Retro Analysis: How Cruyff’s 3–1–2–1–3 outclassed Real Madrid in 1994
Introduction
January the 8th, 1994. A day, the world of football will forever remember: the remarkable 5–0 triumph of FC Barcelona against Real Madrid at the Camp Nou. This game was sort of a turning point in Spain. For years, Real Madrid was the best team in Spain, but after this historical game, the dominance changed.
FC Barcelona, then coached by the legendary Johan Cruyff, played a style of football which still is the foundation for many clubs today.
A beautiful quote from Pep Guardiola:
“Johan Cruyff built the cathedral. Our job is to maintain it.” (Pep Guardiola)
The Catalan’s played a position-based style. They constantly looked to create superiorities through their positioning, by the creation of triangles and diamonds as well as a stretched pitch when in possession. Barcelona preferred to build-up short and progress through the centre as they mostly tried to create an overload in this zone.
All these principles can be best seen in their 5–0 win over Real Madrid. This article focuses on how Barcelona beat Real Madrid in possession.
Barcelona’s structure
As during most games, the Catalans played in a 3–1–2–1–3 (3-diamond-3) formation. The back three consisted of Ronald Koeman in the middle. To his right played Albert Ferrer and to his left, Jon Andoni Goikoetxea. Moving on to the midfield diamond, Pep Guardiola was the single pivot in front of the backline. Miguel Ángel Nadal played as the left 8 slightly deeper than the right 8, Guillermo Amor. José Mari Bakero was positioned on the tip of the diamond in the number 10 position. The front three consisted of the wide wingers (Christo Stoichkov as the right winger and Sergi Barjuan as the left winger) and Romario as the striker.
Real’s defensive shape
To understand how Barcelona beat Real Madrid, we have to take a look on the defensive strategy of the Madrilenians.
First of all, Real Madrid left Barcelona most of the ball. The Los Blancos defended in a passive 4–1–4–1 mid-/low-block. The goal was probably to match up the numbers in midfield, as Real Madrid commonly defended in a 4–4–2 in other games. So how did this 4–1–4–1 shape function?
The striker (Iván Zamorano) was tasked to cut passing lanes into Guardiola, while also pressing Koeman if he had the ball. The midfield three looked to go man-to-man against the two Barcelona 8s (Nadal and Amor) and the 10 (Bakero). Robert Prosinečki marked Amor, Míchel marked Nadal and Luis Milla marked Bakero.
The wingers (Luis Enrique on the right and Alfonso Pérez Muñoz on the left) normally moved up on the halfbacks (Ferrer and Goikoetxea) or at times moved deeper to help their fullbacks to double Barcelona’s wingers.
The fullbacks (Mikel Lasa on the left and Paco Llorente) marked Barcelona’s wingers and the central defenders (Manolo Sanchís on the left and Rafael Alkorta on the right) marked the striker (Romario).
This strategy looked quite promising on paper. However, Barcelona found various ways to beat it and Real Madrid also didn’t execute it that well most of the time.
So, how did Barcelona create chances?
Barcelona’s chance creation methods
To begin with, Real Madrid was out of possession very passive and allowed the back three of Barcelona normally a lot of time and space to build-up. The Catalan’s could then circulate the ball and use Koeman’s outstanding passing quality. The Dutch was predestined to play high balls in behind or accurate line-breaking passes in the midfield.
At the first few minutes, Real Madrid was passive but was able to shut down the midfield diamond more or less sufficiently. The striker (Zamorano) did a solid job to cut passing lanes into Guardiola, using his cover-shadow and the midfielders followed their opponents strictly. A way to progress from there were high balls from Koeman to the wingers, isolating them in a 1v1 duel. Especially Stoichkov used his incredible dribbling ability and speed to beat his opponent.
Guardiola, the key in possession
Nevertheless, after the first few minutes passed, the dominance of Barcelona was unmissable, and the Catalans were able progress through the centre more often. Pep Guardiola was one of the key figures in this Barcelona side. He had an astonishing passing range and quality to create from a deep position. The goal for Barcelona was to find him and then progress further up. So, how did Barcelona achieve this?
One way was that Guardiola constantly made little horizontal or dropping movements to get out of the cover-shadow of Zamorano. Guardiola’s movements were very clever and allowed him to be free temporarily. After he freed himself, by moving on the blind-side of his opponent, Guardiola could be found either directly or through another way. For instance, through a 3rd man combination, using a halfback.
However, this wasn’t the only way to find Guardiola. As Koeman was the pressing trigger for Zamorano, Barcelona often deliberately used the Dutch to attract pressure. The Catalan’s often used backwards passes to Koeman, to provoke pressure from Zamorano. Generally, a backwards pass is often a pressing trigger for most opponents. Barcelona could use this deliberately, to attract pressure. Moreover, other ways to invite pressure were Koeman starting a little dribbling with the ball, quick and short passes or Koeman could hold the ball for a longer period. Furthermore, sometimes a pass to Koeman was enough and Zamorano stepped up to put the Dutch under pressure. Forcing Zamorano to press Koeman made it easier for Barcelona to find Guardiola as it’s more difficult to use the cover-shadow while pressing another opponent. Also, because Guardiola constantly made little horizontal movements out of the cover-shadow.
Again, Koeman could then either directly pass to Guardiola or through a 3rd man combination with a halfback. If a pass to Guardiola wasn’t possible, a pass to a halfback was usually the safety option for Koeman, as the pressure from the Real Madrid wingers on the halfbacks was not sufficient. This allowed the halfbacks to dribble with the ball high up the pitch. Moreover, if all these methods didn’t attract pressure from Zamorano, Koeman could use his passing range and play a long ball forward or Barcelona could circulate possession.
The individual dismarking was also a key part higher up in the midfield diamond. The 8s (Nadal and Amor) and the 10 (Bakero) constantly looked to position themselves on the blind-side of their opponent in between the lines. Therefore, at the beginning, when Real Madrid’s press was quite okay, Barcelona could still at times progress through the centre due to intelligent movements of the midfielders. Guardiola often found players in between the lines, as he attracted focus from the Real Madrid midfielders. This gave the Barcelona midfielders time to move out of the cover-shadow.
However, as the game continued, Real Madrid got increasingly into trouble. Zamorano was more and more lazy to both press Koeman and keep Guardiola in his cover-shadow. Sometimes, he just stood up front without any purpose and waited for a transition. This downfall was maybe due to the exhausting task, to both press and use his cover-shadow, as he wanted to save his energy for transitions, or Zamorano got frustrated as Guardiola was constantly free. This gave Barcelona stability and even more time and space for Guardiola to create from deep.
The first goal kind of came from the immense space for Guardiola: Ferrer dribbled past Alfonso (left winger) and played the ball slightly back to Amor. Amor then played inside to Guardiola, who had huge spaces in a playmaking position, as Barcelona attracted pressure beforehand. Bakero’s central position pinned the right centre back (Alkorta) and the right fullback (Llorente) was slightly pinned by the high position of Sergi. Alkorta then moved back to Romario, to whom Guardiola passes. Romario is now isolated in a 1v1 situation and beats Alkorta with a wonderful skill.
After the goal, Fernando Hierro came in for Alfonso. Hierro then played as the right 8, Enrique moved to the left wing and Míchel played as the right winger. However, this didn’t solve the problems.
Overload in the midfield destroys Real Madrid
Barcelona kept on finding Guardiola in a playmaking/link player position. Real Madrid tried to encounter this with an 8 moving up on Guardiola. But this created even more problems for the Madrilenians as it often led to a chain reaction and Barcelona now had the overload in the midfield they wanted to have originally.
When an 8 moved up on Guardiola, he had to leave his opponent, meaning one Barcelona 8 was free. The 8 then cleverly moved out of the cover-shadow of his initial marker, who moved up, to be accessible. However, most of the time, another Real Madrid midfielder then left his opponent to mark the free player. This created again a free player and so on. This overload was nearly impossible for Real Madrid to defend as no matter what they tried to do, there was always a free player in the midfield. To find this free player, Guardiola could either directly pass to him, or through another player (3rd man combination). Barcelona’s world class movements, structure and passing quality was key to find the free man. The Catalan’s cleverly included this overload in their attacks, which eventually gave Real Madrid no chance. At times, Guardiola could also dribble a few metres to attract pressure from a Real Madrid 8.
Two examples of the overload and the chain reactions:
Important to note is also that Guardiola usually always had enough time to pick a pass, as the distance for an 8 to move up on him was very long and the timing was usually not good.
The first half ended 1–0 for Barcelona. The Catalan’s were the far more dominant side but could eventually only score one goal. However, this changed in the second half.
2nd half
After two minutes in the second half, the keeper (Zubizarretta) made a long throw towards Stoichkov, who dribbled past three defenders and won a freekick near the penalty box. Koeman stepped up and scored a brilliant freekick in the far corner.
After the goal, Stoichkov was substituted for Michael Laudrup on the right wing. The Dane also usually held the width but could more often move inside than Stoichkov, to pin the backline.
Real Madrid got even more lazy to track their opponents and were increasingly unorganised. The 8s moved too far up unnecessarily and without any cover. Sometimes, they even pressed a halfback. Also, the wingers never put the halfbacks under pressure sufficiently. A prime example of the even worse defensive shape in the 2nd half:
At most of these chance creation methods, the pinning of the Real Madrid backline was from huge importance. Romario usually pinned the centre backs with his presence or runs in behind and the wide wingers pinned the fullbacks. This allowed the Barcelona diamond to operate and make use of the overload in the midfield. At times, Bakero could pin a centre back, when he moved higher up or away from Milla.
Later, Emilio Butragueño came in as a striker for Milla, with Zamorano moving to the right wing, Hierro playing as the 6 and Míchel as the right 8.
Barcelona kept on dominating and eventually scored the third goal: Barcelona had a freekick in their own half and passed back to Koeman. This attracted pressure from the striker. The Dutch played to Ferrer, who could access Guardiola (3rd man combination). Guardiola had time and space to pick a pass in behind. The wide wingers pinned the fullbacks slightly wider and Bakero moved higher on the blind-side of Hierro, which pinned the right centre back (Alkorta). This allowed Nadal to make a vertical run in behind in the space between the fullback and centre back. Guardiola played a high pass in behind to Nadal, who passed to Romario, who eventually scored (see image below).
Later on, Ivan Iglesias came in for Bakero as the number 10.
For the sake of completeness, let’s have a look on the fourth and fifth goal as well:
4th goal: Iglesias had the ball in the left half-space and played to Amor, who occupied the number 10 position. Amor laid the ball off to Nadal (3rd man combination), who played the ball wide to Laudrup for a 1v1. The ball wasn’t played well, and the opponent intercepted it. Laudrup immediately applied pressure and won the ball back. The Dane played inside to Romario, who had tons of space and scored the fourth goal.
5th goal: Goikoetxea found Guardiola in the middle, as the striker pressed the halfback, the midfielders marked the Barcelona midfielders, and the left winger anticipated a pass back to Koeman. This gave Guardiola huge spaces. The Spaniard found Romario with an amazing line-breaking pass. Romario attracted the attention of three defenders, which allowed Iglesias to free himself on the blind-side. Romario then made an amazing through pass to the running Iglesias, who scored.
Conclusion
It was truly an amazing game which is still relevant today. Barcelona completely outclassed Real Madrid with their various chance creation methods. Though, Real Madrid often also made life easy for the Catalans with their passive and unorganised defensive shape.
I hope I was able to give you a good insight into the tactics that made this Barcelona side special. Feedback is appreciated in any form whatsoever.
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