Team Analysis: The team everyone enjoyed watching — Bielsa’s Leeds United 2020/21
Introduction
Even though, the Leeds United from 2020/21 only finished 9th, this Leeds side is highly admired, and it was always a joy to watch their games. The reason for this is their unique style of play. Running, rotations, combinations, high-speed football etc. All these words describe the Leeds United from the 2020/21 season.
One person was responsible for this “success” — Marcelo Bielsa. The Argentinian coach is known for his unique style of play. Despite never really winning a major trophy, Marcelo Bielsa is still considered as one of the best coaches in the world.
As Johan Cruyff once said:
“There is no medal better than being acclaimed for your style.” (Johan Cruyff)
This article takes a look on the tactics that made the Leeds United from 2020/21 famous.
In possession
Marcelo Bielsa is obsessed with attacking. He wants his teams to play possession-based and high-speed football. The Argentine prefers his teams to build-up deep and create chances through movements and create dynamical superiority.
There were two major formations Leeds used in possession: the 4–1–4–1 and the 3–3–1–3.
4–1–4–1
During most games, Leeds used a 4–1–4–1 on paper in possession. Usually, if the opponent used one striker/three forwards and/or a back four, as it would match better with their defensive strategy (something I’ll touch on later in the out of possession chapter). According to transfermarkt.com, Leeds used the 4–1–4–1 in possession in 32 of their 38 league games.
Structure
The 4–1–4–1 looked in possession more like a 4–1–5 or 2–3–5, whatever you want to call it. Their structure is created through deep fullbacks, wide wingers and very high 8s in the half-spaces.
However, this structure could change at times, through player movements, rotations, overloads, or other methods to progress and create chances. Though, the 4–1–5/2–3–5 structure is a good starting point to understand this Leeds side.
Let’s first have a quick look on the players and their specific roles and tasks in the 4–1–4–1.
In goal, Illan Meslier played 35 games. He was as important in possession as other players. Bielsa normally wants goal keepers with the ability to help the team in possession. The French keeper is good with the ball on his feet and has a solid passing ability. His capacity, to be used in possession, helped Leeds a lot, to build-up and progress.
There were a few players, who played central defenders, such as Liam Cooper, Robin Koch, Pascal Struijk and Luke Ayling. Again, Bielsa doesn’t just want his central defenders to stop the opponent. Instead, they were a major factor for Leeds in possession, due to their passing abilities.
Most of the time, Luke Ayling, Stuart Dallas or Ezgjan Alioski played as a fullback. Ayling usually on the right and Alioski on the left. Dallas could play on both sides. Leeds often tried to build-up and progress through wide areas, that’s why the fullbacks had a high importance in possession for Leeds. They normally played in a deeper position, than modern fullbacks, but could also underlap or overlap at times. Sometimes, one could move even deeper, to create a temporary back three.
The 6 position was mostly played by Kalvin Phillips and if he couldn’t play, usually Robin Koch replaced him. However, Bielsa didn’t want a static 6 unlike other coaches, for example Pep Guardiola with Rodri. The 6 needed to be in constant movement, to help progress, by creating passing lanes or to open space for other players.
The two 8 positions were also played by various players: Mateusz Klich, Stuart Dallas, Rodrigo Moreno, and Tyler Roberts. The 8s were positioned, high in the half-spaces. Once again, Bielsa also wanted these players to be in constant movement, using vertical runs, diagonal runs, decoy movements, rotations and counter movements, for example. The 8s were highly fluid and from immense importance to progress and create chances.
As mentioned earlier, the wingers stayed wide, to stretch the pitch. Sometimes, they inverted, if for example a fullback made an overlap. Most of the times, Jack Harrison and Raphinha played wide. At times Helder Costa. Harrison usually played on the left and Raphinha on the right-hand side. The wingers were often searched from Leeds for 1v1s out wide, to use their dribbling qualities or to progress further up.
Lastly, Patrick Bamford played most of the games as the lone striker. He was tasked to create depth, pin defenders and being used as a target man/link player. He tended to move to the right more often. Moreover, he was often searched for crosses.
Build-up
Marcelo Bielsa favoured his Leeds side to build-up deep with the ball on the ground. The Argentinian is an advocate of a clean deep/short build-up. Despite high pressure at times, Leeds mostly found ways to bypass the opponent.
“Everything is much easier when the first progression of the ball is clean.” (Juan Manuel Lillo)
As already mentioned, against an opponent with one striker or three forwards (with one striker I refer to a 4–2–3–1 for example and with three forwards I refer to a 4–3–3 for instance), Leeds used the 4–1–4–1 structure in possession. But out of possession, opponents could also change to two forwards, for example the 4–2–3–1 often changes into a 4–4–2 out of possession. Therefore, Leeds didn’t always have an overload in the first line of the build-up.
There were three basic ways on how Leeds built-up and bypassed the pressure: through an overload, through their structure and through a dynamical advantage.
From goal kick, Leeds often wanted to have an overload. Mostly, they used their keeper (Meslier), to create a back three. As already mentioned, Meslier is great on the ball and can play progressive passes. That’s why he was so valuable for this Leeds side in the build-up.
The usage of the goalkeeper in the build-up can have many positive effects: First of all, it creates an 11v10 overload against the opponent, as the opposition’s keeper doesn’t press. Meaning one player is always free. Then, it’s the goal of the in-possession side, to find this free player. Secondly, the usage of the goalkeeper in the build-up often attracts pressure, as he’s normally the weakest player on the ball. That’s why a pass to the keeper is often a pressing trigger for the opposition. Leeds again and again purposefully played to their keeper, to attract pressure. This can be risky, but it has amazing benefits for the team in possession. As the keeper attracts pressure from the opponent, spaces in between the lines, or in behind can enlarge. Due to Meslier’s amazing passing qualities, he could often find players in these opened spaces.
At times, the overload in the first line happened naturally. For example, against 1 striker. This allowed the centre backs more time and space, to dribble and play high or line-breaking passes.
Their in-possession structure with the deep fullbacks also had some strategic benefits. Deep fullbacks are very effective against narrow pressing schemes. For example, against the one from Liverpool. The Reds use wingers, who press from out to in on the centre backs, trying to use their cover-shadow for the fullbacks. When the fullbacks stay deeper, the wingers have to press from a bigger angle, to keep the fullbacks in their cover-shadow. This leads to more time for the centre back on the ball, as the distance for the presser is longer. The ball-far fullback or other players can then be accessed more easily.
Great quote from MV from his article on deep fullbacks on spielverlagerung.com:
“This longer pressing line consequently gives the centre-back more time on the ball before being pressed, this of course gives them greater time to assess their options but also gives their teammates more time to find positions to offer as a passing option, including the full-back themselves.” (MV)
Sometimes, Leeds used one fullback even deeper, to create a temporary back three. However, not just to have an overload in the first line. Leeds often used Ayling as a deeper fullback to create an asymmetric back three. From there, especially after switches, he would have more time and space on the ball. Ayling was one of the main progressors for Leeds. From his deeper position, he often played long, down the lines passes to the wingers for a 1v1 wide or high passes into the near half-space to Bamford. The striker often moved over into the right half-space, to be used as a target man. In this zone is effective, as Bamford had more players to whom he could lay the ball off. This also allowed a better counterpressing, if the ball was lost, as there were more players and Leeds could use the side-line. Moreover, he simply moved into the half-space, as the distance for the ball to travel from Ayling is shorter.
Generally, Leeds built-up more often down the side. Ayling was one of the most important players, when he played as a fullback. From wide, Leeds had some of their major chance creation methods. Something I’ll touch on later.
Lastly, Phillips was also one of the key players for Leeds in the build-up. Bielsa wanted from his 6 to constantly move off-the-ball. This had a few positive effects for Leeds. Firstly, many teams used a player to man-mark him. Being in constant movement made it harder for the opponent to stay tight on Phillips. Therefore, the 6 could often move away from his marker and was free for a short period of time. He could then use his incredible passing range or simply switch the ball to the other side. Secondly, as Phillips was often marked, he could pull his opponent away and therefore open more space for his teammates. It was especially effective when the centre backs had the ball and Phillips moved away. The movement created space for the centre backs to dribble into. Furthermore, it also allowed them to find players higher up in more strategic zones more easily, as the centre was vacated. Advancing centre backs are generally very effective for the in-possession side, as the opponent often doesn’t know how to react. It also often forces an opponent, to leave his initial opponent free, to press the advancing centre back.
Moreover, the movement, which dragged Phillips’ marker away could also be used in another way. The movement often triggered an 8 to drop deep into the created space. This dynamical space occupation is very difficult to defend, as the 8s can start their runs earlier than their markers. This gave them either a short time frame, to play a one touch pass to another player, or it enabled them enough space to turn and play forwards. As the 8, as mentioned earlier, moved very high, they also created therefore more space for themselves to drop into. This was an automatism, Leeds used very often, and it was very effective.
Phillips could also move nearer to one centre back, to provide a better passing angle. For example, for a third man combination, to find the ball far centre back or fullback.
Other teams tried to use the cover-shadow, to make Phillips inaccessible. This was a difficult task, as he constantly tried to move out of the cover-shadow. Usually, directly after his opponent scanned back to him, he changed his direction, to get free and accessible. However, Leeds also used another way, to access him and make use of his amazing deep playmaking qualities. They often used a third man combination, to find the 6. When a centre back was on the ball and couldn’t play forwards, he usually played wide to the fullbacks. Then, the fullbacks, as already mentioned, could play long passes forward. Though, the fullbacks could also play inside to Phillips and access him behind the cover-shadow. Again, the deep position from the fullbacks allowed them more time and space on the ball, to find Phillips/the 6.
Just to make things clear, every player from Leeds, who played the 6 position was tasked to move constantly, but Phillips was the best of them and played most games there.
Moreover, the dropping 8s could also pass to Phillips if he was free (3rd man combination).
However, Leeds wasn’t afraid to go long or play more direct football at times. They could use Bamford as a target man in the centre. He is strong in the air and Leeds supported him very well that he could lay the ball off to someone. Furthermore, they also often played a high ball to a winger for a 1v1 duel wide.
Progress play and chance creation
As already mentioned a lot throughout this article, this Leeds side was basically based on dynamics and running. This was seen especially in their progress phase and final third chance creation methods. Various rotations, interchanges, decoy movements, quick combinations and so on helped Leeds to move further up and create scoring opportunities.
The heart of this Leeds side in attack were the 8s. They were in constant movement both to create space for themselves and for others. As seen on the structure chapter, Leeds used wide wingers, to stretch the opponent. This usually allowed the 8s more space to create and to exploit.
A movement, which Leeds’ 8s used a lot were vertical runs in the space between the opposition’s fullback and centre back. The wide wingers normally pinned the opposition’s fullbacks wide, and Bamford usually pinned the centre backs inside, opening spaces in between them. The 8s constantly tried to exploit these spaces with threatening vertical runs. Moreover, these runs were very effective, as the 8s tried to dynamically occupy this space. Meaning, they stayed in a higher position and then suddenly made a vertical run. This is very difficult to defend, as the 8 usually has a few metres advantage because he can start his run earlier than his opponent.
Generally, Leeds often used vertical runs/runs in behind. This had two major effects. Either the runner could receive in behind or it opened space in front of the runner. Most opponents react when a vertical run is made. That’s why Leeds often used it as a decoy movement, to open space in between the lines, as the run dragged opponents deep.
Back to the 8s. They normally looked to position themselves in between the lines, as it makes them harder to mark. Especially after switches, this position can be very effective. Usually, most oppositions don’t mark their opponent that tightly when they are positioned ball-far. Because ball-far players are less dangerous for the defensive side and more difficult to access. This therefore allowed the 8s to make runs on the blind-side of their markers.
The 8s usually positioned themselves asymmetrically when the ball was on one side. The ball-near 8 was in the half-space and the ball-far 8 in the centre, basically in a number 10 position. This had many positive effects for Leeds in possession. Firstly, it allowed for close distances and therefore a better access after the ball was lost. Secondly, it could create a temporary overload. Again, this allowed for a better counterpressing but also to find a free man and progress further up. Thirdly, the ball-far 8 often made use of the movements from the ball-near 8. For example, after the ball-near 8 made a vertical run, the ball-far 8 dropped into the opened space. Sometimes, the ball-far 8 moved even further over. He was often accessible/unmarked in between the lines, as already mentioned, normally opponents don’t mark ball-far players that tightly. This enabled the ball-far 8 to move over on the blind-side of his opponent. Additionally, the ball-far 8, who moved over could potentially pin a player and therefore open space for others.
At times, the 8s rotated horizontally. If executed well, it can be a great tool to break down man-orientations. Moreover, the 8s often made opposite movements to each other. This again is very effective against man orientations as it creates a dilemma for the defensive side. They have to decide between strictly following or handing over. However, if the movement is executed well, meaning it’s done as a surprise and with high speed, they can still be temporarily free, no matter how the opponent decides. This is because they can start their run earlier as their markers.
Something Leeds used at times was an 8 moving wide to the side-line. This is an unusual movement and creates a dilemma for the opponent. If the opponent follows the 8, space in the half-space opens. If the opponent doesn’t follow, the 8 can receive wide and create from there. Leeds often used this in combination with a horizontal rotation with the winger, meaning the 8 moved wide and the winger inverted.
Let’s now have a look on how Leeds looked to progress and create chances wide.
As mentioned earlier, when the fullback received the ball in the build-up, he had various possibilities to progress. However, there are other possibilities as well, I didn’t mention as I think they are more suitable in this chapter.
Often, when the fullback had the ball wide, the winger dropped deeper, to help the fullback. These dropping movements allowed Leeds to progress and/or get in behind. After the winger moved deeper, he normally pulled the opposition’s fullback with him. This enlarged the space between the opponent’s fullback and centre back even more, allowing the ball-near 8 more space to exploit. The fullback could either access the 8 directly or the 8 was accessible through the winger. At times, Bamford attacked this opened space.
Moreover, there was another way how Leeds attacked the opened space between fullback and centre back. When the fullback had the ball and the winger dropped deep, Leeds often performed a one-two. Meaning the fullback played to the winger, who directly played the ball back to the fullback, who made an underlap. This combination really was an automatism and regularly used.
One-two’s are very effective and difficult to defend, as it again creates a dilemma for the opponent. The focus of the opposition is temporarily split, as he can’t focus on both his opponent and the ball. Leeds also always performs these combinations with full speed. This is essential for a successful one-two.
Even though, the fullbacks normally stayed deeper in the build-up, they could also move higher at times. As just mentioned, through an underlap, but also through an overlap. If these movements are performed at high speed and with a great timing, they are as well very difficult to stop. They are also very effective, as the fullback can start his run earlier and therefore reach a higher speed than his opponent (dynamical superiority). As the fullbacks normally stayed deeper, it was also often surprising for the opponent when the fullback moved up.
The fullbacks regularly performed these over- or underlaps after a switch. Leeds often overloaded the ball-near side and then switched to the underloaded side. The fullbacks also weren’t tightly marked as they are less of a threat if they are positioned ball-far. Leeds regularly tried to exploit this fact (ball-far player less marked) with the 8 moving over as well, as mentioned earlier. As the wingers usually stayed wide, Leeds more often used underlaps from the fullbacks. However, overlaps weren’t uncommon as a surprising aspect. Especially against deeper opponents, the fullbacks overlapped more often.
Leeds generally used a ton of rotations and interchanges. These mostly occurred on the wing. Especially the wide triangle (consisting of fullback, winger and 8) was in constant movement. For example, if the fullback overlapped, the winger moved into the half-space and the 8 dropped deeper, to ensure safety. Another example would be, after an 8 moved wide to the side-line, the fullback underlapped, to attack the half-space.
Rotations are a very effective tool, to unsettle man-orientations. Again, Leeds did them with high speed and with surprise. Therefore, most opponents couldn’t handle them. Moreover, Leeds could also combine rotations with quick passing combinations.
Something they regularly used were 3rd man runs. This refers to the first player passing to a second player, to find a third player, who made an off-the-ball run. These are probably even more difficult to defend for the opponent. The focus of the defenders is on the first and second player, meaning the third player can receive with distance and a dynamical superiority.
Judah Davies brilliantly explains the effectiveness of 3rd man runs in this article on the potential of the blind side on spielverlagerung.com:
“With their focus on the ball carrier and the “2nd man” the 3rd man’s movements are not prioritised or prepared for. This means the 3rd man’s initial actions are out of the immediate perception of the defenders. This is particularly the case when one considers the processing limitations of the human brain.” (Judah Davies)
Two beautiful examples here:
Generally, Leeds often used up-back-through combinations. Especially with Bamford as a link player, who could drop deep a little bit. This is also a 3rd man combination.
Another chance creation method, Leeds commonly used, were the wingers wide in an isolated 1v1 situation. Harrison and Raphinha have an amazing dribbling quality and Leeds could therefore outplay a qualitative superiority on the wing.
Leeds could either directly pass to the wingers from the build-up, or after a switch. Their ball-near overload allowed them to find the ball-far winger in more space on the underloaded side.
In addition, the movements of the other players were also key, to help the winger. Runs in behind dragged defenders deeper, which allowed the wingers to move inside with the ball. These runs are basically decoy movements. However, if the pass was possible, the winger played to the runner. If not, he dribbled inside. Leeds therefore had somewhat of positional superiority. No matter if the opponent decided to follow the run or double up the winger, Leeds always had an advantage. If both, the pass or the dribble inside wasn’t possible, the winger could still play the ball back or inside.
From these 1v1s on the wing, but also from the other chance creation methods (for instance, the vertical runs from the 8s), Leeds could either get in behind and directly a shot on goal or a cross inside. The penalty box occupation was amazing and also like their other chance creation methods, it had something to do with dynamics. Leeds constantly tried to have a high number of players in the penalty area, who were in movement relating to each other. The movements could either create space for oneself or another player.
Moreover, Leeds had a high number of players around the penalty box as well. This ensured a successful counterpressing if the opponent won the ball. These situations are often very random, therefore having a solid number of players to counterpress is essential and very effective to create chances from second balls.
Leeds preferred to use low cutback crosses. A mechanism they often used with Bamford making a forward run, which usually pinned the opposition’s backline deep and then an 8 (often the ball-far) was the target for the cutback.
Generally, Bamford was very important for these crosses. His aerial threat forced the opponent to keep an eye on him, allowing him to make decoy movements to open spaces for his teammates. However, Bamford could also be the target due to his aforementioned aerial strength.
The last things I’d like to mention are individual off-the-ball movements to create space for oneself. Bielsa wanted his players to be in constant movement, either to create space for others or for oneself.
One way to free oneself from a marker were double movements. These are pretty basic, and most players use them. However, it’s really obvious when you watch this Leeds side that Bielsa wanted his players to do them even more often. A double movement basically refers to making a movement in one direction and then suddenly changing the direction. Ideally, the first movement drags the opponent in the faked direction. This creates a dynamical advantage as the opponent just moved in one direction and can’t change his direction that fast. If that’s done with high speed, it can be very effective.
Nevertheless, there are also other movements to lose your marker that Bielsa emphasises. You can find some of them on this beautiful pdf.
I really enjoyed Harrison’s quote on this topic and think it’s quite suitable:
“As a winger, I never thought about it before, but all the different movements that you can make to free yourself from your man that allow you to beat your man without even receiving the ball. So, you can receive the ball in better positions or have more time away from your man or create space for another teammate as well. These movements are so important for all the attacking players, and I never really done as much work as when I came here.” (Jack Harrison)
It’s obvious that Marcelo Bielsa enjoys the attacking phase of the game. His style of play to progress and create chances is unique and some of the mechanisms are highly unusual. However, I think that everyone can learn from this Leeds side in possession. They used so many different ways in the attacking play to progress, create space, create a free man, have a dynamical advantage and eventually create chances. It’s truly astonishing.
3–3–1–3
Against opponents with two strikers and/or with a back three, Leeds used a 3–3–1–3 in possession. Again, as it would match better out of possession. However, it also had advantages in possession. Leeds played six games with this formation in the 2020/21 season according to transfermarkt.com. As this wasn’t Leeds’ preferred structure, I’m only going to briefly touch on it.
First of all, the back three allowed Leeds most of the time an overload in the first line, as the opponents played mostly with two strikers, when Leeds used this structure. This enabled Leeds a clean build-up. The halfbacks could dribble with the ball as they had an overload and therefore a free man at times. However, it’s not just the overload in the first line that is so effective with the back three. It also allowed Leeds to have better passing angles, which made it easier to progress.
The diamond shape (1–2–1) in the build-up with the keeper could still be created within this structure, as the central defender moved higher up in the midfield, acting as the tip of the diamond. The initial 6 then also moved higher up.
Even though, the structure looks quite different on paper, there’s actually not that much difference compared to the 4–1–4–1. The basic movements and principles in possession remained the same. Such as runs in behind, rotations and the other dynamics as mentioned in the 4–1–4–1 section.
The 10 basically played the 8-role similar to the one in the 4–1–4–1. He could drop deep in the build-up, but also make these threatening vertical runs in the half-spaces. However, the 10 was more fluid in this formation and could move around freely.
Additionally, the wingbacks could also overlap or underlap. One-two’s with the wingers were also common.
Out of possession
Leeds used a strict man-marking high press out of possession. They tried to disturb the opponent’s build-up and win the ball as high as possible. Running also played a big role out of possession as the players were tasked to follow their man. Many teams feared their press. However, it was also their weakness.
To be concise, Bielsa didn’t use a man-marking all over the pitch. He always wanted to have a free centre back and therefore sacrificed an underload in the first line of pressure. To ensure this free man, Leeds had to adjust their defensive shape according to the opponent.
A back four was mostly used against teams with one striker/three forwards and/or a back four. Then, Leeds only pressed with Bamford up front, man-orientations all around, and an 2v1 overload against the striker. Their shape then could be for example a 4–2–3–1 or 4–1–4–1. In general, however, it’s difficult to name a formation with numbers as the players constantly moved according to their opponents.
The free centre back was very important for Leeds out of possession. He was basically something like an anchor. He could cover his centre back partner, double up opponents or intercept if needed. This gave Leeds stability in the last line, as the man-to-man system can be very risky and unusual holes can emerge. For example, if a forward dropped deep and pulled his marker with him.
Nevertheless, there were phases when Leeds used a rigid man-marking all over the pitch. Mostly, when they wanted to put the opponent under even more pressure. Often, a winger could press the centre back with the striker. Then, the other players also moved over and 1v1s all over the pitch occurred. Leeds either used it situationally or directly at the deep build-up from the opponent.
Another method Leeds used to put the opponent under more pressure but also to safe energy were hand overs. As the striker was underloaded in the first line, it was very tiring and difficult for him to put the opponent under sufficient pressure. Also, because the distances were very long. To deal with this problem, the ball-near 8 or the 10 (in a 4–2–3–1) could switch positions with the striker. The striker then marked the opponent’s midfielder and the 8 or 10 pressed the ball-near centre back.
Leeds used a back three against two strikers and/or a back three. This enabled a 3v2 overload in the last and therefore a free man. Additionally, it was easier to press the wingbacks against an opponent with a back three.
A suitable quote from the man himself:
My football, in defence, is very simple: We run all the time. I know that it’s easier to defend than create. To run, for example, is a decision of the will. To create you need an indispensable amount of talent.” (Marcelo Bielsa)
Lastly, as mentioned before, their defensive shape also was their biggest weakness. Many opponents found it easy to use the man-to-man system for their advantage. However, I’m not going to dive deep into the methods that teams used to beat Leeds, as that’s not the sake of this article.
I would recommend you to read this article on spielverlagerung.com. There you have all the various methods to beat man-orientations. Nevertheless, as a simple rule of thumb can be used that movement of players is more effective against man-orientations and movement of the ball is more effective against zonal-orientations.
Conclusion
This Leeds United side was enjoyable to watch, both for the fan and the tactician. Although, they didn’t win anything, Marcelo Bielsa’s team will still be remembered for their unique style of play. Not that bad either.
I hope I was able to give you a good insight into the tactics of the Leeds United from 2020/21. Feedback is appreciated in any form whatsoever.
If you want more content from myself or connect with me, my twitter account is the best place to go: @Chris17_t
