Retro Analysis: FC Barcelona 2010/11
Introduction
Who is the greatest football team of all time?
Many people would answer this question with the FC Barcelona in 2010/11. During that season, they won the Champions League, the Spanish League and the Spanish Supercopa. It was a truly successful season. However, there were equal or more successful Barcelona sides in the club’s history. It wasn’t about trophies that made this squad special. Instead, their style of play stood out to others.
Pep Guardiola created a position-based team. Every player knew where to position himself in any given scenario. This positioning enabled Barcelona to control the game. They could hold possession for long periods and therefore have stability.
As the coach himself once said: “Stability is the ball. It’s not to defend 40 meters behind or up front, or high pressing or defend deep or long balls, to be stable as a team is the ball” (Guardiola).
Furthermore, their way of using possession was truly fascinating. Barcelona didn’t just have the ball in sake of having the ball. They constantly seeked for superiority to eventually create chances. It was sometimes slower and sometimes faster, but every pass had an intention.
This article aims to find out, why this Barcelona side is often called the greatest of all time. It mostly covers their in-possession phase as that was most special. But don’t get me wrong, their pressing was incredible too. Nevertheless, most people associate this squad with their possession phase. In the end of this article, I’m shortly going to analyse their counterpressing and why it was so strong.
Structure
As already mentioned, the positioning of the players was the most important to create this dominance in their possession phase.
“It’s a game of position, not possession!” (Torrent)
Barcelona’s structure created a lot of diagonal passing lanes and a good distribution all over the pitch. This enabled them to have the ball, progress further up and create chances.
On paper, it was a 4–3–3. But in possession, it was very unusual and asymmetric. It is difficult to describe it with numbers, so let’s have a look on each players role.
Let’s start with the back line of four. The centre backs stayed in the centre and the half-spaces. Besides them, the fullbacks positioned themselves asymmetrically. The right back (usually Alves) moved high up the pitch, nearly playing like a winger. On the left (mostly Abidal) usually stayed deeper. He only moved up on a few occasions, which I will mention later.
The central defensive midfielder (usually Busquets) was the anchor in the midfield. He had a less flexible role than the other midfielders higher up. Busquets mostly stayed in the centre in front of the centre backs and would make horizontal movements. Rarely, he moved higher up.
The two 8s, Xavi and Iniesta also positioned themselves asymmetrically to each other. Xavi on the right played deeper, sometimes besides Busquets to control the game. On the left, Iniesta moved higher up in the left half-space.
The wingers (usually Pedro and Villa) also had different roles. The right winger mostly moved into the right half-space to open the wing for Alves. The left winger usually stayed wide, to open the left half-space for Iniesta.
Lastly, the heart of the squad was their striker, Lionel Messi. He played as a false nine, meaning he constantly dopped deep to connect with the midfield. He often had a tendency, to drop in front of Xavi, to make use of the opened space by the deeper positioning of the Spaniard. Although, Messi’s role was more or less free and he could move wherever he wanted to.
The structure mostly remained the same. It was important that the positions/spaces are occupied, not who occupied them. Most of the time, it looked like in the image above. Though, rotations could occur, meaning the structure could vary for a short period. I will go into detail on these rotations later.
Although, sometimes the structure changed slightly for longer periods, but the principles always remained the same. One change in the structure was e.g., both fullbacks high and wide and both wingers in the half-spaces. This happened mostly when Maxwell played on the left as he is more attacking-minded than Abidal. At this variation, Iniesta would be a little bit deeper.
Build-up
Only few opponents forced Barcelona to build up deep, as the opposition was often feared of giving more spaces to the midfielders. They therefore sacrificed pressure on the first line of Barcelona’s build-up.
But if the opposition sometimes pressed higher, to put pressure on the centre backs, Barcelona could often easily bypass them.
When pressing higher, most opponents used two players to press Barca’s centre backs. In the deep build-up, Barcelona could use the keeper (Valdes) as the free man, to create a 3v2 overload. The centre backs then would often split wide and deep, to give Valdes more time and space.
The usage of the keeper often had many positive effects to Barcelona’s build-up play. A backwards pass and a pass to the keeper are often pressing triggers for most opponents. This usually led to a striker, who initially marked a centre back, pressing Valdes. Then, the centre back would be the free man.
Even better for Barcelona could be, after a forward, who initially marked a centre back and then pressed on Valdes, another player would take the centre back over. This would again leave a new player free, in a higher position.
This scenario didn’t happen that often, though it showed that Barcelona always had an answer to what the opponent tried to do.
But as already mentioned, most opponents played deeper against Barcelona and would leave the first line free or less pressed.
Still, an overload in the first line was often created, to progress the ball cleaner into higher zones.
Against one striker, the centre backs would naturally have a 2v1 overload, meaning no change in the structure was necessary.
Against two forwards, even though they didn’t press that much, Barcelona liked to have an 3v2 overload. There were a few ways to create the back three:
One was to have Busquets dropping between both centre backs. The centre backs would then move wider and the fullbacks pushed higher up. This enabled the centre backs to be free, have bigger spaces and dribble forwards with the ball.
Sometimes, Xavi dropped between the centre backs or besides one centre back, to create a back three.
The second big way was to use a deeper fullback. Abidal would often stay deeper, to form a temporary back three. This again enabled the centre backs to dribble forward as they had more cover. Moreover, the deep position of Abidal often pulled the opposition’s winger higher, meaning more space were created in the midfield.
As already mentioned, a back three enables the halfbacks to move forward with the ball as they have more cover. This advancing can be very beneficial, to unsettle a deep block.
Many teams aren’t prepared what to do if a centre back starts to dribble with high pace towards them. This quick change of dynamics gave Barcelona an advantage.
One obvious advantage is that by simply moving forwards with the ball, Barcelona was nearer to the opposition goal. Furthermore, it can create a free man or spaces. Any opponent has to press the advancing centre back, no matter what. If no one does, he could dribble freely to the opponent’s goal.
So, one player has to leave his initial marker to press the advancing centre back. This leaves one player unmarked. Either the advancing centre back can directly pass to him, or through another way. Barcelona is incredibly good at finding the free man. Something I will cover more later on.
This is why dribbling is so important for Guardiola: “My first question is always, ‘Can this guy dribble?’ I only want players who have that skill so that’s always what I look at. I want full backs and central defenders and midfielders and inside forwards and winger who can dribble. Because you can learn control and good passing…So, yeah, dribbling, that’s the key.” (Guardiola)
Progress play and Chance Creation
Now that we know, how Barcelona was able to get past the first line of pressure, let’s have a look on how they tried to progress the ball and get into valuable zones to eventually create chances.
First of all, with four players in the midfield (Busquets, Xavi, Iniesta and Messi), Barcelona often had an overload there. These four players mostly formed a box shape or an asymmetrical diamond.
The overload helped Barcelona to find a free player in the centre/half-spaces (the most valuable zones).
Sometimes, the overload was enough, to find the free player. Although, Barcelona also used some interesting mechanisms to find him if it wasn’t that easy.
Now, let’s have a look on some ways to find the free man:
As already mentioned, Barcelona used clever rotations and movements, to unsettle the opposition and eventually create a free man.
You can see the most basic rotation on the image above. Xavi moved deeper, nearly besides Busquets. This allowed Iniesta to move up. Moreover, Messi dropped deeper (mostly in front of Xavi) to create a box structure.
The movement of Xavi usually pulled a midfielder out of position. This opened more space for Messi in between the lines.
We could also often see Busquets making a horizontal movement slightly to the left. This could drag an opponent to the side, which opened space for Xavi to drop into and receive in a deep playmaking position, where he was especially strong.
This rotation occurred mostly, but all in all the midfield box was highly fluid. Sometimes it looked like a box and sometimes like a diamond. Though, the structure wasn’t the most important. What was most important was to create superiorities, find the free man and eventually progress towards the goal.
The fluidity and the rotations had many positive effects and intentions:
The players constantly moved in relation to each other. One big intention was to open passing lanes. Movements could drag defenders out of position, which opened passing lanes and spaces for other players.
The second intention was to move into these open spaces. The midfielders had such an incredible understanding of time and space. They dynamically occupied open spaces. This created a factor of unpredictability and made them harder to mark.
Every midfielder could occupy every space if it had an intention for the collective. That’s why Busquets could also sometimes move into higher zones, to occupy open spaces. The players always moved in relation to each other, therefore, someone needed to occupy Busquets’ central defensive midfield position if he moved up.
Furthermore, the rotations often forced man-oriented opponents to decide between strictly marking or handing over. This is a difficult task to handle. Therefore, a mixture of both often occurred and a player would be free.
Barcelona kept on performing these rotations until a player would eventually receive the ball with time and space. Though, these rotations weren’t the only mechanisms to progress further up.
Barcelona combined the movements with quick combinations, as you can see above. That’s were their famously known Tiki-Taka comes into play.
Sometimes it looked like that they just passed to each other to simply have the ball, but again, every pass had an intention.
“The intention is not to move the ball, rather to move the opposition.” (Guardiola)
The aim of Tiki-Taka, as seen on the quote above was always to manipulate the opponent in a way, to open spaces and create a free player.
Through their structure, Barcelona had small distances in the midfield, which enabled quick combinations that are difficult to defend. The Barcelona players were the best in the world, to execute those combinations.
At the quick combinations, the midfielders and Messi constantly moved related to each other, as already mentioned. Often in the box structure, but also even more fluid, when spaces were somewhere else.
The short passes attracted pressure. Especially, if Barcelona passed to a player with a backwards-facing view. This is often a pressing trigger for the opposition. The opponent thinks he can steal the ball from the player with the suboptimal view, but that’s not the case. The Barcelona player often made a one touch pass, to get out of the pressure. Therefore, the positioning around this player was important to create passing lanes. That’s where the rotations came into play.
When the opponent pressed the Barcelona player with the backwards-facing view, spaces somewhere else open and could be exploited by another player.
Moreover, due to the small distances, many opponents just pressed through and left their initial opponent free, to press another one. Due to Barcelona’s great structure and the mechanisms as already mentioned, they were able to find this free player.
Something that shouldn’t be neglected is that the free man should always be supported, to progress further up and use his potential correctly. The midfielders always had that in mind. Their rotations helped the free man to either have more space or a passing option.
Another movement I’d like to mention, which isn’t necessarily a rotation, is the dropping to the side-line performed by Iniesta. This movement can have two effects.
Iniesta could either receive himself with space or he dragged an opponent to the side, opening spaces in the half-space.
Another rotation we often saw was a winger (mostly the right winger) switching positions with Messi. The winger then moved centrally to pin the opponent’s centre backs. This allowed Messi the move around even more.
It was mostly the right winger as he is usually positioned in the half-space and the right fullback occupied the right-wing zone. Meaning no real change in the structure occurred, but different player profiles had different positions.
The opponent often didn’t know how to react to this switch accordingly. The opposition’s fullback was usually tasked marking the winger and the centre backs marked Messi. Now, with the rotations, the opponent couldn’t carry out this task.
This dilemma combined with the high and dynamic role of the right back often forced the back line to leave Messi free and give him even more spaces than in a central position.
This rotation sometimes occurred surprisingly or Barcelona kept this switch of positions for longer periods.
On an individual level, there were two other major ways on how to find and create a free man:
The first was dribbling. I mentioned the dribbling of the centre backs, but also in the midfield, dribbles were very important to progress and eventually create chances.
In the centre, Barcelona didn’t just have the best creators, but also the best dribblers of all time. Players like Messi and Iniesta constantly waved through the opposition with their breath-taking dribbles. But again, this wasn’t just to show off. It also had an intention.
Their dribbles would attract pressure. When a player bypasses an opponent through a dribble, another player has to step up to press the dribbler. This creates spaces and potentially a free man somewhere else. Messi and Iniesta would often bypass numerous opponents and be surrounded by a lot of players.
The other individual way to find and create a free man were disguised passes. This refers to faking a pass to one player and then passing to another. The opponents can be manipulated for example through the view of the eyes or the body position.
This guides the opponent to a wrong passing option. The opponent often moves to the fake passing option, leaving the real one free.
All midfielders, but especially Busquets were masters at this skill.
Another way, to attract pressure were backwards passes. A backwards pass doesn’t gain space. Though, it can be the beginning of a new and better attack. Backwards passes attract pressure as the team with the ball doesn’t move nearer to the goal.
“[…] a back pass does not indicate fear, but the beginning of another, better play.” (Guardiola)
Mostly, only few players of the opponent move up after a backwards pass. This is dangerous, as these players leave their deeper positions, which can open space between the lines if the other teammates don’t move up.
If the whole team moves up after a backwards pass, spaces between the lines stay narrow and therefore difficult to access. Though, spaces behind can enlarge. If the forwards exploit these spaces, they have a dynamical advantage as the opposition just moved forwards.
Especially for Barcelona, the ability to attract pressure was very important as many opponents just sat deep and tried to defend with eleven players. Being able to constantly manipulate the opponent was a big factor of their incredible in-possession phase.
Sometimes, these mechanisms weren’t enough and Barcelona wasn’t able to get into valuable zones. This mostly happened if the opponent tried to congest the centre with as many players as possible.
The opponents would either use four midfielders or their wingers tucking inside (this occurred more often). This obviously helped the opponents to control the centre and give Barcelona’s midfielders less time and space.
But this led to another problem. By congesting the centre, spaces wide enlarged. This is also why Guardiola always wanted to have both wing zones occupied.
Through the constant occupation of both wing zones (mostly by the wingers or fullbacks), Barcelona could stretch the opposition and had always a passing option wide if the centre was congested.
Sometimes, Barcelona could purposefully play wide. An example would be the overload to isolate principle. This refers to creating an overload on one side of the pitch and then switching to the other side, to create a 1v1 there.
Barcelona often combined the switches with the pinning of the ball-far fullback. This would create even more spaces wide.
Barcelona had amazing wingers and fullbacks with incredible dribbling and crossing abilities. So, it wasn’t really a downgrade compared to going centrally. Nevertheless, Barcelona preferred to go through the middle.
“You have the ball on one side, to finish on the other.” (Guardiola)
Similar to the overload to isolate principle, generally Barcelona used a lot of switches to progress and create chances. Often, the opponents were able to have good local compactness at a specific area and stopped Barcelona from progress. From here, backwards passes and switches were very important.
I already wrote about why backwards passes are so important and why Barcelona used them. Something I didn’t mention was the position of a relay player. This refers to a player who positions himself behind others, to be a back pass option. Combined with the wing zone, Pep Guardiola always wanted to have this space/position occupied.
When being stuck on the wing, a backwards pass option can be highly important. That’s where the relay player comes into play. He usually positioned himself behind the wide player and in the half-space. This was near enough to the wide player and near enough to stay connected with the other players to potentially switch the point of attack.
As seen on an image earlier, which I used to represent a backwards pass, Alves is the relay player in the right half-space. Though, mostly a midfielder (Xavi & Iniesta) provided this back pass option. Sometimes the fullback would stay deeper in the relay player position.
Another position which is very important to be able to switch is the link playing position. Guardiola too always wanted to have this position/space occupied. The link player was mostly positioned centrally in front of the block. He can be the immediate option for the relay player or the player to play a switch to the other side.
Again, it didn’t matter who occupied this space unless it was occupied. But it was mostly Busquets, who positioned himself there. Sometimes, an 8 could occupy this space.
The link player is very similar to the relay player, as he can also be a back pass option. Though, he is positioned differently and even more important for a successful switch.
Many teams congested specific areas. Being able to switch the point of attack elsewhere had many positive effects. Due to those switches, the opponent constantly had to shift across. Sooner or later, the opponent just makes a mistake. For example, someone pushed up to far or someone didn’t move to the other side accordingly.
Although, the act of switching alone isn’t really effective. Sometimes, it can open spaces and create a free man, but mostly it’s about the following action. After a switch, it’s important to support the receiver and force the opponent to make as many decisions as possible.
This quote from Adin Osmanbasic summarizes best Barcelona’s way on how to find the free man: “The goal is to find the free or unmarked man by moving the ball, positioning, or player movement” (Osmanbasic).
Another big chance creation method was combined with Messi’s dropping movement in a false nine position. His dropping move often pulled a centre back out of position, opening spaces in behind. Immediately, as Messi dropped deep, other players (mostly wingers) started to make diagonal runs in behind, to exploit this space.
Villa and Pedro were very fast and had a great timing. Therefore, these runs often caused the opposition big troubles. They also looked to make these runs on the blindside of the opposition, making them even more effective.
Messi could then use his outstanding passing qualities to pick a run of his teammates. Sometimes, Messi would lay it off to another teammate who then could find the running players with a forward-facing view.
This chance creation method mostly was successful against opponents with a high defensive line. But it could also be seen to attack crosses in this way.
Everything I mentioned in this chapter combined forced the opponent to make as many decisions as possible. No matter what the opposition tried to do, Barcelona always seemed to have an answer and the opponent more and more questions.
I’d like to finish this section with a quote from the famous basketball player Stephen Curry, which perfectly describes Barcelona’s aim in possession: “The main goal is to just make the defense make as many decisions as you can so that they’re going to mess up at some point with all that ball movement and body movement and whatnot” (Curry).
Counterpressing
As already mentioned in the introduction, I will now analyse Barcelona’s counterpressing. Yes, this article should mainly cover Barcelona’s in-possession phase, but their counterpressing was outstanding and it is also connected to the in-possession phase as the structure decides if the counterpressing is successful. Moreover, as Barcelona mostly wanted to have possession, their counterpressing was very important to immediately win the ball back.
“Without the ball, we are a disastrous team, a horrible team, so we need the ball.” (Guardiola)
The most important factor of Barcelona’s counterpressing was probably their structure. They always aimed to have small distances to each other. These small distances were a key part of their in-possession phase. As already mentioned, they used small distances to be able to make quicker combinations. Moreover, the different local overloads in possession also led to small distances to each other. This is a good starting point, but that’s not enough for a successful counterpressing. Let’s dive a little bit deeper.
“It’s about how you place yourself in relation to the others on the field when you have the ball and where you should be so that you can continue pressing when you lose it.” (Domènec Torrent)
@roshanrao_ on Twitter used an interesting approach on how to analyse the counterpressing from Manchester City here:
I will also use it a little bit to get a better understanding why Barcelona’s counterpressing was so good.
Basically, @roshanrao_ divides the structure around the counterpressing action into three zones:
“1. Zone of intervention — immediate engagement takes place on the ball
2. Zone of mutual help — support around the ball through numerical superiority
3. Zone of cooperation — Hold positions for width and depth” (@roshanrao_)
Let’s start with the first zone, the zone of intervention. This refers to immediately applying pressure on the ball-carrier after the ball is lost. Barcelona’s players instantly pressed the opponent after a ball loss with full pace. Mostly, the one or two nearest players would sprint towards the ball-carrier. Although, it wasn’t always about winning the ball back immediately. Sometimes, the presser ran through or looked to guide the opponent into a specific area.
Often it was just important to seemingly put the opponent under pressure even though the Barcelona player couldn’t win the ball back. This led to hesitation and often a mistake from the opponent.
Furthermore, it isn’t just important that immediate pressure is applied. The players also need to anticipate counterpressing actions quickly. The Barcelona players were masters at this. They constantly had in mind what would happen if the ball would be lost. Pressing triggers such as a Barcelona player with a bad body posture, a teammate under pressure or a great run from the opponent were signs to apply pressure. The Barcelona players would then slowly move over and backwards to be prepared for the counterpressing action but also for a potential counterattack from the opponent.
Secondly, the zone of mutual help. This refers to the players who position themselves around the ball to provide support and stability but at first don’t directly apply pressure. The occupation of this zones is very important as some teams can come through the zone of intervention. Players in the zone of mutual help can also act as a second wave.
At Barcelona, mostly around three or more players would occupy this zone. They looked to control the space around the ball by using the cover-shadow and often positioned themselves between the opponents. Also, the positioning on different vertical and horizontal lines helped to control the area.
Moreover, if Barcelona won the ball back, players in the zone of mutual help were often the first players who were seeked to play out of the congested area. Counterpressing actions are often very narrow and random. Having players positioned to get out of this space was also key.
Thirdly, the zone of cooperation refers to players who are positioned even further away. The aim of these players is to provide cover if the opponent can break through the first and second zone, e.g., with a long ball. Additionally, these players can also be outlet options after the ball is won from the counterpressing action.
This zone was usually occupied by the centre backs, the ball-far fullback and a midfielder to provide cover for a potential transition. Moreover, forwards would also be positioned in this zone to be the outlet and to transition forward after the ball was won back.
Sometimes, the structure wasn’t ideal or the opponent could play themselves out of the pressure. If this happened, usually the nearest player would still apply pressure and the other players would fall deep to provide cover.
Conclusion
This Barcelona side wasn’t just beautiful to watch, but also incredibly effective. Pep Guardiola brought the possession-based philosophy to the world of football and started an evolution. His Barcelona team was feared but also admired at the same time around the globe.
Something that shouldn’t be neglected is the individual quality of this squad. Without these outstanding players, it wouldn’t be impossible to achieve all this. Though, it’s the role of the coach to fit them into a functioning and effective system. Pep Guardiola definitely established this and should therefore be respected.
I hope you enjoyed this article! It’s my first piece on Medium, so I wanted to make something special. Moreover, I hope that this article was detailed enough but not too long at the same time.
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