Basil II and his legacy: A study in the reign of the Bulgar-Slayer emperor
Basil II is generally considered to be one of the greatest Emperors of Byzantium and has been glorified as the Bulgar-Slayer for his military victories over the Bulgarians. In late nineteenth and early twentieth century Greece (which at the time was engaged in a rivalry with Bulgaria over the region of Macedonia) Basil II was viewed as a national hero. There is no doubt that he was a skillful general and strong ruler. Nevertheless, there has been some debate as to whether his legacy was good or bad in the long term for Byzantium and there has been some reassessment by some historians as to whether he had a role in the eleventh century decline of Byzantium.
Basil and Bulgaria
Although Basil wasn’t able to match his predecessor Ioannes Tzimiskes (969–976) in the rapidness of his conquests, he was a skilled commander and his more slow method of conquering Bulgaria allowed Byzantium to consolidate its control in the region until the end of the twelfth century. Basil was more than once leading in person his armies in offensives in Bulgaria (notable of this being his four years offensive, 991–994). Basil was also a skilled diplomat, something that aided him in his campaigns in 1001–1005, where control was achieved by securing the support of leading men in the region by awarding them lofty imperial titles. Dyrrachion was returned to Byzantine suzerainty by the leading family, the Chryselioi, in exchange for the granting of the title of patrikios. On 29 July 1014, Basil won a decisive victory in the Battle of Kleidion and four years later, he had finished his conquests.
There is however some dispute as to whether the conquest of Bulgaria was overall beneficial for the Empire; on the one hand, Bulgaria had traditionally been an opponent of the Empire in the Balkans and at times could be a dangerous rival. On the other hand, Bulgaria acted as a shield of shorts for the Empire, shielding it from nomadic tribes coming from the north. The results of the removing of this ‘shield’ can be seen by the nomadic invasions of Byzantium in the eleventh century (mainly of Pechenegs and later the Cumans). Bulgarians had not become reconciled with the idea of being Byzantine subjects and while there was no long-lasting resistance (and indeed during much of the twelfth century there was peace in that area), there were occasional Bulgarian rebellions (Uprising of Peter Delyan in 1040–1041, Uprising of Georgi Voyteh in 1071 and the successful Uprising of Asen and Peter in 1185–1204 that established the Second Bulgarian Empire).
Overall, the annexation of Bulgaria solved the problem of having another major state in the Balkans and restored Byzantine frontiers to the Danube but in doing so it brought Byzantium into direct contact and conflict with the northern nomadic peoples. At the same time, while Bulgaria was pacified, its inhabitants had not fully accepted the idea of Byzantine domination and would revolt at times of weakness.
Basil and the Anatolian Aristocrats
Basil’s putting down of the revolts of Anatolian aristocrats is another achievement that was traditionally viewed as positive but now its effects and legacy are more debatable. In 987, the two greatest military families of Anatolia, the Sclerus and Phocas, united in revolt against him. Most of the military forces in the East (the best soldiers of Byzantium) had their back. Basil was forced to ask the Russians for aid and they agreed to send him 6,000 Varangian mercenaries in exchange for the hand of Princess Anna (Basil’s sister). She would marry Prince Vladimir, who accepted that he would be baptized. This was very prestigious as it symbolized imperial power and connection with the rulers of the Roman Empire; it has to be remembered that the German (‘Holy Roman’) Emperor Otto II had to be content with a Byzantine princess that did not belong to the Macedonian House. The arrival of the Russians turned the tide of the war and on 13 April 989 near Abydos the rebels were decisively defeated. Afterwards, Basil took measures against the aristocratic families of Anatolia. He expanded legislation that protected smallholder peasants from the great families. He also forced magnates to pay for the arrears owed by peasants.
His anti-aristocratic policies had both positive and negative results. On the one hand, he strengthened the control of the central government and the Imperial House over the military aristocrats of Anatolia and ended a period of military leaders claiming the throne. He also protected the peasants and their property. On the other hand, it were exactly those Anatolian aristocrats that had defended Anatolia from the Arabs and had extended the borders of the Empire. With their military traditions (that passed on from older to younger generations — something important in a society that did not have military academies that modern states have), their connection with the peoples of their areas and their interest in defending their lands from raids and later in expanding Byzantine lands in order to gain riches and glory, they were the backbone of the Byzantine military machine. They also provided military emperors (such as Nikephoros Phocas and Ioannes Tzimiskes) that could sideline weak rulers and provide strong rule when the empire needed it. When the Turkic tribesmen invaded Anatolia, those aristocratic families weren’t there anymore to face them and the central administration had less connection with the peoples of Anatolia.
Overall, Basil strengthened central rule and put down challengers from the aristocratic families of Anatolia but whether this had an overall positive or negative legacy is debated as in many ways those aristocratic families had played a major role in the defense and expansion of imperial frontiers in the East. Their weakening may have weakened the defense of Anatolia.
It should be noted that Basil’s attempt to suppress opposition to his rule through the means of agrarian legislation had the added result of (deliberately) slowing down economic and social change. He sought to build a free peasants society with a simple agrarian (and rather primitive) economy because he considered that this would provide strong foundations for the imperial government. He wanted the economy and society to be organized in such a way that they would support the imperial war effort and thus he felt that they needed to be under rigid imperial control. In the early era (seventh to ninth centuries) of the Middle Byzantine period, the money economy was mostly a matter of recycling as there were no great urban centers (with the exception of Constantinople and Thessaloniki) and the peasantry paid the bulk of taxation which in turn was siphoned to the capital and was redistributed to state employees. Market forces had little impact on the economy. At the end of the eighth century, the appearance of large aristocratic families who based their local power to the themes’ (provinces) military organization and the gradual stabilization of frontiers meant that more disposable wealth was maintained in the provinces. The balance in the economy began to shift towards the market and this led to both urban growth and the investment of rich families in peasant property, thus building up retinues and clients. This began worrying the Emperors who took measures to protect peasant property from the aristocrats. Basil’s agrarian laws may be seen as part of this attempt by the imperial center to slow down the economic and social changes, although he was far more determined and harsh in his attempt to crush the Anatolian aristocracy.
By the time of his death, Basil II had accumulated 200,000 talents of gold. This was the greatest treasury reserve in Byzantium since the reign of the sixth century Emperor Anastasius, a time when Byzantium still held the rich provinces of Syria and Egypt. Michael Angold (in his book The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204) estimated that Basil’s treasury would be worth 128 billion dollars. His fiscal harshness, however, caused much displeasure, as expected, especially among the aristocracy.
Basil and the East — Fatimids and Armenia
Basil II also had much military success in the East, where he also expanded the frontiers of the Empire. In April 995, responding to a Fatimid invasion of Byzantine holdings in Syria that led to the death of the Doux (Duke) Bourtzes, Basil led an army into Syria, causing the Muslims to retreat. Although the Byzantine siege of Tripoli was unsuccessful, they were able to occupy Tartus. In October 999, Basil again campaigns in the region. His forces raided as far as Baalbek and placed a garrison at Shaiza. In 1000, he signed a ten-years truce with the Fatimids. Overall, Basil was successful in his dealings with the Fatimid Caliphate.
His dealings with Armenia on the other hand, while equally successful in terms of conquest, had mixed results. Basil was successful in dealing with King George of Georgia and emerged victorious in his wars (1021–1022, although the initial conflict had started in 1016) against him. The Varangian Guard played an important role in securing those victories. The result was the annexation of five Armenian dominions. This was somewhat of a reverse of Byzantine policy of having client states acting as buffers in the frontiers.
On the one hand, this success meant that Byzantine influence in Armenia was at its strongest in more than 500 years. On the other hand, it also meant the incorporation of a population that had not accepted the results of the Council of Chalkedon (451) and was thus viewed by the Byzantines as ‘heretical’. Basil tried to avoid conflict by not attempting to impose Orthodoxy on the Armenians but this aroused the suspicion of the Church. Later dogmatic conflicts would weaken the Empire as the Armenian territories were situated in the Empire’s frontiers and were the first to face Turkic raids. Byzantine attempts to impose Orthodoxy led some Armenians to openly subvert the Empire at a time when it faced the Turkish danger.
Overall, Basil was militarily successful, scoring military victories against both Fatimids and Georgians and expanding the lands of the Empire. On the other hand, the annexation of Armenian lands caused friction between the Orthodox Byzantine center and the Armenians who upheld Miaphysitism and thus weakened the defense of the frontiers. While this cannot be wholly blamed on Basil who followed a policy of tolerance, it did mean that his legacy was mixed.
Conclusion
Basil II was one of the greatest Emperors of Byzantium. He was a strong (even autocratic) ruler with an iron will. He was also a successful military commander and skilled diplomat. He was able to crush down revolts of the aristocracy, strengthen the central government and managed to establish Byzantine control over Bulgaria and much of Armenia. Last but not least, he left to his successors a full treasury. On the other hand, he also handed over problems to his successors, including how to deal with the conquered Bulgarians and Armenians as well with the nomads north of the Danube. His measures against the Anatolian aristocracy may have weakened the defense of Anatolia during a period that would witness the invasion of Turkic tribes. He also slowed down economic and social change and his harsh fiscal policies produced bitterness that would have to be dealt by his successors. As he had not married and showed little interest in his succession, his successors (brother and his niece’s husbands) proved to be less than able at a time when the centralization of authority demanded strong leadership.
One cannot but be amazed by this warrior-emperor who expanded imperial borders and terrified the empire’s enemies while emerging as an absolute autocrat. The story of his blinding of 15,000 defeated Bulgarian soldiers after his victory at Kleidion is the epitome of his military prowess and terrible vengeance. Nevertheless, even the most skillful of rulers can unwittingly make decisions that have unforeseen consequences. Basil wasn’t wholly (or even mainly) responsible for the crisis of Byzantium in the eleventh century but many of the policies which he pursued left a mixed legacy to his successors and bequeathed problems which they proved unable to deal with.
