RUDOLF KJELLÉN: STATECRAFT AS A FORM OF LIFE

Rudolf Kjellén (1916) and Christopher Richard Wade Dettling (2018)

INTRODUCTION TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION

We undertake the task of editing and translating into English some of Rudolf Kjellén’s writings in order to liberate Kjellénism from the coils of the sophistical hermenuetics of 20th century Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism, which endeavors to place his legacy of statecraft (Geopolitik and so forth) within the tradition of Machiavellianism, resultant from inexact historiography, and which together serve as the popular mask for an outdated political and economic agenda in the world of today, based upon the surpassed Napoléonic and French Revolutionary category of right, — Bonapartism as autocracy founded upon popular consent.¹

I. Bonapartism and Machiavellianism in Modern European History

Bonapartism is Machiavellianism, — the power of the people and tyranny of the masses is modern European raison d’état, — modern European political and economic irrationalism.² Americanism is neither Eurocentricism nor Europeanism, whether as unipolarity or multipolarity: Modern right is not Global freedom.³

Western democracies which are mortally corrupted fall into the hands of autocracy founded upon popular consent, which is evidenced when every administration of government is ultimately the same, apart from the babble of degenerate élites, whether as liberal or conservative, otherwise as centrist, left–wing or right–wing: Their high tax, low growth agenda is always the result of backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts. Often we hear the inferior ruling classes of Western civilization justify their mortally corrupt activities in the name of asymmetrical federalism and supply management.

As the genuine Hegel of rational (pure) Hegelianism has foretold, the grandeur and decadence of Western civilization is the result of the power struggles between superior and inferior ruling classes, as the dialectic of finitude, die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit: The aggrandizement of Western civilization is the work of superior ruling classes, while the decline of civilization into barbarism is the work of inferior ruling classes. The rise of Western civilization in world history is therefore the result of superior ruling classes, whether as aristocratic, monarchical or democratic.⁴

II. Kjellénism Versus Modern European Irrationalism

Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian idéologues and historiasters (especially today in the European Union) translate the Swedish word “lifsform” and German word “Lebensform” into English as “Living Organism,” in order to conjoin Kjellénism with the Machiavellian tradition of “Social Darwinism,” and to lend credence to their own phantasms and delusions of 20th century totalitarianism (Bonapartism) as only a European right–wing and conservative phenomenon:

“Kjellén was Professor of Political Sciences at the universities of Gothenburg and Uppsala and a Bismarckian conservative politician often accused of having inspired national socialist ideologies both in Germany and elsewhere. Kjellén’s political legacy is, however, more [400] complex than that. But perhaps he should be best known for coining the word ‘geopolitics’ [39. Kjellén’s major work is Rudolf Kjellén, Staten som Lifsform (Hugo Geber: Stockholm, 1916) where the term ‘geopolitics’ was first introduced. In the absence of an English translation I have used the German edition, Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform (Margarete Langfeldt trans., 2nd edn, S. Hirzel: Leipzig, 1917). All translations from the German are mine ... ]. In terms of constitutionalism, Kjellén’s input can, perhaps, best be described as an organic state theory insofar as he considers states to be ‘sentient and rational beings’ [40. Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, supra note 39, at 30. The classic formulation of this theory [Staten som Lifsform] is Herbert Spencer’s ‘organic analogy.’ See Herbert Spencer, ‘The Social Organism’ (originally published in 1860), in Herbert Spencer, Essays: Scientific, Political and Speculative (Williams and Norgate: London & Edinburgh, 1891) 265–307]. Kjellén constructs his overall theory around a perspective on territoriality that he describes as ‘geopolitical.’ Here geopolitics is defined as the synthesis of an ‘old’ juridical theory mainly represented by Jellinek and a ‘new’ geography that, for Kjellén, is inspired by the work of the German political geographer Friedrich Ratzel. The main flaw of the juridical theory, with or without its two–sided realism, is allegedly its static nature and its inability to explain states in a genuinely historical way. And Ratzel’s political geography, at least so Kjellén claims, provides the theory with the required historical dynamism: ‘geopolitics is the doctrine of the state as a geographical organism or a spatial phenomenon: in other words, the state as land, territory, area or, more precisely, as Reich’ [42. Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, supra note 39, at 46, 32 and 43]. Reich, imperium, a new dynamic of territoriality: this is what Kjellén’s geopolitics seemingly contributes to our understanding of the state. But what would this imply in practice? Within the overall organic theory, territory as land that is ruled over by the imperium of the state takes on a central meaning: ‘One word tells us everything: the Reich is the body of the state. The Reich is not property like the peasant’s farm; it belongs to the personhood of the state. It is the state itself’ [43. Ibid., at 57. The word Reich is, of course, notoriously difficult to translate with its troubling political implications] … [403] So what is this ‘life’ that Kjellén situates at the core of his geopolitically flavoured notion of the state? If it is not merely a random metaphor, how can we explain the vitalism that would account for, perhaps not only Kjellén’s own apparent anti–liberalism, but also for the conservative political ethos of Brunner, Carl Schmitt, and a number of other late–Weimar and post–Weimar state theorist? I would like to suggest that the work of all mentioned is informed by a political philosophy that is at heart Nietzschean ... The ‘life’ of Kjellén’s geopolitical vitalism is, I would then suggest, Nietzsche’s will to power [54. Althought their is no apparent direct link between Kjellén and Nietzsche, the intermediate figure here is Oswald Spengler and, more generally, the Weimarian tradition of Geopolitik. [404] See e.g. David T. Murphy, The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933 …]”⁵

Historiasters and sophisters guilty of the puerile fallacy of psychologism (once a very popular academic “method” based upon modern European subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism), insinuate that Rudolf Kjellén was a “Bismarckian conservative politician” who “inspired national socialist ideologies” in Germany, as well as the “conservative political ethos” of German fascists: The personality of Kjellén was very inspirational on the stage of 20th century world history.

Totalitarianism (Bonapartisme) in Europe is only a European right–wing and conservative phenomenon, completely at odds with 20th century European Social Democracy: Rudolf Kjellén is an “apparent” anti–liberal, in true psychologistic fashion, somehow related to Herbert Spencer, a Nietzschean, according to Panu Minkkinen, and perhaps fellow traveler Jarna Petman (Ius Gentium Association/Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs), undoubtedly under the European Union’s influence over the effete Finnish ruling classes, as the mask of Franco–German “Social Democracy,” which hides the mortal corruption of Großdeutschland under the banner of corporate welfare, also combined with a very strong dose of tariffs against American finance, commerce and industry. Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian idéologues and historiasters who elucidate Kjellén’s conception of Geopolitics based upon their own sophistical category of Life (Transzendentalphilosophie), ignore and neglect the rational philological and hermeneutical meaning of “lifsform,” namely the ontological and epistemological conception of Kjellénism: Life and its form as a world historical notion of political and economic knowledge and being.

Alas, Panu Minkkinen’s translations of Rudolf Kjellén’s translated works fail to draw a rational distinction between exact hermeneutical philology on the one hand, versus hermeneutical and philological sophistry on the other: Minkkinen’s English renderings depend upon German translations rather than the Swedish original: “All translations from the German are mine … the word Reich is, of course, notoriously difficult to translate with its troubling political implications.” Minkkinen does not translate into English the Swedish words of Rudolf Kjellén, but rather the German words of Margarethe Langfeldt: The inspirational psychology (psychologism) behind Panu Minkkinen’s sophistical version of 20th century modern European world history is based upon a defective logical and linguistic analysis of Kjellénism.

Why not extract the rational distinction between exact hermeneutical philology on the one hand, versus hermeneutical and philological sophistry on the other, based upon the works themselves, i.e., found within the very conceptual apparatus of world history in question? More on this rational methodology later, for the conceptual instrumentalities of “extraction” are themselves political and economic complexifications resultant from world historical determinations, — in the clash between Kant and Hegel.

Following in the selfsame tradition of the sophistical hermeneutical philology of modern European irrationalism, we propose another example of corrupted Kjellénism:

“Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a generous grant from The Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies, Stockholm, which aided in the publication of this book … Biopolitics was originally conceived as a naturalistic Staatsbiologie or ‘state biology’ based on the principle that all political and social life rested on biological foundations [7. Von Uexküll 1920; Lemke 2011: 9; Lemke 2008]. At the center of this perspective was the belief that the institution of the state itself was a biological organism or ‘life form,’ which had an anatomy and physiology and went through lifecycles of birth, growth, maturity, and eventual decline. Indeed, the term was devised by the Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén precisely to emphasize that the political state shared the very same ‘dependency’ on the ‘laws of [biological] life’ that was characteristic for all organic life [8. Kjellén 1920: 94 (quote); Kjellén 1924: 38, 175; Lagergren 1998]. Deployed in this sense, biopolitics flourished during the interwar period, and the belief in the direct correlation of political behavior with biological factors.”⁶

The writings of Mark Bassin make his readers believe that Kjellénism is somehow connected to “naturalistic Staatsbiologie” and “biopolitics” in order to insinuate that the Kjellénian conception of “lifsform” is historically connected to Nazidom: “Biopolitics flourished during the interwar period … the belief in the direct correlation of political behavior with biological factors.” As evidence of so–called Kjellénian biopolitics, Mark Bassin inserts the word “biological,” between brackets, in a quote from Kjellén (1920) translated into English, between the words “laws of” and “life”: In a footnote to the quote, Mark Bassin also references “Lagergren 1998”⁷ as further proof, in the psychologistic fashion of modern European subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism, that Rudolf Kjellén held the belief and perspective that the “institution of the state itself was a biological organism.” In other words, Mark Bassin’s work merely affirms that the phrase “the laws of life” means “the laws of biological life” in the quotation that he cites from Rudolf Kjellén, because he inserts “biological” between the words “laws of” and “life.” Mark Bassin’s book causes his readers to imagine that Rudolf Kjellén held the belief and perspective that the “institution of the state itself was a biological organism” in order to connect him to whatever exactly it is that Bassin names as “naturalistic Staatsbiologie” and “biopolitics,” — which resembles proto–Nazism: The belief (Bassin) in the direct correlation of political behavior with biological factors.

Of course, there is no question here of any “interpretation” of Kjellénism whatsoever on the part of Mark Bassin, since he advances no rational philological and hermeneutical argument, the conclusion of which is, therefore “the term [Lifsform, Life Form] was devised by Swedish political scientist Rudolf Kjellén precisely to emphasize that the political state shared the very same ‘dependency’ on the ‘laws of [biological] life’ that was characteristic for all organic life.” Mark Bassin is therefore like a poet, except that his poetry is inscribed within the linguistic forms of academic writing instead of the Shakespearean sonnet, and he writes as if he is producing exact historiography, when in fact he is merely creating imaginative literature. We have read far better poetry and much better history.

We must make one last point before moving forward, lest we ourselves risk the counter charge of the very psychologism we condemn. When we maintain, for instance, that the writings of Mark Bassin make his readers believe that Kjellénism is X, we mean the following: Within the world historical strife of ruling classes, especially in Europe, the works of Mark Bassin justify political and economic attacks against “conservatism” and the “right,” labeled as the advocates of “Kjellénism” (naturalistic Staatsbiologie, biopolitics, lifsform), whether as “royalists” and “monarchists” or otherwise. Our own condemnation of psychologism in the field of historiography, on the other hand, is aimed at the destruction of mortal corruption in the political and economic arena of world history, — in the name of American Liberty. We therefore deploy the conception of beliefs, feelings, sensations and perceptions, not according to the Transzendental Logik of the Kantian tradition, but rather in the sense of the rational Hegelian meaning of the clash between ruling classes, as the higher notion of outdated and surpassed conceptions in the world of today: Inert ideas are inscribed within of the apparatus of world historical determinations, in the production of political and economic complexifications as the rational evolution of the notion of that which is coming–to–be and passing–away, i.e., the notion of the world which is its conceptualization of itself.

Ideologies of inferior ruling classes, in the rational Hegelian philosophy, are therefore the political and economic weapons with which they destroy themselves, in the floodtide of rational political and economic order. Superior ruling classes choose their own medicine, while inferior ruling classes choose their own poison: The rationality of higher conceptions uplift superior ruling classes, while the irrationality of inert ideas destroys inferior ruling classes. We choose our fate be cause freedom is our destiny, while our choices themselves are the results of our ideas, conceptions, notions and perceptions, — in the pure Hegelian meaning: Knowledge overpowers ignorance because the rise of science overcomes ideology in the world historical arena of politics and economics:

“All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is absorbed in their mundane interests, they are all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object. All actions, says the Pure Hegel, including world historical actions, culminate with individuals as subjects giving actuality to the substantial, namely, while the consciousness of civilizations is not absorbed in their mundane interests, they are not all the time the unconscious tools and organs of the world mind: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind and they are therefore directly at one with that deed and it is not concealed from them and is their aim and object. World historical individuals and actions, therefore, are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are therefore directly at one with that deed, and it is not therefore concealed from some of them, and it is their aim and object. Wherefore? The historical development of the principle of Western civilization blossoms into the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: World historical individuals and actions are the living instruments of what is in substance the deed of the world mind, and some of them are directly at one with that deed, and it is not concealed from them as their aim and object, — as the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history. The deed of the world mind is the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life in world history: The dialectic of universal history is therefore the principle of the historical development of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life, namely, world civilization. World historical individuals and actions are therefore the living instruments of the historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life as world civilization: World historical individuals are the living instruments of the dialectic of world history. The historical development of the principle of the self–conscious freedom of ethical life is in substance the deed of the world mind, namely, as individual subjects giving actuality to the substantial, from the embryonic stage until it blossoms: They are not therefore absorbed in their mundane interests, they are therefore all the time the conscious tools and organs of the mind of the world. The genuine Hegel of Pure Hegelism says of those individuals who are directly at one with the deed of the world mind although it is concealed from them and is not their aim and object.”⁸

Bonapartism in Europe requires the assistance of American intellectuals, in order to recast its Machiavellian agenda within the world historical form of Americanism, as the political and economic strife between Republicans and Democrats in America, thereby creating the illusion of rational political and economic order, and thereby avoiding the ire of the White House, Washington and Wall Street: The Bonapartist reformulation of Machiavellianism as American Idealism is the world historical downfall of the last vestiges of modern European political economy covertly imported into institutions of the European Union, especially at Maastricht. Bonapartist intervention within American political economy entails the self–destruction of European Machiavellianism, which is evidenced in the world of today. All these political and economic complexifications are inscribed within world historical determinations aimed at the unification of the western and eastern hemispheres, as the rise of Global civilization in the developmental unification of the coaxial integration of the American world, as the supremacy of American Liberty.

“Kjellén, a Germanophile political scientist and journalist, was schooled in Staatswissenschaft, an integrated field containing law, politics, economics, and history, which was nineteenth–century Germany’s form of political science. He produced the earliest extended elucidation of geopolitics in 1916 in his book Staten som lifsform (The state as a life form), which was translated from its original Swedish into German the following year. Kjellén treated geopolitics as one of many aspects of what he intended as a synthetic ‘system of politics on the basis of a purely empirical conception of the state.’ Kjellén anticipated the methods of the Weimar geopoliticians by making geopolitics a purported practical guide to political action, a wegweiser. In the geopolitical marriage of geography and politics the latter clearly played a dominant role. Geopolitical writing ultimately came to be devoted almost entirely to topical German political issues accompanied by precious little scientific geographical content. Kjellén, in his influential definition of geopolitics, helped to ensure that from the start geography would play second fiddle to politics in the geopolitical equation: ‘Geopolitics is the teaching of the state as a geographic organism or a manifestation in space: therefore, the state as land, territory, district or, most obviously, as an empire. As a political science it has the state unit constantly in its focus and wished to contribute to the understanding of the essence of the state; political geography, on the other hand, studies the earth as the site of human communities in their connections to the other properties of the earth.’ Kjellén offered his ‘empirically based’ science of the state as an alternative to what he felt were the sterile abstractions and theoretical juridical concepts that dominated thinking about the state in his day. Geography, he hoped, would form one of the bases of the new science, anchoring it in the physical, the real, and empirically demonstrable facts of geography rather than in the airy legal theorizing on which traditional concepts of the state were constructed. Geopolitics would investigate and explain why a particular state occupied a given area and no other and how mountains, rivers, climate, access to the sea, and other geographical factors shaped the political life and cultural characteristics typical of its people. Kjellén’s effort to create an ‘empirical’ substitute for legalistic conceptions of the state [7] and to find an ‘empirical’ rather than legal basis for relations between states would occupy geopoliticians throughout the Weimar era.”⁹

David T. Murphy’s writings make Rudolf Kjellén into an empiricist, in order to make him and his followers responsible for the evils of the World Wars, and thereby rescue Kant and Locke from Kjellén’s attacks against that which he names as the Manchester School of Advanced British Liberalism, which inherited Social Democracy from the Continent, — Joseph Chamberlain and David Lloyd George being some of British Bonapartism’s earliest and loudest 20th century Kantian and Lockean mouthpieces: Murphy’s work fails to deploy in its English translations of Kjellén, the exact philological and hermeneutical distinction between the Swedish Kjellén and the Kjellén of the German interpreters, whose inexact translations popularized his ideas for their Kantian and Hegelian audiences in Germany.

Rudolf Kjellén: “Från studiet af statens förhållande till de olika sidorna i sitt eget väsen har undersökningen till sist skridit in på statens förhållande till de enskilda individer, som utgöra cellerna i hans nationella kropp.”¹⁰

Margarethe Langfeldt: “In der Untersuchung über das Verhältnis des Staats zu den besonderen Seiten seines Wesens sind wir zuletzt bei seinem Verhalten zu den einzelnen Individuen, den zellen seines natürlichen Körpers, angelangt.”¹¹

Here we have an instance, amongst many examples, of how the works of Kjellén’s German interpreters, in their inexact translations, make Kjellénism into “empiricism,” and make Geopolitics into “science,” in the very popular manner of Machianism, namely German Neo–Kantianism: Nationella kropp = natürlichen Körpers.

How very simple and easy is the task of writing “exact historiography,” following in the footsteps of Bassin, Minkkinen and Murphy (upon whose sophistry Minkkinen depends), when we imagine the psychology of Rudolf Kjellén our protagonist, and then phantasize biographically about his personality (When we imagine and phantasize: When we allow ourselves to become the political and economic victims of inferior ruling classes), as the psychoanalysis of imaginative literature, and thereby reconcile our interpretative yearnings and desires (the political and economical mask of Social Democracy) with world history, instead of embarking upon a rigorous philological and hermeneutical analysis of rational Kjellénian conceptions, — and hence we avoid the intense intellectual work necessitated by the laborious travail of an exact elucidation of Kjellénism!

David T. Murphy’s book defends modern European political and economic irrationalism from the charge of Bonapartism and Machiavellianism, commits the same fatal philological and hermeneutical blunder as found in the works of Mark Bassin and Panu Minkkinen, and fails to distinguish the German production of Kjellénism from the Swedish original, by wrongly making the spirit of both works roughly commensurate: Lifsform is Lebensform, or “Life form” in the sense of “biological organism.” Murphy’s book concentrates upon the German significance of Lifsform as Lebenswelt in its evaluation of the role of Rudolf Kjellén and Kjellénism in 20th century world history, and justifies this endeavor with an “historical,” “autobiographical” and “psychological” assessment of Kjellén as a “Germanophile”: The subjective mental states (desires, passing fancies, fears, sensations, pleasures, feelings and so forth) that are alleged to have once existed, many years ago, in the head of Rudolf Kjellén, at particular times and places. In the name of psychologism, therefore, the works of Murphy, Bassin and Minkkinen ignore the powerful dimension of genuine Hegelianism within Kjellénism, combined with its resolute rejection of the Kantian traditions: Instead of concentrating upon Nazidom’s love of Kant and his sophistical category of Untermenschen (subhumans), especially as the basis of his anthropology, they prefer to saddle the Western tradition of Athens, Jerusalem and Rome with the barbarism of the 20th century. Indeed, the mask of Social Democracy was still quite useful 20 years ago, in the race to self–enrichment and self–glorification of the inferior ruling classes at state controlled schools, colleges and universities hell bent upon the usurpation of federal powers, especially under the Machiavellian influence of the Narco–élites and Québécocracy: Indeed, the “social democrats” were clearing away the last remnants of European modernity from the ground of universal history, in the name of corporate welfare, in preparation for the foundations of 21st century American Idealism, the almighty spiritual awakening of Americanism unchained by the Digital Revolution, and rising upwards in the world of today. Is Social Democracy really to blame for the flabby minds of social democrats? They are merely useful tools in the birth of a far higher conception of the world, as the rise of Global rational political and economic order, in the supremacy of American Liberty.

Social democrats who attack their adversaries as “anti–social” ignore that Hitlerism is as much Bonapartism as Leninism, Trotskyism and Stalinism: But the mortal enemies of modern European Social Democracy as historical Bonapartism, especially in the 20th century, are in no wise obligated to accept its “definition” of itself, forged at the hands of self–proclaimed social democrats. The promises of “welfare,” the uplifting of the poor and downtrodden masses, made in the name of historical Social Democracy, are really methods of self–enrichment designed to advance the backers of modern political and economic irrationalism, whether in the lower, middle and upper classes: The greatest beneficiaries of historical Bonapartism, whether as socialism, liberalism and conservatism, whether as centrism or extremism, are always the backwards cartels, outdated monopolies and corrupt trusts of the Machiavellians. The modern European category of Social Democracy is outdated and surpassed in the American world of today: Modern right is not Global freedom.

The grandeur and decadence of Western civilization is the result of the power struggles between superior and inferior ruling classes, as the dialectic of finitude, — die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit (Hegel). The aggrandizement of Western civilization is the work of superior ruling classes, while the decline of civilization into barbarism is the work of inferior ruling classes: The rise of Western civilization in world history is therefore the result of superior ruling classes, whether as aristocratic, monarchical or democratic.

III. Rational Hegelianism: Kjellénism and World History

We avoid the pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism of impure Hegelianism, and prefer the phrase “Form of Life,” because Kjellénism (Kjellénismus) is neither 20th century Kantian anti–Hegelianism nor Kantio–Hegelianism: Indeed, the 20th century Kantian anti–Hegelianism or Kantio–Hegelianism of Rudolf Kjellén’s own German interpreters and translators (Carl Koch, Margarethe Langfeldt, Alexander von Normann and Friedrich Stieve)¹² whether as “Vitalism,” “Social Darwinism,” “Biopolitics” or “Staatsbiologie” (also pejorative terms, the bad Kantian meanings of which are invented by self–acclaimed good Kantian critics, to discredit the rational Kjellénian conception of Geopolitics, amongst other things), is completely alien to the rational conception of Kjellénism in the realm of world history:

“From our study of the relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence, our investigation has finally arrived at the behavior of the state towards its own individuality, towards the very cells which constitute its national body.”¹³

“The behavior of the state towards its own individuality” (statens förhållande till de enskilda individer): The world historical significance of these Swedish words, and their English translation, greatly demonstrates the powerful influence of Hegelian causality or “self–determination” upon Kjellénism and the Kjellénian conception of organism in the universal historical arena of politics and economics as lifsform: “The relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence” (statens förhållande till de olika sidorna i sitt eget väsen), namely, causa sui as the speculative logical and dialectical relationship between the one and many, as universal and particular, in the pure Hegel’s system of the philosophical science of absolute idealism.¹⁴ In the rational Kjellénian conception of the Geopolitics of Kjellénism, the relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence, means the historical relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence, because the investigation of the relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence, is an historical study.

Of course, in order to conceptualize the aforementioned demonstration, one must first possess the rational Hegelian conception of the difference between pure and impure Hegelianism (based upon pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism) in modern European world history: Otherwise one remains the intellectual victim of the views, outlooks, perspectives and standpoints of the Kantian tradition.¹⁵

The Kjellénian ontological and epistemological conception of organism, from which comes the political and economic notion of “lifsform,” is in no way inherited from the Darwinian theory of evolution, but rather comes from organic development in the Hegelian sense, especially as outlined in Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie, and is interpreted in conjunction with Scandinavian traditions, which are neither revolutionary nor reactionary.

“The nations of the earth also do not live upon bread alone, and still less by the satisfactions of the flesh. Herein resides the ultimate line of demarcation between materialism and idealism: In the conception of what should be, not in the conception of what is.”¹⁶

The ultimate realization of Kjellénism is unchained as the distinction between philosophical materialism and idealism in the political and economic arena of modern European world history, based upon the the Kjellénian conception of what should be, not merely the conception of what is: The rational Kjellénian conception of what should be is not divorced from the realm of organic development in the genuine Hegelian sense of the Rechtsphilosophie because “In the world of today … the nations of the earth also do not live upon bread alone.” Therefore Lifsform is also inscribed within the realm of world history: Idealism and materialism coexist in the Kjellénian conception of rational political and economic order. Philosophical idealism and materialism are opposed in the political and economic arena of modern European world history as sophistry (propaganda and ideology), when the nations of the earth live upon bread alone, — “bread alone” is a metaphor for European modernity, the Bonapartism which Kjellénism rejects, namely Machiavellianism (“the world of today … is overflowing with martyrdom”): Kjellénism reconciles philosophical idealism and materialism in the political and economic arena of modern European world history, in the rational Kjellénian conception of statecraft based upon the state as a form of life, as the Kjellénian philosophical conception of rational political and economic order in the realm of world history, in the genuine Hegelian sense of the organic development of what should be and what is. The philosophical reconciliation of political and economic idealism and materialism in world history (and the rejection of the sophistical distinction between them), in the organic development of statecraft as Lifsform, means that the philosophy of Kjellénism as rational Hegelian “Idealism” is mortally opposed to the subjectivism, relativism and irrationalism of modern European unreason, especially in the contagion of Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism unleashed by the Bonapartist and French Revolutionary category of right.

What is the philosophical aim of Kjellénian statecraft, in the genuine Hegelian organic development of the state, as Lifsform? “[Wealth] which alone increases the value of life, in the fullest sense of the word, and which uplifts personal development (Persönlichkeit) to ever greater heights of achievement.”¹⁷

IV. Kjellénian Statecraft and Americanism: Collapse of European Modernity

The modern European irrationalism of monarchism and republicanism, in the Kantian anti–Hegelian and Kantio–Hegelian political and economic forms of imperialism and nationalism, whether as liberal or conservative, otherwise as centrist, left–wing or right–wing, does not justify the slaughter of millions of human beings in the Great War: The notion of Western freedom, in the sense of Jerusalem, Athens and Rome, which uplifts civilization from barbarism in world history, is worth the combat of nations, — in order to safeguard humanity from the floodtide of satanism and barbarity.

President Wilson is a truly great American Idealist, which no effete and degenerate modern European “statesmen” surpass in the history of the Great War, — whether as Prime Minister, Homme d’État, Kaiser and Czar. President Wilson and the almighty American Idealists of the earth, in the name of American Liberty, beacon of Americanism in the world, ended the greatest slaughter in the history of humanity.

The Kjellénian conception of Geopolitics leads European modernity astray because it is alien to the Kantian traditions, precisely because of the world historical significance of Americanism in rational Kjellénism: American world power is on the rise, unlike fractured European modernity. Indeed, the decomposition of modern Europe and the rise of Americanism, is precisely the world historical strife between Kant and Hegel. The rational Kjellénian Geopolitical distinction between monarchism and republicanism places the United States of America between the extremes of 20th century world power, and is therefore opposed to the modern European political and economic distinction between the Industrial and French Revolutions. The Geopolitics of Kantian anti–Hegelianism and Kantio–Hegelianism in the 20th century destroys itself, and for very good reason: The Kjellénian conception of statecraft is an embryonic political and economic rationalism, following in the wake of Americanism.

EPILOGUE: THE AIM OF STATECRAFT ¹

No prosperity for individuals without the nation — Materialism and idealism in state law — The return to essence — No fortune without personal development.

From our study of the relationship between the state and the various elements of its own essence, our investigation has finally arrived at the behavior of the state towards its own individuality, towards the very cells which constitute its national body.²

The well–being of citizens, their happiness, is the only veritable purpose of the state? In the realm of world history, the ultimate aim of statecraft is expressed in various ways: Increasing the sum of the privilege of happiness (Francis Bacon), as the greatest possible happiness for the greatest possible number of individuals (Jeremy Bentham). Natural law and historical Liberalism could give no other answer to the age–old question, since they derived the state from individuals alone. The answer is historically also explainable as the absolute negation³ of the absolutist police state,⁴ which knew its real responsibility towards individuals, and in general its limitations of state power. Thus, the French Revolution believed that it had done enough to establish human rights⁵ within a strictly fixed sphere of freedom, and to assign to the state the position of a sentry at the periphery of this sphere. Others once again rehabilitated and clothed the Reaction in the form, which constitutes the state’s aim, of making the purpose of statecraft into the protection of the legal system as such. John Locke is the most influential upholder of the former doctrine, while Immanuel Kant is the great vanguard of the latter school, at least within the realm of theory.⁶ However, whether the issue was pursued in one direction [180] or the other, in the safeguarding of freedom or in the maintenance of order and authority, — the answer was always determined only by the relationship of the state to the individual citizen.

Ultimately this means that the state is press–ganged into the service of powerful individuals⁷ and government thereby becomes an organization whose only purpose is to improve the needs of the interested parties, the stakeholders: As the aim of the state, there exists no other end per se. This is the position of historical Liberalism, whose fierce opponent in our time was Hans Järta (1774–1847). We are certainly not mistaken in the world of today, if we still see in him the popular, more or less thoughtless, but hardly doubted public opinion.

Our organic conception⁸ also proves its higher value in that it gives the state its very own purpose: But this possibility exists only for those who recognize in the state the reality of personal development,⁹ which is commensurate with our own sphere of identity and individuality,¹⁰ and not merely as a conglomerate of individuals, — for, according to the nature of all organic life, the whole is something other than the sum of its parts.¹¹ Let us take an external, clearly recognizable example: The German world is not only the sum of its individual states, but is also something newer, stronger and greater which has arisen from their organic coexistence¹² and therefore its purpose cannot be merely the prosperity of the individual states, but must aim at a newer, greater development of personality: This development of the state’s identity and individuality we have discovered as the very raison d’être of the nation.¹³ The state is no longer an abstraction, but is inseparably united to a national identity as the basis of individuality: For this result the state is responsible as a nation (as a form of life). All the same, the purpose of the state is the aggrandizement of the nation. The state serves this national purpose, but also serves the purpose of the national identity. Here, also, we place no limitation upon freedom or security which is inside the realm of jurisprudence.¹⁴ The territory of the modern state coincides with national life. We place a limitation (on state power) only when it infringes upon the individual, in the sense of personal development’s purpose¹⁵ of national identity and individuality (as a form of life). [181]

Detta är svaret på frågan om statens ändamål och nödvändiga uppgift. Det visar ännu en gång, hurusom nationen är en integrerande del i hans väsen; utan detta sammanhang stannar svaret i allmänna talesätt, där det icke sjunker ned till stöd åt individualismen. Men mellan stat och individ ges i grunden ingen konkurrens. De löpa jämnsides i historien, såsom uppbärande hvar sin af hennes stora rörelsekrafter. Individen uppger ingen egen rätt genom att tjäna staten. Och han förnedrar icke sig själf genom att ställa nationalismen som äfven ett praktisktpolitiskt program — särskildt där nationalitetens låga grad så påkallar — ty detta visar sig nu som hans enda väg att fullgöra den skyldiga tributen till hans eget släkte inom mänsklighetens stora familj.

Vårt svar visar ännu en gång staten liksom afkopplad från individens fria handling, och skall därför icke tillfredsställa där man (som JELLINEK) i staten ser primärt en skapelse af medvetet mänskligt förnuft. Men vi tro, att bakom både stat och människor ligga elementära skapande krafter, som de äro på djupet underkastade. Inför denna syn framstå staterna mindre som ledare af sina öden än som ledda på sina vägar, af inflytelser hvilkas djupaste källa är belägen utanför deras eget medvetande; och vår närvarande framställning har velat bidraga att sprida något ljus öfver arten af dessa inflytelser.

Man säger, att detta är en materialistisk uppfattning. Vi känna denna risk, i en värld som har så lätt att förväxla vittnet med gärningsmannen. De, som verkligen vilja döma rättfärdigt, skola måhända döma annorlunda. De veta, att materialisten aldrig får syn på materialismens verkliga utbredning i tillvaron. Verkligt skarpsynt därför är endast den, som i sitt hjärta sörjer däröfver. För honom är det kanske till sist också möjligt att skönja en Kraftfrän ofvan i krafternas spel från nedan.

Men det bör icke heller lämnas ur sikte, att vår analys direkt beträffar en statstyp som mer än någonsin synes [182] fången i materiella omsorger. Det är den moderna statens problem vi närmast haft i sikte. Liksom FUSTEL DE COULANGES för ett halfsekel sedan tecknade »staten i forntiden» och fann dess väsen vara kulten, så hafva vi här sökt fånga bilden och väsendet af den stat som i verkligheten omger oss. Och då skall det slå oss, att dess skilda manifestationer till sist förena sig i en och samma välbekanta tendens. Denna sträfvan efter geografisk individualitet, nationalitet, autarki och intressegruppermg — är det icke alltsammans endast olika former af den återgång till naturen, d.v.s. [det vill säga] anknytning till driftlifvet, som ROUSSEAU predikade för individen! Det är på statslifvets personlighetsområde en materialiseringsprocess, som väl harmonierar med andan i ett materialismens tidehvarf. Icke minst synes den svara emot en internationell politik som förefaller mer än någonsin blottad på ideella motiv. Jämförelsen mellan medeltidens korståg mot Jerusalem och det sista sekelskiftets stormaktståg mot Peking kan måhända anses betecknande för denna allmänna utveckling. Den stat, som Coulanges (måhända något öfverdrifvet) fann absorberad af kult och offertjänst, har alltså genom medeltidens romantik hårdnat till en typ absorberad af arbete och näringsbekymmer, utan tid till bön och utan lust till offer. Är det icke en naturlig växt från barndom genom ungdom till hård och kämpande mandom?

However, in the world of today, which is overflowing with martyrdom, we do not abandon the hope for a polity that will also uphold something more than the mere panem et circenses (bread and circuses) of the Ancients, the sensations of life and pleasures of the masses. The nations of the earth also do not live upon bread alone, and still less by the satisfactions of the flesh. Herein resides the ultimate line of demarcation between materialism and idealism: In the conception of what should be, not in the conception of what is. The materialist gives the state as well as the individual another ambition than the satisfaction of expressing one’s purpose in life, and navigating with the least effort and [183] least potential risk, alongside the favorable winds of the storms. The idealist is aware of the responsibility for the direction, and thus the course of the ship of state moves forward. And where does the course lead? “We wonder,” replies the button–caster (Knopfgießer) to Peer Gynt’s question, on the “opinion of the master.” It is the greatest duty of statecraft to determine the meaning of the state, and then plot the course. Statecraft does not shy away from difficulties and hindrances, and even the great suffering that leadership encounters on the way. For one thing is certain: Only through such a journey does the nation earn the wealth which places peoples and individuals above fortune, which alone increases the value of life, in the fullest sense of the word, and which uplifts personal development (Persönlichkeit) to ever greater heights of achievement. The aim of the state is therefore to uplift the human capital, — whichever way fortune dictates, in other words: Ultimate happiness will come by itself.

In this treatise upon the state as a form of life, this must be our last word. We have seen that for compelling reasons, the state has made very little progress upon this course in our time, and is not really aware of such a conception. But we nonetheless believe in a higher type of state, which develops a rational aim, and which will strive towards this goal with reasonable measures.

To be continued …

ENDNOTES

Introduction to the English Translation

1. See: “There is no mystery about the origins of Bonapartism. It is the child of Napoléon Bonaparte and the French Revolution … the strong executive founded upon the plebiscite which was to be the pillar of Bonapartism; and [Napoléon] had come to the conclusion that legislative assemblies should be merely supervisory, that they should have no power to change the constitution or to interfere with the executive … The French nation, being consulted for the third time, for the third time by an overwhelming majority ratified its belief in Bonapartism … The guiding principle of Bonapartism was autocracy founded on popular consent, safeguarding social order and social equality [Social Democracy, i.e., Socialism].”

Herbert Albert Laurens Fisher, Bonapartism: Six Lectures Delivered in the University of London, Oxford, Oxford Univerisity Press, 1908, 7–22–39–87–120.

See finally: “The Industrial Revolution … is not only one of the most important facts of English history, but Europe owes to it the growth of two great systems of thought — Economic Science, and its antithesis, Socialism.”

Arnold Toynbee (1852–1883), “The Chief Features of the Revolution,” Lectures on the Industrial Revolution of the Eighteenth Century in England, Popular Addresses, Notes, and Other Fragments, London, Longmans, Green, and Company, 1920, 64–73; 64. [1884]

2. See: “From whence comes autocracy founded on popular consent, the origin of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right? … Indeed, it is necessary to elucidate that which the modern irrationalists name, in their various terminological disguises, the rationality governing human actions, the fountainhead of all justice according to the dispensers of modern freedom, and the origin of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, the bastion of autocracy founded on popular consent:

‘We propose a comparison between the doctrine of Machiavelli, as it emerges from the Prince, and the doctrine of absolutism, which we shall endeavor to discern, not from one or another of the theorists who were its champions, but from all of them … the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli … Machiavellism and absolutism are derived from analogous historical situations. This is the first essential point of our parallel. The historical situation inspires Machiavelli with the idea of ​​the legitimacy of every means aimed at the achievement of public interest and the salvation of the State … those who were able to study Napoléon Bonaparte very closely tell us that he was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood (sang des hommes répandu) as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine … The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress … Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people.’ (Louis Couzinet, “Le Prince” de Machiavel et la théorie de l’absolutisme, Paris, Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Arthur Rousseau, Éditeur, 1910, xix–xxi–xxvii–136–349–352)

Machiavellism and absolutism (autocracy not founded on popular consent) are derived from analogous historical situations; The Prince of Machiavelli and the doctrines of absolutism were born of the same sentiment of profound patriotism, at times and in countries where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress; Machiavelli reveals himself as an immoral patriot who wants to save the State, even though his conception of government appears as a policy that is respectful of political freedoms and that is aimed at the happiness of the people; the absolutist doctrines, in their application, lead rulers to the same results as the doctrines of Machiavelli: The spilling of blood is the greatest remedy of political medicine.

Autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, is Machiavellism?

‘[Rulers] cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion … [rulers] must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and, as I said before, not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated.’ (Niccolò di Bernardo dei Machiavelli, The Prince, Luigi Ricci, translator, Oxford, Humphrey Milford, 1921, 71)

What is Machiavellism? Rulers and lawmakers must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated.Wherefore?

‘Many have been and are of opinion that worldly events are so governed by fortune and by God, that men cannot by their prudence change them, and that on the contrary there is no remedy whatever, and for this they may judge it to be useless to toil much about them, but let things be ruled by chance … Our freewill may not be altogether extinguished, I think it may be true that fortune is the ruler of half our actions, but that she allows the other half or a little less to be governed by us. I would compare her to an impetuous river that, when turbulent, inundates the plains, ruins trees and buildings, removes earth from this side and places it on the other; every one flies before it, and everything yields to its fury without being able to oppose it.’ (Machiavelli, Ibidem, 99–100)

In other words, intelligent rulers and lawmakers are very savvy political and economic rapists:

‘Fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by these rather than by those who proceed coldly. And therefore, like a woman, she is a friend to the young, because they are less cautious, fiercer, and master her with greater audacity.’ (Machiavelli, Ibidem, 102)

Machiavellism: Intelligent rulers and lawmakers are very savvy political and economic rapists; they cannot observe all those things which are considered good in men, being often obliged, in order to maintain the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, and against religion; they must have a mind disposed to adapt itself according to the wind, and as the variations of fortune dictate, and not deviate from what is good, if possible, but be able to do evil if necessitated; the arena of politics and economics is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force, and to master her with great audacity.

Is this not the modus operandi of Napoléon Bonaparte? Napoléon was a very powerful ruler who saw the spilling of blood as perhaps the greatest remedy of political medicine: The Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right was born of the same sentiment as Machiavellism, at a time and in a country where a powerful sovereign was necessary to put an end to the disorder and turmoil of the day, the causes of national distress. Wherefore? The Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right is Machiavellism.

From whence comes autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, namely Machiavellism?

‘These principalities … are upheld by higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, I will abstain from speaking of them; for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them … if one could change one’s nature with time and circumstances, fortune would never change … God will not do everything, in order not to deprive us of freewill.’ (Machiavelli, Ibidem, 44–44–101–105)

Higher causes, which the human mind cannot attain to, are exalted and maintained by God, the very highest power. Higher causation and rationality is the realm of the highest power, and is beyond the reach of humanity, civilization, and the rationality of political and economic order. What are the rational determinations of the highest power? We must abstain from speaking of them, for being exalted and maintained by God, it would be the work of a presumptuous and foolish man to discuss them: The highest power of Machiavellism is the Absolute of Kant and the modern irrationalists. The highest power governing human actions, the fountainhead of all justice according to the Machiavellians, the dispensers of modern freedom, is Unknowable: The fountainhead of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right is modern unreason.

The ‘rationality governing human actions, the fountainhead of justice,’ according to Machiavelli, his delusion of rationality and human reason, is modern unreason, the basis of the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right: Autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, therefore comes from the modern sophistry of Kant, Hume, Leibniz and Locke and then ultimately from Machiavelli. Machiavellism, autocracy founded on popular consent, the Napoléonic and French revolutionary conception of right, is modern unreason in the world historical arena of European politics and economics.”

Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Americanism Versus Wilfrid Laurier and “Canadian” Liberalism, San Francisco, California, The Medium Corporation, 2017.

See: Aimé Guillon de Montléon (1758–1842), Machiavel commenté par Napoléon Bonaparte, manuscrit trouvé dans la carrosse de Bonaparte, après la bataille de Mont–Saint–Jean, le 15 février 1815, Paris, Nicolle, 1816.

3. In The Stronghold of Hegel (2016), which was first published with the Medium Corporation, I have outlined in some detail the American Idealist conception of Americanism and the American world:

“That I have laid out some of the philosophical reasons for this doctrine in the third edition of another writing of mine, an outline of sorts, named Americanism: The New Hegelian Orthodoxy, is of slight importance: That the teaching therein involves the sciences of economics and politics is of some interest, however, and therefore has a bearing upon the subject at hand, namely, as the developmental unification and coaxial integration of the American world. In that work I flatter myself as the first Hegelian philosopher ever to apply the Dialectic of Hegel to the Hegelian Dialectic: ‘Modern irrationalism, in order to validate pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism, squares the Lecture Notes and the great works published by Hegel in his lifetime. Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism thus squares both Kant and Hegel in order to prove the speculative logical and dialectical system of the genuine Hegel’s philosophical science of Absolute Idealism is flawed. Irrationalism thus perverts the history of philosophy and modern Europe … Pseudo–Hegelianism and anti–Hegelianism is therefore the political and economic mask of modern European Raison d’État. One drawback will never be remedied in Hegel philology: The Lecture Notes are not authoritative and are therefore useless in the exact determination of the ultimate worth of genuine Hegelianism … In the 20th century upwards of 500 million human beings were slaughtered in the contagion of modern political and economic satanism, more than in all the periods of history combined: Many hundreds of millions more were utterly ruined and destroyed by the most barbaric slavery ever recorded in the world. This is the ultimate verdict of exact historiography and universal history. From whence comes the disease of modern unreason?’”
Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, San Francisco, California, The Internet Archive, 2018, 60–61.

See: “After Hegel’s death, his former students came together with the rather noble thought of assembling various transcripts of the lecture series he gave and to which they had access, hoping to bring to the light of a general public the ‘system’ that [they] were convinced was completed for years and presented orally in the lecture hall. However, the methodologies through which they assembled these transcripts into standalone monographs, with the aid of Hegel’s own manuscripts for his lectures, is [are] dubious at best. They paid little to no attention to changes between different lecture courses, combining them as they saw fit to guarantee the logical progression of the dialectical movement as they interpreted it. But without the original source material, it was impossible to test the suspicion that they may have falsified Hegel’s own views. Indeed, it was all we had to go on to have any understanding of his views. Now, however, many manuscripts and transcripts — even ones not available to his students — have been found. When one compares these manuscripts and transcripts with the lectures published by his students, the differences between them are in no case simply philological niceties … this information may drastically challenge our historical picture of Hegel.”

Sean J. McGrath & Joseph Carew, editors, “Introduction: What Remains of German Idealism?” Rethinking German Idealism, London, 2016, 4. [Italics added]

See: “Hegel’s own course notes and those of his students should be used with caution to clarify and illustrate the meaning of the texts he published during his lifetime … In general, the student notes written during or after Hegel’s classes should be used with caution … What has been said about the student notes must also be applied to the so–called Zusatze (additions), added by ‘the friends’ to the third edition of the Encyclopedia (1830) and the book on Rechtsphilosophie … Some commentators, however, seem to prefer the Zusatze over Hegel’s own writings; additions are sometimes even quoted as the only textual evidence for the interpretation of highly controversial issues. For scholarly use, however, we should use them only as applications, confirmations, or concretizations of Hegel’s theory. Only in cases where authentic texts are unavailable may they be accepted as indications of Hegel’s answers to questions that are not treated in his handwritten or published work. If they contradict the explicit theory of the authorized texts, we can presume that the student is wrong, unless we can show that it is plausible that they express a change in the evolution of Hegel’s thought … According to Leopold von Henning’s preface (pp. vi–vii) in his edition (1839) of the Encyclopädie of 1830, the editors of the Encyclopedia sometimes changed or completed the sentences in which the students had rendered Hegel’s classes.”

Adriaan Theodoor Basilius Peperzak, Modern Freedom: Hegel’s Legal, Moral, and Political Philosophy (Studies in German Idealism), Dordrecht, 2001, xvi–27–28–29–29.

See: “The transcripts known today for all the Berlin lecture series are consistently, even surprisingly, reliable testimonies … It may indeed be disconcerting that only today do we doubt — and not everyone does — that Hegel’s lectures … are actually reproduced authentically in the published [Berlin] edition … that did not become full–blown for more than a hundred and fifty years. We can hardly examine here all the reasons for this circumstance.”
Annemarie Gethmann–Siefert, “Introduction: The Shape and Influence of Hegel’s Aesthetics,” Lectures on the Philosophy of Art: The Hotho Transcript of the 1823 Berlin Lectures, Oxford, 2014, 32–36–36–36.

See: “[The] more sympathetic tradition in Hegel scholarship has reasserted itself decisively since the middle of this century, to such an extent that there is now a virtual consensus among knowledgeable scholars that the earlier images of Hegel, as philosopher of the reactionary Prussian restoration and forerunner of modern totalitarianism, are simply wrong, whether they are viewed as accounts of Hegel’s attitude toward Prussian politics or as broader philosophical interpretations of his theory of the state.”

Allen William Wood, editor, “Editor’s Introduction,” Elements of the Philosophy of Right, G.W.F. Hegel, Cambridge, 2003, ix.

4. See: “Their deeds and destinies in their reciprocal relations to one another are the dialectic of the finitude [die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit] of these minds, and out of it arises the universal mind, the mind of the world, free from all restriction, producing itself as that which exercises its right — and its right is the highest right of all — over these finite minds in the ‘history of the world which is the world’s court of judgement.’”

Thomas Malcolm Knox, translator, “The Philosophy of Right,” Great Books of the Western World: Hegel, vol. 46, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel; Robert Maynard Hutchins, editor in chief, Chicago, 1960, §340, 110.

See: Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts. Naturrecht und Staatswissenschaft im Grundrisse. Zum Gebrauch für seine Vorlesungen, Berlin, 1821, §340, 342–343: “Die Prinzipien der Volksgeister sind um ihrer Besonderheit willen, in der sie als existierende Individuen ihre objektive Wirklichkeit und ihr Selbstbewußtsein haben, überhaupt beschränkte, und ihre Schicksale und Taten in ihrem Verhältnisse zueinander sind die erscheinende Dialektik der Endlichkeit dieser Geister, aus welcher der allgemeine Geist, der Geist der Welt, als unbeschränkt ebenso sich hervorbringt, als er es ist, der sein Recht, — und sein Recht ist das allerhöchste, — an ihnen in der Weltgeschichte, als dem Weltgerichte, ausübt.”

5. Panu Minkkinen, contributor, “The Container and the Septic Tank: Statism, Life, and the Geopolitics of Territoriality,” Finnish Yearbook of International Law: 2012–2013, Jarna Petman, editor–in–chief & Maija Dahlberg, Ruth Donner, Sabine Frerichs, Mónica García–Salmones, Waliul Hasanat, Florian Hoffmann, Stephen Humphreys, Samuli Hurri, Henry Jones, Eva Kassoti, Virpi Laukkanen, Rain Liivoja, Tero Lundstedt, Padraig McAuliffe, Samuli Miettinen, Jarna Petman, Maria Pohjanpalo, Patrick C.R. Terry & Silke Trommer, contributors, vol. 23, Portland, Oregon, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016, 389–410; 399–404.

See: “The Ius Gentium Association gratefully acknowledges the support of the Legal Department of the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the publication of the yearbook.”

Jarna Petman, editor–in–chief, Finnish Yearbook of International Law: 2012–2013, vol. 23, Maija Dahlberg, Ruth Donner, Sabine Frerichs, Mónica García–Salmones, Waliul Hasanat, Florian Hoffmann, Stephen Humphreys, Samuli Hurri, Henry Jones, Eva Kassoti, Virpi Laukkanen, Rain Liivoja, Tero Lundstedt, Padraig McAuliffe, Samuli Miettinen, Panu Minkkinen, Jarna Petman, Maria Pohjanpalo, Patrick C.R. Terry & Silke Trommer, contributors, Portland, Oregon, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016, copyright page.

6. Mark Bassin, The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia, Ithaca/London, Cornell University Press, 2016, copyright page–5.

Remarks: We are being very charitable in our argument that Mark Bassin is like a poet: A far less charitable evaluation of his writings maintains that Bassin is an idéologue and historiaster, bent on corrupting the American mind, — in the name of modern European unreason. Perhaps Mark Bassin will therefore find gainful employment at Business Insider, and produce (for the vulgar) some sophistical political and economic arguments to justify European tariffs against American finance, commerce and industry … (Of course, the flabby minds will imagine that because we critique an American book on Lev Gumilev, that we are therefore in cahoots with Vladimir Putin!)

7. Fredrika Lagergren, “Den mångsidige statsvetaren: Rudolf Kjellén och den biopolitiska teorin,” Forskarbiografin, Stockholm, 1998, 109–122.

See: Fredrika Lagergren, På andra sidan välfärdsstaten: en studie i politiska idéers betydelse, Stockholm, Stehag, Brutus Östlings Bokförlag Symposion, 1999.

8. Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, Stronghold of Hegel: Modern Enemies of Plato and Hegel, San Francisco, California, The Internet Archive, 2018, 14–16. [2016]

9. David T. Murphy, The Heroic Earth: Geopolitical Thought in Weimar Germany, 1918–1933, Kent, Ohio, Kent State University Press, 1997, 6–7. [Italics added]

See: “Geopolitics was originally a Swedish term, coined in 1899 by Rudolph Kjellén, a political scientist who sought to elaborate Friedrich Ratzel’s idea that the state was an organism. Geopolitics was thus conceived as the effect of natural geographical factors on the state as a living thing. These ideas proved influential to the thinking of Germany’s General Karl Haushofer between the first and second world wars. Haushofer and others were looking for a ‘scientific’ justification of how Germany could reverse its losses from World War I. Viewing the state as an organism that needed to expand to survive fitted neatly with Nazi plans for territorial expansion, although it is debatable whether these ideas directly influenced Hitler. As a result, the term geopolitics became closely associated with the Nazis and fell out of popular use among English–speaking scholars.”

Carl T. Dahlman, “Geopolitics,” Key Concepts in Political Geography, Carl T. Dahlman, Carolyn Gallaher, Mary Gilmartin, Alison Mountz & Peter Shirlow, London, Sage Publications Ltd., 2009, 87–98; 87.

See: “Swedish social democracy’s concept of the ‘people’s home’ — Folkhemmet — was appropriated from the nationalist political theorist Rudolf Kjellén, who in turn was inspired by the social–reformism of Otto von Bismarck’s conservative Realpolitik.”

Leigh Phillips, Austerity Ecology and the Collapse–Porn Addicts, Alresford, Hants, John Hunt Publishing Ltd., 2015. [Italics added]

10. Rudolf Kjellén, Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Stockholm, 1916, 179.

11. Margarethe Langfeldt, translator, Der Staat als Lebensform, Rudolf Kjellén, Zweite Auflage, Leipzig, 1917, 227.

12. Carl (Karl) Koch; Margarethe Langfeldt (1875–1922); Alexander Hellmuth August von Normann (1893–1983), Die Gesetzgebung des Deutschen Reiches und Preußens zum Schutze der Republik: einschliesslich der Gesetze über Straffreiheit für politische Straftaten, Textausgabe mit Einleitung und Beigabe d. erg., Berlin, Georg Stilke, 1922; Friedrich Stieve (1909–1985), Was die Welt nicht wollte: Hitlers Friedensangebote 1933–1939, Berlin, Zentralverlag der NSDAP., Franz Eher Nachf. GmbH., 1940.

13. Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 179–183; 179: “Från studiet af statens förhållande till de olika sidorna i sitt eget väsen har undersökningen till sist skridit in på statens förhållande till de enskilda individer, som utgöra cellerna i hans nationella kropp.”

14. See: “Med dessa spekulativa förutsättningar gå vi nu att betrakta utvecklingens faktiska gång under de senaste seklerna i västerlandet. Huru klar speglar sig icke progressismens ande i renässansen med dess lifsstegring på alla områden, dess expansion i geografisk kunskap, i religiös frihet, i konstnärlig skaparkraft — för att nu uttaga blott de mest iögonfallande dragen! Men på denna tid följer absolutismen, ett konservatismens bakslag med stark koncentration i statslifvet, stelnade former i religionen, en förminskad horisont inom andens och skönhetens värld. Kommer så i tidsföljd liberalismen, »ancien régime’s» direkta negation, bäraren af ett nytt politiskt och andligt frihetslif tillika med ett nytt uppfinningarnes tidehvarf — hvem igenkänner icke progressismens mäktiga vingslag till utvidgning af den mänskliga horisonten! Sådan ligger den nyare historien uppenbar i sitt sammanhang för vår syn. Skulle då successionsserien vara [12] slut nu? Ha vi kommit till en Hegelsk syntes, där utvecklingen slutar? Eller äga vi grund att motse en ny utvecklingsfas, denna gång alltså en ny konservatismens hägemoni? Ingen har på svenskt språk gett sannare och djupare uttryck åt otillfredsställelsen i samtiden än författaren till »Masskultur». Är det möjligt att förbise sammanhanget emellan denna själanöd och den herskande liberala lifsåskådningen? Vi skola återkomma till denna räkning i fråga om vårt eget land; nu må endast i största allmänhet framhållas, huru naturligt det är om mänskligheten skall börja känna något liknande öfveransträngning efter den oerhörda expansionen på alla områden. Men när den känslan mognat till medvetande, då är tiden kommen till aflösning i det stora spelet: då stundar en ny tid af relativ hvila, under koncentration. Endast en ny uppenbarelse af den konservativa idén kan frälsa en värld, som håller på att digna under sina framsteg. Och redan se vi den nya tidens förebud vid himlaranden. Ett af dem är protektionismen: en reaktion mot liberalismens ekonomiska system. Ett annat och större är socialismen … Var liberalismen [13] en reaktion mot absolutismen, så är socialismen i sin tur en reaktion mot liberalismen. Linjerna äro i praktiken högst förvecklade, framför allt genom ungsocialismens framträdande under detta namn i faktiskt förbund med socialdemokratien; i själfva verket är den anarkiska rörelsen ett barn af liberalismen — dess idé drifven ut till den yttersta konsekvensen — men socialismen dess polära motsats. Socialismen bäres öfver många sina synder af folkens djupa behof i riktning mot ordning, disciplin och stabila förhållanden efter individualismens utsväfningar.”

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen,” Politiska Essayer II: Studier till Dagskrönikan (1907–1913): Samhälls– och Författningspolitik, Andra Samlingen, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1915, 9–38; 11–12–13. [Italics added, 12]

See: “Här må nu särskildt observeras och starkt framhållas, att statskunskapens orientering åt det sociala hållet betecknar en begynnande emancipation från den rena juridiken. JELLINEK (s. 125) har härom sagt några förträftliga ord, som icke böra saknas i vår framställning: ‘Den sociala synen på staten framställer sig som ett nödvändigt korrektiv på den juristiska. Rättsläran påstår, att den suveräna staten är öfverlägsen hvarje annan organiserad makt och underdånig ingen. Men de väldiga krafterna i samhällslifvet, ingalunda verksamma i en medveten [16] viljas form, dem är härskaren själf underdånig. Må juristen därför akta sig att förväxla sin värld af normer, som skulle behärska statslifvet, med detta lif själft! Alla de formål–juridiska föreställningarna om statsallmakt, hvilka i hypotetisk form hafva sitt goda berättigande, försvinna så snart man blickar bort från de juristiska möjligheternas värld och in i samhällets verklighet. Där härska de historiska krafterna, hvilka skapa och förgöra detta statens väsen i sig, som består på andra sidan om all juristisk konstruktion. Om detta väsen gäller hvad HEGEL uttalat I med sitt geniala ord: för statens födelse, lif och död ges‘ intet annat forum än världshistorien, som är världsdomen. Och dess normer äro säkerligen icke juristernas.’”

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Staten som hushåll och samhälle,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 9–38; 11–17; 15–16.

See: “ROUSSEAU’S ‘volonté de tous’ i motsats mot ‘volonté generale’ utgör en ansats därutöfver, SCHLÖZER’S ‘Gemeinde’ likaså, HEGEL och de första socialisterna hafva från andra håll bidragit att utdestillera begreppet som en motsats mot staten, men först vid 1800 talets midt fastslogs en dylik motsättning i begreppet ‘Gesellschaft,’ sådant det framgick ur LORENZ STEIN’S och ROBERT VON MOHL’S grundläggande undersökningar.”

Rudolf Kjellén, “IV. Staten som hushåll, samhälle och regemente (ekonomipolitik, sociopolitik, regementspolitik): Samhällets begrepp och successiva typer,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 125–160; 137–143; 137.

See: “Men dessa af kriminalisterna sjelfva erkända stridigheter emellan ‘ministerfunktionernas natur’ och straffrättens principer, hvilka stridigheter gjort det för alla omöjligt att med bibehållen konseqvens inrangera ministeransv. inom straffrätten — hvar hafva de sin yttersta grund? Skulle tilläfventyrs felet ligga icke i principen, utan i dess tillämpningar, [73] så att en rationell lära om ministeransv. ändock borde falla under en rationell straffrätt? Eller finnes det någon möjlighet att omgärda straffrätten med en principiell gräns, utanför hvilken mitt ämne skulle ligga? Enkel ställer sig den saken för HEGEL, som ur straffrätten bortrensar all orätt som icke är afsigtlig. Om nu detta allt för skarpt strider emot positiv rätt, skall man då nödgas antaga Bindings slutsats, att gränsen är positiv och aldrig kan vara annat?”

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Om Ministeransvarighetens Princip, IV: §1. Den kriminalistiska teorien,” Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II: Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, Upsala, Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890, 19–149; 68–88; 68–75; 72–73.

15. The public opinion of the vulgar, their received wisdom, makes them into the victims of institutions controlled by inferior ruling classes, especially in the realm of healthcare and retirement pensions, in the name of “cost–savings” and pseudo–rationalization. Indeed, the vulgar embrace their fate at the hands of their corrupt institutions, with blissful ignorance, as they are shuffled into the boneyard of history, — any argument aimed at saving them from their unhappy demise they vehemently reject, in the most violent and thoughtless manner. We must therefore conclude that these “victims” of political and economic irrationalism, and their inferior ruling classes, are themselves together one and the very same thing: With their demise comes the collapse of the political and economic disorder which depended upon their ignorance for its survival.

16. Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 179–183; 182.

17. Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 179–183; 182.

Epilogue: The Aim of Statecraft

1. Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 179–183.

2. Rudolf Kjellén: nationella kropp; Langfeldt: natürlichen Körpers.

3. Margarethe Langfeldt: absolute Verneinung. [Editor]

4. Langfeldt: polizeistaats. [Editor]

5. Langfeldt: individuellen Rechte. [Editor]

6. Rudolf Kjellén holds (1916) that Lockeanism is revolutionary, while Kantianism is reactionary: “Således trodde sig franska revolutionen göra nog med att slå fast de individuella rättigheterna inom en strängt fixerad frihetssfär och anvisa staten ställningen af vaktpost kring denna sfär. Från annat håll tog sig reaktionen en annan form, i det att man satte statens ändamål i hägnet af rättsordningen som sådan. LOCKE är den förra och KANT den senare lärans store banérförare i det allmänna tänkandets värld.”

Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, Stockholm, Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916, 179–183; 179.

See: “As for the famous Manchester School — the ‘minimisers’ stuck in Locke and Kant — they only wanted to make the reality of State power into no more than the supplier of legal protection and maintainer of the justice system.”

Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, Zweite Auflage, Übersetzt von Margarethe Langfeldt, Leipzig, S. Herzel Verlag, 1917, 5: “Denn die berühmte ManchesterschuIe — die in Locke und Kant wurzelnden „minimisers” — wollte wirkliche im Staate nicht mehr sehen als einen „Rechtschutzlieferanten” und einen Aufrechterhalter der Rechtsordnung.” [Editor]

7. Rudolf Kjellén: individens tjänare; Langfeldt: Individuums mächt.

8. Kjellén: organiska uppfattning; Langfeldt: organische Auffassung.

9. Kjellén: verklig personlighet; Langfeldt: wirkliche Persönlichkeit.

10. Margarethe Langfeldt: eigenem Lehen.

11. „Das Volk ist von der Summe der Volksgenossen so weit verschieden als der Baum von der Summe seiner Blätter,” [“People (das Volk) are as different from the sum of their national character (Volksgenossen) as the tree from the sum of its leaves” — Editor] Kurt Riezler, Die Erforderlichkeit des Unmöglichen, 1913, 202. [Rudolf Kjellén]

12. Margarethe Langfeldt: organischen Miteinanderverwachsen.

13. Langfeldt: Hauptregel in der Nation gefunden.

14. Langfeldt: der Rechts.

15. Langfeldt: Persönlichkeitszweck.

See: “As for the famous Manchester School — the ‘minimisers’ stuck in Locke and Kant — they only wanted to make the reality of State power into no more than the supplier of legal protection and maintainer of the justice system.”

Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, Zweite Auflage, Übersetzt von Margarethe Langfeldt, Leipzig, S. Herzel Verlag, 1917, 5: “Denn die berühmte ManchesterschuIe — die in Locke und Kant wurzelnden „minimisers” — wollte wirkliche im Staate nicht mehr sehen als einen „Rechtschutzlieferanten” und einen Aufrechterhalter der Rechtsordnung.” [Editor]

See: “Notre planète est actuellement divisée en environ 50 puissances politiques ou états. Parmi ceux–ci, huit apparaissent comme des puissances majeures occupant une position reconnue avant les autres. Ils forment l’aristocratie et la classe supérieure des États, avec des frontières fluctuantes et des privilèges indéfinis, mais avec une influence réelle du premier ordre sur le monde politique … Enfin, on cherche une réponse à la question importante de savoir dans quelle mesure on peut supposer que la forme d’État aristocratique–féodale est privilégiée aux dépens des formes inférieures de la vie internationale, après qu’elle ait été déplacée dans nos États démocratiques.”

Rudolf Kjellén, “Einleitung,” Die Großmächte der Gegenwart, Übersetzt von Carl Koch, Achte Auflage, (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1915), 1–5. [1914]: “Unser planet zerfällt gegenwärtig in ungefähr 50 politisischen Mächte oder Staaten. Unter diesen treten acht als Großmächte in anerkannter Stellung vor den übrigen hervör. Sie bilden die Aristokratie und Oberklasse der Staaten, mit Schwankenden Grenzen und unbestimmten Privilegien, aber mit tatsächlichem Einfluß ersten Ranges auf die politische Welt … Und schließlich wird nach einer Antwort auf die wichtige Frage gesucht, in welchem Umfang man annehmen darf, daß die aristokratie–feudale Staatsform auf Kosten der niedrigeren Formen im internationalen Leben privilegiert ist, nachdem sie in unseren demokratischen Staaten außer Kurs ist.” [Editor]

See: “The strongest stylistic contrast to this treatment of history is found in two very substantial works of Rudolf Kjellén: First of all his diplomatic prehistory of the World War, published as Dreibund und Dreiverband, which is a very dense study of the two opposing alliance systems and their modification from 1870 to 1914. In his diplomatic prehistory of the Great War, Kjellén believes that he has discovered the foreign policy projection of domestic dualism: On the one side, essentially constitutional states, versus essentially parliamentary states on the other. One can make considerable objections to this rational construction, but it does not seriously damage the value of the exposition, abstracted from all preconceived ideas and emotional tinges, and developed into a war–torn interdependence as a geopolitically conditioned, fateful experience of the European cultural sphere. This becomes even more apparent in Kjellén’s second book, the new edition of his classic study of the great powers. It has changed very little in the main body; instead, the post–war perspectives have been incorporated into an appendix that depicts the formation of the great powers, the outbreak of war, and the formation of Versailles with almost experimental objectivity. The dynamic part is followed by a static one: A significant sketch of the present grandiose system. Hermann Bächtold’s (1882–1934) early work, in close contact with Kjellén, — together they are very geopolitically set — resolutely rejects the question of war guilt in the sense of deliberate and conscious planning. Rather, his motto is Dostoyevsky’s saying: ‘This is how the world diverges,’ namely, the development of modern world politics is inscribed within a unified rhythmic framework, in which ‘a pair of eastern and western millstones grind the fate of Europe.’

Somewhat akin to the style of these works are the comparative histories of Kaiser Wilhelm II. They form a sort of transition from the higher expositions to the primary sources of foreign policy: The selection of dates with which the policy of the Great Powers from 1878–1914 is elucidated, on the one hand contains subjective elements which are susceptible to criticism; on the other hand, the synchronistic compilation of the conjuncture witnessed by the primary sources brings the facts themselves to light.” [Italics added]

Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), “Kapitel IV: Von der Entlassung Bismarcks bis zum Ausgang des Weltkrieges (1890–1918): Rudolf Kjellén,” Jahresberichte der deutschen Geschichte in Verbindung mit Fr. Andreae, R. Haepke, F. v. Klocke, R. Koebner, H. Krabbo, H.O. Meisner, F. Priebatsch, H. Rothfels, M. Stimming, W. Windelband, V. Loewe & O. Lerche, Hrsg., Jahrgang 4 (1921), Breslau, Priebatsch’s Verlag, 1923, 95–106; 95–96: “Im stärksten stilistischen Gegensatz zu [96] dieser Behandlung eines großen Stoffes stehen zwei Arbeiten von Kjellén. Zunächst seine diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges unter dem Titel: Dreibund und Dreiverband [Übers., v. Normann, München–Lpz., Duncker u. Humblot, 138 S.]: eine intensive Studie der beiden entgegengesetzten Bündnissysteme in Ihrer Abwandlung von 1870 bis 1914. Kjellén glaubt in ihnen die außenpolitische Projektion des innerpolitischen Dualismus zu erblicken: hier wesentlich konstitutionelle, dort wesentlich parlamentarische Staaten. Man kann gegen diese rationale Konstruktion erhebliche Einwendungen machen, aber sie schädigt den Wert der Darstellung nicht ernsthaft. Ihr vorbildlicher Zug beruht gerade darin, daß sie von allen vorgefaßten Meinungen imd gefühlsmäßigen Momenten abstrahiert und die zum Kriege führende Verflechtung als ein vor allem geopolitisch bedingtes schicksalsmäßiges Erlebnis des europäischen Kulturkreises entwickelt. Noch stärker tritt das in dem zweiten Buche Kjelléns hervor, der Neuauflage seiner klassischen Studie über die Großmächte [Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise, Lpz. und Berlin, Teubner, 249 S.]. Sie ist im Hauptteil nur wenig verändert, stattdessen sind die aus der nachkriegsperspektive sich ergebenden Gesichtspunkte in einen Anhang eingearbeitet worden, der die Aufstellung der Mächte, den Kriegsausbruch und die Form des Friedensschlusses mit fast experimenteller Sachlichkeit darstellt. Dem dynamischen Teil folgt ein statischer: eine bedeutsame Skizze des gegenwärtigen großmächtlichen Systems. — In naher Berührung mit Kjellén steht ein Anfsatz von Bächthold [Weltwirtschaftl. Archiv., 16, H. 4.], der — gleichfalls ganz geopolitisch eingestellt — die Schuldfrage im Sinne bewußten Planens entschieden zurückweist. Sein Motto ist vielmehr das Wort Dostojewskis: ,So setzt sich die Welt auseinander,’ d. h. die Entwicklung der modernen Weltpolitik wird als ein einheitlicher rhythmischer Zusammenhang aufgefaßt, in dem ,ein östliches und ein westliches Mühlsteinpaar das Schicksal Europas mahlt.’

Mit dem Stil dieser Arbeiten in etwas verwandt sind die Vergleichend,en Geschichtstabellen Kaiser Wilhelms II. Sie bilden gewissermaßen den Übergang von den Darstellungen zu den Quellen der Außenpolitik: Die Auswahl der Daten, mit denen die Politik der Großmächte von 1878–1914 anschaulich gemacht wird, enthält auf der einen Seite gewiß ein subjektives Moment, das der Kritik unterliegt, andererseits bringt die synchronistische Zusammenstellung der quellenmäßig bezeugten Vorgänge die Tatsachen selbst zum Sprechen.” [Editor]

THE SWEDISH TEXT: AFSLUTNING OM STAATENS ÄNDAMÅL

Icke individernas välgång utan nationens. — Materialism och idealism i statsläran. — Återgång till naturen. — Icke lyckan utan personlighetens fullkomning.

Från studiet af statens förhållande till de olika sidorna i sitt eget väsen har undersökningen till sist skridit in på statens förhållande till de enskilda individer, som utgöra cellerna i hans nationella kropp.

Är då deras välgång hans enda och sanna ändamål? Från olika tidehvarf ljuder denna lära oss till mötes i olika formuleringar: att öka summan af privatlycka (BACON), att skapa största möjliga lycka åt största möjliga mängd af individer (BENTHAM). Naturrätten och den historiska liberalismen kunde ju icke hafva något annat svar på den urgamla frågan, då de deriverade staten ur individerna allena. Svaret är också historiskt förklarligt såsom negering af absolutismens polisstat, den där öfverhufvud icke kände något verkligt ansvar för individerna själfva eller öfverhufvud några gränser för statens makt. Således trodde sig franska revolutionen göra nog med att slå fast de individuella rättigheterna inom en strängt fixerad frihetssfär och anvisa staten ställningen af vaktpost kring denna sfär. Från annat håll tog sig reaktionen en annan form, i det att man satte statens ändamål i hägnet af rättsordningen som sådan. LOCKE är den förra och KANT den senare lärans store banerförare i det allmänna tänkandets värld. Men vare sig uppgiften söktes i den ena eller [180] den andra riktningen, vakt kring friheten eller vakt kring ordningen — i båda iallen bestämdes svaret af förhållandet till individen allena.

Detta innebär i grunden, att man gör staten till individens tjänare. Han blir ett bolag utan annan uppgift än intressenternas förkofran. Han är till för deras skull. Han har intet själfändamål. Detta är den historiska liberalismens ståndpunkt, mot hvilken HANS JÄRTA på sin tid hos oss var en så förbittrad motståndare; och man tager säkerligen icke fel, om man ännu i dag som är uppfattar den som den populära, mer eller mindre oreflekterade, men knappast betviflade meningen.

Vår organiska uppfattning bevisar äfven därutinnan sin högre sanning, att den återger staten ett eget mål. Detta blir möjligt endast för den som i staten ser en verklig personlighet med sitt eget lif, icke ett blott konglomerat af individer; enligt lagen för all organisk tillvaro, att det hela är något annat än summan af sina delar.² För att taga ett yttre och klart synligt exempel: Tyska riket är icke endast summan af sina delstater, utan något nytt, starkt och stort, som tillkommit genom deras organiska sammanväxning; därför kan dess mål icke heller vara allena delstaternas trifsel, utan den nya större personlighetens. Denna statens personlighet hafva vi funnit i nationen. Staten är icke längre något abstractum, han är olösligt bunden vid en nationell individ, så att han har sin nation att svara för. Alltså är statens ändamål nationens välgång. Här är han tjänare, men åt sitt eget personlighets mål. Här se vi icke heller någon begränsning till frihet eller säkerhet eller rätt. Den moderna statens område sammanfaller med det nationella lifvet. Endast mot det individuella kvarstår begränsningen, på den punkt där individen har sitt personlighetsmål. [181]

Detta är svaret på frågan om statens ändamål och nödvändiga uppgift. Det visar ännu en gång, hurusom nationen är en integrerande del i hans väsen; utan detta sammanhang stannar svaret i allmänna talesätt, där det icke sjunker ned till stöd åt individualismen. Men mellan stat och individ ges i grunden ingen konkurrens. De löpa jämnsides i historien, såsom uppbärande hvar sin af hennes stora rörelsekrafter. Individen uppger ingen egen rätt genom att tjäna staten. Och han förnedrar icke sig själf genom att ställa nationalismen som äfven ett praktisktpolitiskt program — särskildt där nationalitetens låga grad så påkallar — ty detta visar sig nu som hans enda väg att fullgöra den skyldiga tributen till hans eget släkte inom mänsklighetens stora familj.

Vårt svar visar ännu en gång staten liksom afkopplad från individens fria handling, och skall därför icke tillfredsställa där man (som JELLINEK) i staten ser primärt en skapelse af medvetet mänskligt förnuft. Men vi tro, att bakom både stat och människor ligga elementära skapande krafter, som de äro på djupet underkastade. Inför denna syn framstå staterna mindre som ledare af sina öden än som ledda på sina vägar, af inflytelser hvilkas djupaste källa är belägen utanför deras eget medvetande; och vår närvarande framställning har velat bidraga att sprida något ljus öfver arten af dessa inflytelser.

Man säger, att detta är en materialistisk uppfattning. Vi känna denna risk, i en värld som har så lätt att förväxla vittnet med gärningsmannen. De, som verkligen vilja döma rättfärdigt, skola måhända döma annorlunda. De veta, att materialisten aldrig får syn på materialismens verkliga utbredning i tillvaron. Verkligt skarpsynt därför är endast den, som i sitt hjärta sörjer däröfver. För honom är det kanske till sist också möjligt att skönja en Kraftfrän ofvan i krafternas spel från nedan.

Men det bör icke heller lämnas ur sikte, att vår analys direkt beträffar en statstyp som mer än någonsin synes [182] fången i materiella omsorger. Det är den moderna statens problem vi närmast haft i sikte. Liksom FUSTEL DE COULANGES för ett halfsekel sedan tecknade »staten i forntiden» och fann dess väsen vara kulten, så hafva vi här sökt fånga bilden och väsendet af den stat som i verkligheten omger oss. Och då skall det slå oss, att dess skilda manifestationer till sist förena sig i en och samma välbekanta tendens. Denna sträfvan efter geografisk individualitet, nationalitet, autarki och intressegruppermg — är det icke alltsammans endast olika former af den återgång till naturen, d.v.s. [det vill säga] anknytning till driftlifvet, som ROUSSEAU predikade för individen! Det är på statslifvets personlighetsområde en materialiseringsprocess, som väl harmonierar med andan i ett materialismens tidehvarf. Icke minst synes den svara emot en internationell politik som förefaller mer än någonsin blottad på ideella motiv. Jämförelsen mellan medeltidens korståg mot Jerusalem och det sista sekelskiftets stormaktståg mot Peking kan måhända anses betecknande för denna allmänna utveckling. Den stat, som Coulanges (måhända något öfverdrifvet) fann absorberad af kult och offertjänst, har alltså genom medeltidens romantik hårdnat till en typ absorberad af arbete och näringsbekymmer, utan tid till bön och utan lust till offer. Är det icke en naturlig växt från barndom genom ungdom till hård och kämpande mandom?

Midt i denna tid af öfverströmmande Martha–omsorger släppa vi emellertid icke hoppet om en stat, som skall få tillfälle att sörja för annat än de gamles »panem et circenses», bröd och skådespel, lifsuppehälle och nöjen åt de enskilda individerna. Äfven nationerna lefva dock till sist icke af bröd allena och ännu mindre af nöjen. Här går den verkliga skärningslinjen mellan materialism och idealism: i uppfattningen af hvad som borde vara, icke i uppfattningen af hvad som är. Materialisten ser för staten liksom för individen intet annat mål än lyckan, att få svälla ut på sin naturell och segla för drifternas medvind, med [183] minsta möjliga risk och besvär. Idealisten vet af ett ansvar för kursen, alltså äfven för statsskeppets kurs framåt. Och hvart skall kursen ställas? »Det skal man ane», svarar knappstöparen på Peer Gynts fråga efter »Mesters mening». Det är statsmannens djupaste plikt att ana meningen med sin stat och därefter ställa rodret. Sedan må han icke väja undan för svårigheter, hinder, kanske stora lidanden, som möta på vägen. Ty ett är visst: genom en sådan färd allena vinner hans nation det som för folk som för enskilda är förmer än lyckan, det enda som i grunden betalar lifvets pris, nämligen personlighetens förbättring till allt större fullkomhghet. Att fullkomna folkanlaget blir sålunda till sist statens mål — sedan må det gå med lyckan som det vill, eller rättare: sedan kommer den verkliga lyckan af sig själf.

Detta må vara vårt sista ord i denna undersökning af staten som lifsform. Vi ha sett den samtida staten, af tvingande skäl, föga framskriden på en sådan väg eller ens mycket medveten om en sådan uppgift. Men vi tro på en högre statstyp, som klarare skönjer och säkrare vandrar mot ett förnuftigt mål. Transcribed by Christopher Richard Wade Dettling

THE GERMAN TEXT: DER ZWECK DES STAATS

In der Untersuchung über das Verhältnis des Staats zu den besonderen Seiten seines Wesens sind wir zuletzt bei seinem Verhalten zu den einzelnen Individuen, den zellen seines natürlichen Körpers, angelangt.

Ist nun ihr Wohlergehen sein einziger und wahrer Zweck? Aus verschiedenen zeitabschnitten tönt uns diese Lehre in verschiedenem Ausdruck entgegen: Erhöhung der Summe des privatglücks (Bacon), größtmögliches Gluck für die größtmögliche Anzahl Individuen (Bentham). Naturrecht und der geschichtliche Liberalismus konnten ja gar keine andere Antwort auf die uralte Frage geben, da sie den Staat aus den Individuen allein ableiteten. Die Antwort ist geschichtlich auch erklärlich als absolute Verneinung des polizeistaats des Absolutismus, der seine wirkliche Verantwortlichkeit für die Individuen und überhaupt seine Grenzen der Staatsmacht kannte. So glaubte die französische Revolution damit genug getan zu haben, dass sie die individuellen Rechte innerhalb einer streng fixierten Freiheitsphäre feststellte und dem Staat die Stellung eines Wachtpostens an der Peripherie dieser Sphäre anwies. Andere wieder kleideten die Reaktion in [228] die Form, das man den Zweck des Staats in den Schutz der Rechtsordnung als solcher setzte. Locke ist der große Bannerträger ersteren Lehre und Kant der große Bahnbrecher der letzteren in der Welt des Denkens. Ob man nun aber die Ausgabe nach der einen oder der anderen Richtung hin, im Bewachen der freiheit oder im Behüten der ordnung, suchte — immer wurde die Antwort allein durch das Verhältnis zum Individuum bestimmt.

Das besagt aber Schließlich, daß man den Staat zum Diener des Individuums mächt. Er wird zu einer Genossenschaft, deren einzige Ausgabe das Sichverbessern der Interessenten ist. Er ist ihretwegen da. Er hat keinen Selbstzweck. Dies ift der Standpunft des geschichtlichen Liberalismus, dessen erbitterter Gegner bei uns sienerzeit Hans Järta gewesen ist; und man irrt sich ganz gewiß nicht, wenn man in ihm noch heute die volkstümliche, mehr oder weniger unüberlegte, aber kaum angezweifelte Meinung sieht.

Unsere organische Auffassung beweist auch darin ihre höhere Wahrung, daß sie dem Staat wieder einen eigenen Zweck gibt. Das ist aber nur dem möglich, der in dem Staat eine wirkliche Persönlichkeit mit eigenem Lehen, nicht ein aus Individuen bestehendes Konglomerat erkennt; denn nach dem Gesetz alles organischen Lebens ist das Ganze etwas anderes, als die Summe seiner Teile.² Nehmen wir ein äußeres, deutliche erkennbares Beispiel: das Deutsche Reich ist nicht nur die Summe seiner Einzelstaaten, sondern [229] etwas Neues, Starkes und Großes, das aus ihrem organischen Miteinanderverwachsen entstanden ist: daher kann sein Zweck nicht einzig und allein das Gedeihen der Einzelstaaten sein, sondern muß auf das der neuen, größeren Persönlichkeit abzielen. Diese Persönlichkeit des Staats haben wir als Hauptregel in der Nation gefunden. Der Staat ist nun nicht länger mehr ein Abstraktum, sondern ist unzertrennlich mit einem nationalen Individuum verknüpft und so für dieses, d.h. [das heißt] seine Nation verantwortlich. Allso ist der Zweck des Staats die Wohlfahrt der Nation. Er ist hierin Diener, aber er dient dem Zweck seiner eigenen Persönlichkeit. Hier sehen wir auch keine Begrenzung der Freiheit oder der Sicherheit ober der Rechts. Das Gebiet des modernen Staats fällt mit dem nationalen Leben zusammen. Nur gegen das individuelle bleibt die Begrenzung da bestehen, wo das Individuum seinen Persönlichkeitszweck hat.

… Inmitten dieser von Marthasorgen überströmenden Zeit lassen wir jedoch nicht von der Hoffnung auf einen Staat ab, [232] der auch für etwas anderes wird Sorgen können, als für die »panem et circenses« der Alten, Lebensnotdurft und Vergnügen für die einzelnen Individuen. Auch die Nationen leben doch Schließliche nicht von Brot allein, und noch weniger von Vergnügungen. Hier liegt die wirkliche Trennungslinie zwischen Materialismus und Idealismus: in der Auffassung dessen, was sein sollte, nicht in der Auffassung dessen, was ist. Der Materialist gibt dem Staat wie dem Individuum seinen anderen Zweck als das Glück, sich seinem Naturell nach aus zuleben und mit geringster Anstrengung und möglichst geringem Risiko mit dem günstigen Winde der Triebe zu segeln. Der Idealist ist sich der Verantwortlichkeit für den Kurs bewüßt, hier also für den Kurs des Staatsschiffs vorwärts. Und wohin foll der Kurs gehen? „Das soll man ahnen,” antwortet der Knopfgießer auf Peer Gynts Frage nach der „Meinung des Meisters.” Es ist die tiefste Pflicht des Staatsmanns, den Sinn seines Staats zu ahnen und danach das Steuer zu richten. Dann aber scheue er auch nicht vor den Schwierigkeiten und hindernissen zurück und den vielleicht großen Leiden, die ihm unterwegs begegnen. Denn eines ist gewiß: einzig und allein durch eine solche Fahrt gewinnt seine Nation das, was Volkern wie Einzelmenschen höher steht als das Glück, und was allein im tiefften Grund den Preis des Lebens bezahlt, und das ist die Verbesserung der Persönlichkeit zu immer größer werdender Vollkommenheit. Die Volksanlage zu vervollkommnen, ist also der Zweck des Staats — nachher mag es mit dem Glück werden wie es will, oder richtiger: dann kommt das wirkliche Glück von selbst.

Das muß unser letztes Wort in dieser Untersuchung des [233] Staats als Lebensform sein. Wir haben gesehen, daß der Staat unsere Zeit aus zwingenden Gründen sehr geringe Fortschritte aus einem solchen Weg gemacht hat und sich einer darartigen Ausgabe noch nichte recht bewußt geworben ist. Aber wir glauben dennoch an einen höheren Staatstypus, der einen Vernunftzweck klarer erkennen läßt und diesem Ziel mit sichereren Schritten entgegenstreben wird. Transcribed by Christopher Richard Wade Dettling

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Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 179–183.

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RUDOLF KJELLÉN: SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources in Swedish

Rudolf Kjellén (1864–1922), Om Eriksgaten. Kritiska Studier: I Gammalsvensk Statsrätt, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1889).

Rudolf Kjellén, Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II: Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890).

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Om Ministeransvarighetens Princip,” Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II: Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890), 19–149.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Om Forum Vid Ministeranklagelse,” Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II: Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890), 151–226.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Om Ministeransvarighetens Princip, IV,” Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II: Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890), 19–149; 68–88.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Om Ministeransvarighetens Princip, IV: §1. Den kriminalistiska teorien,” Studier Rörande Ministeransvarigheten I och II:Academisk Afhandling Som Med Tillstånd af Vidtberömda Filosofiska Fakultetens I Upsala Humanistiska Sektion För Filosofiska Gradens Vinnande Till Offentlig Granskning Framställes, (Upsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1890), 19–149; 68–88; 68–75.

Rudolf Kjellén: “Den nationella karakteren i 1809 års grundlagstiftning,” Historisk tidskrift, (1893): ?

Rudolf Kjellén, “Underjordiska Inflytelser på Jordytan, — om nivåförandringar, jordbäfningar och vulkaniska företeelser,” Föreningen Heimdals folkskrifter, nr. 10(Uppsala, 1893): ?

Rudolf Kjellén, Unionen sådan den skapades och sådan den blifvit, (1893–1894).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Samuel Åkerhielm d.y. och de ryska stämplingarna i Sverige 1746–1749,” Historisk tidskrift, (1894).

Rudolf Kjellén, Riksrättsinstitutets utveckling i Sveriges historia, (1895).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Hvem har stiftat Sveriges regeringsform?” Historisk tidskrift,(1896).

Rudolf Kjellén: “Om den svenska grundlagens anda,” Göteborgs högskolas årsskrift, (1897): ?

Rudolf Kjellén, Om den Svenska Grundlagens Anda: Rättpsykologisk Undersökning, (Göteborg: Wald. Zachrissons Boktryckeri, 1897).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Stat och Samhälle i det Gamla Vestergötland,” Vestergötlands fornminnesförenings tidskrift, (1897): ?

Rudolf Kjellén, “Studier öfver Sveriges politiska gränser,” Ur Ymer, tidskrift utgifven af Svenska Sällskapet för Antropologi och Geografi, H.3, Årg. (1899): 283–331.

Rudolf Kjellén, Rätt och sanning i flaggfrågan, 2 uppl., (Göteborg: Gumperts Bokh, 1899).

Rudolf Kjellén, Inledning till Sveriges geografi, (1900).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Döda Bokstäfver i Sveriges gällande Regeringsform,” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 5:e årg., Maj. N:o 2(1902): 101–122.

Rudolf Kjellén, Stormakterna: Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, forsta delen, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1905).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Japans ancien régime,” Statsvetenskaplig tidskrift, (1906): ?

Rudolf Kjellén, Nationell Samlung: Politiska och Etiska Fragment, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, Isaac Marcus’ Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1906).

Rudolf Kjellén, Sångare– och Turistfärder, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1908).

Rudolf Kjellén, Ett Program: Nationella Samlingslinjer, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1908).

Rudolf Kjellén, Mellanpartiet: En Fråga för Dagen i Svensk Politik, (Göteborg: Göteborgs Aftonbl:s, 1910).

Rudolf Kjellén, Inledning till Sveriges Geografi, (Göteborg: Wettergren & Kerber, 1910).

Rudolf Kjellén, Justitieombudsmannen och författningen, (1911).

Rudolf Kjellén, Stormakterna: Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, forsta delen, [Les grandes puissances: Des contours de la grande politique contemporaine, première partie] (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1911). [1905]

Rudolf Kjellén, Stormakterna. Konturer kring samtidens storpolitik, (1905; 2:a omarbetad upplaga, del I–IV, 1911–1913)

Rudolf Kjellén, Den Ryska Faran, (Karlskrona: Karlskrona–Tidningen, 1913).

Rudolf Kjellén, Samtidens stormakter, (1914).

Rudolf Kjellén, Politiska Essayer I: Studier till Dagskrönikan (1907–1913): Internationell Politik och Geopolitik, Första Samlingen, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, Isaac Marcus’ Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1914).

Rudolf Kjellén, Politiska Essayer II: Studier till Dagskrönikan (1907–1913): Samhälls– och Författningspolitik, Andra Samlingen, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, Isaac Marcus’ Boktryckeri–Actiebolag, 1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, Världskrigets Politiska Problem (Populärt vetenskapliga föreläsningar vid Göteborgs Högskola), Ny följd XIV, (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, Alb. Bonniers Boktryckeri, 1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, Otto Järte, Yngve Larsson & Adrian Molin, Sveriges utrikespolitik i världskrigets belysning, (Stockholm: Nordiska Bokhandeln, 1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, Rösträttsfrågan 1866–1909, (1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Försök till ett statsformernas naturliga system,” Festskrift till Pontus Fahlbeck, (1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Den endogena geografiens system,” Göteborgs högskolas årsskrift, (1915).

Primary Sources in Swedish: Politiska Handbocker III, 1916

Rudolf Kjellén, Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Förord,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), v–vii.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Den politiska vetenskapens tillbakasatta ställning i svensk folkuppfostran,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 1–2.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Anledningarne därtill,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 2–3.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Uppfattningen af staten som uteslutande rättssubjekt,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 3–6.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Sammanhang med ‘Manchesterläran,’” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 6–7.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Reaktionen i statspraxis,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 7.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Inledning om statskunskapens själfbesinning: Nödvändigheten af en vidare teori,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 1–8; 7–8.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Erfarenhetsanalys n:r 1: det ‘invärtes’ statsbegreppet,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 9.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Staten som rättssubjekt,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 10.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Staten som hushåll och samhälle,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 11–17.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Erfarenhetsanalys n:r 2: det ‘utvärtes’ statsbegreppet,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 17–20.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Staten som rike och folk,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 20–23.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Statskunskapens rätt till detta studium,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 23–30.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Statens organiska enhet,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 30–36.

Rudolf Kjellén, “I. Statens allmänna väsen: Systemet och undersökningsplanen,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 9–38; 36–38.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik),” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Rikets integrerande i staten,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 39–42.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Olika rikstyper: stad och land,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 42–44.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Statens ‘lifegenskap’ under riket,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 44–47.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Den organiska uppfattningen: statens kropp,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 47–48.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Folkrättsliga och politiska konsekvenser,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 48–53.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Den geografiska individualiteten,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 53.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Naturliga gränser, olika typer,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 53–57.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Naturgebit och dess typer,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 57–60.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Lösningen af riksproblemet,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 60–61.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Statens återverkan på riket,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 61–62.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Statens förgänglighet och rikets odödlighet,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 62–64.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Den privata äganderättens problem,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 64–66.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): Speciell geopolitik: inflytelser af rum, gestalt och läge,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 66–71.

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Staten som rike (geopolitik): ‘Lägeförvandlingar’ och ‘historiska sidor,’” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 39–75; 71–75.

Rudolf Kjellén, “III. Staten som folk (etnopolitik),” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 76–124.

Rudolf Kjellén, “IV. Staten som hushåll, samhälle och regemente(ekonomipolitik, sociopolitik, regementspolitik),” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 125–160.

Rudolf Kjellén, “IV. Staten som hushåll, samhälle och regemente(ekonomipolitik, sociopolitik, regementspolitik): Samhällets begrepp och successiva typer,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 125–160; 137–143.

Rudolf Kjellén, “V. Staten under lifvets lag,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 161–178.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Afslutning om statens ändamål,” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 179–183.

Rudolf Kjellén, “Bilaga. Om politiken som vetenskap (Ur Göteborgs Aftonblad den 22 och 26 mars 1901),” Politiska Handbocker III: Staten som Lifsform, Årg. 3, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1916), 184–188.

Rudolf Kjellén, Politiska Handbocker IV: Sverige, Årg. 4, (Stockholm: Hugo Gebers Förlag, 1917).

Rudolf Kjellén, Världspolitiken 1911–1919, (Uppsala: J.A. Lindblad, 1920).

Rudolf Kjellén, Stormakterna och världskrisen, (1920).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Bismarcks Förbundssystem: Några anmärkningar av Rudolf Kjellén,” Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift, 23(1920): 279–287.

Rudolf Kjellén, Rudolf Kjellén: geopolitiken och konservatismen, Bert Edsröm, Ragnar Björk & Thomas Lundén, red., (Stockholm: Hjalmarson & Högberg Bokförlag, 2014).

Primary Sources in German

Rudolf Kjellén, Die Ideen von 1914: Eine weltgeschichtliche Perspektive,Übersetzt von Carl Koch, (Leipzig: S. Herzel Verlag, 1915).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Versuch eines natürlichen Systems der Staatsformen,” Zeitschrift für Politik, 8(1915): 427–451.

Rudolf Kjellén, Die Großmächte der Gegenwart, Übersetzt von Carl Koch, Achte Auflage, (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1915). [1914]

Rudolf Kjellén, “Einleitung,” Die Großmächte der Gegenwart, Übersetzt von Carl Koch, Achte Auflage, (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1915), 1–5. [1914]

Rudolf Kjellén, Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, Übersetzt von Friedrich Stieve (1884–1966), (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1916).

Rudolf Kjellén, “Geopolitische Probleme I: Rußland und England,” Die politischen Probleme des Weltkrieges, Übersetzt von Friedrich Stieve, (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1916), 9–21.

Rudolf Kjellén, Der Staat als Lebensform, Zweite Auflage, Übersetzt von Margarethe Langfeldt (1875–1922), (Leipzig: S. Herzel Verlag, 1917). [1916]

Rudolf Kjellén, “Schluß: Der Zweck des Staats,” Der Staat als Lebensform, Zweite Auflage, Übersetzt von Margarethe Langfeldt, (Leipzig: S. Herzel Verlag, 1917), 227–233. [1916]

Rudolf Kjellén, Studien zur Weltkrise, Übersetzt von Friedrich Stieve, Dritte Auflage, (München: verlegt bei Hugo Bruckmann, 1917).

Rudolf Kjellén, Studien zur Weltkrise, Übersetzt von Friedrich Stieve, Dritte Auflage, (München: verlegt bei Hugo Bruckmann, 1918). [1917]

Rudolf Kjellén, Grundriß zu einem System der Politik, (Leipzig: S. Herzel Verlag, 1920).

Rudolf Kjellén, “II. Spezieller Teil: 1. Das Reich (Geopolitik),” Grundriß zu einem System der Politik, (Leipzig: S. Herzel Verlag, 1920), 59–103; 61–70.

Rudolf Kjellén, Die Großmächte und die Weltkrise, Übersetzt von Carl Koch,(Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1921). [1920]

Rudolf Kjellén, Dreibund und Dreiverband: Die diplomatische Vorgeschichte des Weltkriegs, Übersetzt von Alexander von Normann, (München/Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot 1921).

Rudolf Kjellén, Die Großmächte vor und nach dem Weltkriege, Band 1, (Berlin/Leipzig: Verlag und Druck von B.G. Teubner, 1933).

Primary Sources in Finnish

Rudolf Kjellén, Valtio elinmuotona: politiikan käsikirja: Tekijä Luvalla Suomentanut Aarne Anttila, (Hämeenlinna: Arvi A. Karisto, 1919).

Primary Sources in English

Rudolf Kjellén, The State As a Form of Life: The Aim of Statecraft, Christopher Richard Wade Dettling, editor and translator, (San Francisco, California: The Medium Corporation, 2018). [1916 & 1917]

Secondary Sources

Georg Andrén (1890–1969), “Rudolf Kjellen: Några ord till tioårsminnet av hans död,” Svensk Tidskrift, Årgång 22(1932): 377–394.

Wilhelm Bernsdorf, “Johan Rudolf Kjellén,” Internationales Soziologenlexikon: Beitrage uber bis Ende 1969 verstorbene Soziologen, Wilhelm Bernsdorf & Horst Knospe, Herausgegeben, neubearbeitete Auflage, Band 1, (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke Verlag, 1980), 213.

Nils Elvander, “Rudolf Kjellén,” Svenskt biografiskt lexikon: Katarina–Königsmarck, Årgång 21, (Stockholm: Sveriges släktforskarförbund, 1975–1977). [1918–2017]

Gunnar Falkemark (red.), “Rudolf Kjellén — vetenskapsman eller humbug?” Statsvetarporträtt: Svenska statsvetare under 350 år, (Stockholm: SNS Förlag, 1992), 89–109.

Birger Hagård (1932–2013), “Arvet från Rudolf Kjellén,” Svensk Tidskrift,Årgång 58(1971): 321–327.

Bertil Haggman, “Rudolf Kjellén and Modern Swedish Geopolitics,” Geopolitics, 3.2(1998): 99–112.

Herman Hofberg (1823–1883) et alia, “Johan Rudolf Kjellen,” Svensk biografiskt handlexikon, årgang 1, Ny upplaga, (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Förlag, 1906), 584. [1873–1876]

Sven Holdar, “The Ideal State and the Power of Geography: The Life–Work of Rudolf Kjellén,” Political Geography, 2.2(1992): 307–323.

Ruth Kjellén–Björkquist, Rudolf Kjellén: en människa i tiden kring sekelskiftet,(Stockholm: Verbum, 1970).

Fredrika Lagergren, “Den mångsidige statsvetaren: Rudolf Kjellén och den biopolitiska teorin,” Forskarbiografin, (Stockholm: Kungliga Vitterhets– historie– och antikvitetsakademien, 1998): 109–122.

Hans Rothfels (1891–1976), “Kapitel IV: Von der Entlassung Bismarcks bis zum Ausgang des Weltkrieges (1890–1918): Rudolf Kjellén,” Jahresberichte der deutschen Geschichte in Verbindung mit Fr. Andreae, R. Haepke, F. v. Klocke, R. Koebner, H. Krabbo, H.O. Meisner, F. Priebatsch, H. Rothfels, M. Stimming, W. Windelband, V. Loewe & O. Lerche, Hrsg., Jahrgang 4 (1921), (Breslau: Priebatsch’s Verlag, 1923), 95–106; 95–96.

Charles Seymour, “Rudolf Kjellén,” Zeitschrift für Geopolitik, 1(1924): 339–346.

Ola Tunander, “Swedish–German Geopolitics for a New Century — Rudolf Kjellén’s The State as a Living Organism,” Review of International Studies, 27.3(2001): 451–463.

Ola Tunander, “Swedish Geopolitics: From Rudolf Kjellén to a Swedish ‘Dual State,’” Geopolitics, 10(2005): 546–566.

Ola Tunander, “Geopolitics of the North: Geopolitik of the Weak: A Post–Cold War Return to Rudolf Kjellén,” Cooperation and Conflict, 43.2(2008): 164–184.

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