … The Franco–German dynamic won out and it was this that would assure the success of Maastricht at the end of 1991.”

Frédéric Bozo, “French Diplomacy and the New European Architecture (1990–1991),” Mitterrand, the End of the Cold War and German Unification, Susan Emanuel, translator, New York, Berghahn Books, 2009, 310–376; 312.

Remarks: Mitterrand’s left–wing Gaullism, the profound anti–Americanism of the Gaullist ruling class as the Bonapartism of the Francosphère, especially in the Franco–German Éntente established at Maastricht, is ultimately the basis of Angela Merkel’s rise to power, and Mitteleuropa’s transformation of Großdeutschland and Ostpolitik into Großeuropa. Twenty–first century Europe contains the last remnants of modern European political and economic irrationalism, because after the collapse of the Cold War dynamic in Europe, the Middle East remained untouched by the fall of the Berlin Wall, — in other words, the “European Union” is itself a stepping stone on the road to a far higher conception of freedom in the world, as the supremacy of American Liberty. The world historical roots of the War on Terror are found in the continuation of the disintegration of the Cold War dynamic in the Middle East, the center of which is located in the clash between Europe and Asia, especially in the world historical evolution of the power complexifications forged between Jerusalem, Athens and Rome.

6. Justin Massie, “Introduction,” Francosphère: L’importance de la France dans la culture stratégique du Canada, Montréal, Québec, Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2013, 3–12; 3–6–7: “[3] La France exerce un rôle de première importance dans la conduite de la politique étrangère du Canada … Le modèle constructiviste [relativiste] que nous développons dans les pages qui suivent nuance les fondements matérialistes [subjectivistes] de ce phenomène en insistant sur la prééminence de facteurs identitaires [psychologisme] … [5] Il n’existe aucune étude systématique, théorique et empirique portant sur les relations franco–canadiennes en matière de sécuritié internationale, et encore moins sur l’importance de la France dans la politique de sécurité internationale du Canada … [6] Les efforts français ont conduit a une nouvelle ‘éntente’ géostratégique entre les deux pays … [grace à] la Révolution tranquille et l’accession à la présidence française du général de Gaulle … c’est au nationalisme québécois et à la personnalité d’un homme politique français que l’on doit l’intérêt canadien pour la France, notamment comme alliée indispensable au sein de l’Alliance atlantique … La réémergence de la France dans la culture stratégique canadienne découle d’une transformation de l’identité du Canada comme État biculturel (anglophone et [7] francophone) et atlantiste, c’est–à–dire qu’il exprime un sentiment de filiation identitaire envers la Grande–Bretagne et les États–Unis (anglosphère) tout autant qu’à l’égard de la France (la francosphère).”

Remarks: The Québécocentric sophistry of “la culture stratégique canadienne” and “État biculturel” are masks devised to hide the anti–Americanism of our inferior ruling class. Wherefore? The raison d’être of all Québécocentric sophistry, whether in the sciences, philosophy and history as well as religion, literature and art, is the propagation of the delusion that the Québécocracy is not really the dominant ruling class in Canada, — especially under the Québec regime in Ottawa and Empire of Paul Desmarais. Why not readily admit, shout it out to the world with pride, that the Québécocracy is really the dominant ruling class in Canada, why the colossal subterfuge? Once we admit the truth, that the Québécocracy is really the dominant ruling class in Canada, the question naturally arises, How did this extraordinary turn of events unfold? No sooner do we pose this question, than we are confronted with hard facts, when we discard the mask of the Québécocracy: Behold the cruel and twisted visage of Machiavelli!

Why fear the appearance of Machiavellianism in the New World? Indeed, the satanic gaze of Machiavelli, our recognition of the bankruptcy of the anti–Americanism of all inferior ruling classes in the world of today, is itself the suppression of the Québécocracy in the supremacy of American Liberty.

The Francosphère is the “Francophonie and Communauté” of the 20th century Gaullist ruling class, except on the grandiose and delusional scale of Großeuropa, propagated by the Dieselgate aristocracy of Eurocentric Eurocracy, — the Airbus ruling class. The delusional character of the “Francosphère” is evidenced in the BREXIT, which is another world historical exemplification of the collapse of European modernity, in the dissolution of the last remnants of modern unreason in the arena of politics and economics.

See: Anne Francis, The Return of France to North America, Toronto, Ontario, Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1966; Justin Massie & David G. Haglund, “L’abandon de l’abandon: The Emergence of a Transatlantic ‘Francosphère’ in Québec and Canada’s Strategic Culture,” Québec Studies, 49(2010): 59–85; and David G. Haglund, Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada–United States Security Community: From the Civil War to Today, New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.

See also: “France is present in Canada not only through its representatives, but also because many Canadians are of French blood, French language, French culture and French mind. In short they are French except in matters concerning the realm of sovereignty … French Canada will inevitably become a state.”

General Charles de Gaulle (1964–1965) in John Francis Bosher, The Gaullist Attack on Canada: 1967–1997, Montréal/Kingston, McGill–Queen’s University Press, 1999, 34–35.

See also: “All de Gaulle’s acts were directed not toward war, but toward politics and the seizure of power for his own purposes … Gaullism is a phenomenon originating in fascism. It is a political movement born at a time when Nazi ideology was victorious in France and in the rest of Europe … Gaullism is a form of fascism that placed its stakes on the winning side. It is a fascism that glibly uses the language of Democracy, while despising and hating it. It is a fascism that digs into the structure of the Republic as Italian fascism, at an earlier date, dug into the Monarchy.” Henri de Kerillis, I Accuse de Gaulle, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1946, xii–259–260.

See finally: “[General Charles de Gaulle] can’t be considered a wholly reliable ally. He has ‘Fascist and dictatorial tendencies.’” Winston Churchill (July 1943) in Henry de Kerillis, I Accuse de Gaulle, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946, 220.

7. See: “From whence comes autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, namely Machiavellism?

‘These principalities … are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill,’ (Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 44–44–101–105).

Higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, are exalted and maintained by God, the very highest power. Higher causation and rationality is the realm of the highest power, and is beyond the reach of humanity, civilization, and the rationality of political and economic order. What are the rational determinations of the highest power? We must abstain from speaking of them, for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them: The highest power of Machiavellism is the Absolute of Kant and the modern irrationalists. The highest power governing human actions, the fountainhead of all justice according to the Machiavellians, the dispensers of modern freedom, is Unknowable: The fountainhead of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right is modern unreason.

The ‘rationality governing human actions, the fountainhead of justice,’ according to Machiavelli, his delusion of rationality and human reason, is modern unreason, the basis of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right: Autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, therefore comes from the modern sophistry of Kant, Hume, Leibniz and Locke and then ultimately from Machiavelli. Machiavellism, autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, is modern unreason in the world historical arena of European politics and economics.” Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism Versus Wilfrid Laurier and “Canadian” Liberalism, San Francisco, California, The Medium Corporation, 2017.

2/ The School of Charles Margrave Taylor

1. Damien–Claude Bélanger, “Introduction,” Prejudice and Pride: Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States, 1891–1945, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2011.

2. See: “Neo–Kantianism is a term used in a rather arbitrary way to cover a wide variety of philosophical movements that not only show the influence of Kant’s thought but also explicitly claim to go back to Kant, to free his system from inconsistencies and other errors, or to develop it further in the light of new mathematical and scientific discoveries.” Stephan Körner (1913–2000), “Neo–Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 16, Chicago, William Benton, 1967, 213–214; 213. See: Stephan Körner, Kant, Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1960. [1955]

See finally: “The philosophical movement called Neo–Kantianism commenced in Germany in the 1860’s. Beginning with certain epistemological inquiries, it extended gradually over the whole field of philosophy. The individual thinkers who belong to this movement differ from each other in their interpretation of the Kantian doctrine as well as in the results which they reach from the Kantian premises. But, notwithstanding differences of detail, there is a certain methodical principle common to all of them. They all see in philosophy not merely a personal conviction, an individual view of the world, but they enquire into the possibility of philosophy as a science with the intention of formulating its conditions. They take their cue from the most general statement of the Kantian problem in the preface of the Critique of Pure Reason and in the Prolegomena. But in returning to the fundamental aim of Kant, to lead philosophy ‘into the safe road of a science,’ Neo–Kantianism finds itself confronted with a new task inasmuch as it must face a different state of science itself.” Ernst Cassirer, “Neo–Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 16, Chicago, The University Press, 1945, 215–216; 215.

Remarks: Kantians hold that Kant is a great philosopher, while anti–Kantians hold that Kant is a Sophist. Those who maintain that Kant is a great philosopher, and that they disagree with his philosophy (and that therefore they are anti–Kantians), really mean that they disagree with a certain interpretation of Kantianism: Precise examination of their “philosophies” proves that they are actually Kantians in disguise, pushing Kantianism, or some version thereof, under some other name, i.e., existentialism, phenomenology, empiricism, and so forth, wherein are covertly imported transcendental arguments and distinctions under new names, — a tactic calculated to avoid serious criticism of their doctrines, which allows them to pass themselves off as intellectual innovators, especially in the arena of politics and economics. The reason these Kantian and semi–Kantian idéologues possess their government sinecures is not from intelligence, but rather from their political and family connexions: Of course they will argue that such behavior is evidence of intelligence, but only in mortal degeneration are corruption and criminality ever named as enlightenment.

3. Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989, 200.

See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.” Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, Joseph Carew, Wes Furlotte, Jean–Christophe Goddard, Adrian Johnston, Cem Kömürcü, Sean J. McGrath, Constantin Rauer, Alexander Schnell, F. Scott Scribner, Devin Zane Shaw, Konrad Utz & Jason M. Wirth, contributors, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 1–19; 4. [Italics added]

See also: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.” Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, 7–176; 32–36–36–36.

See also: “Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.” Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, Dordrecht, Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See also: “[The] more sympathetic tradition in Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as accounts of Hegel’s attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state.” Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel; Hugh Barr Nisbet, translator, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003, vii–xxxii; ix. [1991]

See also: “[In The Philosophy of Right] the state so described is unlike any existing state in Hegel’s day. It is a form of limited monarchy, with parliamentary government, trial by jury and toleration for Jews and dissenters. In all these respects it differed from the contemporary Prussia. It has often been said by Hegel’s detractors that his book was written on the ‘dunghill of servility’ and that his ideal state is identified with the monarchy of Friedrich William III. Little historical knowledge and little study of Hegel is required to see that this is nonsense.” Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, Chicago, William Benton, 1967, 298–303; 302.

See also: “The problem as to whether or not and to what extent Hegel succeeded in overcoming Kant’s ‘thing–in–itself’ is a separate question. At any rate, this was his aim. In a metaphysics of the Absolute Spirit, realities beyond the realm of knowledge, in so far as the ‘thing–in–itself’ represents such realities, cannot exist.” Richard Hoenigswald, “Philosophy of Hegelianism,” Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought, Dagobert David Runes, editor, New York, Philosophical Library, 1947, 267–291; 270.

See also: “It is a mistake to regard his [Hegel’s] philosophy as nothing more than the logical outcome of Kant’s system. The influence of Greek philosophy on Hegel, particularly of Plato and Aristotle, must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is not difficult to defend the thesis that the essentials of Hegel’s philosophy are to be found in Plato and Aristotle and that all that he did was to make a new synthesis of them with such modifications as modern knowledge required. The beginning, for example, of his logic, all that he says about being and nothing, will be found almost in identical terms in Plato’s Parmenides.” Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, London, Heath Cranton, Ltd., 1927, 10.

See finally: “It is the Transcendental Deduction that has played the most important part in the arguments of the English Kantio–Hegelians.” Andrew Seth Pringle–Pattison in Hiralal Haldar, Essays in Philosophy, Calcutta, University of Calcutta, 1920, 6.

4. See: “Plato’s mind was synthetic rather than analytic. He never treats subjects separately … [Plato] would have understood what was meant by the theory of Ideas (the core of his metaphysics), by the problem of pleasure (the root of all ethics) and the nature of the soul (the basis of all psychology) … The theory of “ideas” is the belief in eternal, unchanging, universal absolutes, independent of the world of phenomena; in, for example, absolute beauty, absolute justice, absolute goodness, from which whatever we call beautiful, just or good derives any reality it may have. Its meaning and scope — for there are Ideas of much more than ethical concepts — will become clear as we proceed, but a warning is necessary at the outset: It is well known, but cannot be too often repeated, that the word Idea in this connexion is a very misleading transliteration, and in no way a translation, of the Greek word idea which, with its synonym eidos, Plato frequently applies to these supreme realities. The nearest translation is “form” or “appearance,” that is, the “look” of a person or thing. We shall see how the meaning of the word probably developed. Suffice it for the moment to say that “theory of forms” is much nearer the Greek, though the expression “theory of ideas” is so firmly established that it is all but impossible, and perhaps undesirable, to avoid it altogether. But it must be quite clear that we are not speaking of ideas in any sense which the word can carry in ordinary English. In the sequel, to avoid misunderstanding, the words Idea and Form are printed with a capital when they refer to Platonic eide … in the intelligible world there is no place for progress or evolution: The pattern is the same though the copy — the world of sense — may reflect it more or less closely at different times … the Ideas are spaceless and immaterial. That is perfectly clear from the Phaedo on, and to press poetical expressions used in certain myths which would seem to assert the contrary, is childish and ridiculous.” George Maximilian Anthony Grube (1899–1982), “The Theory of Ideas,” Plato’s Thought, London, Methuen and Company Ltd., 1935, 1–50; viii–viii–1–49.

See also: “Grube was also very active in Canadian politics. A leading member of the provincial Cooperative Commonwealth Federation (forerunner of the New Democratic Party), he was president of the provincial party in the 1940s. He served on the Toronto Board of Education and ran unsuccessfully for Parliament a number of times.” Donald J. Zeyl in George Maximilian Anthony Grube, Plato’s Thought, Donald J. Zeyl, introduction, bibliographic essay and bibliography, Indianapolis, Indiana, Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1980, vi. [1935]

See finally: “Plato, abandoning the world of sense because of the narrow limits it sets to the understanding, ventured upon the wings of ideas beyond it, into the void space of pure intellect. He [Plato] did not reflect that he made no real progress by all his efforts; for he met with no resistance which might serve him for support, as it were, whereon to rest, and on which he might apply his powers, in order to let the intellect acquire momentum for its progress … Plato employed the expression idea in a way that plainly showed he meant by it something which is never derived from the senses, but which far transcends even the conceptions of the understanding, inasmuch as in experience nothing perfectly corresponding to them could be found. Ideas are, according to him, archetypes of things themselves, and not merely keys to possible experiences … In his view, they flow from the highest reason, by which they have been imparted to human reason, which, however, exists no longer in its original state, but is obliged with great labour to recall by reminiscence — which is called philosophy — the old but now sadly obscured ideas. I will not here enter upon any literary investigation of the sense which this sublime philosopher attached to this expression … I cannot follow him [Plato] in this, and as little can I follow him in his mystical deduction of these ideas, or in his hypostatization of them … What I have termed an ideal was in Plato’s philosophy an idea of the divine mind — an individual object present to its pure intuition, the most perfect of every kind of possible beings, and the archetype of all phenomenal existences … Aristotle may be regarded as head of the empiricists, and Plato of the noologists.” Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960, vii–250; 16–113–113–114–173–249.

5. In the Stronghold of Hegel (2016), which was first published with the Medium Corporation, I have outlined in some detail the American Idealist conception of Americanism and the American world:

“That I have laid out some of the philosophical reasons for this doctrine in the third edition of another writing of mine, an outline of sorts, named Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, is of slight importance: That the teaching therein involves the sciences of economics and politics is of some interest, however, and therefore has a bearing upon the subject at hand, namely, as the developmental unification and coaxial integration of the American world. In that work I flatter myself as the first Hegelian philosopher ever to apply the Dialectic of Hegel to the Hegelian Dialectic: ‘Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe … Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism … In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?’” Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, San Francisco, California, The Internet Archive, 2018, 60–61. [2016]

World Historical Characteristics of Charles Margrave Taylor’s School

1. Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer (Herman Jan de Vleeschauwer, 1899–1977/1986?), “Kantianism,” Encyclopedia Britannica: Macropædia, 15th edition, vol. 22, Chicago, Illinois, The University Press, 1991, 495–499; 495. [Italics added]

See: “Vleeschauwer, a Nazi collaborator during World War II, was tried for war crimes in 1945 and condemned to death in abstentia as he was in hiding.”

Elaine Harger, Which Side Are You On? Seven Social Responsibility Debates in American Librarianship 1990–2015, Jefferson, North Carolina, McFarland & Company, Inc., 2015, 60.

See: “The work of the ERR was to confiscate archives, libraries, and works of art from the ideological enemies of Nazism. It was the most productive unit of plunder in Belgium and was directed by archivists, librarians, and museum curators. De Vleeschauwer was close to senior ERR officials like Adolf Vogel, Karlheinz Esser, and Hans Muchow who targeted private libraries in Jewish homes in Belgium. He had attended German book exhibitions regularly, and wrote several articles on politics and culture for the German–language Nationalsocialist, advocating Nazism.” Archie L. Dick, The Hidden History of South Africa’s Book and Reading Cultures, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2012. See: Archie L. Dick, “Scholarship, Identity and Lies: The Political Life of H.J. de Vleeschauwer, 1940–1955,” Kleio, 34.1(January, 2002): 5–27.

See: Herman Jan de Vleeschauwer, “Kants invloed op Duitschlands geest,” Jong Dietschland: Tijdschrift Voor Kunst & Letteren, 4.32(1930): 500–501; Herman Jan de Vleeschauwer, “De Joodsche godsdienst–philosophie der laatste jaren,” Jong Dietschland: Tijdschrift Voor Kunst & Letteren, 4.32(1930): 823–825; Herman Jan de Vleeschauwer, “Hegel in de laatste eeuw,” Jong Dietschland: Tijdschrift Voor Kunst & Letteren, 5.46(1931): 741–744; Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer, La déduction transcendantale dans l’oeuvre de Kant, 3 vols., Antwerpen/Paris/‘S–Gravenhage, De Sikkel–Édouard Champion–Martinus Nijhoff, 1934–1937; Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer, L’évolution de la pensée Kantienne: L’histoire d’une doctrine (Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine), Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1939; Herman Jean de Vleeschauwer, The Development of Kantian Thought, Edinburgh/London, Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962; Staf Vos, Dans in België 1890–1940, Leuven, Universitaire Pers Leuven, 2012, 317: “de artikelenreeks van Herman J. de Vleeschauwer in Jong Dietschland.”

See: “It is now known that unlike Kant, Hegel was despised by the Nazis.” Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005, 975–977; 977.

See also: “In The Myth of the Twentieth Century: An Evaluation of the Spiritual–Intellectual Confrontation of Our Age, Rosenberg’s claims that Kant’s religious philosophy was so popular with the Germans that ‘Kant’s words’ about ‘the starry heavens above us and the moral law within us’ (an allusion to the conclusion of Critique of Practical Reason) are in danger of being ‘reduced to triviality’ (197). That Rosenberg’s observation has some merit is clear from comments Adolf Eichmann made at his trial. During a police examination, Eichmann ‘declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life according to Kant’s moral precepts, and especially according to a Kantian definition of duty’ … Prominent Nazis such as Eckart, Alfred Rosenberg, and Adolf Eichmann read Kant, but most people from the Nazi period, [45] including Nazi élites, derived their view of Kant mainly from Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who is considered ‘the spiritual founder of National Socialist Germany,’ which is why Paul Gilroy rightly claims that ‘we can interpret Chamberlain’s work as he wanted it to be understood: As a strong bridge between Kant and Hitler.’ It is this link between Kant and the Nazis that has led prominent scholars to say that the German philosopher bears some responsibility for the Holocaust. As Berel Lang says: ‘Certain ideas prominent in the Enlightenment [and he specifies Kant] are recognizable in the conceptual framework embodied in the Nazi genocide.’ Or, as Charles W. Mills claims: ‘The embarrassing fact for the white West (which doubtless explains its concealment) is that their most important moral theorist [Kant] of the past three hundred years is also the foundational theorist in the modern period of the division between Herrenvolk and Untermenschen, persons and subpersons, upon which Nazi theory would later draw.’ Given Chamberlain’s comprehensive vision of religion, politics, and Germany, Rosenberg ‘hailed him as a pioneer and spiritual forerunner and viewed himself as Chamberlain’s true successor.’ In 1923, Joseph Goebbels read the Foundations, and when he met Chamberlain in 1926, he indicates in his diary how important Chamberlain was to National Socialism by referring to [46] him as a ‘spiritual father,’ dubbing him a ‘Trail blazer, pioneer!’ Chamberlain’s biographer, Geoffrey G. Field, notes that Hitler read the Foundations. But more importantly, Field indicates how crucial Chamberlain was by describing Hitler’s response to the famous writer’s public endorsement. After getting word of Chamberlain’s support, members at the Nazi party headquarters in Munich were euphoric, and Hitler was so giddy that he was supposedly ‘like a child’ … Hitler considered National Socialism to be based on [Kantian] idealism.” Michael Lackey, “The Fictional Truth of the Biographical Novel: The Case of Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The American Biographical Novel, New York, Bloomsbury, 2016, 35–82; 44–45–46–49.

See also: “[Kant] is best understood not as a ‘system builder,’ but as a systematic philosopher — that is, as a thinker who was ever reexamining the conclusions he had come to within each component part of the critical project both with respect to the conclusions he had previously established for the other component parts of the project as well as to his most favored ‘core’ beliefs. He was, in other words, not the sort of philosopher who never revised his views on the many topics that interested him, and he clearly endeavored to keep himself informed of developments in every imaginable field of investigation of his time. Consequently, to consider any narrowly [2] defined topic within the scope of the critical philosophy, such as Kant’s race theory or his philosophy of biology, could lead to a reconsideration of every other part of the critical project. We should then hardly find it surprising that significant interest in the texts by Kant included in this volume has, in the years since the volume was originally conceived, also increased among scholars concerned primarily with Kant’s political philosophy — or, more specifically, with his role in the formative development of a view that is difficult to define but commonly referred to as liberal internationalism. Thus it would be no exaggeration to suggest that what is at stake in these discussions is not simply Kant’s views on specific topics but a complete reassessment of his contribution to the ‘project of modernity,’ inasmuch as Kant’s contribution to the construction of liberal internationalism is viewed as a core element of that project as famously sketched by Jürgen Habermas in his 1980 Adorno Prize lecture, ‘Modernity versus Postmodernity’… Kant did indeed write numerous texts concerned with issues of race which had otherwise been almost universally ignored by English–language Kant scholarship in the past two centuries … [3] Who — half a century, or even a couple of decades ago — would ever have thought of Kant as a major contributor to the formative development of either race theory or the philosophy of biology? For the Kant we knew then was typically presented as a figure who had contributed so much to the development of modern liberal internationalism that it was inconceivable that he could ever have written or uttered comments that could be construed as racist or have even concerned himself with any of the problems of race theory — except, perhaps, in ways that directly contributed to the construction of modern concepts of human rights. Now, however, with new knowledge of the texts by Kant included in this volume and a reexamination of related texts and other source materials, there can be no doubt about the fact that Kant was not only deeply concerned with the analysis of the concept of race but that he gave expression to views both in print but in his private notebooks that are clearly racist not only in tone but also in spirit, if not, necessarily, in ideological intent … [5] [Earl W. Count] chided scholars for forgetting ‘that Immanuel Kant produced the most raciological [racist] thought of the eighteenth century’ … [10] ‘in spite of Kant’s avowed cosmopolitanism … evident in such essays as his ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,’ one also finds within his philosophy expressions of a virulent and theoretically based racism, at a time when scientific racism was still in its infancy’ … [13] Whatever definition of race is ultimately attributed to Kant — whether or not Bernasconi can make good on his claim that Kant was, in some sense or other, the inventor of the concept — it is clear from the references provided in the final section of the second of these articles that Kant was indeed generally ‘opposed to the mixing of races’ and that his views on this matter are recorded in texts dating from the 1760s through the late 1790s.” Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Recent Work on Kant’s Race Theory,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor, New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, 1–40; 1–2–3–5–10–13.

See finally: “Much has of course changed since the mid–1980s, when Joe and I first encountered some of the terminology in the German text of Kant’s 1788 article that is still so disturbing. I can well recall, for example, our astonishment upon finding the term halb–schlächtig in the text and concluding that in using it Kant really did mean to classify certain individuals as ‘half–breeds’ … It can no longer be doubted that issues of race did indeed play a significant role in the development of Kant’s critical philosophy from the earliest years to the end of his professional life — even if the significance of that interest will surely continue to be disputed for years to come.” Jon M. Mikkelsen, “Acknowledgements,” Kant and the Concept of Race: Late Eighteenth–Century Writings, Jon M. Mikkelsen, translator and editor, New York, State University of New York Press, 2013, vii–x; x.

3/ The Hegelian School of Alexandre Kojève

1. Christoph Kletzer (King’s College London), “Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelianism and the Formation of Europe,” The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2005–2006), vol. 8, John Bell & Claire Kilpatrick, editors, Oxford, Oxfordshire/Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2006,133–152; 138. [Italics added]

See also: “[138] Of course, we have to take this comment of the ‘farceur who impersonated the wise man on so high a level that he succeeded in becoming a philosopher, if not the sage or god that he claimed to be’ … [139] Whether a real influence was exerted via these channels of admiration, whether Kojève’s ideas on Europe and the end of the nation state migrated via Marjolin to Monnet, and whether this accounts for the striking similarities between Kojève’s and Monnet’s thoughts on this issue can only be a subject of speculation.” Christoph Kletzer, “Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelianism and the Formation of Europe,” Ibidem, 138–139.

Remarks: Why exactly we must identify our American Idealist conception of Kantio–Hegelianism as one of the pillars of Gaullism and Bonapartism (modern European raison d’état) in France from 1945 to 1968, with the “farceur who impersonated the wise man on so high a level that he succeeded in becoming a philosopher, if not the sage or god that he claimed to be,” Christoph Kletzer does not elucidate, unless by the term “elucidation” we mean inexact historiography and cosmopolitan world history: “The European Union is first and foremost the incarnation of a certain (ultimately Platonic–Kantian) concept of philosophy,” (Kletzer, Ibidem, 149). Undoubtedly Kletzer’s “absolute positivism” leads him astray with regards to the struggle between Kant and Hegel upon the stage of world history: “Absolute positivism is thus aware that it is a philosophical doctrine about philosophy, about the limits of philosophy. As such a philosophical doctrine about the limits and incompetence of philosophy, absolute positivism to a certain extent has to be both a reflexive and also an anti–philosophical doctrine,” (Kletzer in Ana Dimiškovska, 2019, 264). According to Kletzer, “Force is not an accessory to the law but its attribute: The law is an order of violence or force, it is a Gewaltordnung … I will try to elucidate and defend the aristocratic attitude,” (Christoph Kletzer, “The Germ of Law,” 2018, 2). The “aristocratic attitude” of Christoph Kletzer’s “absolute positivism” at King’s College, as a “reflexive and also an anti–philosophical doctrine (reflexionphilosophie),” wherein “the law is an order of violence or force” and “force is not an accessory to the law but its attribute,” is itself modern European unreason, in the world historical clash between Kant and Hegel, as the strife between Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism in the European Union. Christoph Kletzer’s assertion that “Kojève’s ideas on Europe and the end of the nation state … can only be a subject of speculation” is therefore encased within the pseudo–Hegelian and anti–Hegelian tomb of “speculation” (impure Hegelianism) as a vanishing phase of world history, the BREXIT’s Kantian graveyard of inferior ruling classes.

See finally: “[1] [Friedrich Nietzsche] developed his understanding of Napoléon as a representative of pagan antiquity and Renaissance virtù, a supreme commander type … Nietzsche evokes Napoléon as an exemplar intended to capture his politics of the future that involves the construction of durable, imperial institutions … I will consider Nietzsche’s [modern sophistry] … as an outgrowth of his reflections on Napoléon [2] Bonaparte’s personality, political reign and method of governance. These reflections begin cautiously in the early 1870s but assume full affirmative force by the early 1880s when Nietzsche exalts Napoléon as the embodiment of the state of exception. Nietzsche begins to think about Napoléon in more coherently political terms in the period 1884–1885 as he begins to cultivate his ideas regarding the philosopher–legislator and the necessity of a new European ruling caste in opposition to the crisis presented by the [false] social question and the steady advance of international socialism. Through invoking Napoléon in the context of this crisis Nietzsche is proposing a theory of leadership and a political solution to combat the ideological forces that produced the Paris Commune … Nietzsche’s political thought … is a species of Bonapartism … Napoléon is the model for the Nietzschean philosopher–legislator who knows how to command; not only in terms of his Renaissance virtù or his martial ethos but also in terms of his political institutions … Nietzsche admired Napoléon because of the psychological control he was able to exert over the masses and social and political classes and institutions hostile to his rule … [5] Nietzsche is imagining a political alliance in which immoralism is mixed with the blood of select European Royal Houses, communicating a transparent diagram for the criminalization of the European ruling class.” Dom Dombowsky, Nietzsche and Napoléon: The Dionysian Conspiracy, Cardiff, Wales, University of Wales, 2014, 1–2–5.

2. Stanley Rosen, “Hermeneutics as Politics,” Hermeneutics as Politics, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Oxford University Press, 1987, 92: “Through the mediation of one of his students, Robert Marjolin, Kojève held a high post in the ministry of foreign economic affairs before and during the regime of General de Gaulle. His political influence in the government — through his membership in the ministry and in the French legation to GATT and to the United Nations, in which he functioned as a self–taught economist of world class — was perhaps second only to that of General de Gaulle. So Kojève told me; and his self–assessment was confirmed for me by Raymond Aron and André Philip, the latter the head of the French legation to GATT. According to Philip, whereas the other participating nations had a specialist for each article of the international treaty on tariffs, France had Kojève, who was a specialist on all the articles.” [Italics added]

See finally: “Former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre said Kojève’s ideas paved the way for the Common Market.” Anonymous, “Russian Stalinist Who Invented Europe,” Politico: EU, 22 March 2017.

3. Steven B. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy, Judaism, Chicago, Illinois/London, England, University of Chicago Press, 2006, 228. [Italics added]

See: “[Alexandre Kojève] died suddenly, on June 4, 1968, while giving a speech in Brussels at a meeting of an organization he had done much to create and foster: the European Common Market … After the war, he was asked by a former student, Robert Marjolin, to join him in the Direction des Relations Économiques Extérieures as an ‘adviser.’ From this time on Kojève seems to have played a rôle of considerable importance in the postwar French government, shaping economic policy, promoting the common market, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and support for third world development. Anecdotes abound regarding his influence on French policy making, the 1957 creation of the European Community from the Coal and Steel Treaty, and his unusual position as a feared and enigmatic éminence grise who, together with Bernard Clappier and Olivier Wormser, dominated French economic policy for more than a decade.” Jeff Love, “Introduction: A Russian in Paris,” The Black Circle: A Life of Alexandre Kojève, New York, Columbia University Press, 2018.

See also: “At the time of his sudden death, Alexandre ‘Kojevnikoff, dit Kojève Alexandre,’ was serving on the Committee for Commercial Policy of the European Economic Community, the so–called Committee 113, the sancta sanctorum of its external commercial policy. This is how a man almost universally considered one of the most brilliant exegetes of Hegel came to receive his first official mourning from two European civil servants, during a meeting of the Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the then Council of Ministers, to which the Committee 113 was attached.” Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexander Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, 91–114; 92.

See also: „Alexandre Kojève hat hier angeknüpft und einen interessanten Gedanken Hegels radikalisiert. Um seine Schlüsselthese zu verstehen, muss man sich daran erinnern, das der Hegelsche Mensch als ein geistiges Wesen gedacht wurde, das durch »Negativität« und einen ständigen Prestigekampf um Anerkennung charkterisiert ist. Negativität heißt bei Hegel das Gegenteil dessen, was man vermuten würde. die negative Energie ist nämlich das »Positivste« am Menschen. Hegel meint damit die Arbeit, auch die begriffliche Arbeit und alle Weisen des »Formens«. Dadurch macht sich der Mensch frei von den Fesseln des Materials und der Natur; er wird Geistmensch. Und Presigekampf meint den Kampf um Anerkennung. Hegel enwickelt ihn in seiner Urform, als Kampf zwischen Herr und Knecht auf Leben und Tod. Wichtig daran ist, dass der Mensch hier nicht aus Bedürftigkeit und Not, sondern wegen eines ideellen Werts sein Leben riskiert. Kurzum: Der Kampf um Anerkennung und die Arbeit des Negativen machen für Hegel den Menschen erst zum Menschen. Und dieser Mensch stirbt am Ende der Geschichte im napoleonischen Endstaat. Denn jetzt ist der Prestigekampf um Anerkennung ja gewonnen, die Knechte sind seit der Französischen Revolution gleiche Bürger, von denen die Macht ausgeht. Es gibt keinen Grund und Ansatzpunkt mehr fur »Negativität«. Nunn beginnt das Posthistoire; der nachgeschichtliche Mensch betritt die Weltbühne: »Was verschwindet, ist der Mensch im eigentlichen Sinn … Das Ende der menschlichen Zeit oder der Geschichte … bedeutet ja ganz einfach das Aufhoren des Handelns im eigentlichen Sinn des Wortes. Das heißt praktisch: das Verschwinden der Kriege und Blutigen Revolutionem. Und auch das Verschwinden der Philosophie; den da der Mensch sich nicht mehr wesentliche selbst ändert, gibt es keinen Grund mehr, die (wahren) Grundsatz zu verändern, die Basis der Welterkenntnis und Selbsterkenntnis bilden. Aber alles ubrige kann sich unbegrenzt erhalten: die Kunst, die Liebe, das Spiel«. Alexandre Kojève hat selbst radikale Konsequenzen aus dieser Diagnose gezogen und seine wissenschaftliche Karriere beendet. Denn wenn die Geschichte am Ende ist, endet auch die »große Politik« — und damit ist auch die Philosophie am Ende. Kojève wurde Beamter in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft. Die EG war für ihn »ein angemessenes Symbol für das Ende der Geschichte«. Alles geschieht nur noch, als ob etwas geschehe. Die Fülle der Ereignisse gehorcht einem stabilen Pattern. Man könnte sagen: Seither hört die Geschichte nicht auf zu enden.“ Norbert Bolz, „Das Happy End der Geschichte,“ Geschichtskultur in der Zweiten Moderne: Herausgegeben für das Deutsche Historische Museum von Rosmarie Beier, Rosmarie Beier & Alfred Nützmann, herausgebers & Christoph Stölzl, Vorwort, Frankfurt am Main, Campus Verlag, 2000, 53–70; 60.

4. Hugh Donald Forbes, George Grant: A Guide to His Thought, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2007, 264: “Kojève’s Marxism and perhaps ironical Stalinism were well known during Kojève’s lifetime, and they seem not to have impeded his ascent to the very highest levels of the French civil service. However, his political leanings were put in a new light in September 1999, when stories appeared in the French press alleging that he had been a Soviet agent for the last thirty years of his life. The stories were based on a dossier that the French secret service (the DST) had apparently received from the KGB. After a brief flurry of interest, the controversy surrounding the allegations dropped from view, and nothing more substantial than the original sketchy reports seems ever to have been published. The most thorough discussion of the whole affair is by an Australian writer, Keith Patchen.”

See: “In 1999 the DST, the French equivalent of the FBI, announced that Kojève had in fact been a KGB agent for some thirty years before his death in 1968. Although this revelation has since been disputed by friends and biographers of Kojève, his fondness for Stalin was already well known.” Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism, and the End of Economic Democracy, New York, Anchor Books, 2001, 415. [2000]

See also: Keith Patchen, “Alexandre Kojève: Moscow’s Mandarin Marxist Mole in France,” National Observer, 58(Spring, 2003): 37–48.

See finally: “Kojève was a Marxist and apparently an ardent admirer of Stalin the statesman, party leader, and military strategist, but not Stalin the philosopher. In fact, it is said that he offered to be Stalin’s chief ideologist with a view to helping him to put the Soviet Union on a sounder ideological footing. He would have been well qualified for the task. He was probably the most interesting of the Marxists who were trying sixty years ago to deal in a genuinely Marxist spirit with the obvious deficiencies of orthodox Marxist theory — deficiencies that were being dramatically demonstrated.” Forbes, Ibidem, 152.

5. See: Jean–François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, G. Bennington & B. Massumi, translators, Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, 1984; Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,” New Left Review, 146(July–August, 1984): 59–92; Stanley Rosen, Hermeneutics as Politics, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Oxford University Press, 1987; Stephen K. White, Political Theory and Postmodernism (Modern European Philosophy), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991; Shadia B. Drury, Alexander Kojève: The Roots of Postmodern Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994.

See also: “We all know that the originary event of the open–ended (space) and infinitely durable (time) ‘War on Terror’ consisted of nothing more than a sum total of a series of decisions made by clandestine agencies concerning the identity and the presence of the Enemy. In this way, the Second Gulf War constituted a ‘double’ decision: the private and covert one (WMDs) and the public and democratic one (Operation Iraqi Freedom). Yet, the public decision was not the ‘real’ one: it was the simulacrum produced by the anterior (and more primary) covert manipulation of the collective processes of recognition and de–notation. To the extent that international relations and foreign policy are subordinated to the paradigm of ‘securitization’ and the technocratic computations of anticipatory self–defense, true politics becomes the exclusive domain of parapolitical entities who are continuously deciding the emergency within an eternal (and historically suspended) present. With the onto–political reduction of the people to an ‘un–real’ simulacrum, the existentially defining moment of decision escapes ‘democratic political control.’” Eric Wilson, editor, “The Concept of the Parapolitical,” The Dual State: Parapolitics, Carl Schmitt and the National Security Complex (International and Comparative Criminal Justice), Mark Findlay & Ralph Henham, series editors; Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed, Len Bracken, Enrico Carisch, Mark Findlay, Daniele Ganser, David N. Gibbs, Jeff Kinkle, David MacGregor, Stig A. Nohrstedt, Rune Ottosen, Guido Giacomo Preparata, William Rasch, Tom Reifer, Ola Tunander & Eric Wilson, contributors, Surrey, England/Burlington, Vermont, Ashgate Publishing, 2012, 1–28; 27. [Italics added]

See also: “‘Non è soltanto questo o quell’uomo che muore: muore l’Uomo in quanto tale. La fine della Storia è la morte dell’Uomo propriamente detto.’Questa parole, lucidamente pronunciate in una piccola aula dell’École Pratique, dove ogni lunedì alle 17.30, per cinque anni, si repeté la liturgia del seminario, segnarono per sempre una sparuta manciata di studenti. Tra questi: Raymond Queneau, Georges Bataille, Jacques Lacan, Alexandre Koyré, Éric Weil, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, André Breton, Raymond Aron, Roger Caillois, Denyse Harari, padre Fessard e Robert Marjolin. Con il metodo tutto parigino dell’agrégation, un’intera generazione intellettuale [17] ruotò attorno all’austero ed eccentrico commento di Kojève. Il suo seminario divenne in pochi anni leggendario, le discussioni che esso suscitava scavalcavano le mura delle aule universitarie per prolungarsi nei circoli letterari, nei laboratori politici e sociologici in cui si incubava un’estrema riflessione sulla crisi del moderno.” Matteo Vegetti, La fine della storia. Saggio sul pensiero di Alexandre Kojève, Milano, Editoriale Jaca Book SpA, 1999, 16–17.

Remarks: The precise influence of Kojève and his school upon the formation of French and European postwar institutions is largely ignored, especially in the context of European political and economic unity, since Kojève is somewhat of a closed book even to Hegel scholars: “In his list of works on Hegel, D’Hondt, a well known Hegel specialist, does not even list Kojève’s book … similarly, in his lengthy, authoritative introduction to the French translation of the Encyclopedia, Bourgeois, another well known Hegel specialist, does not even mention Kojève.” Tom Rockmore, Ibidem, 204.

6. See: “[148] Compared with the immense importance and public discussion of the problem of finality, that is, the question of what the European Union will or should ultimately turn out to be, the attempt to solve the mystery of the Union’s actuality — the question of what the European Union currently is — is demoted to inferior rank and causes neither jurisprudential nor philosophical furore … [149] What is really new and distinctive about Europe from a philosophic point of view is not this or that organisational arrangement, not this or that cross cutting between supranational and intergovernmental, functional and neo-institutional compromises, but the immense modal straddle in which Europe extends over our heads: never in human history has there existed an entity the actuality and potentiality of which are kept so neatly and consciously apart. throughout history the actuality and potentiality of a political entity have been wildly intertwined, thus constantly confronting philosophers, politicians, and bureaucrats. But for Europe this has changed … If the distinctive idea of Europe, the decisive insight responsible for its success is the neat distinction between finality and actuality, if this distinction, in turn, is responsible for the separation of labour between philosophers dealing with the future and politicians/bureaucrats dealing with the present, then the European Union is first and foremost the incarnation of a certain (ultimately Platonic–Kantian) concept of philosophy, of a certain conception of what the objects of philosophy are.” Christoph Kletzer, “Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelianism and the Formation of Europe: IV. Europe and Philosophy,” Ibidem, 148–152; 148–149.

See also: “Force is not an accessory to the law but its attribute: The law is an order of violence or force, it is a Gewaltordnung … I will try to elucidate and defend the aristocratic attitude.” Christoph Kletzer, “The Germ of Law,” Vienna Lectures on Legal Philosophy: Legal Positivism, vol. 1, Christoph Bezemek, Michael Potacs & Alexander Somek, editors, Oxford, Oxfordshire, Hart Publishing, 2018, 1–22; 2.

See also: “The approach to the relationship between Kelsen and Kant presented in this chapter, as a critical reconstruction, differs from the recent attempt by Kletzer to present an essential compatibility between the Kelsenian and Kantian approaches in the framework of the conception of ‘absolute positivism’ attributed to Kelsen, based on the idea that both Kant’s and Kelsen’s solutions to great intellectual impasses that preceded their theories have not been ‘conciliatory, but radical.’ (Christoph Kletzer, ‘Absolute Positivism,’ Netherlands Journal of Legal Philosophy, Vol. 42, no. 2, (2013): 87–99 (88)) … the main problem of this interpretation lies in the fact that whilst, on the one hand, it tries to defend ‘the Pure Theory against the charge of inconsistency,’ on the other hand, it cannot escape the internal inconsistencies that are characteristic of the ‘absolute positivism’ itself as a theoretical stance. These problematic aspects of the position of the absolute positivism are, in fact, very well summarized by Kletzer himself: ‘Absolute positivism is thus aware that it is a philosophical doctrine about philosophy, about the limits of philosophy. As such a philosophical doctrine about the limits and incompetence of philosophy, absolute positivism to a certain extent has to be both a reflexive and also an anti–philosophical doctrine.’ (98).” Ana Dimiškovska, “Grounding the Normativity of Law: The Role of Transcendental Argumentation in Kelsen’s Critique of Natural Law Theory,” Hans Kelsen and the Natural Law Tradition (Studies in Moral Philosophy), Ian Bryan, Peter Langford & John McGarry, editors, Leiden, The Netherlands/Boston, Massachusetts, Koninklijke Brill NV, 2019, 253–288; 264.

See finally: “The End of History was never linked to a specifically American model of social or political organization. Following Alexander Kojève, the Russian–French philosopher who inspired my original argument, I believe that the European Union more accurately reflects what the world will look like at the end of history than the contemporary United States. The EU’s attempt to transcend sovereignty and traditional power politics by establishing a transnational rule of law is much more in line with a ‘post–historical’ world than the Americans’ continuing belief in God, national sovereignty, and their military.” Francis Fukuyama in Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexander Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity:Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, 91–114; 101.

7. When I first arrived in Paris as a young man, so many years ago, in furtherance of my education, I very soon came upon the followers of Merleau–Ponty, Sartre, Althusser and Foucault, — the intellectual offspring of Alexandre Kojève and his Kantio–Hegelian school. Even in the higher schools of public administration, wherein I was located, their influence extended like a plague. Their anti–American followers were relentless in their hatred of so–called Yankee Imperialism, and our debates raged deep into the nights. I made the acquaintance of many Europeans whose admiration of Americanism exceeded all bounds, — my dearest friends. Those were the years of François Mitterrand’s regime: “Nous sommes en guerre avec l’Amérique … une guerre à mort!” when socialism was the rage in France, especially amongst the Parisian intellectuals of the rive gauche. After having spent some years in their midst, I learned the ways and means of their combat, which have benefited me ever since, especially in my philosophical projects. Even in the 1980s, our philosophical debates were European in the widest sense, and mostly German. Those were the years when I first became deeply exposed to Kant and Hegel. Having lived in Europe within the confines of European institutions, especially during the fall of the Berlin Wall and during unification, when Maastricht was on everyone’s lips, I came to appreciate the last great upheaval of the twentieth century in profoundly European and American terms. Afterwards, at the eastern Canadian universities, I greatly advanced my knowledge of German Idealism, but always within the frame of Americanism. For I seek knowledge as an end in itself, but never as a means merely to obtain position: The end in view is the advancement (conceptualization) of the American world.

8. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994, 806–808.

9. Stalin’s successors differentiated themselves from his legacy in order to advance themselves and Soviet imperialism as Russophiles: These so–called anti–Stalinists did not modify Stalin’s European policy, but in fact extended and solidified their grasp upon the eastern nations of Europe as the Soviet Bloc, especially in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. For the most part, the anti–Stalinists in the Kremlin during the Cold War were really Stalinists in disguise, — at least until Gorbachev.

I/ The Hegelian School of Kojève

1. Aimé Albert Georges Patri (1904–1983) in Allan Bloom, editor, “Editor’s Introduction (1968),” Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau; Allan Bloom, editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca, New York/London, England, Cornell University Press, 1980, vii–xii; vii. [1969] See: Aimé Albert Georges Patri, “Dialectique du maître et de l’esclave,” Le contrat social, 5.4(juillet–août, 1961): 231–235.

See: “[vii] Queneau’s collection of Kojève’s thoughts about Hegel constitutes one of the few important philosophical books of the twentieth century — a book, knowledge of which is requisite to the full awareness of our situation and to the grasp of the most modern perspective on the eternal questions of philosophy … [viii] Kojève is the most thoughtful, the most learned, the most profound of those Marxists who, dissatisfied with the thinness of Marx’s account of the human and metaphysical grounds of his teaching, turned to Hegel as the truly philosophic source of that teaching. Although he made no effort at publicizing his reflections, the superior force of his interpretations imposed them willy–nilly on those who heard him. For this reason, anyone who wishes to understand the sense of that mixture of Marxism and Existentialism which characterizes contemporary radicalism must turn to Kojève. From him one can learn both the implications and the necessary presuppositions of historicist philosophy; he elaborates what the world must be like if terms such as freedom, work, and creativity are to have a rational content and be parts of a coherent understanding. It would, then, behoove any follower of the new version of the left who wishes to think through the meaning of his own action to study that thinker who is at its origin. However, Kojève is above all a philosopher — which, at the least, means that he is primarily interested in the truth, the comprehensive truth. His passion for clarity is more powerful than his passion for changing the world. The charm of political solutions does not cause him to forget the need to present an adequate account of the rational basis of those solutions, and this removes him from the always distorted atmosphere of active commitment. He despises those intellectuals who respond to the demands of the contemporary audience and give the appearance of philosophic seriousness without raising the kinds of questions which would bore that audience or be repugnant to it. A certain sense of the inevitability of this kind of abuse — of the conversion of philosophy into ideology — is, perhaps, at the root of his distaste for publication. His work has been private and has, in large measure been communicated only to friends. And the core of that work is the careful and scholarly study of Hegel. Because he is a serious man, Kojève has never sought to be original, and his originality has consisted in his search for the truth in the thought of wise men of the past. His interpretation has made Hegel an important alternative again and showed how much we have to learn from him at a time when he seemed no longer of living significance. Kojève accomplished this revival of interest in Hegel not by adapting him to make him relevant, but by showing [ix] that contemporary concerns are best understood in the permanent light of Hegel’s teaching. Kojève’s book is a model of textual interpretation; the book is suffused with the awareness that it is of pressing concern to find out precisely what such a thinker meant, for he may well know much more than we do about the things that we need to know. Here scholarship is in the service of philosophy, and Kojève gives us a glimpse of the power of great minds and respect for the humble and unfashionable business of spending years studying an old book. His own teaching is but the distillation of more than six years devoted to nothing but reading a single book, line by line. Introduction to the Reading of Hegel constitutes the most authoritative interpretation of Hegel. Such a careful and comprehensive study which makes sense of Hegel’s very difficult texts will be of great value in America where, though his influence has been great and is ever greater, very few people read, let alone understand, him. He has regularly been ignored by academic positivists who are put off by his language and are unaware of the problems involved in their own understanding of science and the relation of science to the world of human concern. Hegel is now becoming popular in literary and artistic circles, but in a superficial form adapted to please dilettantes and other seekers after the sense of depth who wish to use him rather than understand him. Kojève presents Hegel’s teaching with a force and rigor which should counterpoise both tendencies … [xii] It is the special merit of Kojève to be one of the very few sure guides to the contemplation of the fundamental alternatives.” Allan Bloom, general editor, “Editor’s Introduction (1968),” Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau; Allan Bloom, general editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca, New York/London, England, Cornell University Press, 1980, vii–xii; vii–viii–ix–xii. [1969]

See finally: “[xiii] The present translation includes slightly under one half of the original volume: the passages translated correspond to pp. 9–34, 161–195, 265–267, 271–291, 336–380, 427–443, 447–528, and 576–597 of the French text. The selections for this edition were made with two goals in mind: to present the outlines of Kojève’s interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and to present the most characteristic aspects of his own thought. The translation tries to preserve as much as possible of Kojève’s style and terminology, which are determined at least in part by his careful attempt to preserve and explain the meaning of Hegel’s own precise terminology. Some of the oddities consequently present in the translation should perhaps be mentioned. Many of Kojève’s translations of Hegelian terms are not the customary ones, but represent his interpretation of their meaning.” James H. Nichols Jr., translator, “Translator’s Note,” Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau; Allan Bloom, general editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca, New York/London, England, Cornell University Press, 1980, xiii–xiv; xiii. [1969]

2. Francis Roger Devlin, “Preface,” Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought, New York, University Press of America, Inc., 2004, ix–xvi; xi.

3. Matteo Vegetti, La fine della storia. Saggio sul pensiero di Alexandre Kojève, Milano, Editoriale Jaca Book SpA, 1999, 16–17.

See: “The audience at these seminars over the years included some of the most distinguished intellectuals and artists of the time, from all generations and political credos; among them Raymond Aron, George Bataille, Georges Callois, Gaston Fessard, Jean Hyppolite, Pierre Klossowski, Georges Gurvitch, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau Ponty, Raymond Queneau (who took the notes which became the basis of the Introduction), Claude Valéry, Eric Weil, and, at least in some instances, also André Breton and Hanna Arendt.” Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexander Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, 91–114; 110.

4. Shadia B. Drury, Alexandre Kojève: The Roots of Postmodern Politics, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 1994, 9.

See: “Toute notre époque, que ce soit par la logique ou par l’épistémologie, que ce soit par Marx ou par Nietzsche, essaie d’échapper à Hegel.” Michel Foucault, L’ordre du discours, Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 1971, 74.

5. Tom Rockmore, Heidegger and French Philosophy: Humanism, Antihumanism, and Being, New York/London, Routledge, 1995, 201–202–205–206.

6. Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Allan Bloom, editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1980, 128–142. [1947+1969]

II/ Alexandre Kojève: Gaullism, Bonapartism and European Unity

1. Robert Marjolin, Architect of European Unity: Memoirs 1911–1986,William Hall, translator, London, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1989, 52.

2. Kletzer, “Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelianism and the Formation of Europe,” Ibidem, 136–137.

See: “Kojève’s lectures were collected, edited, and published in 1947 by Raymond Queneau. This, coupled with the publication of Jean Hyppolite’s translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit (undertaken between 1939 and 1942), helped to set the stage for the introduction and subsequent reign of Hegel and Hegelianism in postwar French intellectual life. With the help of Robert Marjolin, Kojève secured a job at the Direction des relations économiques extérieures after World War II, and for the next twenty years, he was instrumental in helping to shape France’s foreign trade and economic policy. According to everyone who worked with him, Kojève was the éminence grise of French foreign economic policy, and he was involved in diplomatic events and treaties whose significance continue to define international affairs. After helping to implement the Marshall Plan, he was involved in promoting the European Economic Community (now the European Union); he was a central participant in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization); and he took a keen interest in encouraging Third World development (what is now routinely referred to as the North–South dialogue and aid). Although Kojève continued to publish occasionally, his longer and more detailed studies in the history of philosophy and political thought were published posthumously. He died in 1968 after giving a speech in Brussels before a meeting of the Common Market.” Timothy W. Burns & Bryan–Paul Frost, editors, “Introduction,” Philosophy, History, and Tyranny: Reexamining the Debate Between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève, Nasser Behnegar, Murray S.Y. Bessette, Daniel E. Burns, Timothy W. Burns, Bryan–Paul Frost, Alexandre Kojève, Mark J. Lutz, Waller R. Newall, James H. Nichols Jr., Emmanuel Patard, Richard L. Velkley, contributors, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2016, 1–14; 7.

Remarks: Government academics in the tradition of the New York intellectuals downplay Kojève’s anti–Americanism for their own political and economic purposes: In order to blur the historical connexions between modern European unreason and violent extremism in American politics, especially in the 1960s, which threatens party unity and electoral success. When confronted with the raciology of Immanuel Kant they feign ignorance, otherwise remain silent. Modern unreason within America is no danger to rational political and economic order, since heavily monitored by the Federal government: The danger is always external, when this unreason is energized by anti–American powers.

3. Jeff Love, “Introduction: A Russian in Paris,” The Black Circle: A Life of Alexandre Kojève, New York, Columbia University Press, 2018.

See: “Koyré proposed Kojève as his replacement, and for the next five and a half years Kojève devoted the seminar to a line–by–line reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit. His audience included Raymond Aron, Maurice Merleau–Ponty, Raymond Queneau, André Breton, Georges Bataille, Gaston Fessard and other well–known figures.” Francis Roger Devlin, “Preface,” Alexandre Kojève and the Outcome of Modern Thought, New York, University Press of America, Inc., 2004, ix–xvi; xi.

See: “[128] Kant’s philosophy must be accepted as given truth … [142] the first attempt at a dualistic ontology was made by Kant … Hegel merely makes more precise the Kantian theory.” Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Allan Bloom, general editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 1980, 128–142. [1947+1969]

4. Timothy W. Burns & Bryan–Paul Frost, editors, “Introduction” Philosophy, History, and Tyranny: Reexamining the Debate Between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève, Nasser Behnegar, Murray S.Y. Bessette, Daniel E. Burns, Timothy W. Burns, Bryan–Paul Frost, Alexandre Kojève, Mark J. Lutz, Waller R. Newall, James H. Nichols Jr., Emmanuel Patard, Richard L. Velkley, contributors, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2016, 1–14; 7: “Kojève’s lectures were collected, edited, and published in 1947 by Raymond Queneau. This, coupled with the publication of Jean Hyppolite’s translation of the Phenomenology of Spirit (undertaken between 1939 and 1942), helped to set the stage for the introduction and subsequent reign of Hegel and Hegelianism in postwar French intellectual life. With the help of Robert Marjolin, Kojève secured a job at the Direction des relations économiques extérieures after World War II, and for the next twenty years, he was instrumental in helping to shape France’s foreign trade and economic policy. According to everyone who worked with him, Kojève was the éminence grise of French foreign economic policy, and he was involved in diplomatic events and treaties whose significance continue to define international affairs. After helping to implement the Marshall Plan, he was involved in promoting the European Economic Community (now the European Union); he was a central participant in the negotiations leading to the establishment of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (now the World Trade Organization); and he took a keen interest in encouraging Third World development (what is now routinely referred to as the North–South dialogue and aid). Although Kojève continued to publish occasionally, his longer and more detailed studies in the history of philosophy and political thought were published posthumously. He died in 1968 after giving a speech in Brussels before a meeting of the Common Market.” [Italics added]

5. Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexander Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014 , 91–114; 92.

1/ Alexandre Kojève’s Latin Empire

1. Alexandre Kojève, “Extraits d’un inédit d’Alexandre Kojève: ‘Esquisse d’une doctrine de la politique française,’” Hommage à Alexandre Kojève: Actes de la “Journée A. Kojève” du 28 janvier 2003 (Collection Conférences et Études), Florence de Lussy, direction, Paris, Éditions de la Bibliothèque nationale de France, 2007, 86–98; 93–94–95–96. [1944+1990]

Remarks: The quotations are from Florence de Lussy’s 2007 sanitized version of Kojève’s text from the 1990 edition, itself heavily edited under Bernard–Henri Lévy: “le comité éditorial (sous la plume de Dominique–Antoine Grisoni) a jugé bon de le tronquer de plusieurs paragraphes … Il semble que le moment soit venu de mettre au point une édition intégrale de ce texte, en le replaçant dans son contexte et en le munissant d’un appareil de notes adéquates,” (Florence de Lussy, Ibidem, 88) which does not include compromising material, and which thereby facilitates the pseudo–Hegelian and anti–Hegelian versions of “Latin Imperialism” advanced by interpreters and translators like Robert Howse and Erik de Vries. See: Alexandre Kojève, “L’impero latino. Progetto di una dottrina della politica francese (1945),” Il silenzio della tirannide, ed. it. a cura di Antonio Gnoli, Milano, Adelphi Edizioni, 2004, 163–210.

2. Kojève, Ibidem, 92.

3. Ibidem, 94.

4. Ibidem, 95.

5. Ibidem, 88–89.

6. Ibidem, 89.

7. Alexandre Kojève in Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexander Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, 91–114; 100.

See: “Le PhG est une description phénoménologique de l’existence humaine. C’est dire que l’existence humaine y est décrite telle qu’elle ‘apparaît’ (erscheint) à celui–là même qui la vit. En d’autres termes, Hegel décrit la conscience de soi de l’homme qui est dominé dans son existence soit par une des attitudes existentielles types qui se retrouvent partout et toujours (Ire Partie), soit par l’attitude qui charactérise une époque historique marquante (2e Partie).” Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau, Introduction à la lecture de Hegel: leçons sur la Phénoménologie de l’Esprit professées de 1933 à 1939 à l’École des hautes études réunis et publiées par Raymond Queneau, Paris, Éditions Gallimard 1947, 576.

2/ Kojève’s Anti–Americanism

1. Lorenza Sebesta, “Alexandre Kojève and the Reinvention of Modernity: European Communities as the ‘End of History,’” Regional Integration and Modernity: Cross–Atlantic Perspectives, Natalie J. Doyle & Lorenza Sebesta, editors, Lanham, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2014, 91–114; 96.

Remarks: Of course the extermination of Europe’s sick and elderly in the name of cost–savings is vehemently “refuted” by European leaders, especially the socialists and Greens, in the name of “scientific” studies promoted by think tanks and academic organizations, — themselves fattened in the larder of European Union cultural subsidies: They easily forget that their own time is coming, when they themselves will fall prey to the very unreason that greases the wheels of anti–Americanism in Europe, the enemy of rational political and economic order. Eurocrats attack American finance, commerce and industry in the European Union, in the name of their backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts instead of heavily investing in Americanism, the bastion of the Digital revolution, — they prefer the likes of Airbus over European healthcare systems: They thereby neglect and ignore the upcoming computational and technological revolution in the sciences of medicine, when inexpensive healthcare for the masses will depend upon robots, supercomputers, global telecommunications and space technology.

2. Christoph Kletzer, “Alexandre Kojève’s Hegelianism and the Formation of Europe,” The Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2005–2006), vol. 8, John Bell & Claire Kilpatrick, editors, Oxford, Oxfordshire/Portland, Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2006, 139–140.

3. Lorenza Sebesta, Ibidem, 107–108.

See: “First comes the idea of Europe as a civilian power. As we saw earlier, human life had been characterized, according to Kojève in his interpretation of Hegel, by two permanent struggles: the wrestle with Nature through science, technology, and unremitting work; and the quest for recognition, either as individuals or bearers of state flags … Second comes the idea of a universal state with ‘no a priori given limits (geographic, ethnic, or otherwise), no pre–established ‘capital,’ or even a geographically and ethnically fixed center destined to exercise political dominion on its periphery. The European Union still owes its legitimacy to its identification with a political system whose universality (as opposed to the nationalism of states) has guaranteed the absence of intrastate wars among its members and whose homogeneity (based on a classless society) has removed the danger of internal conflicts. In the framework of this vision, agricultural policy, as well as industrial policies in the coal and steel sectors, have been the social policies managed by Brussels — with the original objective of protecting the weakest among the European social classes from the challenges of modernization.” Lorenza Sebesta, Ibidem, 108.

Remarks: Lorenza Sebesta’s “interpretation” of Kojève is not world historical, i.e., is not based upon his Gaullist and Bonapartist struggle against Americanism upon the stage of universal history: Lorenza Sebesta’s outdated and surpassed Kantio–Hegelian version of Europeanism is blinded by the imaginaries and ideologies of Gaullism and Bonapartism, i.e., profoundly distorted by the modern European unreason of the Kojèvean school. Sebesta defends European protectionism as “social policy,” in the name of Kojèveanism: What is this but the modern European political and economic irrationalism of the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of the inferior ruling classes of the European Union?

4. Sebesta, Ibidem, 108–109. [Italics added]

5. Alexandre Kojève in Sebesta, Ibidem, 100.

See: “The question of Kojève’s Stalinism is too complex to be treated here. Although Kojève was aware of Stalin’s ruthlessness, and although he (Kojève) was arrested and nearly executed at the beginning of the Russian Revolution, he still remained a communist of sorts; he still admired Stalin for his brutal genius in seeing the necessity for bringing Russia into the twentieth century by creating a modern, industrial, Slavic–Soviet empire; and he still claimed to be Stalin’s conscience and was reportedly extremely moved by Stalin’s death.” Bryan–Paul Frost, “Who Won the Strauss–Kojève Debate? The Case For Alexandre Kojève in His Dispute With Leo Strauss,” Philosophy, History, and Tyranny: Reexamining the Debate Between Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève, Timothy W. Burns & Bryan–Paul Frost, editors; Nasser Behnegar, Murray S.Y. Bessette, Daniel E. Burns, Timothy W. Burns, Bryan–Paul Frost, Alexandre Kojève, Mark J. Lutz, Waller R. Newall, James H. Nichols Jr., Emmanuel Patard & Richard L. Velkley, contributors, Albany, New York, State University of New York Press, 2016, 157–196; 166. [Italics added]

Remarks: The question of Kojève’s Stalinism is too complex to be treated here. This is the traditional academic cop–out of idéologues, doctrinarians and theoreticians, — our contemporary sophists. The same bankrupt mentality that admires Stalin’s genius for bringing Russia into the modern age, — at the expense of some 50 million human lives, — is thriving today in the European Union, with the policy of dumping the sick and elderly into the graveyards in the name of cost–savings, i.e., in order to bring the likes of Airbus into the twenty–first century: The Gaullists and Bonapartists in Brussels have learned much from Kojève’s hermeneutics as postmodern politics.

6. Sebesta, Ibidem, 97.

7. James H. Nichols Jr., translator, “Translator’s Note,” Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau; Allan Bloom, general editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca, New York/London, England, Cornell University Press, 1980, xiii–xiv; xiii. [1969]

III/ Kojeve’s Kantio–Hegelian Doctrine of the Concept

1. Alexandre Kojève & Raymond Queneau, “A Note on Eternity, Time, and the Concept: Complete Text of the Sixth Through Eighth Lectures of the Academic Year 1938–1939,” Introduction to the Reading of Hegel: Lectures on the Phenomenology of Spirit Assembled by Raymond Queneau, Allan Bloom, general editor & James H. Nichols Jr., translator, Ithaca, New York/London, England, Cornell University Press, 1980, 100–149; 138.

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Ian Fraser, Dialectics of the Self: Transcending Charles Taylor, (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2007).

Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Robert F. Brown, editor and translator, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Oxford University Press, 2014), 7–176.

George Maximilian Anthony Grube (1899–1982), Plato’s Thought, (London, England: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1935).

Maximilian Anthony Grube, Plato’s Thought, Donald J. Zeyl, introduction, bibliographic essay and bibliography, (Indianapolis, Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 1980). [1935]

Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842) & Napoléon Bonaparte, Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, (Paris: Nicolle, 1816).

David G. Haglund & Justin Massie, “L’abandon de l’abandon: The Emergence of a Transatlantic ‘Francosphère’ in Québec and Canada’s Strategic Culture,” Québec Studies, 49(2010): 59–85.

David G. Haglund, Ethnic Diasporas and the Canada–United States Security Community: From the Civil War to Today, (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015).

Hiralal Haldar, Essays in Philosophy, (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1920).

Hiralal Haldar, Neo–Hegelianism, (London: Heath Cranton, Ltd., 1927).

Immanuel Kant, “The Critique of Pure Reason,” Great Books of the Western World: Kant, John Miller Dow Meiklejohn, translator & Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, (Chicago, Illinois: Encyclopedia Britannica Inc., 1960), vii–250.

Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994).

Henry Kissinger, “Concepts of Western Unity: Macmillan, de Gaulle, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” Diplomacy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 594–619.

Thomas Malcolm Knox, “Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel,” Encyclopedia Britannica, 14th edition, vol. 11, (Chicago, Illinois: William Benton, 1967), 298–303.

Michael Lackey, “The Fictional Truth of the Biographical Novel: The Case of Ludwig Wittgenstein,” The American Biographical Novel, (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 35–82.

Jean Lesage, “Exploitons à fond la Confédération,” The Canadian Experiment, Success or Failure? (Le Canada, expérience ratée … ou réussie?) Congress Held 15–18 November 1961, Under the Auspices of the Association générale des étudiants de l’Université de Laval, Mason Wade, editor; Murray G. Ballantyne, Jean–Jacques Bertrand, Marcel Chaput, Douglas Fisher, Eugene Forsey, Edmund Davie Fulton, Maurice Lamontagne, André Laurendeau, Jean Lesage, René Lévesque, James R. Mallory, Michael Oliver, Gérard Pelletier & Mason Wade, contributors, (Québec, Québec: Presses de l’Université de Laval, 1962), 168–180.

David W. Livingstone, editor, “Introduction,” Liberal Education, Civic Education, and the Canadian Regime: Past Principles and Present Challenges, (Kingston, Ontario/Montréal, Québec: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2015), 3–28.

Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli (1469–1527), The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, (Oxford, Oxfordshire: Humphrey Milford, 1921). [1532]

Justin Massie & David G. Haglund, “L’abandon de l’abandon: The Emergence of a Transatlantic ‘Francosphère’ in Québec and Canada’s Strategic Culture,” Québec Studies, 49(2010): 59–85.

Justin Massie, Francosphère: L’importance de la France dans la culture stratégique du Canada, (Montréal, Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2013).

Justin Massie, “Introduction,” Francosphère: L’importance de la France dans la culture stratégique du Canada, (Montréal, Québec: Presses de l’Université du Québec, 2013), 3–12.

Yitzhak Y. Melamed & Peter Thielke, “Hegelianism,” New Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Game Theory to Lysenkoism, vol. 3, Maryanne Cline Horowitz, editor in chief, (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 2005), 975–977

François Mitterrand, De l’Allemagne, de la France, (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1996).

Pierre Péan, Une jeunesse française: François Mitterrand, 1934–1947, (Paris: Fayard, 1994).

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Reinier Munk, series editor, (Dordrecht: Springer Science+Business Media, B.V., 2001).

Steven B. Smith, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context, (Chicago, Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

Charles Margrave Taylor, “La révolution futile ou les avatars de la pensée globale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.69(août–septembre, 1964): 10–22.

Charles Margrave Taylor, Hegel, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).

Charles Margrave Taylor, “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 79(1978): 151–165.

Charles Margrave Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

Charles Margrave Taylor, “An Epistemological Revolution: Converging Roads Around Dilemmas of Modernity,” Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Charles W. Lowney II, editor; John V. Apczynski, John Fennell, Charles W. Lowney II, David James Stewart, Charles Margrave Taylor & Diane M. Yeager, contributors, (London, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 15–26.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “An Epistemological Revolution: Dialogue, Discovery, and an Open Future,” Charles Taylor, Michael Polanyi and the Critique of Modernity: Pluralist and Emergentist Directions, Charles W. Lowney II, editor; John V. Apczynski, John Fennell, Charles W. Lowney II, David James Stewart, Charles Margrave Taylor & Diane M. Yeager, contributors, (London, England: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 27–49.

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, “Un manifeste démocratique,” Cité Libre, 22(octobre, 1958): 1–31.

Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel; Hugh Barr Nisbet, translator, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), vii–xxxii.

CHARLES MARGRAVE TAYLOR’S SCHOOL: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Louise Arbour, War Crimes and the Culture of Peace: The Senator Keith Davey Lectures, R. Roy McMurtry, introduction, (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2002).

Edward P. Belobaba & Eric Gertner, editors, The New Constitution and the Charter of Rights: Fundamental Issues and Strategies, (Toronto, Ontario: Butterworths, 1983).

Edward P. Belobaba, “The Charter of Rights and Private Litigation: The Dilemma of Dolphin Delivery,” Charter Issues in Civil Cases, Neil R. Finkelstein & Brian MacLeod Rogers, editors, (Toronto, Ontario: Carswell, 1988), 29–46.

Martin Blais, Philosophie du Pouvoir (Cahiers de Cité Libre), vol. 20.1, (Ottawa/Montréal: Éditions du Jour, 1970).

Ronald William Gower Bryant, “Transport en commun et expansion urbaine,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13(14).57(mai, 1963): 16–19.

Mario Bunge, “Courrier des Lecteurs: Cherchons projet politique novateur,” Cité Libre: La voix québécoise pour le libéralisme et l’unité canadienne, 28.3(été, 2000): 12.

Raymond Chrétien, Le Canada dans le monde d’hier à aujourd’hui: Entretiens avec Raymond Chrétien (Entrevue de Jean–Frédéric Légaré–Tremblay), (Montréal: Varia, Collection Entretiens, 2007).

Adam M. Dodek, editor, The Charter Debates: The Special Joint Committee on the Constitution, 1980–1981, and the Making of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 2018).

Neil R. Finkelstein & Brian MacLeod Rogers, editors, Recent Developments in Administrative Law, (Toronto, Ontario: Carswell, 1987).

Neil R. Finkelstein & Brian MacLeod Rogers, editors, Charter Issues in Civil Cases, (Toronto, Ontario: Carswell, 1988).

Neil R. Finkelstein & Brian MacLeod Rogers, editors, Administrative Tribunals and the Charter, (Toronto, Ontario: Carswell, 1990).

Stanley George French, “Considérations sur l’histoire et l’esprit de la philosophie au Canada–français,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.68(juin–juillet, 1964): 20–26.

Stanley George French, editor, Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, (Montréal, Québec: Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979).

Eric Gertner, Michael J. McNaughton, J.J. Morrison, Melvin A. Springman & George R. Stewart, editors, Debtor–Creditor Law: Practice and Doctrine, (Toronto, Ontario: Butterworths, 1985).

George Di Giovanni, editor and translator, “Introduction,” The Science of Logic, G.W.F. Hegel; Michael Baur, General editor, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), xi–lxii.

Chantal Hébert & Jean Lapierre, The Morning After: The 1995 Québec Referendum and the Day That Almost Was, (Toronto, Ontario: Vintage Canada, 2014).

Michael Ignatieff, The Liberal Imagination: A Defense (The Senator Keith Davey Lectures), (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1998).

Janice MacKinnon, Minding the Public Purse: The Fiscal Crisis, Political Trade–Offs, and Canada’s Future, (Kingston/Montréal: Queen’s–McGill University Press, 2003).

Janice MacKinnon, “Preface,” Minding the Public Purse: The Fiscal Crisis, Political Trade–Offs, and Canada’s Future, (Kingston/Montréal: Queen’s–McGill University Press, 2003), ix–xii.

John McCallum, Unequal Beginnings: Agriculture and Economic Development in Québec and Ontario Until 1870, (Toronto, Ontario: University of Toronto Press, 1980).

John McCallum & Clarence Barber, Unemployment and Inflation: The Canadian Experience (Canadian Institute for Economic Policy), (Toronto, Ontario: James Lorimer and Company Limited, 1980).

John McCallum & Clarence Barber, Controlling Inflation: Learning from Experience in Canada, Europe and Japan (Canadian Institute for Economic Policy), (Toronto, Ontario: James Lorimer and Company Limited, 1982).

John McCallum & Christopher Green, Parting as Friends: The Economic Consequences for Québec (Canada Round), (Toronto, Ontario: C.D. Howe Institute, 1991).

John McCallum, Mario Baldassarri & Robert Mundell, editors, Global Disequilibrium in the World Economy: Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992).

John McCallum, “National Borders Matter: Canada–U.S. Regional Trade Patterns,” The American Economic Review, 85.3(1995): 615–623.

Beverley McLachlin, “What Price Disability? A Perspective on the Law of Damages for Personal Injury,” Canadian Bar Review, 59(1981): 1–51.

Beverley McLachlin, “The Charter: A New Role for the Judiciary?” Alberta Law Review, 29(1991): 540–559.

Beverley McLachlin, “Who Owns Our Kids? Education, Health and Religion in a Multicultural Society,” The Cambridge Lectures 1991, (Montréal: Les Éditions Yvon Blais, 1991).

Beverley McLachlin, “The Role of Judges in Modern Commonwealth Society,” Law Quarterly Review, 110(1994): 260–269.

Beverley McLachlin, “Freedom of Religion and the Rule of Law: A Canadian Perspective,” Recognizing Religion in a Secular Society: Essays in Pluralism, Religion and Public Policy, Douglas Farrow, editor; Iain T. Benson, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Laura Spelman, H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr., Douglas Farrow, William Galston, Beverley McLachlin, David Novak, J. Richard, Dorothy Shiff, Margaret Somerville & El Hassan bin Talal, contributors, (Montréal/Kingston: McGill–Queen’s University Press, 2004), 12–34.

CHARLES MARGRAVE TAYLOR & CITÉ LIBRE: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Charles Margrave Taylor, “La bombe et le neutralisme,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.47(mai, 1962): 11–16.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “L’Homme de Gauche et les Élections Provinciales II: L’Opinion de Charles Taylor,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.51(novembre, 1962): 6–7 & 21.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “L’État et la laïcité” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série,14.54(février, 1963): 3–6.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Le Canada, ouvrier de la paix?” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.56(avril, 1963): 13–17.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: Le chevalier de la Contre–révolution,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.69(août–septembre, 1964): 2–3.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “La révolution futile ou les avatars de la pensée globale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.69(août–septembre, 1964): 10–22.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: Le communisme occidentale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.71(novembre, 1964): 3–5.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: La guerre froide s’effrite,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.72(décembre, 1964): 3–4.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: Au chevet de la livre Stirling,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.74(février, 1965): 3–4.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: La pagaille à Ottawa,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.75(mars, 1965): 1–3.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “La planification fédérale–provinciale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.76(avril, 1965): 9–16.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Pointes sèches: Que faire au Vietnam?” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.77(mai–juin, 1965): 1–3.

Charles Margrave Taylor, “Batir un nouveau Canada,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.79(août–septembre, 1965): 10–14.

Charles Margrave Taylor, Maurice Blain, Jean Pellerin & Jacques Tremblay (l’Équipe de rédaction de Cité Libre), “Marchand, Pelletier, Trudeau et le 8 novembre,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.80(octobre, 1965): 1–3.

Charles Margrave Taylor, Maurice Blain, Jean Pellerin & Jacques Tremblay (l’Équipe de rédaction de Cité Libre), “La civilisation Yankee au Vietnam,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.81(novembre, 1965): 1–2; 2.

PIERRE TRUDEAU & CITÉ LIBRE: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (l’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Règle du jeu,” Cité Libre, 1.1(juin, 1950): 1–3.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Politique fonctionnelle,” Cité Libre, 1.1(juin, 1950): 20–24.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (l’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Faites vos jeux: Mounier disparaît,” Cité Libre, 1.1(juin, 1950): 37.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (l’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Faites vos jeux: Blum et Laski,” Cité Libre, 1.1(juin, 1950): 37–38.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (l’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Faites vos jeux: La question,” Cité Libre, 1.1(juin, 1950): 39.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Politique fonctionnelle II,” Cité Libre, 1.2(février, 1951): 24–29.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (l’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Positions sur la présente guerre,” Cité Libre, 1.3(mai, 1951): 1–11.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: L’auberge de la grande U.R.S.S.,” Le Devoir, 14 juin 1952, 4.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: Premières rencontres,” Le Devoir, 16 juin 1952, 4.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: Un peuple sympathique, mais conventionnel jusqu’à la nausée,” Le Devoir, 17 juin 1952, 4.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: Le citoyen soviétique demeure un ‘cochon de payant,’” Le Devoir, 18 juin 1952, 4–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: La conférence commence …,” Le Devoir, 19 juin 1952, 4–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: Les conclusions de la conférence,” Le Devoir, 20 juin 1952, 4.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “‘Je reviens de Moscou’: Est–ce pour ça qu’on a ait trois révolutions?” Le Devoir, 21 juin 1952, 4–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Charles–A. Lussier, Gérard Pelletier & Roger Rolland (L’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “Note liminaire,” Cité Libre, 2.3(décembre, 1952): 1.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Réflexions sur la politique au Canada français,” Cité Libre, 2.3(décembre, 1952): 53–70.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Matériaux pour servir à une enquête sur le cléricalisme,” Cité Libre, 3.7(mai 1953): 29–37.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’élection fédérale du 10 août 1953: Prodromes et conjectures,” Cité Libre, 3.8(novembre, 1953): 1–10.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Charles–A. Lussier, Gérard Pelletier, Roger Rolland & Pierre Vadboncoeur (L’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “I. D’un refus–symptôme,” Cité Libre, 9(mars, 1954): 1–9.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Maurice Blain, Réginald Boisvert, Guy Cormier, Jean–Paul Geoffroy, Pierre Juneau, Charles–A. Lussier, Gérard Pelletier, Roger Rolland & Pierre Vadboncoeur (L’Équipe de la revue Cité Libre), “II. Conflit de droits ou quand la loi méprise la justice,” Cité Libre, 9(mars, 1954): 10–14.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Fluctuations économiques et méthodes de stabilisation,” Cité Libre, 9(mars, 1954): 31–37.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “De libro, tributo … et quibusdam aliis,” Cité Libre, 10(octobre, 1954): 1–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Chroniques du Temps Perdu: Essais sur le Québec Contemporain,” Cité Libre, 10(octobre, 1954): 60–61.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Pauline Lamy (secrétaire de la rédaction), “Radio et télévision,” Cité Libre, 15(août, 1956): 1–3.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Guy Cormier (secrétaire de la rédaction), “Note sur une guerre momentanément évitée,” Cité Libre, 16(février, 1957): 1–2.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Les octrois fédéraux aux universités,” Cité Libre, 16(février, 1957): 9–31.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Guy Cormier (secrétaire de la rédaction), “Faites vos jeux: Les accusations de M. Marcel Clément,” Cité Libre, 16(février, 1957): 50–53.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Le Père Ledit et la delectation morose,” Cité Libre, 16(février, 1957): 69.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Guy Cormier (secrétaire de la rédaction), “Début d’une réflexion,” Cité Libre, 17(juin, 1957): 1.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “In Memoriam: Albert Beguin et Jacques Perrault,” Cité Libre, 17(juin, 1957): 2.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Guy Cormier (secrétaire de la rédaction), “Ressac,” Cité Libre,18(novembre, 1957): 1–2.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Gérard Pelletier (directeurs de Cité Libre) & Guy Cormier (secrétaire de la rédaction), “La liberté académique,” Cité Libre, 19(janvier, 1958): 1–2.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “À propos de ‘domination économique,’” Cité Libre, 20(mai, 1958): 7–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’Affaire Coffin,” Cité Libre, 21(juillet, 1958): 45–46.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Un manifeste démocratique,” Cité Libre, 22(octobre, 1958): 1–31.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau & Cité Libre, “Note de la Rédaction: II. Notes sur le catholicisme d’un certain pays,” Cité Libre, 22(octobre, 1958): 35.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau & Cité Libre, “Note de la Rédaction: De Gaulle,” Cité Libre, 22(octobre, 1958): 45.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Le Père Cousineau, s.j., et ‘la Grève de l’amiante,’” Cité Libre, 23(mai, 1959): 34–36.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Critique de la critique,” Cité Libre, 23(mai, 1959): 36–48.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Mauvaise foi et bonne conscience: L’Argumentation selon Saint Ignace?” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.24(janvier–février, 1960): 25–26.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Leçon de science politique dans un parc qu’il s’agirait de préserver,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.25(mars, 1960): 15–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Diefenbaker monte en ballon (Air connu),” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.26(avril, 1960): 15–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “La notion d’opposition politique,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.27(mai, 1960): 13–14.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Notes sur l’élection provinciale,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.28(juin–juillet, 1960): 12–13.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’élection du 22 juin 1960,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.29(août–septembre, 1960): 3–8.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Faites vos jeux: De nouveau, la carte d’identité,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 11.33(janvier, 1961): 17–18.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “À l’ouest rien de nouveau,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 12.34(février, 1961): 8–9.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’aliénation nationaliste,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 12.35(mars, 1961): 4–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Faites vos Jeux: De l’inconvénient d’être catholique,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 12.35(mars, 1961): 20–21.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Note sur le parti cléricaliste,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 12.38(juin–juillet, 1961): 23.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “La Guerre! La Guerre!” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 12.42(décembre, 1961): 1–3.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “La nouvelle trahison des clercs,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.46(avril, 1962): 3–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Les progrès de l’illusion,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.47(mai, 1962): 1–2.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “À propos des élections du 18 juin 1962: Note sur la conjoncture politique,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.49(août–septembre, 1962): 1–4.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’homme de gauche et les élections provinciales I: L’opinion de Pierre Elliott Trudeau,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.51(novembre, 1962): 3–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Pearson ou l’abdication de l’esprit,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.56(avril, 1963): 7–12.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “L’Élection fédérale: Problèmes et conjectures,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 13.8(novembre, 1963): 1–10.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Les séparatistes: Des contre–révolutionnaires,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.67(mai, 1964): 2–6.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Albert Breton, Raymond Breton, Claude Bruneau, Yvon Gauthier, Marc Lalonde & Maurice Pinard, “Pour une politique fonctionnelle,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.67(mai, 1964): 11–17.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, Albert Breton, Claude Bruneau, Marc Lalonde & Maurice Pinard, “Pour une politique fonctionnelle: L’agriculture au Québec,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.78(juillet, 1965): 9–16.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau & Gérard Pelletier, “Pelletier et Trudeau s’expliquent,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 15.80(octobre, 1965): 3–5.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Le Québec est–il assiégé?” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 16.86(avril–mai, 1966): 7–10.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Entretien avec Pierre Elliott Trudeau,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 25.1(janvier–février, 1997): 9–17.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Document d’archives: La recours à la loi sur les mesures de Guerre: Trudeau explique,” Cité Libre: Nouvelle série, 25.4(septembre–octobre, 1997): 15–18.

Joseph Philippe Pierre Yves Elliott Trudeau, “Document d’archives: Le rapatriement et la Cour suprême,” traduction de Gérard Pelletier, Cité Libre: La voix québécoise pour le libéralisme et l’unité canadienne, 26.4(octobre–novembre, 1998): 65–74.

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